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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines aspects of government expenditure and inter- 
vention the UK. The first five chapters focus on different aspects of 
government expenditure. The last three concern other aspects of gov- 
ernment intervention. Chapter 1, which also examines six other 
developed nations: France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the USA, is concerned with the growth of government expenditure 
since World War Two. Chapter 2 examines the current expenditure of 
local government., and develops and estimates a model of local authority 
current expenditure change. Chapter 3 examines central government's 
motives and record in controlling local government capital expendi- 
tore. Sub-branches of the local authority current expenditure and 
capital expenditure budget are considered in Chapters 4 and 5 which 
examine the education branch of current expenditure and the housing 
branch of capital expenditure. The last three chapters of the thesis 
look at aspects of government intervention in the private sector. 
Chapter 6 concerns government intervention in the aerospace industry 
and its effect on profits in the industry. Chapter 7 concerns the 
government's payment of grants to schools in the private sector under 
the Direct Grant system abolished in 1976 (but currently relevant to 
Government education policy proposals) and estimates cost curves for 
these schools. Lastly Chapter 8 concerns tax expenditures the govern- 
ment makes on owner-occupiers. Alternative definitions of the subsidy 
to owner-occupiers, arising from viewing the house as an investment 
good or alternatively as a consumption good are explored and some 
estimates of subsidy under these definitions are made. 
-viii- 
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INTRODUCTION 
The overall theme of this thesis is the intervention of government in 
the economy. It is based on papers written over a number of years, 
examining government expenditure and intervention. The rapid growth 
in government expenditure and intervention in the economy is one of 
the more striking economic facts of the century(1) In the UK, govern- 
ment expenditure has grown from about 404 of national income in the 
1950s to about 60Z of national income in the 1980s. (2) 
There are a number of ways the government can act in an economic 
context. It can exchange money for goods and services. It can make 
transfer payments with no goods or services passing in the opposite 
direction. It can pass regulations that affect the actions of econom- 
is agents, and it can pay subsidies and levy taxes. 
Philosophically more troublesome perhaps, a government can be seen 
to "act" by failing to tax. This yields the concept of a tax expendi- 
ture, which is said to be incurred when the government fails to apply 
taxation consistently. The thesis examines examples of all the above 
modes of government action. 
(1) See for example Head (1974, p vii): "The vast extent and growth 
of the public sector have been perhaps the most important fiscal 
phenomena of the post-war period. ", or Tullock (1980, p xv): "The 
growth of the government sector in almost all western countries is 
one of the most conspicuous phenomena of the present day. " 
(2) See Table 7, Chapter 1, p. 13, below. 
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PLAN OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 investigates the growth of general government expenditure 
on transfers and in return for goods and services in developed 
nations. In Chapter 2 attention is turned to local government expen- 
diture in England, and an expenditure change model for the current 
expenditure of English local government is developed and estimated. 
Chapter 3 considers the control by central government of the capital 
expenditure of local government. 
Next, two branches of the local authority budget, education and 
housing, are examined in detail. In Chapter 4a model of local 
authority education expenditure change is developed, based on the mod- 
el of total local authority expenditure change set out earlier in 
Chapter 2, and in Chapter 5a study of the determinants of local 
authority housing investment is carried out. 
Chapters b, 7 and 8 are concerned with aspects of government inter- 
vention in private market activity. In Chapter 6, government attempts 
to regulate the profits of the aerospace industry are examined. 
Chapter 7 looks at the cost structure of the former Direct Grant 
schools, which received a direct grant from the government for each 
pupil on the school roll. Chapter 8 examines government intervention 
in the housing market in the form of the tax expenditures it makes in 
the owner-occupied housing sector. Lastly, Chapter 9 sets out the 
Conclusions. 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The unifying theoretical standpoint that is to be distinguished in 
these chapters is a Public Choice approach. Essentially the 
approach of the public choice school is to apply the methods of eco- 
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nomics to the analysis of government. (1) Before the rise of public 
choice theory, the positive theory of government action was a compara- 
tively unexplored area for economics. Economists' energies were 
largely absorbed by the tasks of coming to an understanding of the 
market for goods and identifying and analysing situations in which it 
was expected to "fail". Economists' prescriptions for the market 
failures they identified were added as something of an afterthought, 
along the lines that the government should step in and "correct" them. 
Implicit in such policy prescriptions is a view of the government as a 
disinterested agent of the public good, able and willing to correct 
sub-optimal market outcomes. 
Although doubts had been raised early on over the government's 
suitability for this idealised role - for example Wicksell writing in 
1896: 
Even the most recent manuals on the science of public finance 
frequently leave the impression, at least upon me, of some sort 
of philosophy of enlightened and benevolent despotism(2) 
or, again, Henry Sidgwick, writing in 1887: 
It does not follow that whenever laisser faire falls short 
government interference is expedient; since the inevitable 
drawbacks of the latter may, in any particular case, be worse 
than the shortcomings of private enterprise(3) 
(1) The Public Choice Society began as a group called the Committee 
for non-Market Decision Making at the University of Virginia, 
co-founded by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock and attended by 
John Rawls, James Coleman, Duncan Black, William Riker, Roland 
McKean and Vincent Ostrom (See Tollison, 1984) In later years the 
school's main embodiment was the Center for Study of Public Choice 
at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and later at George Mason 
University. 
(2) See Wicksell (1896), p. 82 
(3) See Sidgwick (1887, p. 414), quoted in Wolf (1988) 
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it is only comparatively recently that this more realistic view of 
the government's role: "politics without romance"(1) has informed 
analysis of government behaviour. Public choice has shown that the 
government as "benevolent despot" is not an alternative to be set 
against market failure. Market failure is therefore joined by the 
concept of government failure as deserving of economists' attention. 
The insights of public choice theory have been gained by the applica- 
tion of the same utility maximisation calculus to the public sector 
that economists have applied to the private sector. The standpoint is 
one of individual utility maximisation, and public choice theorists 
assume that the utility functions that those in government seek to 
maximise are essentially no different from the utility functions of 
other individuals. Thus, it is argued, individuals who move from the 
private to the public sector are not radically altered by the process, 
but retain the largely self interested behaviour that has been assumed 
to drive economic actors since Adam Smith. Government action is 
explained in terms of rational choice based on the desire of voters, 
bureaucrats and politicians to maximise utility. 
SUMMARY AND REVIEW 
This section summarises the findings of the thesis. However, it is 
important to note that much of the work of this thesis is based upon 
papers published some time ago. The paper that Chapter 5 is based on, 
for instance, was published in 1975. Over such a time span the ideas 
of the author and of economics generally have changed. Although some 
revisions and re-writing of these papers has been carried out, in many 
(1) See Buchanan (1979) 
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cases this is relatively minor, and a complete re-writing has not been 
attempted. In some chapters the data on which the original computa- 
tions had been performed are no longer available. (1) For the same 
reason, the extent to which a public choice standpoint is apparent 
varies greatly from chapter to chapter. In addition to providing a 
summary therefore, this section will seek to emphasise the public 
choice elements of the thesis and to provide a review of the work set 
out in the older chapters. 
The main concern of Chapter 1 is the growth of government expendi- 
ture. The pattern of government expenditure growth since the Second 
World War is examined in seven developed nations: France, Germany, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA and a 
statistical picture of the growth of government in these countries is 
presented. This builds on the work of Warren Nutter, who monitored 
the growth of government in an earlier etudy, (2) tabulating government 
expenditure from 1950 to 1972. Nutter's tabulations are extended for- 
wards another ten years to 1982, using data constructed from OECD 
(1984). 
Analysis of these statistics shows that Government expenditure has 
grown both as a percentage of the national income, and at an 
increasing rate over time. Government expenditure can be divided into 
expenditure on transfers and expenditure on goods and services. The 
proportion of transfers in this total of expenditure is found to have 
been increasing, as has public employment in the countries studied 
(1) The local authorities used in the data set for Chapter 5 no longer 
exist, for instance. 
(2) Nutter (1978) 
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except the United States(1) 
Across the sample of nations there is a considerable difference in 
the ratio of government expenditure to national income. In 1982, for 
example, it ranges from 42-% in Japan to 87 % in Sweden. An explana- 
tion for this is found to be the political orientation of the country; 
right-wing orientation being associated with lower levels of govern- 
ment activity, though this leaves the political orientation itself to 
be explained. 
The second part of Chapter 1 examines theories of the growth of 
government. Starting with Wagner's Law, (2) a great number of theoret- 
ical explanations of government expenditure growth have been proposed. 
Amongst the theories discussed are Peacock and Wiseman's "Displacement 
Effect", Baumol's Disease, Parkinson's Disease (as set out by 
Niskanen), Tullock's "Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy" and Meltzer 
and Richard's and Peltzman's median voter models, as well as 
rent-seeking models and interest group theories. 
Many of these theories have been developed by the public choice 
school of analysis. Thus Niskanen's bureaucratic maximisation hypoth- 
esis is based upon the assumption that a bureaucrat derives utility 
from the size of his bureau, and uses an assumed monopoly of informa- 
tion as a tool in achieving a size-maximisation objective. Tullock's 
Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy suggests that bureaucrats vote for 
larger bureaus, and that this effect is likely to snowball. In 
Meltzer and Richard's model, the median voter in an expanding fran- 
chice, and in Peltzman's model a coalition for a "politically domi- 
(1) However see Bennett and Johnson (1980, p54) 
(2) Wagner (1883), translated in Musgrave and Peacock (1958) 
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nant" policy, will vote for increased government activity of a 
redistributive nature. 
The theories discussed in Chapter 1 suggest reasons why the public 
sector may be too large, but are less successful in explaining the 
continuous increase in the share of public expenditure in National 
Income observed this century. An unresolved issue is whether movement 
is still proceeding slowly to a high equilibrium level of public 
expenditure, or whether nations are already at an equilibrium. 
Furthermore there has been little success, as yet, in discriminat- 
ing between these competing theories empirically. The position has 
been summed up by Peacock as follows: 
At the moment the debate on the size of the public sector rath- 
er resembles a Turkish wrestling match in which all the contes- 
tants battle with one another until one is left the winner, but 
with the crucial difference that every contestant claims victo- 
ry. (1) 
In common with other surveys of the growth of government literature, 
this chapter does not succeed in isolating the winning theory, or com- 
bination of theories, to explain the statistical facts. Progress in 
this field awaits improved statistical data to enable a more searching 
examination of competing hypotheses. 
One theory of the growth of government that has attracted much 
empirical work is Peacock and Wiseman's Displacement Effect. Appendix 
I to Chapter 1 is concerned with the econometrics of testing for the 
Displacement Effect and Appendix II suggests a testing procedure that 
has proved to be quite important and has stimulated a number of tech- 
nical investigations (see footnote 1 on page xvii). The purpose of 
(1) Peacock (1983, p. 2) 
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Appendix l(l) is to demonstrate an econometric error in Diamond 
(1976/77). Diamond argued that, when testing for the Displacement 
Effect using ordinary least squares regression analysis, equality of 
the error variances before and after the displacement must not be 
assumed as part of the null hypothesis. His view rules out the Chow 
test which does assume equality of error variance. However, as it 
turns out, it is in fact the standard Chow test that Diamond applied 
in practice, although he was not aware of it. (2) 
In Appendix i, Diamond's data are therefore re-tested using a 
Jayatissa (1977) test which does not constrain error variances to 
equality. (3) This work stimulated the investigation of a number of 
technical questions concerned with the testing of change of structure. 
The resulting study appears as Appendix II(4) which discusses the 
(1) This Appendix is based on Watt, 1978. 
(2) This can be explained as follows. Because Diamond uses separate 
regressions rather than a number of dummy variables within a sin- 
gle regression to perform the estimations for his test, he 
believes that the error variances will not be constrained to be 
equal in the pre- and post-displacement regressions. Whilst this 
is true in the estimations he performs, the distribution of the 
Chow statistic he uses to test for the displacement effect is 
obtained under an assumption in the null of equal error variance 
in the two populations (pre- and post-displacement) so his own 
empirical work suffers from the same assumption of equality of 
error variance for which he criticises others. 
(3) Of the two of Diamond's tests which were re-run (a third was not 
re-run because equality of error variance was not rejected in a 
pre-test), the null was not rejected in Diamond's tests in the 
first, but very strongly rejected in the second. Essentially the 
effect of re-running the tests using Jayatissa's statistic is to 
reduce the power of the testing procedure and this reduction in 
power makes the null more likely to be accepted. Thus when the 
tests were re-run, Diamond's first test result - acceptance of the 
null - was strengthened, whereas his second result was unaltered 
because the reduction in power was not enough to counteract 
Diamond's finding of a strong rejection of the null. 
(4) Appendix II is partly based on Watt (1979). 
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whole subject of testing for change of structure in some depth -a 
subject that also of relevance to Appendix I of Chapter 5. The paper 
it is based on (Watt, 1979), suggested an asymptotic Wald test for 
change of structure. This test has been widely cited(l) and the terms 
empirical power and empirical size introduced by the paper have 
been adopted in later discussion. (2) 
The concern of Chapters 2,3,4 and 5 is local government expendi- 
tune, a major component of general government expenditure, forming 
more than a quarter of the public expenditure planning total. The 
chapters deal with different aspects of local government expenditure. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with current expenditure, which forms over 
75'/ of the total. The chapter begins with an examination of the over- 
all pattern of local government expenditure over recent years. The 
picture is one of cuts in housing expenditure and increases in expen- 
diture on social security and law and order. Another feature that 
emerges is a tendency for the government to propose large cuts in 
local authority expenditure in White Papers that are not realised in 
subsequent budgets. One reason for this is that, with the exception 
of rate-capped authorities, central government has no direct powers of 
control over local authority spending. It does however have a power- 
ful indirect influence over local government spending in its ability 
to determine the parameters of the block grant system. 
It seems likely that one of the reasons for the divergence between 
(1) See Buse (1981), Dufour (1982), Honda (1982), Erlat (1984), Ohtani 
(1985), Ohtani and Toyoda (1985a), Ohtani and Toyoda (1985b) 
Pesaran, Smith and Yeo (1985), Honda (1986), Toyoda (1986), 
Patterson (1986), Ohtani (1986), Kobayashi (1986) 
(2) See Honda (1982), Ohtani and Toyoda (1985a), Toyoda and Ohtani 
(1986), Ohtani (1986) 
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plans and outturns for local government expenditure in the White 
Papers is a lack of understanding of the linkages between block grant 
changes and the changes these may induce in local government expendi- 
ture. The major purpose of Chapter 2 is therefore to explore the 
nature of such relationships with the aid of a model of local authori- 
ty expenditure determination that includes reference to the features 
of the block grant system. (1) The chapter reviews existing expendi- 
tune determination models before turning to analyse in detail the bud- 
get constraint inherent in the block grant system. 
The chapter's method reflects a public choice approach of examining 
the constraints and incentives that public decision-makers face. It 
is suggested that differences between authorities in how tightly their 
decision-makers are constrained by the financial circumstances of the 
authority will affect their expenditure decision-making. 
How can these different feelings of financial constraint be related 
to some operationally meaningful measure of financial constraint? The 
measure developed in Chapter 2 is called fiscal pressure (Gibson) 
Smith and Watt, 1987). The fiscal pressure measure answers the ques- 
tion: "what are the rate increases for each authority implied by some 
equal level of increase in expenditure for every authority? " Fiscal 
pressure is measured by these rate increases. The hypothesis is that 
the higher the fiscal pressure, the more reluctant will be the 
decision-makers of an authority to increase expenditure. (2) 
(1) The model is a development of that set out in Gibson and Watt 
(1987a) 
(2) Suppose this hypothesised expenditure increase is set at three per 
cent. The fiscal pressure measure may be one per cent for author- 
ity a, seven per cent for authority b and ten per cent for author- 
ity c. These three different percentages are the rate rises that 
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In practice the local authority budget constraint is a far more 
complicated construction than can be expressed by this simple approxi- 
mate measure, and the most recent research in expenditure modelling 
has been able to take its full form explicitly into account. (1) How- 
ever, the fiscal pressure approximations used in Chapter 2 are found 
to work quite well in the expenditure change models estimated. 
A section of the chapter is devoted to reviewing existing local 
government expenditure models before a cross-section model of 
year-on-year expenditure change is developed. Expenditure change 
rather than the level of expenditure is modelled because it is 
expenditure change that has been the major policy interest for central 
government. In the empirical results of the expenditure modelling, a 
firmly established negative link is found between expenditure 
increases and fiscal pressure. As overall fiscal pressure can be 
determined by adjustment of the parameters of the grant system, the 
results of this chapter have implications for the control of local 
authority current expenditure by central government. 
Since this chapter was written the government has announced its 
intention to replace the present system of local rating with a poll 
tax. (2) A public choice analysis of this policy suggests that the 
introduction of this tax is likely to be a very unpopular measure 
local politicians would have to impose on local ratepayers for the 
same three per cent increase, in expenditure. The hypothesis is 
that ceteris paribus the decision-makers of authority c will 
feel more reluctant to increase expenditure than the 
decisaion-makers of authority a, and fiscal pressure will express 
this. 
(1) See Barnett et al. (1988) and Moffit (1986) 
(2) Department of the Environment (1986) 
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because of its redistributive impact. (1) 
In public choice theory the redistributive effects of a prospective 
item of legislation are of vital importance to its success or failure 
in the political marketplace. Karl Brunner (1978) argues that 
The essence of politics is redistribution and political con- flicts center on matters of redistribution. 
The political success of redistributive policies is strongly connected 
with interest group support. (2) 
The introduction of the poll tax will have redistributive effects 
and hence the change will create gainers and losers. Gainers and los- 
ers thus form potential members of interest groups with diametrically 
opposed objectives. Which interest group prevails partly depends upon 
which interest group is the stronger, and this in turn depends upon 
whether the gainers or the losers have the better combination of char- 
acteristics favourable to success as an interest group. In forming a 
viable interest group, several factors are important. Firstly, other 
potential members should be clearly identifiable, secondly the larger 
and more easily predictable the potential gains to the group the bet- 
ter, thirdly it is helpful if the self-interest of potential members 
is not too transparent and can be concealed effectively by a convinc- 
ing "cover story", and fourthly it helps if gains are not too thinly 
diffused over very large numbers but concentrated over smaller 
numbers, (3) 
(1) See Watt (1986) 
(2) See for example Tollison (1982) 
(3) As an illustration consider recent privatisations. The 
privatisation of public sector monopolies without introducing com- 
petition has been judged a political success. One way that this 
can be interpreted is to say that the gainers are a more success- 
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How then does the introduction of the poll tax look when analysed 
in this way? First of all, both the gainers and the losers are fairly 
clearly established. Other things being equal, the gainers will be 
those in small households in houses with a high rateable value and in 
authorities that are low spenders and the losers will be those in 
large households in houses with a low rateable value and in 
authorities that are high spenders. At first sight it appears that 
both the gainers and the losers show rather equal interest group 
forming potential. 
Which group then is likely to succeed? Poll tax is already on the 
statute books. However this is not likely to be the end of the story. 
In all recent Rate Support Grant Settlements one principle that has 
thrived strongly in the political arena is that of using safety nets 
to limit the magnitude of gains or losses in year-on-year change. The 
explanation of this, it is argued, is that gains and losses in this 
context create an asymmetrical effect where great political strife is 
generated by the losers, whilst little is heard from the gainers.. 
Accordingly, the greater the gains and losses the greater the politi- 
cal strife. The continuing story of political strife under the block 
grant is likely to be far from over with the introduction of poll tax. 
ful interest group than the losers. The gainers have been those 
members of the public who have chosen to buy shares at the low 
offer price, and probably the employees of the privatised 
concerns. This forms a fairly concentrated potential interest 
group in comparison with the losers. The losses are incurred by 
everyone else and the size of loss to each individual is low 
because of the numbers involved. Moreover the losses, springing 
from absence of competition, with its effects on reducing prices 
and stimulating innovation, and from the reductions in taxation 
that could have been financed by a higher offer price, are not 
readily identifiable and much more easily disputed than the over- 
night capital gains to share buyers. 
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Much of the interest in the properties of the grant system analysed 
in Chapter 2 arises from its relevance to the Government's desire to 
control local authority cut rent G., p ýý turA7 Hný,, per. supposing 
this problem were solved the question of controlling capital expen- 
diture would remain. 
If central government successfully controlled local authority 
current expenditure, this would still leave out of account the whole 
of local authority capital expenditure. The control of local 
authority capital expenditure is the subject of Chapter 3, which is 
based in part on Watt (1982). The chapter takes a public choice 
approach to the question of why the government might want to control 
local government capital expenditure. 
Why central government should wish to control local government 
expenditure can be explained by public choice theory. As the question 
is relevant to both Chaptr 2 and 3 it is worth summarising here. It 
may be asked why individuals who vote in local elections da not vote 
directly for the local expenditure control policies that they appear 
to vote for in general elections. 
distributions of costs and votes. 
The answer lies in the different 
It is argued that central 
government's desire to control local government capital expenditure 
derives fundamentally from issues of accountability. 
The idea of accountability is well summed up by the expression "He 
who pays the piper calls the tune". If local ratepayers entirely paid 
for local government expenditure, then, it might reasonably be argued, 
it would be entirely a matter for them how much expenditure their 
local authority incurred each year. Currently, however, much of local 
expenditure is paid for from central grants, and more than half of 
rate income comes from business and commercial rates which do not con- 
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fer voting rights. (1) Hence these otherwise disenfranchised taxpayers 
are likely to seek influence through central government elections. Of 
course, central taxes are paid by individuals, and individuals will in 
general live in some local authority area. Hence the total of local 
expenditure will be paid for by the total of the local electorate. 
However, if one local authority expands its expenditure, the finance 
will be largely spread across all authorities and the cost will not be 
fed back to these particular local voters. (2) 
Analytically the most satisfactory solution would be to revise 
the institutional framework to make the lines of accountability more 
direct, and this rationale has been advanced for the introduction of 
the poll tax. (3) However, for capital expenditure, the form of the 
present institutional framework serves to explain why central govern- 
ment should wish to exercise control. 
Although central government is, on this analysis, seen to have a 
motive to control local government capital expenditure in total, it is 
not clear why it should wish to examine the content of these plans in 
any great detail. The capital expenditure plans of local authorities 
are, however, examined in detail by civil servants, and, it is argued 
in Chapter 3 that a bureau maximisation motive on the part of civil 
servants is the explanation. 
Chapter 3 also contends that the control of capital expenditure as 
exercised has been destabilising in the sense argued by Friedman 
(1) See the discussion in Paying for Local Government (1986, pp. 5-7) 
(2) "Restraint in expenditure" can be seen as a public good subject to 
free-riding. 
(3) Department of the Environment, 1986 
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(1953) p 145) for monetary policy. 
Since Chapter 3 was written, the Government has published a consul- 
tation paper on the control of capital expenditure(l) It confirms the 
view advanced in Chapter 3(2) that capital expenditure "is not strict- 
ly being controlled", stating that 
[The current system of capital expenditure control] has failed 
to bring about net capital expenditure consistent with the 
Government's public expenditure plans (DOE 1988, p7) 
The consultation paper also refers to the problem of the "cascade" 
described in Chapter 3 whereby capital receipts may eventually all be 
spent on future capital projects. The government only allows a pro- 
portion of capital receipts to be spent, but the unspent part can be 
carried forward and a proportion of this spent in the next year, and 
so on in a cascade until all is spent. Spending of capital receipts 
was originally allowed as an incentive to asset disposal. However, 
until receipts are spent, net capital expenditure is reduced. 
Chapter 3 suggests that, the government would like very little of the 
receipts spent, but find= difficulty in reconciling this with the need 
to provide an incentive for asset sales to generate the same capital 
receipts. This suggestion finds endorsement in the language of the 
consultation paper. 
In deciding what allowances should be made [for spending of 
receipts] the Secretary of State will wish to strike an appro- 
priate balance between the efficient distribution of spending 
power and the incentive to dispose of assets. (DOE 1988) p22) 
The next two chapters of the thesis move to examine two branches of 
the local government expenditure budget. Chapter 4 examines local 
(1) Department of the Environment, 1988. 
(2) See page 153, and Table 1, page 152. 
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authority education expenditure -a branch of the revenue budget, and 
Chapter 5 examines local authority housing expenditure -a branch of 
the capital expenditure budget. 
Chapter 4, based on Gibson and Watt (1987), applies the expenditure 
model developed in Chapter 2 to explain year-on-year changes in a 
local authority's revenue expenditure, to modelling local authority 
education expenditure. Here the same fiscal pressure variables used 
in modelling changes in total current expenditure in Chapter 2 are 
used to explain changes in education expenditure. Whilst the model is 
very similar to the model estimated in Chapter 2, a new variable, 
ALIGN, is introduced. This variable measures for each authority the 
change to the education budget that would move the education budget's 
share of the total budget into line with education GRE's share of 
total GRE. (1) When these are out of line the disparity can be made 
use of in inter-bureau budget-making debate. Empirical estimation of 
the model shows the effect of ALIGN to be well established, with 
authorities on average adjusting their budgets to remove one third of 
the divergence each year. 
Chapter 5 examines capital expenditure on housing by the four types 
of pre-reorganisation local authorities engaged in housing investment: 
County Boroughs, Non-County Boroughs, Urban District Councils and 
Rural District Councils. In this work the determination of local 
authority housing investment was assumed to be analogous to investment 
(1) GREs, short for Grant-Related Expenditure Assessments, are levels 
of expenditure that each authority is considered to "need" to 
spend for the purposes of grant calculation. Clearly the concept 
of GREs begs many questions, and the calculation of GREs - an 
annual process - gives rise to much debate and dispute between 
central government and the local authority associations every 
year. 
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determination in the private sector, occurrring at equilibrium between 
the Social Marginal Efficiency of Investment, and the Social Marginal 
Cost of Funds. 
Because the rate of interest charged to local authorities, who then 
borrowed from the Public Works Loans Board, was the same for all, the 
simultaneous equation model of housing investment and interest rate 
determination could not be identified and therefore the results were 
restricted to an estimation of the reduced form coefficients. 
The model does not take account of the private sector housing mar- 
ket, although in practice there is likely to be significant interac- 
tion between the private and public sector markets. However, in the 
situation where below equilibrium rents are charged for local authori- 
ty housing, with quantity rationing, the effects are more likely to 
flow from the local authority housing market to the private market 
rather than vice versa. The study finds the most important deter- 
minants of housing investment to be a variable called IMPETUS, 
measuring recent pre-sample period additions to the housing stock as a 
percentage of each authority's post-war housing investment, and vari- 
ables indicating the condition of the housing stock - the percentage 
of houses declared unfit for instance, and the percentage of house- 
holds without hot water. 
Rather surprisingly, political variables were not found to be 
important although the multicollinearity between the political vari- 
ables and indicators of condition of the housing stock may explain 
this result. 
This chapter is the oldest piece of work in this thesis, and some 
comments made with the benefit of hindsight are in order. A contribu- 
tion of public choice theory has been to raise question marks whenever 
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the maximisation of "society's" welfare is discussed. The problem is 
that of the link between self-interested behaviour of individuals and 
the maximisation of society's welf are. (l) 
Seen in this light, Chapter 5 is somewhat cavalier in its invoca- 
tion of a Social Marginal Efficiency of Investment function. Le Grand 
and Winter (1977) identify the following groups whose preferences may 
interact to produce observed local government decisions: (a) the 
electorate, (b) pressure groups, (c) councillors, (d) local officers 
and (e) the central government. Chapter 5 takes some steps towards 
examining the different sources of preferences by classifying vari- 
ables as relating to central government preferences, local government 
preferences, and implicitly, with the variable IMPETUS, bureaucratic 
preferences. However, the paper on which theis chapter is based would 
have benefitted from a more explicit approach to examining the inter- 
ests that combine to yield decisions. 
A finding of Chapter 5 that has been made mention of in the subse- 
quent literature i's the apparent lack of influence on housing invest- 
ment of the political control of local authorities. Hoggart (1984) 
cites the paper Chapter 5 is based upon(2) and has performed a further 
study on similar data, finding that a disaggregation of the sample 
into groups according to political control, similar to that carried 
out in the current expenditure models of Chapter 2 of this thesis, did 
reveal significant party differences. This would be an interesting 
line of investigation to pursue in future work on housing investment. 
(1) Adam Smith's insight was to see the "invisible hand of market 
forces" as being the link in the private sector. 
(2) Nicholson, Topham and Watt (1975) 
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Eastall and Kleinman (1988) also cite the work of Chapter 5 and 
have estimated a similar model. They find this model "fits the data 
fairly well", but they also find political effects to be important. 
However in their work, which is preliminary, the political effects are 
estimated in a separate politics-only regression and specification 
error is likely to be a problem. 
tics is very difficult to resolve. 
The issue of the importance of poll- 
The central question is whether 
environmental factors such as overcrowding, unfitness of the stock, 
and absence of höt water which cause housing investment also "cause" 
Labour control of the authority, or whether, alternatively, Labour 
control exerts an independent effect. The high correlation between 
indicators of need and Labour control currently prevent a decisive 
answer to this question. 
The Appendix to Chapter 5 uses some of the methodology set out in 
Appendix II to Chapter 1 to establish that the housing investment 
functions estimated in Chapter 5 for the different tiers of authority 
then in existence were not homogeneous across the tiers. 
In Chapters 6,7 and 8 the thesis turns from examining questions of 
government expenditure to examining government intervention in the 
private sector. Chapter 6 examines government intervention in the UK 
aerospace industry and is based on Hartley and Watt (1981). It exam- 
ines some of the ways other than by means of expenditures in which the 
government can affect the private economy: the use of regulation, the 
threat of regulation and the use of market power. 
During the period studied, the aerospace industry was closely 
involved with the Government which was its major customer. Between 
1958 and 1960 the Government induced a number of mergers in the indus- 
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try(1) by using its monopsony power to cause firms in the industry to 
merge. (2) As well as government influence over industry structure, 
another feature of the close relationship between the government and 
the aerospace industry is the formula-related return on capital incor- 
porated in contracts, with development work being paid for by cost 
plus contracts and production work by fixed cost contracts. From 1968 
onwards the operation of profit formulae was monitored by the newly 
formed Review Board for Government Contracts. The chapter specifies 
and tests an econometric model of the profits of the aerospace indus- 
try. Amongst the findings are that the government-induced mergers 
appeared to have a well established negative effect on profits, where- 
as, less conclusively, the Review Board for Government Contracts was 
not found to have had a significant negative effect on profits. 
If the study were to be repeated now, the work would benefit from a 
more extensive emphasis on the the theory of regulation, based on the 
seminal work of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), which has achieved 
a greater prominence since this chapter was written. Stigler and 
Peltzman's work, which can be considered a part of the public choice 
literature, rejects the public benefit theory of regulation, a 
sub-species of the benevolent despot model of government. Stigler 
considers the motivation of both the actors in the regulated industry 
and the regulators and argues that 
(1) See Hartley (1965) 
(2) Thus Mr Duncan Sandys stated in parliament after the mergers had 
been completed that: 
Except where specialised requirements or public policy made it 
necessary to do otherwise, the Government intends to concen- 
trate its orders on the five major groups. (Hansard, 15 Febru- 
ary, 1960, quoted in Hartley, 1965, p848) 
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as a rule regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit(l) 
Under this view of regulation, the finding of Chapter 6 that regula- 
tion by the Review Board for Government Contracts did not reduce the 
profits of aerospace manufacturers is not unexpected. 
Chapter 7, which is based on Watt(1980b)5 is concerned with the 
cost structure of direct grant schools which attracted government 
intervention in the form of a "direct grant" subsidy. Before the 
direct grant system was abolished in 1976, government intervention in 
this market took the form of grants paid to the direct grant schools 
of X84 per sixth-former and 52 for other pupils. In return for this 
capitation fee the Government had powers to regulate certain features 
of the school such as the income scale for fees charged to parents. 
The study found that on average the level of fees was inversely relat- 
ed to the proportion of pupils in the school whose fees were paid by 
the local authority, although the reason for this effect is not clear. 
No significant economies of scale in provision were found. 
Since this work was published it has been cited by Kumar (1983) and 
Bee and Dolton (1985) whose studies are based on the same approach and 
use a similar form of cost function in their estimation. Kumar's 
study is for data on Ontario schools, and as in Chapter 7 here no 
clear evidence of economies of scale is found. Bee and Dolton's model 
uses data for secondary schools in the independent sector. In con- 
trast to the findings of Kumar and Chapter 7 of this thesis, Bee and 
Dolton find significant evidence of the existence of economies of 
scale. A second finding for their study is the lack of significant 
(1) Stigler, 1971, p. 3, quoted in Utton (1986) 
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effect on costs of the quality of output, as measured by "A" level 
passes -a variable not available when Chapter 7 was written. Since 
then there has been a great improvement in the availability of data. 
Thus data for individual school costs are now available in many local 
authority areas and examination results have been published for a num- 
ber of years. The current cost structure of UK public sector schools 
would make an interesting study. One study currently exists (Hough 
1981) which found significant economies of scale but the issue cannot 
be regarded as settled at present. 
Chapter 8 is concerned with government intervention in the 
owner-occupied housing market in the form of a subsidy to 
owner-occupiers. It is argued that, the precise form of this subsidy 
depends upon whether a house is seen as a consumption good or an 
investment good. On the more logical view that a house is an invest- 
meet good, government intervention lies in the implicit subsidy to 
owner-occupiers that results from its failure to tax their imputed 
rental income and capital gains. The theoretical arguments 
surrounding the definition and measurement of this subsidy are set out 
and a survey is made of existing work in the area. 
There is general agreement amongst the works on housing subsidy 
surveyed that this subsidy leads to welfare loss and should be 
removed. A public choice issue of why the government does not remove 
the subsidy to owner-occupiers therefore arises. (1) Chapter 8 argues 
that the losers under such a reform, the owner-occupiers, form a sub- 
stantial and relatively concentrated interest group of considerable 
(1) See page 313 below. 
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political importance who are likely to prevail over those who stand to 
gain: taxpayers in general, whose gains, though putatively greater in 
surº, are more diffused and less widely recognised. The Chapter con- 
cludes with some estimates of the subsidy to owner-occupiers in 
inner-city Birmingham and an Appendix sets out an estimation of a 
hedonic model of price change used to obtain house price inflation 
rates for estimating the value of home-owners' exemption from capital 
gains taxation. 
To summarise, this thesis presents work that has been written over 
a number of years. The overall theme of is government expenditure and 
intervention, and the unifying theoretical standpoint is that of pub- 
lic choice analysis. This introduction has summarised the main find- 
ings and reviewed the work of the older chapters in the light of 
recent developments. In the next chapter the growth of government 
expenditure is examined. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED DEVELOPED NATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the overall pattern of government expendi- 
tune. In the first part a statistical picture of general government 
expenditure is built up for seven selected developed nations. In the 
second part some competing hypotheses to explain the growth of govern- 
ment are surveyed. 
The sustained growth of government during the twentieth century has 
attracted comment from many economists. According to Borcherding 
(1977, p. 33) 
a pattern completely contrary to the nineteenth century experi- 
ence emerges for this century: an expansion of the public sec- 
tor relative to the private sector. 
Nutter (1978) reflects that 
Government, it seems safe to say, is one thing that has been 
growing rapidly in the West. Wherever governments were once 
small they have become big, and wherever they were big they 
have become bigger. Nothing is so rare as a shrinking govern- 
ment. 
and Peltzman (1980, p 210) finds for the USA, UK7 Germany and Sweden 
that the data 
show that government budgets have grown faster than 
GNPs since 
at least 1900, and that they may have grown more slowly 
before. 
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Peltzman, in the most recent of these studies, considers data 
extending to 1974. Has this pattern of growth of government continued 
since then? In the next section a statistical picture of the pattern 
of growth of government from the most recently available OECD accounts 
is set out. 
MEASURING THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 
Measurement of the size of government is subject to some severe 
conceptual and practical p problems. The focus in this chapter is the 
extent to which government is involved in the economy. The level of 
government expenditure is only a partial measure of government's 
involvement in the economy. Quantification of government expenditure 
leaves totally out of account the effect of government regulation of 
private enterprise. Such effects may well be considerable: 
Wiedenbaum and De Fina (1978, p3) have estimated that the compliance 
costs incurred by the private economy as a result of federal regulato- 
ry agency activity in the USA reached $66 billion in 1976, equivalent 
to $307 per head or over one-third of all US private investment in new 
plant and equipment. Peacock (1984) raises the question. of the cost 
of regulation in the UK but makes no overall estimates in what is pri- 
marily a preliminary investigation. Mohammad and Whalley (1984, p387) 
estimate the welfare cost of government price and quantity controls in 
India at between thirty and forty-five per cent of GNP per year. 
Other kinds of government involvement in the economy may have major 
effects but not be reflected in expenditure statistics. Thus, to take 
an example discussed in Chapter 6, the UK Government caused a major 
series of mergers in the aircraft industry between 1958 and 1960 by 
making suggestions about its future purchasing policy to the firms 
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CHAPTER ONE: TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED DEVELOPED NATIONS 
concerned. (1) A further example is the use of "moral suasion" by cen- 
tral banks. Crockett (1973) argues that: 
Moral suasion is normally employed when it is felt that the 
ordinary market mechanism does not, and cannot easily be made 
to, take full account of the public interest. Under these cir- 
cumstances, allocation of resources to the bidder prepared to 
pay the highest price does not necessarily secure the best 
distribution. If the monetary authorities are capable of 
improving the allocation of financial resources - say by 
directing lending to activities where there are "spin-off" 
advantages to other sectors of the economy - then the 
community's economic welfare will benefit if the banks can be 
induced to follow the authorities' wishes. The advantage of 
moral suasion over direct controls ... is that it is a highly 
flexible control and does not need legal implementation. 
Because of this, there is less need for detailed and costly 
administrative regulation and, if the national interest is 
clear, then there should be less trouble about a divergence 
between observing the letter and the spirit of the guidelines. 
Crockett points out that competitive pressures may lead to the break- 
down of the effectiveness of moral suasion, and direct controls may be 
necessary: 
Moral suasion is therefore best applied as a temporary weapon. 
But even if moral suasion is changed into direct legal controls 
in order to prevent backsliding, problems still exist. The 
fact that controls have to be used to induce banks to act in a 
certain way means, in essence, that the monetary authorities 
are assuming that they can ensure a better allocation of 
resources than would occur as a result of the play of market 
forces. It is possible that in some circumstances this may be 
the case; but since the use of such controls is inevitably sub- 
ject to political pressure, it is by no means likely that this 
will always be so. 
These quotes are revealing. Crockett, a former member of staff of 
the Bank of England, envisages situations where the monetary 
authorities know better than both the market and the political proc- 
ess. Whether or not such situations do exist, the absence of any 
robust mechanism to ensure that it is the public interest rather than 
the monetary authorities' interest that is advanced is a cause for 
(1) See Hartley (1967, p. 19) 
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some concern. 
In the public expenditure process, resource allocation changes 
induced by Government spending relate directly to expenditure budgets, 
and political accountability is able to operate in the light of this 
information. Moral suasion may, however, be equally effective in 
inducing resource allocation changes, whilst not showing up in any 
expenditure budget. 
Also excluded from the government expenditure approach to measuring 
the influence of government on the economy are the effects of govern- 
ment participation in lending, loan insurance and guarantee programmes 
and tax expenditures incurred by the government. (1) Tax expendi- 
tares are "departures from the normal tax structure ... designed to 
favour a particular industry, activity or class of persons"(2) The 
level of tax expenditures, of course, is very dependent on how the 
normal tax structure is defined, but it is clear that tax expenditures 
can be of significance. In Chapter 8 study is made of British tax 
expenditures on owner-occupied housing. Table 1 gives some indication 
of levels of tax expenditures for Japan, the Netherlands and the UK. 
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE TAX EXPENDITURES 
Tax Expenditure Corpor- Indivi- Tax Expenditure 
1975 ations duals Other as a% of NI 
Japan 796bn Yen 468 304 24 0.7 
Netherlands 27910m Guilders 6960 20950 .. 13.3 
UK 1974-5 13189m Pounds 7748 5442 19.7 
Source: International Fiscal Association (1976) 
(1) Break (1982) 
(2) Surrey and McDaniel (1985, p3) 
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The statistical analysis of this chapter focusses on government 
expenditure and the growth of regulation in the economy is not 
examined further here. However, other studies(i) suggest that this 
arm of government is growing. Reasons for its growth will be consid- 
ered below under the general discussion of theoretical explanations of 
government expenditure growth. 
THE RECENT PATTERN OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
Tables 2 to 8 show the relation between National Income (net 
national income at factor cost), total government expenditure 
(including transfers) and government transfers for France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA for, subject to data availabil- 
ity, the years 1950 to 1982. These tables are an extension and sim- 
plification of Nutter's (1978) study of government growth. 
As Brown and Jackson (1982) point out there are a number of choices 
to be made in defining both public expenditure and national income, 
with consequent Implications for the ratio of government expenditure 
to national income. For instance, should transfers be included in the 
definition of public expenditure? Transfers, it is argued, do not 
represent government consumption of resources but their 
redistribution. If transfers are included in the definition of public 
expenditure it is possible, in theory, for the ratio of public expen- 
diture to national income to be greater than one hundred per cent. 
This has also been true in practice for at least one country - 
Israel. (2) Yet it has been generally reported that transfers are the 
(1) OECD (1985) surveys work on this question 
(2) Peltzman (1980 p 287) 
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most rapidly growing part of public expenditure(1) and to leave trans- 
fers out of a measure of public expenditure because they do not indi- 
cate government resource use would neglect one of the most important 
features of government intervention in the economy. In this chapter 
transfers are included in the total of government expenditure shown in 
Tables 2 to 8 on the basis that the total acts as an indicator of gov- 
ernment intervention. However, the part transfers play in this total 
is also shown separately. 
In defining a denominator for constructing government expenditure 
to national income ratios, a wide range of choices is available. 
Brown and Jackson (1982, p. 130) point out that dividing public expen- 
diture by net national product at factor cost leads to the highest 
ratio and will "obviously be chosen by those who wish to argue that 
the size of the public sector is too large". Warren Nutter's views 
placed him in this camp, so it is perhaps no accident that this is the 
measure he chooses to construct his public expenditure/national income 
ratios. (2) However Nutter does argue a strong case for selecting this 
particular ratio for examination, and because this paper presents 
tables which are an extension of Nutter's tabulations to 1982s it is 
worth summarising his case here. 
Nutter argues that although capital depreciation is difficult to 
measure, on balance a truer measure of the nation's income is given if 
allowance is made for this. He favours measuring prices at factor 
cost as most government purchases do not occur on the market. Further 
- as Brown and Jackson (1982) discuss - measuring net national product 
(1) Brown and Jackson (1986, p133), Musgrave (1981, p 81) 
(2) Nutter (1978) 
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at market prices has the drawback that by this measure, national 
income can be raised spuriously by a shift from direct to indirect 
taxation. 
GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT IN SELECTED DEVELOPED NATIONS 
Tables 2 to 8 show the growth of government expenditure as a per- 
centage of net national product at factor cost from (where available) 
1950 to 1982 for seven selected developed nations. These data are 
perhaps most easily appreciated from the graphs of Figure 1. 
In each graph, the upper line shows total government expenditure as 
a percentage of Net National Product at Factor Cost, and in each case 
this line shows a steady upward trend with no signs of decline in 
recent years. Overall the graphs are rather surprisingly similar in 
the sense that, given the steady rise in National Income that has 
occurred for all these countries, the casual observer might be 
forgiven for expecting the possibility of a fall in the ratio of gov- 
ernment expenditure to National Income in at least one of these 
nations. In fact this is not the case. However, some broad differ- 
ences can be distinguished. Sweden's ratio of government expenditure 
to National Income is markedly higher and rises more rapidly than oth- 
er countries, whilst Japan and the USA's ratios are lower. 
By visual inspection an upward kink in the government 
expenditure/net national product ratio can be observed for most 
countries starting in 1973 - the year of the Arab-Israeli war and the 
oil price shock and resultant recession. (1) The ratios are expected 
(1) Downward kinks for 1972-73 for most especially the Netherlands, 
but also for Sweden and the USA result from the joining of two 
statistical series, and should be ignored. See the Note at the 
foot of Table 2 for further detail. 
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TABLE 2, FRANCE: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN MILLIONS OF FRENCH FRANCS 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a National Government h of % of % of Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a col b 
1950 76470 28500 37.27 11780 15.40 41.33 1951 91980 36080 39.23 14900 16.20 41.30 
1952 106900 46270 43.28 17920 16.76 38.73 
1953 111820 49650 44.40 19610 17.54 39.50 
1954 119310 50880 42.65 21160 17.74 41.59 
1955 129580 54900 42.37 23630 18.24 43.04 
1956 143810 64560 44.89 26680 18.55 41.33 
1957 160840 72490 45.07 30220 18.79 41.69 
1958 185110 80700 43.60 34260 18.51 42.45 
1959 208130 90290 43.38 39760 19.10 44.04 
1960 227060 98090 43.20 43930 19.35 44.79 
1961 247450 110540 44.67 49950 20.19 45.19 
1962 277360 128360 46.28 58800 21.20 45.81 
1963 310390 146720 47.27 68370 22.03 46.60 
1964 342630 162680 47.48 76730 22.39 47.17 
1965 367760 176840 48.09 84120 22.87 47.57 
1966 399760 191260 47.84 91770 22.96 47.98 
1967 433340 210100 48.48 100580 23.21 47.87 
1968 482760 236660 49.02 111420 23.08 47.08 
1969 551640 266990 48.40 127960 23.20 47.93 
1970 588420 294440 50.04 142320 24.19 48.34 
1971 654600 325370 49.71 161050 24.60 49.50 
1972 736230 365250 49.61 184360 25.04 50.48 
1973 868068 424512 48.90 213148 24.55 50.21 
1974 991337 501406 50.58 249527 25.17 49.77 
1975 1122435 624610 55.65 313037 27.89 50.12 
1976 1278617 721771 56.45 364766 28.53 50.54 
1977 1460890 825741 56.52 424004 29.02 51.35 
1978 1651652 961055 58.19 505258 30.59 52.57 
1979 1872569 1102903 58.90 581957 31.08 52.77 
1980 2110308 1272690 60.31 672584 31.87 52.85 
1981 2364379 1518609 64.23 802397 33.94 52.84 
1982 2684476 1783376 66.43 958233 35.70 53.73 
Notes for Tables 2 to 8: the series in these tables are from Nutter 
(1978) up to 1972. From 1973 onwards (1974 in the case of the UK) the 
entries are computed from OECD (1984). Some discontinuity is 
introduced in the changeover year as a result. Thus the disparity 
between the OECD (1984) figures for, for instance Total Government 
Expenditure as a percentage of National Income are as follows: (OECD 
- Nutter) France -. 84, Germany +. 33, Japan -. 57, Netherlands -11.39, 
Sweden -1.68, UK -. 33, USA -1.24. These disparities are judged to be 
minor except for the case of the Netherlands, where the change is very 
large. The entries for the Netherlands are further impaired by a sub- 
stantial revision of the methods used by the Dutch for constructing 
the accounts for 1977 and onwards. 
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TABLE 3, GERMANY: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
MILLIONS OF DEUTSCHMARKS 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a 
National Government 'V. of % of % of 
Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a col b 
1950 75160 29520 39.28 12630 16.80 42.78 
1951 91080 35880 39.39 14530 15.95 40.50 
1952 103770 42580 41.03 17300 16.67 40.63 
1953 112130 45500 40.58 19720 17.59 43.34 
1954 121080 48020 39.66 20840 17.21 43.40 
1955 139460 53580 38.42 23300 16.71 43.49 
1956 154370 59200 38.35 25990 16.84 43.90 
1957 168290 67750 40.26 31700 18.84 46.79 
1958 180140 75720 42.03 35630 19.78 47.05 
1959 193970 82150 42.35 37500 19.33 45.65 
1960 235730 94920 40.27 39670 16.83 41.79 
1961 258060 106200 41.15 43710 16.94 41.16 
1962 277490 120660 43.48 47890 17.26 39.69 
1963 295780 132920 44.94 50870 17.20 38.27 
1964 324270 144450 44.55 55700 17.18 38.56 
1965 355270 161510 45.46 62230 17.52 38.53 
1966 377120 174310 46.22 67000 17.77 38.44 
1967 376010 184230 49.00 73980 19.68 40.16 
1968 416890 197030 47.26 79250 19.01 40.22 
1969 460640 217830 47.29 85930 18.65 39.45 
1970 529190 246460 46.57 92090 17.40 37.37 
1971 585620 281730 48.11 103160 17.62 36.62 
1972 639140 315520 49.37 118500 18.54 37.56 
1973 721890 364730 50.52 140600 19.48 38.55 
1974 772960 419630 54.29 161870 20.94 38.57 
1975 803060 482550 60.09 200680 24.99 41.59 
1976 879230 514170 58.48 216700 24.65 42.15 
1977 935980 548290 58.58 232320 24.82 42.37 
1978 1009310 588580 58.32 244920 24.27 41.61 
1979 1086940 635540 58.47 261240 24.03 41.11 
1980 1139380 687020 60.30 278230 24.42 40.50 
1981 1185370 732620 61.81 310360 26.18 42.36 
1982 1224300 761440 62.19 319410 26.09 41.95 
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TABLE 4, JAPAN: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
BILLIONS OF YEN 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a 
National Government Y. of % of h of 
Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a cal b 
1952 5275 906 17.18 158 3.00 17.44 
1953 5896 1104 18.72 201 3.41 18.21 
1954 6465 1261 19.51 303 4.69 24.03 
1955 7078 1331 18.80 365 5.16 27.42 
1956 7977 1384 17.35 369 4.63 26.66 
1957 9115 1503 16.49 399 4.38 26.55 
1958 9410 1725 18.33 536 5.70 31.07 
1959 10482 1837 17.53 546 5.21 29.72 
1960 12596 2818 22.37 614 4.87 21.79 
1961 15523 3317 21.37 704 4.54 21.22 
1962 17109 4003 23.40 827 4.83 20.66 
1963 19736 4715 23.89 1005 5.09 21.31 
1964 23336 5497 23.56 1194 5.12 21.72 
1965 25684 6373 24.81 1448 5.64 22.72 
1966 29565 7432 25.14 1685 5.70 22.67 
1967 35214 8378 23.79 1943 5.52 23.19 
1968 41644 9921 23.82 2238 5.37 22.56 
1969 47700 11444 23.99 2542 5.33 22.21 
1970 56599 13633 24.09 3106 5.49 22.78 
1971 63662 16360 25.70 3544 5.57 21.66 
1972 72535 19739 27.21 4392 6.06 22.25 
1973 91522 23971 26.19 6065 6.63 25.30 
1974 108705 31330 28.82 8666 7.97 27.66 
1975 120362 38731 32.18 11996 9.97 30.97 
1976 135770 44490 32.77 14732 10.85 33.11 
1977 148498 51797 34.88 17219 11.60 33.24 
1978 163559 59648 36.47 20061 12.27 33.63 
1979 175685 66994 38.13 22688 12.91 33.87 
1980 190767 74629 39.12 25186 13.20 33.75 
1981 201165 82497 41.01 28276 14.06 34.28 
1982 209813 87858 41.87 30976 14.76 35.26 
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TABLE 5, NETHERLANDS: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPEND ITURES IN 
MILLIONS OF GUILDERS 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a 
National Government Y of Y, of 7.. of 
Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a col b 
1950 14926 5085 34.07 1272 8.52 25.01 
1951 16917 5857 34.62 1483 8.77 25.32 
1952 17689 6115 34.57 1656 9.36 27.08 
1953 19110 6985 36.55 1788 9.36 25.60 
1954 21565 7755 35.96 2017 9.35 26.01 
1955 24525 8680 35.39 2247 9.16 25.89 
1956 26493 10530 39.75 2440 9.21 23.17 
1957 29044 12530 43.14 3238 11.15 25.84 
1958 29560 12916 43.69 3829 12.95 29.65 
1959 31444 13150 41.82 3973 12.64 30.21 
1960 35149 14639 41.65 4428 12.60 30.25 
1961 37045 15718 42.43 4855 13.11 30.89 
1962 39591 17346 43.81 5532 13.97 31.89 
1963 43130 19983 46.33 6622 15.35 33.14 
1964 51079 24102 47.19 7990 15.64 33.15 
1965 56949 27730 48.69 9801 17.21 35.34 
1966 61568 31732 51.54 11507 18.69 36.26 
1967 67759 36248 53.50 13365 19.72 36.87 
1968 73320 38220 52.13 15813 21.57 41.37 
1969 84113 43782 52.05 18552 22.06 42.37 
1970 93704 50921 54.34 21646 23.10 42.51 
1971 104720 60370 57.65 27070 25.85 44.84 
1972 118550 69170 58.35 32300 27.25 46.70 
1973 171870 81010 47.13 40540 23.59 50.04 
1974 192620 96250 49.97 48290 25.07 50.17 
1975 209480 115420 55.10 60750 29.00 52.63 
1976 241090 132930 55.14 70050 29.06 52.70 
1977 271160 149775 55.23 76650 28.27 51.18 
1978 299290 163620 54.67 83050 27.75 50.76 
1979 316110 178840 56.58 90810 28.73 50.78 
1980 335340 193020 57.56 97850 29.18 50.69 
1981 349360 207210 59.31 106120 30.38 51.21 
1982 361390 224990 62.26 117010 32.38 52.01 
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TABLE 6, SWEDEN: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
MILLIONS OF KRONER 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a National Government % of % of / of 
Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a col b 
1960 58999 22692 38.46 6185 10.48 27.26 
1961 63818 24662 38.64 6712 10.52 27.22 
1962 68029 27696 40.71 7415 10.90 26.77 
1963 73249 31747 43.34 8574 11.71 27.01 
1964 82093 35609 43.38 9570 11.66 26.88 
1965 89914 40503 45.05 11194 12.45 27.64 
1966 97097 46563 47.96 12676 13.05 27.22 
1967 104908 53042 50.56 14781 14.09 27.87 
1968 110859 59252 53.45 16654 15.02 28.11 
1969 121617 64799 53.28 18980 15.61 29.29 
1970 135286 73341 54.21 21090 15.59 28.76 
1971 141509 82706 58.45 24995 17.66 30.22 
1972 153223 92163 60.15 28726 18.75 31.17 
1973 176804 102410 57.92 31023 17.55 30.29 
1974 202342 124158 61.36 41210 20.37 33.19 
1975 238642 148619 62.28 48392 20.28 32.56 
1976 269577 177383 65.80 57979 21.51 32.69 
1977 287630 212977 74.05 69858 24.29 32.80 
1978 324800 243720 75.04 81377 25.05 33.39 
1979 367036 257624 70.19 91960 25.05 35.70 
1980 412961 302054 73.14 105135 25.46 34.81 
1981 439629 344978 78.47 119199 27.11 34.55 
1982 475022 411744 86.68 129446 27.25 31.44 
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TABLE 7, UNITED KINGDOM: NATIONAL 
IN MILLIONS OF POUNDS STERLING 
(a) (b) 
Total 
National Government 
Year Income Expenditure 
INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
col b Government Transfers: 
as a as a as a 
'h of 'h of % of 
col a Amount col a col b 
1950 10781 4217 39.12 746 6.92 17.69 
1951 11845 5044 42.58 785 6.63 15.56 
1952 12762 5782 45.31 905 7.09 15.65 
1953 13760 6044 43.92 995 7.23 16.46 
1954 14576 5974 40.99 1014 6.96 16.97 
1955 15515 6139 39.57 1105 7.12 18.00 
1956 16850 6647 39.45 1179 7.00 17.74 
1957 17871 6936 38.81 1244 6.96 17.94 
1958 18682 7330 39.24 1484 7.94 20.25 
1959 19618 7778 39.65 1637 8.34 21.05 
1960 20778 8191 39.42 1663 8.00 20.30 
1961 22186 9176 41.36 2046 9.22 22.30 
1962 23255 9886 42.51 2251 9.68 22.77 
1963 24802 10548 42.53 2529 10.20 23.98 
1964 26913 11342 42.14 2699 10.03 23.80 
1965 28754 12492 43.44 3079 10.71 24.65 
1966 30365 13599 44.79 3351 11.04 24.64 
1967 31994 15323 47.89 3749 11.72 24.47 
1968 34171 16818 49.22 4265 12.48 25.36 
1969 35817 17596 49.13 4547 12.70 25.84 
1970 39275 19359 49.29 4990 12.71 25.78 
1971 44182 21389 48.41 5527 12.51 25.84 
1972 49432 24753 50.07 6703 13.56 27.08 
1973 57181 28560 49.95 7540 13.19 26.40 
1974 67021 36807 54.92 8902 13.28 24.19 
1975 83655 47860 57.21 11617 13.89 24.27 
1976 99002 56322 56.89 14882 15.03 26.42 
1977 111690 61883 55.41 17707 15.85 28.61 
1978 128392 70280 54.74 21366 16.64 30.40 
1979 147995 82281 55.60 25020 16.91 30.41 
1980 168882 100935 59.77 29867 17.69 29.59 
1981 183413 114484 62.42 36036 19.65 31.48 
1982 200956 126230 62.81 41598 20.70 32.95 
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TABLE 8, U. S. A: NATIONAL INCOME AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
(a) (b) col b Government Transfers: 
Total as a as a as a 
National Government % of % of h of 
Year Income Expenditure col a Amount col a col b 
1950 242167 63634 26.28 17717 7.32 27.84 
1951 279232 82761 29.64 14482 5.19 17.50 
1952 293180 97508 33.26 13421 4.58 13.76 
1953 306635 105021 34.25 14150 4.61 13.47 
1954 304918 100615 33.00 15699 5.15 15.60 
1955 332175 101998 30.71 16865 5.08 16.53 
1956 352832 108633 30.79 18246 5.17 16.80 
1957 368187 120167 32.64 21037 5.71 17.51 
1958 369962 133270 36.02 25314 6.84 18.99 
1959 402355 136813 34.00 26146 6.50 19.11 
1960 417093 143848 34.49 27829 6.67 19.35 
1961 430129 157187 36.54 31752 7.38 20.20 
1962 460613 168112 36.50 32540 7.06 19.36 
1963 485264 175472 36.16 34179 7.04 19.48 
1964 521739 184979 35.45 35231 6.75 19.05 
1965 568423 193889 34.11 38019 6.69 19.61 
1966 625128 218792 35.00 41799 6.69 19.10 
1967 658468 251869 38.25 49177 7.47 19.52 
1968 706210 277468 39.29 61123 8.66 22.03 
1969 756002 295105 39.03 64493 8.53 21.85 
1970 788158 330644 41.95 77088 9.78 23.31 
1971 849574 356812 42.00 91273 10.74 25.58 
1972 936503 388760 41.51 101861 10.88 26.20 
1973 1078661 420243 38.96 121697 11.28 28.96 
1974 1154526 477716 41.38 144113 12.48 30.17 
1975 1234137 553728 44.87 180406 14.62 32.58 
1976 1376787 597882 43.43 194531 14.13 32.54 
1977 1542393 645548 41.85 207645 13.46 32.17 
1978 1743718 711072 40.78 222985 12.79 31.36 
1979 1948020 796015 40.86 250278 12.85 31.44 
1980 2102822 923105 43.90 298631 14.20 32.35 
1981 2358383 1048095 44.44 338442 14.35 32.29 
1982 2437414 1158576 47.53 375870 15.42 32.44 
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to rise in recession because most public expenditure programs are 
based on long term social programs which will continue regardless of 
whether national product is rising or f alling. (1) 
In Britain the ratio of government expenditure to National Income 
kinks downwards from 1975 to 1977 after the imposition of conditions 
on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy by the International Mon- 
etary Fund, and also from 1968 when there was an attempt to shift 
resources into exports. (2) In the USA, expenditures rise for several 
years from the mid-60s as a result of the Vietnam War and the "Great 
Society" programmes. The ratio of government expenditure to National 
Income is noticeably the lowest for Japan. Several reasons for this 
can be advanced. Between 1945 and 1952 Japan was under American con- 
trol. A policy of dismantling all organisations that had been 
associated with the war machine was pursued(3) and this policy led to 
extensive de-nationalisation. Also important were the post-war avoid- 
ance of military outlays and the government's policy choice of keeping 
social welfare expenditures low in an economy where many welfare 
responsibilities are adopted by corporations: "neither welfare nor 
warfare". (4) In Japan, public expenditure is concentrated to a 
greater extent than in other developed economies on public 
investment(5) partly because of the low level of defence expenditure. 
This high rate of investment in turn partly explains the high growth 
(1) Eltis (1983, p73). 
(2) OECD (1978, p13) 
(3) Allen (1980, p. 108) 
(4) Boltho (1975, p124) 
(5) ibid 
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rate of national income, which has allowed the public sector to grow 
rapidly, without markedly increasing its share. (1) 
As a way of summarising the information contained in Tables 2 to 8, 
government expenditure is regressed on a time trend. The object of 
doing this is not to suggest that the mere passage of time is a 
cause of government expenditure growth, but to derive summary fig- 
Ures for rate of growth over time and a projected constant for 1950. 
The results of these estimations are given in Table 9. The aggregate 
regression is derived by pooling all the observations. 
TABLE 9, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL INCOME 
REGRESSED ON TIME IN YEARS 
Country Constant Regression t Period 
Term Coefficient Statistic Rý-' 
France 37.79 . 67 14.43 . 87 1950-1982 
Germany 34.73 . 77 16.65 . 89 1950-1982 
Japan 12.21 . 77 14.62 . 88 1952-1982 
Netherlands 34.05 . 82 15.85 . 89 1950-1982 
Sweden 14.32 1.98 23.48 . 96 1960-1982 UK 35.76 . 69 12.07 . 82 1950-1982 
USA 29.37 . 48 14.07 . 86 1950-1982 
Aggregate 30.31 . 80 11.46 . 38 
Note: Regression is Y=a+bt where Y is total government expenditure 
divided by net national product at factor cost, a is the constant 
term, b is the regression coefficient and t is time in years with 
1950=1. 
In all cases it can be seen that there is a significant positive 
relationship between the passage of time and the level of government 
spending. (2) 
(1) ibid 
(2) The critical point for a one tailed test of significance at the 1% 
level for the regression coefficients, with 31 degrees of freedom 
is 2.04 and with 21 degrees of freedom (Sweden), is 2.08. 
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It is noticeable that the coefficient on time for Sweden is far 
higher than for all other countries. At the same time the regression 
is over a shorter time period than for the other countries as data 
were not available for Sweden before 1960. Visual inspection of the 
graphs of Figure 1 shows that the slope of the government expenditure 
curve often steepens over time. It is of interest to ask whether the 
higher coefficient for Sweden purely a result of the data for Sweden 
being restricted to 1960 onwards when the slope steepens for most 
countries? As a way of examining this all the regressions were re-run 
for just the later years: 1960-1982. This re-estimation resulted in 
all the coefficients on time increasing markedly except those for the 
Netherlands and the USA. (1) However, these increased coefficients 
still did not approach the value for Sweden, which still stands out as 
having the highest rate of public expenditure growth amongst the 
group. 
Another feature of the results for Sweden from Table 9 is that the 
intercept is rather low. Could it be the case that Sweden's high 
growth rate is a consequence of catching-up from a low start? Some 
doubt is cast on this explanation when it is noted that Japan also has 
a low intercept, but in Japan's case this goes with a low growth rate 
of public expenditure as a percentage of National Income. (2) 
(1) The changes were France . 67 to . 86, Germany . 77 to 1.06, Japan . 
77 
to . 90, Netherlands . 82 to . 69, UK . 69 to . 99 and USA . 48 to . 
47. 
(2) As a way of examining the question of a possible relationship 
between growth rate and intercept the growth rates from Table 9 
were regressed on the intercepts from Table 9 for the seven 
countries of the study. The estimated regression was slope = 
-. 274 x intercept + 1.65, R2 = . 342. The t-statistic of 
the 
coefficient -. 274, was -1.61 and was not significant at the . 05 
level in a one-tailed test. 
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One way of explaining differences in the percentage of government 
expenditure to national income in different countries is the different 
political orientation of different countries. The hypothesis is that 
Conservative governments will cause the ratio of public expenditure to 
national income (6/NI) to be lower than non-Conservative governments. 
This suggests a model of the form G/N = f(CONS, T), where CONS is some 
measure of right-wing orientation of a nation's parliament, T is a 
time trend, and , the expectations are o(G/N)/oCONS<O and o(G/N)/oT>O. 
This leaves the political orientation itself of the countries to be 
explained, but if a relationship can be found between political arien- 
tation and the ratio of public expenditure to national income then the 
explanation is advanced one step. Castles (1986) contains a tabula- 
tion for the annual average percentage of right-wing parliamentary 
seats which includes the seven nations studied here. These averages 
are for 1951-59,1960-74, and 1975-81. (1) To test for a relationship, 
Castles's data on political orientation were regressed on the data 
collected here for the percentage of government expenditure to nation- 
al income averaged for Castles's three periods. The following result 
is obtained: 
Y= 42.42 - . 3124CONS + . 809**YEAR R-- = . 
58 
(-2.727) (3.936) 
(1) Castles's data for percentage annual average right-wing seats are 
as follows: 
Country 1951-59 1960-74 1975-81 
France 21 56 34 
Germany 47 49 47 
Japan 50 60 52 
Netherlands 10 12 17 
Sweden 15 14 17 
UK 53 49 47 
USA 54 46 50 
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where CONS is annual average right-wing parliamentary seats, YEAR is 
middle year of the time periods, 1950 = 1, t-statistics in 
parentheses, and * denotes significantly different from zero in a one-tailed test at the . 01 level. 
This estimation suggests that the percentage of government expendi- 
ture to national income is expected to rise by eight per cent every 
ten years, and reduce by three per cent for every ten per cent 
increase in the percentage of right-wing parliamentary seats. One way 
of interpreting this result is to see the size of government as being 
in disequilibrium, in the sense that it is growing over time, and to 
see the presence of Conservative parliamentary representation as 
tending to increase this secular growth. 
Political orientation would certainly appear to have a role in the 
explanation of government growth for Sweden, which stands out amongst 
the countries examined as having the highest growth rate and level of 
public expenditure. Apart from one hundred days in 1936, the Social 
Democrats have from 1932 to 1976 had either an absolute majority or 
have been the main party in a coalition. 
Given this well established overall pattern of growth in government 
expenditure it is to be expected that the growth would be reflected in 
an increase in the percentage of manpower employed by government. (1) 
Thus suppose the production function for public output is Q= AK N12) 
where Q is the value of public production - assumed as in national 
(1) Musgrave (1982) points out that there is no elegant theoretical 
justification for public employment analogous to the public 
goods argument for public expenditure. The implication of the 
existence of public goods is the need for government finance and 
hence expenditure, but the provision need not necessarily be pub- 
lic and hence there is no necessarily implied need for public 
employment. However, the major growth of public expenditure has 
been on private rather than public goods (OECD 1985a). 
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accounts calculations to be equal to the cost of inputs, K is capital 
in the public sector and N is employment in the public sector. The 
marginal value(l) product of labour dQ/dN = AK NR~t= 0Q/N. Assuming 
that employment is set at a level where the value of its marginal 
product is equal to the wage, w yields w= ßQ /N. Rearranging, gives 
the demand for labour as N= Q/w. Hence public sector employment 
would be expected to be positively related to the size of the public 
sector, Q, and negatively related to the level of public sector wages, 
w. (2) 
International evidence on public sector employment is limited, but 
Table 10 reproduces some evidence gathered by the OECD for those in 
employment in the public sector. The public sector is defined by the 
OECD as covering the departments and agencies at central, state, pro- 
vincial and local level that produce non-market goods and services. 
Thus the main exclusions are government owned firms and public corpo- 
rations that produce and sell goods and services. (3) Public sector 
employment is seen to have absorbed an increasing proportion of the 
workforce for all countries considered except for Japan and the USA. 
In Table 11 the time trend has been regressed on these public 
employment percentages and the coefficient on time is significantly 
positive for all countries examined except the USA. However, Bennett 
and Johnson (1980) have shown that this stability in numbers employed 
(1) Analogous to the marginal revenue product in the private sector, 
where the value of output in the public sector is assumed equal to 
input costs 
(2) For discussions of public sector employment see Addison and 
Siebert (1979, Ch 2) and Ehernberg (1973) 
(3) OECD (1982, p9) 
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TABLE 10: 
Country 
SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 1960-1979 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 
France 12.1 11.6 12.4 13.7 14.2 n. a. Germany 8 9.8 11.2 13.9 14.5 14.7 
Japan n. a. n. a. 5.8 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Netherlands 11.7 11.5 12.1 13.5 14.6 14.7 
Sweden 12.8 15.3 20.6 25.5 29.0 29.8 
UK 14.9* 15.7 18.0 21.0 21.4 21.5 
USA 15.7 16.7 18.0 18.0 16.8 16.5 
* 1961 
Source: OECD (1982, p12) 
N 
in the USA conceals substantial qualitative shifts in the ratio of 
blue-collar employment to more highly remunerated white-collar employ- 
ment, from one-in-three in 1959, to less than one-in-five in 1978. 
They also argue that there has been a dramatic increase in the employ- 
ment of contractors and consultants, with, for instance, ninety per 
cent of the then Department of Energy's budget devoted to research 
work by contractors and consultants. 
In contrast Sweden shows explicitly the highest growth in the pub- 
lic employment rate in Table 11, reflecting its high growth rate of 
public expenditure and strong full-employment policy objective. (1) 
In summary, it can be said that employment in the public sector has 
grown strongly in all the countries considered except for the USA 
where as argued by Bennet and Johnson the data may still be compatible 
(1) Martin (1982) has sought to explain the share of the public sector 
in total employment for 20 OECD countries. He finds a weakly 
established positive relationship between public sector employment 
share and GDP per capita, but also a more strongly established 
positive relationship between public sector employment share and 
the ratio of the non-working to the working population. This lat- 
ter variable was used on the hypothesis that public sector client 
groups are more likely to be non-working - the school-going popu- 
lation for instance. 
1NWE «`'"'Y` 
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TABLE 11, PERCENTAGE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT REGRESSED ON TIME IN 
YEARS 
Country Constant Regression t Observations 
Term Coefficient Statistic Rz 
France 11.51 . 13 3.41 . 79 5 Germany 7.94 . 36 19.01*ý* . 99 6 Japan 5.11 . 08 3.05-*-w . 82 4 Netherlands 11.03 . 18 5.11-* . 87 6 Sweden 11.73 . 93 18.44-*-**- . 99 6 UK 14.17 . 40 12.51--* . 98 6 USA 16.41 . 05 . 88 . 90 6 
Note: Regression is E=a+bt where E is the percentage of public sector 
employment ,a is the constant term, b is the regression coefficient 
and t is time in years with 1960=0. *, ** and *** denote significant 
difference from zero in . 1, . 05 and . 01 level tests respectively. 
TABLE 12, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON TRANSFERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET 
NATIONAL PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST REGRESSED ON TIME IN YEARS 
Country Constant Regression t Period 
Term Coefficient Statistic Re 
France 14.24 . 53 22.16 . 94 1950-1982 
Germany 14.86 . 28 8.24 . 69 1950-1982 
Japan 1.19 . 33 9.54 . 76 1952-1982 
Netherlands 5.33 . 81 29.42 . 97 1950-1982 
Sweden -. 44 . 83 28.42 . 97 1960-1982 
UK 4.70 . 40 22.35 . 94 1950-1982 
USA 3.27 . 34 14.60 . 87 1950-1982 
Aggregate 7.14 . 46 10.18 . 32 
Note: Regression is Y=a+bt where Y is total government expenditure on 
transfers divided by net national product at factor cost, a is the 
constant term, b is the regression coefficient and t is time in years 
with 1950=1. 
with growth. 
Having discussed, in the first part of this chapter, government 
employment and government expenditure in total, the role of 
transfers within this total of government expenditure is now consid- 
ered. Tables 2 to 8 show as the second to last of their columns, 
transfers as a percentage of national income, and this percentage is 
shown graphically in Figure 1 as the lower line in each graph. From 
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these diagrams it is seen that there is a clear rising trend of trans- 
fers as a percentage of national income, and this trend is summarised 
in the regression results of Table 12 where government expenditure on 
transfers has been regressed on time. Once again all the slope coef- 
ficients are positive and statistically significant in each case. The 
Netherlands and Sweden show the strongest time trends for the increase 
in transfers as a proportion of National Income, and Germany the 
lowest. Political orientation appears to give some explanation for 
these findings, with Sweden and the Netherlands having a low level of 
right-wing Parliamentary representation. In addition, since the War, 
the overall economic strategy in Sweden has been to "leave the private 
sector intact", ( l) but to redistribute income out of it by tax policy, 
which would accord with Sweden's high level of transfers. 
Given that both total government expenditure and government 
expenditure on transfers are rising as a percentage of national 
income, the question arises of how the ratio between these classifica- 
tions has been changing. Thus it may be asked whether transfers have 
been rising as a percentage of government expenditure. The data to 
answer this question are computed as the last column of Tables 2 to 8 
and are shown graphically in Figure 2. From these graphs it can be 
seen that there has been a clear upward trend in transfers as a per- 
centage of government expenditure in all the countries in the sample 
except for Germany. (2) This pattern is reflected in the regression 
(1) Ryden and Bergstrom (1982, p10) 
(2) West Germany does not have a centralised old age or sickness 
insurance scheme but instead a large number of independent 
semi-official bodies. Except for old-age insurance these bodies 
are self-financing. Health insurance is provided by around 2000 
separate health funds. Hallett (1973) 
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TABLE 13, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON TRANSFERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE REGRESSED ON TIME IN YEARS 
Country Constant Regression t Period 
Term Coefficient Statistic Rl-ý' 
France 39.49 . 43 26.58 . 96 1950-1982 Germany 42.69 -. 09 -2.07 . 12 1950-1982 Japan 19.23 . 38 4.60 . 42 1952-1982 Netherlands 20.33 1.05 22.17 
. 94 1950-1982 Sweden 21.52 . 40 10.96 . 85 1960-1982 UK 15.48 . 48 19.31 . 92 1950-1982 USA 13.62 . 56 9.41 . 74 1950-1982 
Aggregate 25.39 . 43 5.99 . 14 
Note: Regression is Y=a+bt where Y is government expenditure on 
transfers divided by total government expenditure, a is the constant 
term, b is the regression coefficient and t is time in years with 
1950=1. 
results of Table 13 where government expenditure on transfers as a 
percentage of total government expenditure is regressed on time. 
Coefficients are positive for all the countries examined except 
Germany, and the shift to transfers has been strongest in the 
Netherlands. OECD (1985b) analyses the growth of social expendi- 
tures from 1960 to 1975, and from 1975 to 1981. Although these 
include non-transfer items such as education, the following points 
about transfer expenditures emerge from their findings. In Sweden, 
France and the UK the growth of unemployment compensation has been 
high, especially over the later of the two periods examined. In 
France this high growth rate of unemployment compensation stems from 
growth in both coverage and real benefit. In the UK on the other 
hand, the high growth rate of unemployment compensation results from a 
combination of increased numbers and a fall in real benefit (OECD 
1985b). Another important transfer, pensions is noted for its high 
growth rate in Japan, where both the retired population and coverage 
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have been growing rapidly. In Germany, on the other hand, the average 
real level of government pensions declined from 1975-81, which accords 
with the predominance of independent pension schemes. 
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
Whilst there are considerable difficulties of consistency and defi- 
nition, a study by the OECD(1) has broken down total government expen- 
diture into a series of broad functional categories that enables com- 
parisons to be made for all of the countries considered in this study, 
with the exception of Sweden. This division of government expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP is given in Table 14. Examining this table, 
TABLE 14, GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONAL EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GDP 
General 
Social Economic Adminis- 
Defence Education Health Security Services tration 
France 3.5 5.8 6.0 18.7 3.6 7.3 
Germany 2.9 5.1 6.4 19.6 5.3 5.9 
Japan 0.9 4.9 4.6 7.3 6.0 6.2 
Netherlands 3.2 7.3 .. 21.1 .. .. 
United Kingdom 4.7 5.9 4.6 12.1 4.4 8.5 
United States 5.2 6.0 2.4 10.2 3.3 4.6 
Source: Computed from Saunders and Klau (1985, p47) 
the main features that stand out are the contrasts between the large 
share of public expenditure an defence in the UK and the USA and its 
small share in Japan; the relatively large share of education in pub- 
lic expenditure in the Netherlands and the smaller share in Germany 
and Japan and the large share of health in the public expenditure of 
Germany compared with the small share in the USA. Lastly, high Social 
(1) Saunders and Klau (1985) 
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Security spending in the Netherlands contrasts with low Social Securi- 
ty spending in Japan. 
OECD (1985b) also presents the elasticities of growth of these com- 
ponents with respect to the growth of GDP. Again there are some prob- 
lems of consistency which prevents a uniform comparison of time peri- 
ods and the consideration of Sweden. These growth elasticities are 
presented in Table 14. 
The largest growth in spending programmes can be seen to be in the 
TABLE 14, ELASTICITIES OF GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONAL EXPENDITURE 
COMPONENTS WITH RESPECT TO GROWTH IN GDP, VARIOUS TIME PERIODS. 
Gen. Def - Social Econ 
Years Total Admin ence Educ'n Health Sec'ty Serv Other 
France 75-81 1.14 1.03 1.18 0.99 1.20 1.25 0.89 1.10 
Germany 70-81 1.30 1.37 0.88 1.22 1.52 1.34 1.01 1.61 
Japan 70-82 1.37 1.18 1.11 1.26 1.44 1.89 1.12 1.38 
N'lds 60-81 1.26 .. 0.86 1.17 .. 1.33 .. 1.33 
U. K. 60-79 1.08 1.07 0.82 1.20 1.20 1.29 0.77 1.09 
U. S. A 70-78 1.05 0.98 0.44 1.09 1.35 1.41 0.71 1.52 
Source: OECD (1985b) 
welfare state areas of health and social services, and the lowest 
growth is in defence and economic services - i. e. capital transac- 
tions and subsidies. 
To summarise the statistical picture presented above, there has 
been a clear upward trend in government expenditure and employment in 
the countries considered with no sign of a decline in recent years. 
Transfers by government have also maintained their rising trend, both 
in their relation to national income and also, with the exception of 
Western Germany, as a proportion of total government expenditure. 
In the next section, theoretical explanations of these phenomena 
are reviewed. 
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THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 
Given the universality and long term nature of government expendi- 
ture growth commented on at the beginning of this chapter, it is not 
surprising that a large number of theories of government expenditure 
have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. Adolph Wagner, writing 
in 1883, (1) speaks of "a law of increasing expansion of public, and 
particularly state, activities", declaring that 
its explanation, justification and cause is the pressure for 
social progress and the resulting changes in the relative spheres 
of private and public economy, especially compulsory public econ- 
omy. 
In explaining his law, Wagner identified three types of state 
activity: the maintenance of law and order necessary for markets to 
function, material production, and the provision of such things as 
postal services, education and banking services. (2) The state would 
be increasingly involved in the first type of activity because Wagner 
believed there would be a need for centralisation of administration as 
the market increasingly atomised social and economic life, and as the 
division of labour increased the complexities of economic life and 
generated more possible causes of friction. Wagner believed a growing 
involvement by the state in material production would be required 
because new technical processes, for example steam power, meant that 
production would increasingly need to be organised by the state or 
joint stock companies, and the private alternative was vulnerable to 
business cycle disturbances. Lastly the state would become 
(1) Translated and reproduced in Musgrave and Peacock (1967, p8) 
(2) Because the relevant part of Wagner's work is not available in 
English translation, this discussion relies on Peacock and Wiseman 
(1967) 
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increasingly involved in services such as education and banking 
because technical developments were likely to favour monopolies, or 
because the social benefits of services, such as education, were dif- 
ficult to evaluate. 
Peacock and Wiseman criticise Wagner's "law" as being dependent 
upon his organic theory of the state which in turn is only one of many 
alternative interpretations of the nature and duties of the state. (1) 
In their own contribution, which has stimulated much research and 
debate, Peacock and Wiseman introduced the idea of the displacement 
effect into the consideration of government expenditure growth. 
They argue that 
the revenue and expenditure statistics of the government may show 
a displacement after periods of social disturbance. Expenditures 
may fall when the disturbance is over, but they are less likely 
to return to the old level. (2) 
Thus Peacock and Wiseman expect to find a displacement of postwar 
expenditures higher than prewar ones. 
Wagner's views on the determinants of public expenditure growth, 
and the views of Peacock and Wiseman, have been subject to extensive 
debate and empirical investigation in the economic literature. (3) In 
many ways these statistical debates amount to a discussion over which 
particular econometric sledgehammer is appropriate to crack the nut. 
Seen in this light, Peacock and Wiseman's methodology, "the visual 
inspection of charts"(4) is perhaps a more appropriate tool than they 
(1) Peacock and Wiseman (1967) p19) 
(2) Peacock and Wiseman (1967, p27) 
(3) See for instance Gupta (1967) Bonin, Finch and Waters (1969), 
Diamond(1977) and Watt (1978). The last reference is reproduced 
as Appendix I to this chapter. 
(4) Peacock and Wiseman (1979, p. 13) 
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would claim. Thus, one would expect there to be a "Structural break" 
in many economic relationships if two time periods were compared, 
interrupted by a gap as long as that between 1939 and 1948 for 
instance, war or no war. 
A different line of explanation for the growth of government was 
suggested by Baumal (1967). In Baumol's view it is more difficult to 
increase productivity in the public sector because of technical barri- 
ers imposed by the labour intensive nature of its services. Thus the 
share of public expenditure in national income could rise purely as a 
result of a desire to maintain the volume of public sector output if 
public sector productivity lags behind other sectors. 
Baumol's article drew much comment at the time. (1) Peacock and 
Wiseman (1979) later suggested that productivity growth in the public 
sector is low because of institutional barriers to innovation rather 
than because of technical barriers, and pointed to economic theories 
of bureaucracy as explanation. 
The theory [of bureaucracy] tells us that bureaucrats are in 
charge of productive operations in which they have a monopoly 
of supply and a monopoly of information about the way in which 
supply is produced. Further their "products" are not priced. 
They are therefore not under the same pressure to innovate as 
private producers subjected to competitive conditions... 
The view that bureaucrats will expand government beyond its optimum 
size is most associated with the name of Niskanen (1971 and 1975), 
although the idea has a long history as Niskanen points out: 
I do not, of course, claim paternity for the idea that bureau- 
crats act to maximise their bureau's budget. Indeed, the plau- 
sibility of "Parkinson's Law" is based on a popular belief that 
bureaus have an inherent tendency to grow. (2) 
(1) Beck (1985) notes seven comments in the American Economic Review 
and asks if this is a record. 
(2) Niskanen (1971, p. 41). See also Parkinson (1962) 
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Niskanen's model may be set out as follows. Bureaucrats are 
assumed to be governed by a sponsoring agency which has a budget func- 
tion that relates the budget B it is prepared to grant the bureau to 
the perceived output of the bureau Q. Niskanen assumes this function 
to be quadratic and of the following form: 
B= aQ-bQý-' 0tQ _< a/2b. 1 
The budget is available to the bureau because the sponsors value 
the bureau's output. Hence B may be thought of approximately as the 
total public benefit or utility function. (1) More precisely, and as 
something of an understatement: 
The budget-output function of the sponsors as revealed to the 
bureau will be related to that of the constituents through the 
processes by which the officers of the collective organisation 
are selected and by its internal decision processes, but will 
not necessarily be identical with that of the constituents. (2) 
The first derivative of this utility function corresponds to the 
marginal valuation of the consumer or the maximum "price" the sponsor 
is willing to pay, price being placed in inverted commas because of 
the practical difficulties of identifying it. (3) Niskanen assumes the 
costs of the bureau also to be quadratic of the following form: 
TC = cQ + dQ2', 0 >_ 0.2 
A further assumption that the bureau does not return its surplus funds 
to the sponsor gives the constraint that the bureau's costs must equal 
its budget: 
TC. 3 
Niskanen assumes that the bureaucrat's utility is a positive 
(1) Mueller (1979, p159) 
(2) Niskanen (1971, p45) 
(3) Niskanen (1971) pp28-29), Jackson (1982, p127) 
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monotonic function of size of budget, arguing that from the following 
likely sources of utility: 
... salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, 
power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, 
and ease of managing the bureau. (1) 
all except the last two are positive monotonic functions of the total 
budget of the bureau. The bureau therefore attempts to maximise its 
budget. To maximise the budget the bureau will set Q so that the bud- 
get at the output equals the total cost, i. e. 
N 
B=aQ-bQ2 =cQ+dQ =TC, 4 
which yields 
Q= (a - c)/(b + d). 5 
A further constraint is that the sponsor is not satiated - i. e. 
dB/dQ 
_> 
0, 
or 
Q a/2b. 7 
Niskanen's model is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3. The diagram 
shows the linear marginal cost and marginal valuation functions that 
result from differentiating the total cost and total benefit functions 
with respect to Q. Bureaucrats maximise their utility by setting 
Q=(a-c)/(b+d) unless this is greater than satiation for the sponsors - 
i. e. a/2ab, in which case a/2ab is chosen. 
With full knowledge, the sponsors would restrict bureau output to 
Q,,, beyond which point the marginal valuation to the sponsors of 
bureau activity exceeds its marginal cost. Niskanen suggests the 
sponsors will be unsuccessful in this because only the bureau has 
(1) Niskanen (1971, p 38) 
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FIGURE 3: NISKANEN'S MODEL 
a- 2b0 
information on marginal cost and it has no incentive to reveal it. (1) 
The sponsors only know the total cost - the budget - of the bureau. 
Thus the sponsor's potential consumer surplus, ace, is exhausted by 
an equal amount of excess of marginal cost over marginal benefit, 
efg, imposed upon them by the bureaucrats. 
Hartley and Tisdell (1981) p. 60) give a number of examples of how 
bureaucracies are likely to manipulate information to help secure 
their budget expansion ambitions: 
A ministry might deliberately underestimate the costs of a 
project in order to "buy into" a new programme. Cost estimates 
which are "too low" can lead a government to buy "too much" of 
a project which appears to be relatively cheap. Once started, 
public sector projects are difficult to stop. Agents in the 
political marketplace have an interest in continuation and the 
costs are borne by the taxpayer. Projects create interest 
groups of architects, engineers, scientists, surveyors, con- 
tractors and unions, each with relative income gains from the 
continuation of the work. 
(1) Niskanen (1971) p48) 
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For the particular functions selected by Niskanen the budget will 
be double the sponsor's optimum, as Qmm, can be found (by setting 
MC=MV) to be equal to one half (a-c)/(b+d). 
Although Niskanen's model suggests government bureaucracy will be 
too large, this is not in itself an explanation for rg owth of gou- 
ernment(1) unless the model is one of long term disequilibrium. 
Niskanen favours instead an explanation of institutional changes over 
the past few decades caused by such things as the progressive move- 
ment. (2) 
Another way in which bureaucrats might over-expand their budgets is 
suggested by Tullock (1974) who introduces consideration of voter 
behaviour. In Tullock's view bureaucrats are likely to vote for an 
expansion of the bureaucracy in elections, an effect that is likely to 
snowball - although in Britain the effect will be contingent upon the 
number and distribution of bureaucrats within constituencies. 
Consideration of the effect of voters can be divided broadly into 
two approaches, depending upon the presence or absence of full infor- 
mation. The importance of information has become increasingly 
recognised in economics. Hayek (1945) emphasised the crucial impor- 
tance of information in the economy in a seminal article. Stigler 
(1961 & 1983) suggested the application of standard optimising theory 
to explain how much information agents would choose to acquire and 
Sowell (1980) has provided insight into many aspects of society by 
considering the results of agents rationally making decisions with 
limited information. 
(1) See Jackson (1982) p135) 
(2) Niskanen (1972) cited in Borcherding (1977) 
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Information costs are not required in Tullock's theory of self 
interested bureaucrats voting themselves bigger budgets. On the other 
hand, information costs are important in Downs's (1965) view. Here 
voters vote for public budgets that are too small because they are 
assumed to underestimate the benefits of public programmes. 
Using information costs to argue the opposite viewpoint, Buchanan 
and Wagner(1977) argue that deficit finance leads voters to underesti- 
mate not the benefits of public programmes, but their costs in terms 
of future tax obligations. Suffering from "fiscal illusion" when 
weighing the price of future tax obligations they will vote for public 
benefits that are larger than they would require with full informa- 
tion. An important feature of these papers therefore is the use they 
make of the concept of the cost of obtaining information to different 
groups of actors in the economy. 
However, in addition to Tullock's "Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucra- 
cy" noted above, other voting models can yield results suggesting the 
likelihood of government size being non-optimal. Thus, a simple medi- 
an voter model of decision making in the economy can demonstrate that 
either under-provision or over-provision of public goods may take 
place and that optimum provision is only likely to be the result of 
chance. No information costs are necessary to this model. 
Thus in Figure 4 there is a pair of diagrams, with, in each case 
three voters A, B and C having marginal valuation curves for a public 
good MVA, MV, and Mo. If the price of the public good is P, the 
social optimum is given by the intersection of this price line and the 
vertical summation of the marginal valuation curves as Q.. If provi- 
lion of the public good is financed by way of equal tax shares of 
one-third P, individual demands will be given by QA, QE, and Qmm. 
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FIGURE 4: A SIMPLE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 
Thus, depending upon the price of the public good, and the height of 
the marginal evaluation curves, the median voter B will either vote 
for over provision or under provision, depending on whether QB is 
above or below Q,,. 
Spann (1974) has used an analysis similar to the one above to show 
that a move to collective provision of private goods can receive 
majority support although substantial welfare loss is imposed on the 
minority. Deadweight efficiency losses are outweighed by 
distributional gains to the majority. 
Distributional theories of government growth are examined in the 
next section. However, before examining distributional questions, a 
brief review of empirical work on some of the above hypotheses is in 
order. 
Cameron (1978) has analysed data for eighteen nations(1) for the 
(1) USA, Canada, UK9 Ireland, Austria, Japan, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. 
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years 1960-1975 and examines a number of theoretical explanations for 
government growth. He rejects Wagner's law on the basis of his find- 
ing no significant relation between economic growth and the share of 
the public sector. He tests fiscal illusion theories using a variable 
for the percentage of "hidden" taxation. This is measured by the per- 
centage of indirect taxes and social security contributions in overall 
taxation. Cameron rejects fiscal illusion as an explanation of gov- 
ernment growth because a high proportion of "hidden" taxes is not 
found to relate to high government growth. On the other hand, the 
view that politics is likely to influence the scope of the public 
economy is confirmed by his study. Cameron states: 
Thus nations such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark, in which left- 
ist parties tended, on average, to possess a majority of the 
government's electoral base, experienced increases in public 
revenues, which were much larger as a proportion of GDP, than 
those nations such as Japan, Italy or France, where the Left 
either participated in government only as the minority partner 
of non-leftist parties or was excluded from government alto- 
gether. (1) 
In addition Cameron finds that the frequency of elections shows 
some positive relationship with public sector growth. He tests 
bureaucratic growth theories by suggesting, following Tarschys (1975) 
that increases in public sector spending should be high in nations 
where no single authority controls spending, but instead there is "a 
multiplicity of autonomous governmental bureaucracies". (2) Somewhat 
tenuously it appears, he suggests that bureaucratic theories therefore 
imply higher growth of government in federal states where 
fragmentation encourages bureaucratic expansion. He therefore rejects 
(1) Cameron (1978, p1253) 
(2) Cameron (1978, p1248) 
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bureaucratic theories of government growth on finding empirically that 
a high degree of centralisation is related to the expansion of the 
public economy. 
Another writer who has attempted, more recently, to assess the rel- 
ative importance of competing theories is Borcherding (1985), who con- 
siders the case of the United States. Borcherding examines a number 
of empirical studies and concludes that Baumol's relative price effect 
can explain thirty-one per cent of the growth of the share of govern- 
ment expenditure in the USA. Borcherding accounts for a further twen- 
ty per cent of the growth of the share of government spending in GNP 
using Peltzman's (1980) estimate of unity for the income elasticity of 
demand for public expenditure in conjunction with an estimate of 
growing income equality. Together these explanations account for 
nearly forty per cent of the growth rate of US public budgets since 
1902. (1) 
Although Borcherding discusses other theories of government growth 
at some length, he does not make an attempt to assess their relative 
importance. 
A view has been strengthening recently in the economics literature 
that growth of government can best be understood by seeing it as 
essentially a question of income redistribution. One theory based on 
distributional considerations, due to Spann (1974) has already been 
considered above. Spann's interest in the effects of potential 
distributional gains is shared by others. (2) This question is now 
examined. 
(1) Borcherding (1985) p368) 
(2) Pommerhene and Schneider (1985) 
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GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
It is likely that David Ricardo(1) was the first economist to have 
drawn attention to interest groups' use of government expenditure as a 
means of redistributing income to themselves, suggesting that the 
House of Commons was 
... tormented... with constant solicitations to sacrifice the 
public good to particular interests. 
Over one-hundred and fifty years later Karl Brunner argues that 
The essence of politics is redistribution and political con- 
flicts center on matters of redistribution. This central 
aspect of political processes, the very motor force of poli- 
tics, has been discarded by the public goods approach to "col- 
lective choice" and government, and similar approaches fail to 
comprehend therefore, in my judgement, the crucial mechanism 
producing the relative growth of government. (2) 
Models of the growth of government as an agent for securing trans- 
fers between groups in society have been developed by many authors. 
With the extension of the franchise, government expenditure may be 
increased by the poor voting for increased expenditure. This is the 
basis of Meltzer and Richard's model (1977,1983) though the idea had 
been raised earlier by de Tocqueville writing in 1848. DeTocqueville 
contrasts majority rule of the rich, the middle classes and the poor: 
In countries in which the poor should be exclusively invested 
with the power of making laws no great economy of public expen- 
diture ought to be expected: that expenditure will always be 
considerable; either because the taxes do not weigh upon those 
who levy them, or because they are levied in such a manner as 
not to weigh upon those classes. In other words, the govern- 
ment of a democracy is the only one under the power which lays 
on taxes escapes the payment of them. (3) 
(1) Hansard, 22 May 1822, quoted in Seldon (1987) 
(2) Brunner (1978) p662-663) 
(3) de Tocqueville (1971, p150), quoted in Bennett and Johnson (1980, 
p59) 
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In Meltzer and Richard's model (1977,1983) the voter is assumed to 
be fully informed and the median voter determines the level of 
redistribution. His desired level of redistribution rises with 
increases in the (positive) difference between average income and the 
median voter's income. The median voter recognises that too much 
redistribution can lower GNP and hence the amount available to be 
redistributed, so in setting the level of his demand for 
redistribution he will beware of killing the goose that lays the gold- 
en egg. 
Who the median voter is depends upon who can (and does) vote. 
Thus the median "voter" could be "a dictator, absolute monarch, or 
marginal member of a junta"(1) or the median voter in a system of uni- 
versal suffrage. 
Redistributional theories of government growth can also be classi- 
fied according to their treatment of information costs: Meltzer and 
Richard emphasise a major difference between their theory and those 
about to be discussed below: 
Our assumption that voters are fully informed about the size of 
government differs from much recent literature. There, taxpay- 
ers are portrayed as the prey sought by many predators who con- 
spire to raise taxes relative to income by diffusing costs and 
concentrating benefits, or in other ways(2) 
Anthony Downs was an early writer to identify some of the features 
of a theory of government redistribution where voters lack informa- 
tion, or, as he demonstrated, are "rationally ignorant". As an exam- 
ple, he argues that 
... legislators are notorious for writing tariff 
laws which 
(1) Meltzer and Richard (1981, p924) 
(2) ibid 
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favour few producers at the expense of thousands of 
consumers. (1) 
Downs summarises the reasons for this as follows: 
In order to influence government policy-making in any area of 
decision, a citizen must be continuously well-informed about 
events therein. Unlike a voter, he cannot deal merely with 
post facto differentials. The expense of such awareness is 
so great that no citizen can afford to bear it in every policy 
area, even if by doing so he could discover places where his 
intervention would reap large profits. If he is going to exer- 
cise any influence at all, he must limit his awareness to areas 
where intervention pays off most and information costs least. 
These are the areas of his production specialisation, since his 
income flows from them and he already knows a great deal about 
them. (2) 
More generally, Borcherding (1977b, p59) points out that 
... if a coalition consisting of 100 persons stands to make a 
net gain of $3000 each from a policy, they may successfully 
push it through the legislature even though the attendant net 
damage is $1 each to 500,000 people. 
Tullock (1959) has set out a mechanism of using funds raised by a 
general levy to benefit specific individuals, and Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962, p289) have shown how this mechanism can be applied to the 
activities of special interest(3) groups. These arguments lead to the 
conclusion that the government will engage in excessive activity. 
Olson (1965,1982) has analysed the features of interest groups. He 
argues that the assumption that 
if the individuals in some category or class had a sufficient 
degree of self interest and if they all agreed on some common 
interest, then the group would to some extent also act in a 
self-interested or group-interested manner. (4) 
(1) Downs (1957) p255) 
(2) Downs (1957, p259) 
(3) The term "pressure group" is more common in Britain. 
(4) Olson (1982) p17) 
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is "fundamentally and indisputably faulty". (1) 
The reason for this is that individuals in the interest group have 
an incentive to free-ride on efforts of others to advance group col- 
lective interests. Olson shows that the viability of interest groups 
depends upon selective incentives - selective in the sense of being 
differentially provided to those who contribute towards the costs of 
the interest group. (2) 
One interest group that may be well organised is the middle-class 
as a whole. This is the basis of Stigler's statement of Director's 
Law: 
Public expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the 
middle classes, and financed with taxes which are borne in con- 
siderable part by the poor and the rich. (3) 
In Britain, Le Grand has found evidence that Director's Law oper- 
ates. Reviewing expenditure on health care, education, housing, and 
transport, he finds that: 
Almost all public expenditure on the social services in Britain 
benefits the better off to a greater extent than the poor. 
This is not only true for services such as roads where, due to 
the insignificant role played by a concern for equality in 
determining policy, such an outcome might be expected; it is 
also true for services whose aims are at least in part egali- 
tarian, such as the National Health Service, higher education, 
public transport and the aggregate complex of housing 
policies. (4) 
The mechanism of government growth through transfers to interest 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) Examples of selective incentives, which can be negative as well as 
positive include "sending to Coventry", union closed shop arrange- 
ments and private goods made available only to members of the 
interest group. 
(3) Stigler (1970) 
(4) Le Grand (1982) pp 3-4) 
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groups has also been identified as part of the new rent-seeking liter- 
ature (Buchanan) Tollison and Tullock, 1980). In this view the 
interest-group theory of government is a special case of rent-seeking. 
Thus according to Tollison 
the theory of rent seeking involves the study of how people 
compete for artificially contrived transfers. (1) Politicians 
will have incentives to search for issues on which well defined 
groups gain transfers at the expense of the general polity. (2) 
Gabriel and Loderer's (1983) model is one of transfers from a 
majority to an interest group. The transfers will be larger, under 
their model, the larger. the individual income of majority members, the 
lower the incomes of interest group members and the higher the overall 
income of the population. 
Peltzman's (1980) model works in terms of a "politically dominant" 
policy. A politically dominant policy "maximises the difference 
between the number of beneficiaries perceiving the policy as the best 
deal [in terms of redistribution] and losers perceiving it as the 
worst deal. "(3) 
Combining elements of a number of related approaches enables the 
following picture to be constructed. Interest groups succeed in 
gaining redistribution of income to their members because they have 
informational advantages over their "victims" the general public. 
Although a straight cash transfer would be the most attractive way to 
receive the transfer it has the major disadvantage of being too obvi- 
ous. The information costs to the injured parties are too low. Thus 
(1) Tollison (1982, p 576) 
(2) Ibid. p590 
(3) Peltzman (1980, p222) 
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cover stories(1) are brought in and redistribution is generally in 
kind to aid the cover story. An advantage of these redistributive 
theories of government growth is that the are in accord with the rela- 
tive and absolute growth of transfers shown in Tables 2 to 8 and the 
regressions of tables 12 and 13 above. A convincing element is their 
incidental explanation of why so much government provision is of pri- 
vate goods rather than public goods. Under this view, government pro- 
vision of private goods is a vehicle for complicated redistributions 
that would be likely to be rejected if they were explicit in cash 
terms. (2) Often successive redistributions may pass expenditure back 
and forth between interest groups -a process that has been referred 
to as "churning". (3) 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The growth of government this century is a well established phenom- 
enon for the developed western nations. Investigation of the latest 
OECD data in this chapter has confirmed a number of facts about the 
public sector. Firstly, government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income has been rising continuously this century, and specif- 
ically since 1948 for the countries studied here. Secondly the rate 
at which it has been rising has itself been increasing over time. 
Thirdly, there is evidence for a negative relation between conserva- 
(1) This term is used by Tullock, see Tullock (1983) p11) 
(2) Plotnick (1986) points out that the predictions of models of 
interest group induced redistribution can also be derived from 
altruistic models such as Hochman and Rogers (1969). He suggests 
that tests that discriminate between the two models may be diffi- 
cult to construct and that a synthesis of the two approaches may 
be more promising. 
(3) Lindbeck (1985, p324) 
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tive political orientation and the rate of this growth. Fourthly, 
public sector employment has also been growing continuously, except in 
the United States, though here there is evidence that growth may have 
occurred "off-budget". Lastly, transfers have been continuously 
rising as a proportion of national income, lending support to the 
newer theories explaining government growth in terms of income 
distribution. 
A large number of theories have been put forward to explain the 
growth of government. It is likely that there is no single cause of 
government growth but rather an aggregation of separate effects 
stemming from the arguments discussed above. Empirical work to assess 
the relative contributions that these effects along the lines of 
Cameron will be of value, but is likely to be hampered by the 
difficulties of quantification. 
Within the theories discussed two broad questions apply rather gen- 
erally. Firstly there is the question of information. Do voters con- 
sistently receive and act on incorrect or incomplete information as in 
the case of fiscal illusion theories, or theories of bureaucracy. Or, 
relatedly, are they consistently the victims of interest group 
behaviour. If so the question first put by Muth in starting the 
rational expectations revolution arises: "if expectations were not 
moderately rational there would be opportunities for economists to 
make profits in commodity speculation, running a firm, or selling the 
information to present owners". (1) Thus, one may ask, why do not 
firms arise to sell information correcting fiscal illusions, exposing 
redistributional conspiracies of interest groups, or revealing infor- 
(1) Muth (1961) 
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mation that bureaucracies would wish to keep to themselves? The 
explanation would appear to be that such information is not excludable 
and therefore needs to be demanded collectively. An opposing interest 
group needs to be organised, but this may not be practicable, due for 
instance to diffusion of possible membership. 
Secondly, the majority of these theories suggest good reasons for 
believing that the public sector may be "too large", but are less suc- 
cessful at explaining the continuously increasing share of government 
expenditure in National Income observed for this century. Is this 
just the result of a very gradual movement to a high equilibrium posi- 
tion as yet unrealised, or are there some other factors at work such 
as the progressive relaxation of constraints so far unidentified in 
the literature? Some evidence that the country with the highest 
growth rate of government expenditure of those examined in this chap- 
ter, Sweden, may have reached an equilibrium appears in Table 15, 
which shows that public expenditure as a percentage of GDP reached a 
peak in 1982. 
TABLE 15, SWEDEN: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS A PER CENT OF GDP 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
62.3 65.3 67.4 67.0 64.4 65.2 63.5 62.5 
Source: The Swedish Economy 1986, National Institute of Economic 
Research, Stockholm, 1986. 
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ECONOMETRIC TESTING OF THE DISPLACEMENT EFFECT: A NOTE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article, Diamond(1) criticises the econometric tech- 
nique used by Bonin et al. (1969) in their investigation of the Pea- 
cock and Wiseman "displacement' hypothesis. (2) In using slope and 
shift dummies in a single regression to estimate the displacement 
effect, Bonin et al. (1969) implicitly assume that the variance of the 
error term is the same before and after the displacement. Diamond 
suggests that this assumption is unrealistic(3) and in his tests of 
the displacement hypothesis implies that the problem of unequal error 
variance has been overcome. In this comment it is shown that 
This Appendix reproduces P. A. Watt, "Econometric Testing of the 
Displacement Effect: A Note", Finanzarchiv, 36(3), 1978. The 
author wishes to thank A. J. D Buxton, L. G. Godfrey, K. Hartley, 
J. D. Hey and A. R. Tremayne for helpful comments, but retains 
responsibility for error. 
(1) Diamond (1976/77) 
(2) Peacock and Wiseman (1967). In their pioneering analysis of 
public expenditure growth, Peacock and Wiseman gave the name 
"displacement effect" to the tendency for public expenditure to 
shift to a new plateau after "large scale social disturbances". 
They suggested that the displacement effect was the result of the 
emergence of "new ideas of tolerable tax levels" and the 
unearthing of new social wants as a result of the "inspection 
effect". 
(3) Diamond (1976/77 p. 397. ) 
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Diamond's tests require the same assumption of equal error variance 
for which he originally criticised Bonin et al. The assumption is 
then directly tested and where indicated some of Diamond's tests are 
re-run using a test developed by Jayatissa (1977) which is valid for 
cases of both equal and unequal error variance. 
II. TESTING FOR THE "DISPLACEMENT EFFECT" 
Diamond argues that the determinants of public expenditure may be 
divided into two categories: first, "environmental factors such as 
per capita GNP, " that vary continually and secondly, such factors as 
"institutional arrangements, " and "tastes and preferences, " that may 
usually be assumed to remain constant, but in "times of major social 
upheaval... can safely be assumed to change". This second category 
of factors is naturally difficult to quantify and Diamond follows oth- 
er studies in seeking to express its effect indirectly as a structural 
shift in the coefficients of a regression equation estimated for more 
easily quantified variables. 
There are three ways in which changes in institutional 
arrangements, tastes and preferences may be reflected in, sucb a 
regression equation. First, once and for all changes are likely to 
affect the constant term. Secondly, any interaction effects will 
affect the slope coefficients and thirdly, any change in the pattern 
of variation of tastes and preferences will affect the error variance. 
A formal test of the displacement hypothesis should focus on these 
three changes. 
Diamond's structural change model may be written as(I) 
(1) Diamond (1976/77, p. 397). The above model is set out in some 
detail as Diamond's formulation is incorrect; cf. Chow (1960) 
p59) 
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y1 = X1 O+ U1 uýNNtO, I) 
Yý =0 X1 ýz' uJ uý rv N(O, CZ I) 
where there are Nl observations before the displacement and N2 
afterwards and yl and ul are(N, x 1), ya and ue are (Na xl), p1 
and PE! are ((k + 1) x 1), Xz is (N1 x (k + 1)), X, - is 
{(Ne x (k + 1)) and Nl + Na = N. Diamond uses the "Chow" test to 
test H,: B1 = Bz- against H, : B, # Be. This involves comparing 
1. 
the sum of squared errors obtained by estimating a single vector of 
regression coefficients B in the pooled model 
y, =Xx [BJ +u 
= Xua 
with that obtained by estimating B1 and Br2 in (1). Diamond states 
the test statistic to be(1) 
Ez/(k + 1)J/Ez'/(N - 2k -2)] N F(kll. N-lk-2) 
where z= (y, - Xab)'(yl - X1b) + (yam - Xýb)'(ya - Xpb), 
2' = (yl - Xb)'(yi. - Xzb) + (ya - X2b)'(ye - XEb), 
b1, bz and b are the least squares estimators of Pig Pp and P, and 
2. 
yl = Xlbl and ys = XEb2. However, this result only holds if 
z IL CrI = cr, , i. e. if the error variance is equal before and after the 
postulated displacements. (2) If, as Diamond himself argues at an 
earlier point in his article, this assumption is incorrect then the 
true size of the test will in general be larger than intended. (3) 
(1) In Diamond's article the degrees of freedom are incorrectly given 
as (2k, N-2k). Diamond (1976/77, p. 395) 
(2) See Chow (1960, p. 592), or Fisher (1970) 
(3) See Toyoda (1974), but also Schmidt and Sickles (1977) 
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Thus if 6Z #dz the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null 
hypothesis will be greater than Diamond states in his tests. 
The question of whether the error variance is equal or not is, 
therefore, seen to be important. Diamond argues a priori that an 
assumption of unequal error variance "must be favoured". However, a 
direct test of the assumption is possible. Such a test is performed 
in the next section. 
III. RE-ESTIMATION OF DIAMOND'S RESULTS 
It can be shown that (N1 -k-1 )sly/crj Znr' and 
(N2 -k -1)sýý/Q2rv ý(Ný-k-1) (Where s12 = 
ulul(N1-k-1)-1, sae =u ue(Na-k-1)-i and ü,. and uz-. are 
the vectors of residuals obtained using the OLS estimates of B,. and 
Ba) if ul and ua have the properties assumed in equation 1. (1) 
If further, it is assumed that u, and ua are independent, then 
under H,,: c= are 
S, 
2/(NNý _kk _l 1) 
NF ( N, - k-ß), (N2 k -li 
and this statistic can be used to test for equality of error variance. 
The results of performing this test on Diamond's three pairings of 
data series, using his G1 definition of public expenditure, are given 
in Table 1 below. 
The hypothesis of equal error variance is rejected for comparisons 
a) and c) and it is seen that Diamond's use of the Chow test is 
inappropriate in these cases and his results are placed in doubt. 
Fortunately, however, a test appropriate to cases of inequality in 
error variance has been developed by Jayatissa (1977) and the results 
(1) See, for example, Schmidt (1976 p. 12, Theorem 3). 
-58- 
CHAPTER ONE: APPENDIX I 
TABLE 1: VARIANCE RATIO TESTS 
Time series compared F Degrees of Critical point Null hypothesis 
Freedom at 5h level of equal error 
variance 
rejected? 
a) 1920-1938 and 10.152 17,4 8.63 Yes 
1885-1913 
b) 1930-1938 and 1.220 7,8 4.53 No 
1920-1929 
c) 1950-1970 and 43.478 19,17 2.76 Yes 
1920-1938 
TABLE 2: JAYATISSA TESTS ON DIAMOND'S DATA 
Time Series compared F Degrees Critical Null hypothesis 
of point at B1 = B2 
Freedom 5% 1% rejected? 
a) 1920-1935 and 57.764 2,1 200 4999 No 
1885-1913 
c) 1950-1970 and 8.444 2,7 4.74 9.55 Yes 
1920-1938 
of performing this test for comparisons a) and c) are given in 
Table 2. (1) The properties of Jayatissa's test are discussed in 
Appendix II to this chapter. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Direct testing confirms that Diamond was correct to question the 
assumptions of equality of error variance before and after a dis- 
placement. However, his subsequent use of the Chow test is incorrect. 
It is argued that future research involving testing for change of 
structure should follow the procedure set out in this note. An ini- 
tial test of the hypothesis of equality of error variance should be 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1) The computations involved are lengthy. Listings of a FORTRAN sub- 
routine to compute this statistic are available on application to 
the author. 
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made and where this is rejected, a Jayatissa test rather than a Chow 
test should then be used. 
REFERENCES 
Bonin, J. M., Finch B. W. and Waters, J. B. "Alternative Tests of the 
"Displacement Effect" Hypothesis", Public Finance, Vol. 24,1969, 
pp. 441-456. 
Chow, G. C. "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Lin- 
ear Regressions", Econometrica, Vol. 25,1960, pp. 591-605. 
Diamond, J. "Econometric Testing of the "Displacement Effect": A 
Reconsideration", Finanzarchiv, N. F. Vol. 35,1976/77, pp. 357-404. 
Fisher, F. M. "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions: An Expository Note", Econometrica, Vol. 35,1970, 
pp. 361-366. 
Jayatissa, W. A. "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions when Disturbance Variances are Unequal", 
Econometrica, Vol. 45,1977, pp. 1291-1292. 
Peacock, A. T. and Wiseman, J. The Growth of Public Expenditure in the 
United Kingdom (Rev. Ed. ), London 1967. 
Schmidt, P. Econometrics, New York 1976, 
Schmidt, P. and Sickles, R. "Some Further Evidence on the Use of the 
Chow Test Under Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica, Vol. 55,1977, pp. 
1293-1295. 
Toyoda, T. "Use of the Chow Test Under Heteroscedasticity", Econo- 
metrica, Vol. 42,1974, pp. 601-605, 
Watt, P. A. "Econometric Testing of the Displacement Effect: A Note", 
Finanzarchiv, 36(3), 1978. 
-60- 
CHAPTER ONE: APPENDIX II- 
TESTING FOR CHANGE OF STRUCTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this appendix is to set out and discuss a range of 
econometric techniques for testing for change of structure. Such 
tests answer the question of whether a set of regression coefficients 
is the same for regressions performed on different populations. These 
testing techniques are used in two parts of this thesis. Chapter 1, 
Appendix I concerns the question of testing for the existence of a 
Peacock-Wiseman "Displacement" effect on public expenditure resulting 
from war. This can be seen as an example of testing for change of 
structure. The question is examined operationally by testing whether 
the regression coefficients of a public expenditure model are the same 
before and after war. The two sample populations are therefore 
pre-war years in Britain and post-war years in Britain. Because in 
the testing of the displacement effect it was not wished to include 
equality of error variance in the null hypothesis, a Jayatissa (1977) 
test was used. The properties of Jayatissa's test are examined in 
* This Appendix is a significantly expanded version of 
P. A. Watt, "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions when Disturbance Variances are Unequal: Some 
Small Sample Properties", Manchester School, December 1979, 
pp. 391-396. 
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detail in this appendix. 
Perhaps the most well-known approach to testing for equality of 
regression coefficients is that proposed by Chow (1960). In 
Chapter 5, Appendix III, the question of whether the determinants of 
investment in housing by different types of local authority vary 
between authority type is tested by a Chow test. Here the different 
populations are the different local authority types. 
The discussion of these methods of testing for change of structure 
begins with the Chow test. 
THE CHOW TEST 
Consider the following two regression models: 
Y,. = X,. (31 + e1 
Ya = X2p + f, 2 
Where there are T, observations from the first population and Te 
observations from the second population. Y1 is (T1 x 1), Ye is 
(T2 x 1), ( and pa are (k x 1), X1 is (T1 x k) and Xe is 
(T, e x k). The T,, elements of the (T1 x 1) error vector 
s. 1 are 
each distributed independently as N (O, o2) as are the Te elements of 
the (Te x 1) error vector Ea. The Chow test involves comparing the 
sum of squared errors obtained by estimating ß., and in (1) and 
(2) with the sum of squared errors obtained by estimating the follow- 
ing pooled model: 
Y1' = CYJ = X1 Ct3 + 21 = Xß + 
Ye xe ele 
The necessary estimated residuals are obtained as 
It = Y, - 
Y, 
= Yi - X, ß,. = Y, - Xi(X', Xi) 
1 
X', Yi i=1,2 
3 
4 
for the population models (1) and (2) and 
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n 
=Y-Y=Y-X=Y- X(X'X) 1X'Y 
for the pooled model (3). 
5 
Chow (1960) and Fisher (1974) have shown that the test statistic 
1' A 
F=--6 
+ 
is distributed as F with k and Tx + Te -k degrees of freedom. 
This result for two populations is easily generalised to the case 
of p populations. (1) The model is expanded to 
Y Y1' = X, 
ye Xa a 
Y,, Xp /P Ep 
where Y is a (T x 1) vector of observations of the dependent variable 
comprising p (T, x 1) subvectors Y,, i=1, ..., p., X., is a fixed 
(T x kp) block diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are (T, x k) 
matrices of explanatory variables with T, >k i=1,..., p. P... is 
(kp x 1) a vector of regression coefficients comprising p (k x 1) 
subvectors 01 corresponding to the p classes of data and F- is a 
(T x 1) vector of random independently normally distributed errors 
with mean zero and variance 62 comprising p (T, x 1) subvectors 1,. 
It is well known that if ý-. is estimated by 
p. = the resulting estimates for the p 
A 
subvectors of ý. j 
ý,. i=1,... p are identical to those obtained by 
running O LS separately for each of the p populations. A pooled 
model analagous to 3 is formed as 
(1) See for example Dhrymes (1971). 
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Y Y1 
Yý2 X2 
Yp Xp 
8 
where the observation matrices X1, i=1... p are now stacked verti- 
cally to form X, and P is a (k x 1) vector of pooled regression coef- 
ficients. The test for equality of the p vectors of regression coef- 
ficients ß i=1, ... p is now given by the statistic 
F-- Z''/k(p-1) 
[/T-kp 
9 
which is distributed as F with k(p-1) and (T - kp) degrees of freedom, 
where 
'_ (Y - Xß. ß )' (Y -Xß)ß 10 
ý'ý _ (Y - X1)'(Y-Xß), and (X'X)-'X'Y. 11 
UNEQUAL DISTURBANCE VARIANCES 
The tests so far considered assume that the variance of the distur- 
bance terms is the same for each population. If this assumption is 
false these tests may still be correctly used if equality of the dis- 
turbance variances is added to the null hypothesis, (1) but the test 
then becomes a joint test of equality of regression coefficients and 
disturbance variances between the populations. This may be what it is 
desired to test. If, however, the question to be examined is solely 
confined to whether the regression coefficients are equal, and the 
disturbance variances are regarded as nuisance parameters not to be 
tested, a null which does not specify equality of disturbance vari- 
ances is necessary and under such a null, use of the Chow test will be 
(1) c. f. Fisher (1950, pp 124 - 125) 
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incorrect in that it will not have the stated F distribution. This is 
the situation described in Chapter 1, Appendix I. (1) 
An exact test does not require equality of the variances of the 
disturbance terms has been proposed by Jayatissa (1977) and in the 
next section this is set out for the two population case. 
JAYATISSA'S TEST 
Jayatissa establishes his test for the following model 
Yl. = X1(32 + £t 12 
X ýa + ýla 13 
identical to the model of (1) and (2) above except that the errors in 
(12) are assumed to be identically and independently distributed (iid) 
with mean zero and variance dxl-' and the errors in (13) are assumed 
to be iid with mean zero and variance ci . 
Computing the test statistic is quite a lengthy process. First, 
OLS regressions are run for the two population models to give 
(X, 'Xi)-1Xj, 'Y1 and t, = YI-X, (Xj, Xk)-1X3'Yi 
= M1Yi, where Mr = Ir 
The two vectors of regression coefficients are subtracted to give 
d= Pý - ýý and a matrix of eigenvectors of 
Mitsfound such that 
ZjZ, ' = M Zi'X1 =0 and Zi'Z1 = IT. -k7 for 1,. 2. 
For 
t 
each population, £, - = Z1'ji is then formed and each E1' is 
then partitioned into r sub-vectors each of k elements where r is the 
largest integer less than or equal to min ((T1-k)/k, (Tz-k)/k). 
These r subvectors are denoted ýci cy  . "", 
£ crýý 
i=1,2. Now let Q, be a (k x k) matrix such that Q, 'Q= _ 
(1) See Toyoda (1974) and Schmidt and Sickles (1977) 
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(X, 'X, )°1 and form r vectors 
-It 'ýs = Qs'i c, >> + Qý' 
-W<s>> j=1,2,..., r. 
These vectors are then used to form 
r 
S_ 
r; =w 
and finally 
J= d' S-1d . r-k+l 
rk 
14 
Using a result from Anderson (1958), Jayatissa proves that under 
the null: distributed as F with k and r-k +1 degrees of 2 
freedom. 
Jayatissa's test is an exact test for the case where it is not 
desired to constrain dlý = o'er in the null, but as Honda (1982) 
has pointed out there are a number of disadvantages. Firstly there is 
the waste of data that occurs when T1 ý T-. gas at least 
IT2 - Tel 
transformed residuals are thrown away from the larger set of observa- 
tions in forming the partitioned subvectors 
used for calculating the weight matrix. Waste of observations can 
also occur when min ((T, - k)/k) (Ta - k)/k)) is not an integer. 
Secondly the matrix Z defined above is, in general, not unique and 
hence the statistic J is also not unique. A further reason for 
non-uniqueness of J is the possibility, in cases where transformed 
residuals are discarded, of discarding a variety of sets of 
transformed residuals. 
Lastly a major disadvantage of the test in practice is the comp i- 
cated computations needed to calculate it. 
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THE WALD TEST 
Jayatissa's test is the only exact test available at present for 
testing for change of structure with equal error variances neither 
part of the null hypothesis nor the alternative hypothesis. With its 
difficulty of computation and other drawbacks the question arises of 
whether an alternative asymptotic test might be better in practice. 
Such a test is Wald's 
ýýý W= tr3ý. -j rE 1ý(X1'X1)-i }- 
where following the notation used above to set out the Jayatissa test, 
the two regressions YV= XLFt+ E are distinguished by the subscript int, 2. 
X, "IY,. are (T1 x k) and (Ti x 1) matrices of explanatory and depen- 
dent variables, , is a (k x 1) vector of regression coefficients 
estimated by 0, = (X1'X, )-'X, 'Y, ; ¬i is a Ti x1 vector of 
disturbances with elements distributed as IN(O, d"P-) estimated by 
z, = , Y1 - Xi (X' Xi )-1 X,. ' Y1 and j, 2 
(T, - k>-I£, '61. Under the null hypothesis ý1 = fz W is 
distributed asymptotically as 'ý with k degrees of freedom. A proof 
of this result is given in Honda (1982). 
A COMPARISON OF JAYATISSA'S AND WALD'S TESTS 
The question now addressed is whether in practice the Wald test is 
preferable to the Jayatissa test or vice versa. This appendix seeks 
to shed light on this problem by means of a Monte Carlo study. 
Before the Monte Carlo study is described some concepts used in 
comparing tests are reviewed. 
Formally, a test is a procedure for determining whether to accept 
or reject a statistical hypothesis. Rejection of the null hypothesis 
is indicated for each sample for which the test statistic is greater 
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than some appropriately chosen constant k. A test therefore deter- 
mines a partition of the sample space into a critical region 
comprising all those samples for which it rules the null hypothesis to 
be rejected and its complement to the acceptance region. Associated 
with the critical region are a test's size and power. Size is 
defined as the probability, given that the null hypothesis is true, of 
the event of drawing a sample from the critical region (and hence 
rejecting the null hypothesis). Power is defined as the probability 
of the same event given that the null hypothesis is false. Clearly 
high power and low size are to be desired although these aims conflict 
in the sense that in general an expansion of the critical region 
obtained by reducing k is expected to increase both. 
The classical method of comparing tests rests upon consideration of 
the power of tests of a given size and thereby avoids the question of 
the relative importance attached to size and power. Knowledge of the 
exact distributions of tests allows their sizes to be set equal by the 
appropriate choice of critical values. (1) However as the exact 
distribution of the Wald test is unknown it is not possible to use 
this method of comparison here. Instead Monte Carlo simulation tech- 
niques were used as the basis for comparison. The critical value for 
the Wald test is set by reference to its asymptotic distribution 
to 9lVVe a test of nominal size 0.5 and the empirical size and 
empirical power are computed in a Monte Carlo study. Empirical size 
is defined as the sample proportion of rejections of the null hypothe- 
sis in a Monte Carlo experiment where data has been artificially 
(1) Strictly, in some cases not relevant here, randomisation may be 
necessary to achieve this result. See Silvey (1970, p. 100). 
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generated so that the null hypothesis is true. Similarly, empirical 
power is defined as the sampling proportion of rejections of an untrue 
null hypothesis. Although the exact power and size of Jayatissa's 
test are known, its empirical size and power have been computed during 
the same experiments and are tabulated for comparison. (1) 
The model used for the Monte Carlo study was: 
yt = 0 + bixt + £t, Et IN(0)cr1 )9 t= 1, ..., n2 
yt =0 + bext + fit' E IN(0, C2P-), t = nx+l, ... n., +na, 
with the following parameter values: 
bi = 2.0, be = 2.0,2.5,3.0,4.0 
n1, na = 10,10; 10,40; 20,30; 50,50 
8= U2.12/neo = 100.0,10.0,1.0,0.1,0.01 
Five different pairs of (50 x 2) X1, Xe matrices were generated 
with the first columns being in each case unit vectors, and the second 
columns (i) uniform, (ii) AR(1), P =. 05 (iii) AR(1), 1=. 5, (iv) AR(1), 
p=. 9, each with zero mean. The variance of the first fifty observa- 
tions of xt was set to one. To remove effects on the power of the 
tests due merely to changes in G, the signal noise ratio, this ratio 
was kept at a constant value of four for the two equations by making 
appropriate adjustments to the variances of the disturbances and the 
second fifty observations of xt and b;. and 8 were varied. The 
observation matrices were truncated for values of n1 and ne less 
than fifty. 
One thousand sets of values for the Y1 and Y2 vectors were 
generated for each combination of parameter values with Q'12 deter- 
(1) The results for the empirical size of Jayatissa's test provide 
some check on the computations and give a feel for the sampling 
variation. 
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mined by the variances of the regressors in the two subsampies, G, 
b1, be- and 0. The nominal size of the tests was set to . 05. In the 
light of results obtained for the empirical size of W, a Wald test 
with a nominal size of . 025, denoted W2, was also tried. As the 
results were not sensitive to different values of 0 only results for 
the case 8= 10 are given here and they appear in Table I. In common 
with other Monte Carlo studies the results are conditional on the par- 
ticular parameter values and observation matrices used in the experi- 
ments and there is no firm ground for more general inference. 
TABLE 1: RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS 
Number of rejections of null hypothesis in 1000 replications 
(G04) 0=10, bl=2.0) 
x process: Uniform; AR(1), P=O: AR(1), P=. 5; AR(1), (0=. 9 
ni n2 b2 W WE 3 W WE 3 W W2 3 W WE 3 
10 10 2.0 89 59 55 97 57 49 80 55 48 90 56 49 
2.5 150 107 76 123 81 65 183 138 96 141 95 63 
3.0 282 208 112 149 97 59 360 284 134 211 153 92 
4.0 519 444 209 253 178 104 659 565 301 336 269 125 
10 40 2.0 111 69 48 92 60 50 94 60 50 101 64 46 
2.5 279 208 132 179 122 79 296 211 138 277 205 127 
3.0 648 557 294 439 351 187 741 649 322 703 595 304 
4.0 984 968 643 879 824 439 991 987 684 988 970 613 
20 30 2.0 64 39 45 56 31 40 71 42 42 68 39 48 
2.5 279 189 178 218 156 141 289 192 192 279 199 185 
3.0 674 572 481 618 519 428 696 595 514 684 576 512 
4.0 976 954 898 936 907 816 988 971 913 984 967 907 
50 50 2.0 58 24 51 61 35 48 47 24 39 46 25 48 
2.5 472 367 409 428 335 381 432 309 368 369 274 313 
3.0 930 897 902 909 855 867 924 880 898 832 755 779 
4.0 1000 1000 999 999 998 999 1000 998 998 996 993 995 
Note: The critical values for a two sided test of the hypothesis that 
the type I error is 0.05 are 36 and 64 using the 5 per cent level of 
significance. 
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RESULTS OF THE MONTE CARLO STUDY 
In these experiments the W test generally has the highest empirical 
power. It has been noted that it is desirable to make such compari- 
sons of power between tests of equal size, and that the exact size of 
the Wald test cannot be determined, but in the 50,50 samples the 
empirical size of W is close to its nominal value of . 05. In the 
smaller samples the empirical size of W is often considerably in 
excess of its nominal value but here the size of the ad hoc W2 test 
appears to be only slightly biased above . 05, even for very small val- 
ues of nx and ne, whilst its power is almost always considerably 
greater than that of J. A comparison of results for the 20,30 and 
10,40 samples suggests that unbalanced samples markedly reduce the 
power of J whilst the effect on the two Wald tests is to raise their 
empirical size. As the degrees of freedom for Jayatissa's J relate to 
min (nl, ne) this reduction of power is not unexpected. 
Similar results to these have recently been reported by Honda 
(1982) who has carried out more Monte Carlo work along the same lines. 
What conclusions can be drawn from these results? 
With samples as large as 50,50 the nominal size of the Wald test 
appears to be correct. There is therefore a strong case for 
preferring it to Jayatissa's test which has lower power and entails a 
considerably greater computational burden. For the smaller samples no 
firm conclusions can be drawn. The empirical power of W is consider- 
ably greater than that of J but its empirical size is also consider- 
ably in excess of the nominal value. However, results for the 
ad hoc W2 test suggest that not all of this extra power results 
merely from slippage in size caused by setting the critical value too 
low, and that research into finding a more systematic method for 
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improving on the accuracy of the asymptotic distribution of the Wald 
test in small samples may yield a better test than any considered 
here. 
Meanwhile, whether the gain in power offered by the Wald test ade- 
quately compensates for its unreliable size in samples smaller than 
50,50 will depend upon the relative importance attached to these 
properties in the particular testing problem involved. 
CONCLUSIONS I 
This appendix has set out and examined some alternative tests for 
change of structure which are used in Chapter 1, Appendix I and Chap- 
ter 5, Appendix III for empirical testing. When disturbance variances 
can be assured to be equal, or the experimenter is happy to examine a 
joint test of equality of regression coefficients and disturbance 
terms, the Chow type test or extension to several populations set out 
in the first half of this chapter, may be used. If it is not wished 
to assume that disturbance variances are equal and attention focusses 
solely on the question of equality of the regression coefficients the 
verdict is much less clear cut. A Wald test is easier to compute than 
a Jayatissa test and yields more power, but at the expense of some 
slippage in size. 
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 of this thesis was concerned with general government 
expenditure in a number of developed western nations. In the next two 
chapters the focus is narrowed down to local government expenditure in 
England. 
Local government expenditure is important both as a part of the 
economy and as a part of public expenditure. Local authorities' 
expenditure stood at £35,000 million in 1985-86, forming more than a 
quarter of the public expenditure planning total and eleven per cent 
of GDP. Local government employs three million persons in Great 
Britain, representing fourteen per cent of the workforce. 
Seventy-seven per cent of local government spending is devoted to 
*) This chapter is a substantially revised and extended version of 
Chapters 3 and 4 of J. G. Gibson and P. A. Watt, The Effect of GREs 
on Education Expenditure and Budgetary Decision-making by Local 
Authorities, Report to the Department of Education and Science, 
INLOGOV, April 1987. The fiscal pressure measures used are 
discussed in more length in J. G. Gibson, P. Smith and P. A. Watt 
"Measuring the Fiscal Pressure on English Local Authorities under 
the Block Grant System", Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy, 1987, (5) pp 157-170. Discussion of the block grant 
builds on P. A. Watt, "The New Block Grant and Controls over Local 
Authority Capital Payments", Local Government Studies, March/April 
1980, pp 27-30, and P. A. Watt, "The 1981/82 Block Grant Settlement 
for England", Local Government Studies, March/April 1981, pp. 
12-14. The author is grateful to C. R. Barrett and W. S. Siebert 
for helpful comments. 
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current expenditure, fourteen per cent to capital expenditure and 
eight per cent to debt financing. (l) This chapter, and the following 
three, are devoted to different categories of local authority expendi- 
ture. Thus this chapter is devoted to current expenditure, Chapter 3 
is devoted to capital expenditure, Chapter 5 is devoted to the housing 
branch of the capital expenditure budget and Chapter 4 is devoted to 
the education branch of the current expenditure budget. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the overall pattern of 
local authority current spending and then turns to its main focus: 
the modelling of year-on-year changes in local authority aggregate 
current expenditure. After theoretical discussion, a model of local 
authority expenditure change is estimated for the year-on-year change 
in local authority budgets for three pairs of years: 1982/3 on 
1981/2,1983/4 on 1982/3 and 1984/5 on 1983/4. 
Results from modelling year-on-year change in local government 
expenditure have policy implications for the present government, 
which, since it came to power in 1979, has been concerned to control 
the level of local government expenditure. The discussion of expendi- 
ture modelling is introduced in a section that surveys the recent 
expenditure modelling literature. The remaining part of the chapter 
is used to develop a model of local authority expenditure change and 
test it. 
A major element in a local authority's expenditure decision-making 
is its budget constraint. However the budget constraint facing 
English local authorities over the years considered - 1982-83 to 
(1) Department of the Environment (1986, p83) and Smith and Squire 
(1987, p9) 
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1984-84 - is complicated by a complex grant system. Much of the chap- 
ter is therefore devoted to setting out the nature of this budget con- 
straint and developing summary measures to represent its hypothesised 
effect an spending. These measures are termed fiscal pressure. 
In the final part of the chapter a model of local authority expen- 
diture change is estimated using measures of fiscal pressure, vari- 
ables indicating political control and variables measuring other fea- 
tures of the grant system. 
THE PATTERN OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CURRENT SPENDING 
In 1983-84 local authorities in England devoted £23,738m to current 
expenditure. The distribution of this expenditure for recent years is 
shown in Table 1 which is extracted from a recent public expenditure 
White Paper (HMSO 1986, p339) and sets out local authority current 
expenditure by category. The entries for 1984-85 are estimated 
outturn, as are those for 1985-86, which are derived from local 
authority budgets. 
The distribution of expenditure between categories is seen more 
clearly in Table 2 which shows the same information expressed as per- 
centages of the yearly totals. Education represents the largest pro- 
portion of local authority expenditure, though this has been falling 
over time, largely as the result of the demographic change of falling 
school rolls. Social security has at the same time risen sharply, due 
to a different demographic effect - the rising number of old age pen- 
sinners, and has also risen as a result of local authorities being 
required to take over the administration of housing benefit under the 
Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982. 
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATED AND OUTTURNN CURRENT EXPENDITURE BY CATEGORY FOR LOCAL AUTH- 
ORITIES IN ENGLAND (£ million) 
CdlD! i ý, -Q1 ßnl-0C Onti-G n"3 83-84 ý7 
n;. -, 7ncJ 85-86' 886-67 
er- t. 
out out- out- out- out- out- planE 
turn turn turn turn turn turn 
Agriculture) fisheries 36 7s 97 109 121 125 116 
food and forestry 
Irºdustry, energy, trade 102 115 128 141 147 160 149 
and employment 
Arts and Libraries 278 1303 339 362 387 407 396 
Roads and transport 1,335 1,543 1,751 1,837 1,943 1,778 1,747 
Housing 547 525 547 647 5+84 554 491 
Other enviromental 1,880 2,0 2 2,221 2,383 2,543 2,626 2651 
services 
Laws order and 2,173 2,:, 34 2,8 9 3,1: 3 3,4? 6 3, `73 3,, 533 
protective SerViCE_" 
Education and science 8,682 9,71 10,227 10,792 11, CJ9 11! 627 11,417 
Health and Pere-coral 11619 
SCCldl S E7 Vices 
SoCi. aI security 331 
Total Cllr; Ei E; peiiuitue 1710 1 
in E-rigland 
Source: Extracted from the G}overm 
1986-8-1 tos 101.98-69 C nd 9702 1&I 
71, " r? R 221 ] 50" 
. 91 "1 t7p(*ý vý Li I: 5 L! ý. L1ý CiJ_ 
19016 L1 t0 L% L33 132 5 72 3[ CJ7JL CJS7U-1 
nent's Expe Biture Plans 
I 
Lo-. 
don. Tab! _ 4.1 p339. 
In Table 3 the entries of Table 1 are adjusted for inflation, (1) 
Table 4 shows actual and estimated year-on-year growth of expenditure 
and Table 5 shows these growth figures in real terms as derived from 
Table 3. In the earlier years shown in Table 5, the most dramatic 
real cuts were in housing in 1981-82. These cuts followed the sub- 
stantial cuts in housing subsidies on the introduction of a new local 
authority housing subsidy system in April 1981. 
(1) Using the price deflator shown in Association of County Councils 
(1985) p 279). Because this index did not project forward to 
1986-87 this year's index has been extrapolated using the GDP 
index which can be calculated from a comparison of CMND 9702-II 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.1. 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATED AND OUTTURN CURRENT EXPENDITU 
DRIVES IN ENGLAND AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL. 
}teal : 80'41 81-OL Q2-83 
taut- Gut- out- 
turn turn tarn 
AgriculturE, fisheries 
ftod avid fcrestry 
Induc. try, ertergyftrade 
and employment 
Arts and Libraries 
Reads and transport 
Houslinq 
Other e ivirorsnner tai 
services 
Law, order and 
protective Services 
Education and science 
Health and Persoial 
social services 
Social security 
:EB "'r, Cl 
83-84 
out- 
tL! rr, 
TEGORY FOR LOCAL AUTH- 
ä4-$. `s 85-96 86-87 
e5 . 
out- ou - Plans 
turn turn 
0.46 ßi. 46 0.48 0 . 4ä 0.45 
0.60 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.62 x. 57 
1.63 1.61 1.61 1.52 1.53 1.5 1.52 
7.84 8.07 8.33 7.74 7.70 6 . 35 6.72 
3.21 2.75 2.0 2.73 2.1 2.13 1 , 89 
H. O4 10.73 10.56 10.04 10. OR 10.12 10 . 2.1 
1L 13 , ri r i. 12.76 ý. _{2 1.3. ;4 13.20 13.86 1,:.. 7.14.17 
50.98 50.32 '! 8.6- 5, 't 6 44.62 44.80 44.25 
9.51 7.39 9.37 8.99 9.03 5.33 9.72 
ný c IS ý7 + -. 3, ý am, cV 1.74 2.51 k. 18 9.2 9.811 10.32 10.51 
Total cu I Lent expenditure 100.00 100.00 160.00 100.00 
100,00 100,00 1001.0(1 
in Engiand 
Sous__: Calculated from The Government's Expenditure Pleite 
1986-87 to 19831-80, C n902 7r: ý 1&ý& ;I{ p339- ýrýld Loý, don. Table 4.1 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED AND OUTTURN CURRENT EXP£N»ITU 
ORITIES IN ENGLAND IN REAL TERMS (198 -85=1007 £ 
Year. 80-81 81-82 82-83 
out- out- out- 
turn turn turn 
Agriculture, fisheries 
food and forestry 
Industry, energyItrade 
and employment 
Arts and Libraries 
Roads and transport 
Housing 
Otter einvircnmenta? 
Services 
Law, order and 
protective Services 
Education and science 
E BY CATEGORY FOP, LOI 
rniIIiýjn) 
83-84 84-85 B5-86 
est. 
out- out- out- 
tu Ti turn turn 
; rt AUTH- 
8ö-3! 
plans 
114 112 
1iß? 
114 121 120 10 
135 136 141 147 149 153 1 37 
36 363 373 378 387 392 363 
1068 1,819 1 , 92k 13918 1,9k3 1 , 7O 1,604 
724 619 601 676 584 531 451 
2,490 214119 24 411 2,488 2,543 23519 23433 
31873 3 046 3.153 3,271 3, ?6 35432 3,331 
11,499 11,339 11,22A 11,268 11 259 11 ,i2 
10,1 515.4 
and Personal Health LI 2144 2,116 L1165 2 229 
2/27 
sLL 322 1 a'v 27. =14 
social services 
Social security 438 566 967 2,297 2,472 2,569 2,505 
ýýr? Total current expenditure + 2J2 }ý57 
ýJ85 +}')53`i 23i1ý? ý 9 24,785 
L 
253232 týji1 r LT r 
aýlý_ý1 
in England 
Price Index 75.5 84 .E 91 . tß 95.6 100.0 104.3 10.9 
S urce. Calculated frogs The Government's Expenditure Plans 
1986-87 to 19B3-89 Crind 97702 1& II Londun. Table 4.1 p339. 
and Association of Cc'urity Councils(1985) Rate Support Girant) 
London Table i p279. 
It is interesting to compare the planned negative growth in public 
expenditure, shown in the last column of Table 5, with the positive 
real growth that has been the overall pattern of outturns. This is an 
example of an effect that has been noted in earlier work by Jackman 
(1984), of major planned cuts in expenditure programs, which do not 
materialise by the time the plans become outturns. 
The tendency for these planned cuts not to be fulfilled in subse- 
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quent outcomes can be explained in terms of a number of political and 
institutional effects. Firstly, until the recent Rates Act conferring 
powers on central government to ratecap selected local authorities, 
central government has not had direct powers to control the level of 
any local authority's current expenditure -a situation leading one 
senior treasury official to describe local government finance as the 
"Achilles Heel" of Treasury control of public expenditure. (1) Second- 
ly, it has been argued(2) that the effective way to obtain cuts in 
local government expenditure is to cut central grant. However, it 
appears that the government has been unwilling to bear the political 
costs of the implied rate rises. (3) Thirdly, local authorities' 
political composition has changed during the period which may have 
worked to prevent cuts. (4) 
Apart from social security payments which have risen very rapidly 
for the reasons described above, Law and Order has received the most 
sustained growth in resources, reflecting central government policy 
priorities. (5) 
THE FINANCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
The major sources of finance for local government net expenditure(6) 
are local taxes in the form of rates, and central grants from the gov- 
(1) Layfield, 1976, p307, quoted in Jackman (1984) 
(2) Gibson (1983) 
(3) Gibson (1983) 
(4) Gibson (1985) 
(5) See Gibson 1981 
(6) "Net" expenditure excludes that financed from fees and charges. 
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TABLE 4: YEAR ON YEAR GROWTH IN ESTIMATED AND OUTTURN CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
BY CATEGORY FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND 
81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 
0n On 11n Oil {+R on 
Year: 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 64-85 85-86 
% % Y, tie % º 
Agriculture, fisheries 10.47 2.11 12.37 11.01 3.31 -7.20 
food and forestry 
Industry, eneray, trade 12.75 11.30 1&16 5.67 7.38 -6.68 
and employment 
Arts and Libraries 10.77 10.06 6.78 6.91 5.68 -3.18 
Roads and transport 15.58 13.48 4.91 5.77 -8.49 -1.74 
Housing -4.02 4.19 18.28 -9.74 -5.14 -11.37 
Other environmental 9.15 8.24 7.27 6.71 3.26 0.95 
services 
Lai, order and 18.91 11.03 9.20 11.59 2.35 2.93 
protective services 
Education and science 10.74 , x. 33 5.02 413 3.17 -1.11 
Health and Personal 10.87 7.71 8.33 6.70 6.23 4.30 
social services 
Social security 45.02 83.33 150.00 12.36 8.33 1.90 
Total current expenditure 12.24 1U. 01 12.813 6.29 2.87 0.11 
in England 
Source: Calculated frotA The Eoverni era' s Expenditure Plans 1986-87 to 1986-89 
Und 9702 1& II London. Table 4.1 p339. 
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TABLE 5: YEAR OPA YEAR GROWTH IN ESTIMATED AND OUTTURN CURRENT 
REAL EYPE, DITURE BY CATEGORY FUR LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND 
(1984-85=100) 
81-83 8c-83 83-84 84-85 35-8ö 86-87 
ar on on on or, oon 
ye¢t i et)-81 31 °L 82-803 83 0s 84-85 55-86 
n `{r % h ii 
Agriculture, fisheries 
food and ff orestry 
Industry, eriergy, trade 
and employment 
Arts and Libraries 
Roads and trflrlrpo, t 
wousirrq 
Other envirormenta? 
se vices 
Law, ürd, r and 
protective services 
Education and science 
HEalth and PE s i, _ß 
sotlai services 
Social _c-curl -v 
Total cur SE it expenditure 
it Enq'and 
-1.68 -4.82 6.77 6.32 -0.92 -11.19 
0.35 "3.76 4.66 1.21 2.99 -10.88 
-1.11 2.60 1.46 2.39 1.37 -?. 3 
2.7 
"Jt -0.32 
1.30 
-1 .23 -5.97 
-14 . 58 -2.87 1L. 3ä -13.55 -9.01 -1=. 18 
-t. B5 0 . 
90 L94 2.21 -'"f. `ia -3.39 
5.84 3.0 3.1116 6.87 9 
-1.39 -0.89 0.26 -0.08 -0.9 11 -5.36 
-1 . 
32 2.31 L. 
17 
2.19 1.93 
-0.19 
29.07 70.91 137.53 7.62 3.91 -2.48 
-10.10 L. 
55 
I. 
25 1.80 
-1,33 -4.20 
Sourc_: Calculated frcaa The Government'= Expenditure Plaits 1936-9; to 1988-9 
iC nd 9702 1& II London. Table 4.1 p339. and Association of County 
Councils(19 5) Rate Support Grant, London Table J p279. 
ernment. Rates and grant are linked in the sense that net expenditure 
must either be financed by rates, grant, or changes in balances. 
The total of all grants paid to local government by central govern- 
ment is called aggregate exchequer grant. Out of this are paid spe- 
cific and supplementary grants and the rate support grant. The rela- 
tive importance of the various components of aggregate exchequer grant 
is shown in Table b. 
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TABLE 6: COMPONENTS OF AGGREGATE EACHEOUER GRAIL#T 
1984/85 
% of 
Settlement Relevant 
la Expenditure 
Relevant Expenditure 24161 
% of Settl erst 
Grant £N, 
2 55 329 
1985! $6 
A {+f 
Relevant % of 
Expenditure Grant 
Specific Grunts E410 10. O 20.5 2606 10.3 22.2 
Supplementary Grants 166 0.7 1.4 170 0.7 1.4 
Dc<«Gs is Rate Relief 699 2.9 5.9 708 2.8 6.0 
Bloch' 8i-Mniv 8489 35.1 72.2 8280 32.7 70.4 
Total N 11764 48.7 100 11764 46.5 100.0 
Source: tCC ; 1986 PH ID) 
The rate support grant is itself divided into two parts - domestic 
rate relief grant, and the block grant. The domestic rate relief 
grant, or domestic element was introduced in 1967(1) and has been paid 
at the same rate of 18.5p in the pound for twelve years, including 
1986/87. Richard Crossman, the Minister responsible for its introduc- 
tion wrote at the time: 
The first item on my list was rating and how to shift the bur- 
den to taxes. I told [Harold Wilson] I had got into a dead-end 
because the Chancellor just hadn't the money. I therefore 
proposed to de-rate the domestic ratepayer. This is my own 
bright idea which Crocker, my Accountant-General, has accepted 
as a practical proposition at last. The idea is beautifully 
simple. If the Chancellor can only spare me £30 million a year 
in rate relief I am going to make sure that every penny of that 
£30 million relieves the domestic ratepayer; and that is going 
to be done by making him a special government grant which the 
shopkeepers and industry don't share. I got the P. M. into 
thoroughly good humour by telling him about this idea, which he 
immediately liked and regards as the sort of thing a Minister 
is there to invent. (2) 
(1) Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980 p 194) 
(2) Crossman (1975, p419) 
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However, domestic element is of small magnitude compared with the 
major element of the rate support grant: the block grant, which, as 
is shown in Table b, represents seventy per cent of aggregate exche- 
quer grant. Block grant is a residual element in the sense that it is 
made up of aggregate exchequer grant minus specific and supplementary 
grants and the domestic element. The block grant was introduced in 
1981-82 and replaced the previously existing needs and resources ele- 
ments of the rate support grant. (1) 
Unlike the domestic element, which is fixed by an authority's total 
domestic rateable value, block grant varies according to a local 
authority's level of spending. (a) In this discussion, a grant which 
varies with expenditure will be called a matching grant. In order 
to model local authority expenditure change it is necessary to take 
account of the form of block grant. Block grant is therefore 
described in detail. First, however, existing work on local authority 
expenditure modelling is briefly surveyed. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE MODELS 
A large number of expenditure models have been estimated for local 
government in the USA and Britain. A convenient starting point for 
this brief overview of previous work is Ohls and Wales (1972). Ohls 
and Wales estimate a cross section model of the supply and demand for 
state and local government services. They state that they "do not 
attempt to explain how the community demand curve is obtained" though 
"in practice... this demand curve must be obtained through the voting 
(1) See Watt (1980) and Watt (1981) 
(2) In King's (1984) suggested terminology it is an effort-related 
general grant. 
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process". A further problem they encounter is that the price of local 
services is not directly observable. In order to proceed, they assume 
that the supply price of local expenditure is unaffected by quantity, 
but is a function of a number of demographic and factor price 
elements. Demand for local expenditures, on the other hand, is 
assumed to be a function of income, grant and the price of expendi- 
tures. In detail, the following equations are postulated: 
Supply: 
P= a1NM + aeD + a3W + a4CHPOP 
Demand: 
(1) 
Q bt +bG+bý, Y+bti. P (2) 
Where 
P is price of state and local services (unobservable) 
Q is quantity of state and local services (unobservable) 
NM is the fraction of a state's population living in 
non-metropolitan areas 1966 
D is density of population per square mile 1968. 
W is an index of wages of employees providing state and local 
services 
CHPOP is the ratio of population in 1960 to population in 1968. 
G is per capita federal grants to states and localities, 1968 
Y is per capita personal income 1968 
The supply and demand Equations (1) and (2) cannot be directly 
estimated because P and Q are unobservable. However their product 
is observable as expenditure. Ohls and Wales therefore estimate (1) 
and (2) multiplied together for three sets of expenditure series: 
highways, education and local services. 
Because of this unobservability of price and quantity, Ohls and 
Wales are not able to identify the coefficients of Equations (1) and 
(2), but they are able to arrive at the elasticities of demand and 
supply with respect to the explanatory variables. 
Ohls and Wales's supply price equation is improved upon consider- 
-85- 
CHAPTER TWO: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
ably by Strauss (1974) who sees the local tax rate as the relevant 
price that decision takers face: 
... a city council, given a tax base of known assessed value, 
may cut agency-proposed expenditures and/or raise the property 
tax rate when proposed expenditures exceed revenues. The prop- 
erty tax rate that is chosen equilibrates the demand pressures 
for additional services with the supply of revenue. (1) 
and 
The property tax rate represents the political risk of a par- 
ticular expenditure level, given population, income and block 
grants levels ... it operates as a political price that the coun- 
cil faces. tz) 
Strauss sets out demand and supply equations for public expenditure 
of the following form: 
E'-' = bl + b2. -Y 
+ baP + b4P' + b, Trans + bE, t 
and 
E- =R+ Trans = tW + CAF + Trans 
Where 
Y is money income 
P is population 
Trans is grant and income from fees and charges 
t is the local tax rate 
R is total revenues 
W is total local property value 
CAF is revenue from fees and charges 
(3) 
(4) 
Equation 4 is written as an identity because of the legal require- 
ment to balance budgets on the revenue side. There is no equation to 
relate grant to expenditure because Strauss is describing a system 
using non-matching grants. A complicated estimation process yields 
values for the structural parameters of b? = 1.573 and 
bh = -457x10&. Thus grants are found to increase the demand for 
(1) Strauss (1974, p270) 
(2) Strauss (1974, p271) 
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expenditure and tax rate increases are found to decrease the demand 
for expenditure. 
Ashford, Berne and Schramm (1976) follow Strauss's model rather 
closely. They hypothesise that local governments are 
... seeking to maximise social welfare subject to the simultane- 
ous forces of available resources and community needs. tl> 
They argue that 
Since higher expenditure requires higher taxes, those making 
fiscal decisions in local government must simultaneously weigh 
the urgency of community needs against the ability of the com- 
munity and others to provide resources for these needs, and 
then select a combination of expenditure and tax rate which 
they deem best for the community. (2) 
They postulate essentially the same expenditure demand and expenditure 
supply equations as Strauss, except that political control variables 
are added to the demand equation. However, their use of the same for- 
mulation as Strauss for the expenditure supply identity is, on its 
own, inadequate for the English data used because, account needs to be 
taken of the matching element of grant. This matching element was, in 
the period they studied, the resources element of the rate support 
grant. Thus in England, under the block grant(3) the authority's bud- 
get constraint is affected by the expenditure of the authority because 
of the matching element of grant and this complicates the expression 
of the budget constraint. Fiscal pressure expressions of the budget 
constraint take account of this matching element. This review of 
expenditure models is therefore briefly interrupted to introduce the 
(1) Ashford, Berne and Schramm (1976, p8) 
(2) ibid. 
(3) And also under the former resources element of the rate support 
grant 
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concept of fiscal pressure. 
Fiscal pressure is defined in Davies et al (1983) in the following 
way in relation to the Rate Support Grant (RSG) settlement: 
We suggest here that the only sensible expenditure level from 
which to measure the extent to which the RSG measure imposes 
the need for increased use of rates and balances is the actual 
level of expenditure of the local authority in the previous 
year ... Given this starting position a primary measure of the 
severity of the RSG settlement is the rates/balances increase 
if the authority attempts to maintain a constant volume of ser- 
vices. (1) 
In this definition, fiscal pressure is defined as the year-on-year 
rate rise that would maintain last year's spending in real terms and 
is a function of grant changes and inflation. To compute this mea- 
sure, a block grant model is used to calculate the rate rise for each 
authority that would result from raising expenditure by the rate of 
inflation. Because authorities face different budget constraints, 
there will be considerable variation across authorities in this mea- 
sure. 
The first use of a fiscal pressure variable in empirical work is 
Barnett (1986). Barnett defines his fiscal pressure variable as 
the increase in the rate of local taxation that a local author- 
ity would have to levy if it sought to maintain in real terms 
the expenditure plans of the last period(2) 
Barnett hypothesises that local authority expenditure is determined by 
factors including fiscal pressure and a pattern of incremental 
budgeting from past expenditure, and that political control can affect 
the relationship between fiscal pressure and expenditure. The model 
estimated later in this chapter builds on the approach adopted by 
(1) Davies et al (1983) p. 127-128 
(2) Barnett (1986), p136 
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Barnett. Another author who uses an incremental approach is Bennett 
(1984), who argues that: 
The approach developed in this paper views decisions on local 
taxes and expenditures as essentially bureaucratic 
decisions... Local government decisions are not entirely 
incremental, however. They are subject to variable local 
demand and to constraints on the supply of revenue deriving 
from the size of the local tax base and intergovernmental 
transfers ... In addition, it is hypothesised that local govern- 
ment decisions are informed by the desire to maximise some 
overall utility function. (1) 
Bennett concludes that 
The results of the analysis strongly confirm that a very large 
proportion of the expenditure level of local authorities in 
Britain is determined by rolling forward the decisions of pre- 
vious years. (2) 
The model developed in this chapter draws on several features of 
the works discussed above. Before setting out this model, the basic 
features of the local authority budget constraint are discussed, as 
determined by the block grant. 
BUDGETARY CHOICE UNDER THE BLOCK GRANT 
The budget constraint under the basic block grant(3) is described 
first. Next the more complicated budget constraint under targets and 
grant penalties is described and an approximate measure of the effect 
of these complicated changes in the grant system is developed. 
Thirdly, the expected effects of other variables seen as exerting 
influence on budgetary choice - namely local politics, and the 
published figures of GRE and target - are discussed. 
(1) Bennett (1984) p257) 
(2) Bennett (1984, p267) 
(3) i. e. without targets and grant penalties. 
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THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT : BASIC BLOCK GRANT 
(i) Basic Block Grant 
In setting out the block grant system it will be convenient to work 
with variables scaled by population. The basi 
(BG) of an authority is the difference between 
per head (TE)(1) and an amount it is deemed to 
standard tax effort to its property tax base. 
are levied by applying a tax effort termed the 
poundage (GRP) to the property tax base. 
c block grant per head 
its total expenditure 
raise by applying a 
Local property taxes 
grant related 
This tax effort is an increasing function of the authority's total 
expenditure per head in relation to an assessment of its need to spend 
called its Grant Related Expenditure Assessment per head 
(GRE). GREs are determined by the government in consultation with the 
local authority associations, and are intended to be a benchmark of 
each authority's spending needs. They are constructed using an amal- 
gam of regression analysis of past expenditure, consideration of unit 
costs and committee debate. (2) 
First the block grant of an authority is determined by a set of 
equations specified by the government in its annual Rate Support Grant 
Report. (3) The authority's q rant related poundage is determined 
by two alternative equations, depending on whether its total expendi- 
ture is above or below a threshold level of expenditure. Above the 
threshold level of expenditure (on average ten per cent above GRE) the 
(1) i. e. all spending left to be met on revenue account after receipt 
of other grants 
(2) See Association of County Councils (1985) 
(3) The particular values in the formula quoted here are for 1984/85 
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rate poundage price of spending steepens. The two equations that 
determine GRP are, for authority i: 
GRP, = GRP' + s, (TE1 - G'REj) (5 
where expenditure is less than Threshold, and 
GR'P, = GRP* + s1(THR5. - GRE. j) + s2(TE; _ - 
THRS_) (6) 
where expenditure is greater than Threshold. 
Then GRP1_ is used to define block grant in the following formula: 
HG,. = TE;. - GRP i. GRV :L. M, 
1 100 
(7) 
BGj. is the block grant claim of local authority i (£ per head) 
TEi is the total expenditure of local authority i (f per head) 
GRE is the grant-related expenditure assessment of authority i (f per head) 
GRVj is the gross rateable value of local authority i (£ per head) 
M. is the multiplier for local authority i 
GRP,. is the grant related poundage (in pence) for local authority i 
GRP", is the grant related poundage for spending equal to GRE. 
THRi is the threshold expenditure for local authority i (£ per head) 
When an authority is spending at its grant related expenditure 
assessment, Equation 5 determines GRP, TE1-GREG _0 and hence 
GRP; 
_ = 
GRP-. (1 ) 
GRP- can be seen as the benchmark level of rate poundage that cor- 
responds to the benchmark need to spend (GRE) and is set by the Secre- 
tary of State for the Environment annually in the Rate Support Grant 
Report. Full rate poundage equalisation would be achieved should all 
authorities spend at GRE because GRP-*, which is set by class of 
authority, sums by tier of local authority to the same rate poundage 
for ratepayers throughout England. 
Above threshold the rate poundage cost of spending, dGRP/dTE, is 
raised from s, _ 
to sag an effect known as taper. (2) Two further 
(1) Balances will be assumed to remain constant in this discussion 
(2) e. g. increased 25% from 0.6p to 0.75p for 1984/85. 
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conditions set on the grant system are firstly that the grant-related 
poundage cannot be below zero(1) and that grant cannot be negative, 
but is set to zero should the Equation 7 yield a negative grant. 
Conceptually, the block grant can be split into two components - 
lump-sum and matching(2) - similar respectively to the replaced needs 
element and resources elements of the previous rate support grant sys- 
tem. The rate of matching, or marginal rate of grant can be found by 
taking the derivative of (7) with respect to total expenditure: 
dBG, =1- (dGRP/dTEj). GRV, Mj (8) 
dTE;, 100 
where dGRP/dTE., is sl below threshold, and se above threshold. 
This rate of matching can be negative(3) and this occurred, for exam- 
ple, on expenditure below threshold for those authorities where GRV. M 
was greater than £166.6 per head and on expenditure above threshold 
for those authorities where GRV. M was greater than £133.3 per head for 
1984/85. The multiplier, M, is a device that enables the Secretary 
of State to modify the effective GRV of each authority for the pur- 
poses of year-on-year safety-netting and London equalisation. From 
here on, multipliers will be assumed to be equal to one to reduce 
notational clutter, though they are taken account of in the empirical 
work later. To the same end, the i subscript is also dropped. 
The lump-sum, or fixed element of block grant is defined (by the 
Society of County Treasurers (1981)) as the amount of grant receivable 
(1) Were this to be the case, grant receipts would be so high as to 
allow a negative rate to be set - i. e. payment would flow from 
the authority to the ratepayer. 
(2) See Society of County Treasurers (1981) 
(3) This contrasts with the situation under the old resources element 
grant where the lowest rate of matching was zero. 
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if GRP is equal to zero. If GRP is zero, grant is equal to total 
expenditure. Hence the fixed element can be found by substituting 
GRP =0 in Equation 5 and solving for TE, which at this point of the 
schedule is equal to grant. Thus: 
Fixed Element = GRE - (GRP*/si). (9) 
Some features of the grant system can be shown diagrammatically. 
Figure 1 shows a grant receipts function OA, As2AaZ for authority A. 
The section of the function A, AR occurs where expenditure is below 
threshold. The marginal rate of grant as expressed by Equation 8 is 
negative, shown by the slope. For section AaAa expenditure is above 
the threshold level OT and the negative slope steepens, caused by the 
rise of dGRP/dTE from Si to se in Equation B. To the left of AxAe 
the block grant Equation 7 would indicate a grant function marked by 
the dotted line in the diagram. However, this section is also to the 
left of the forty-five degree line OA1, where grant receipts would 
exceed expenditure -a situation prohibited by statute. Hence, for 
this range, grant receipts are set equal to expenditure and the func- 
tion is given by OA.. 
The fixed element of the grant, discussed above is OF, defined by 
the point where A, Ae meets the forty-five degree line and rate 
poundage first becomes zero as expenditure falls. Lastly for all 
expenditures above A3 the authority receives no grant. At these 
points, the grant, as determined by formula, would be negative, as 
shown in the diagram by the dotted line below the horizontal axis. 
Statute prevents this, and grant is set to zero along the section A3. 
In the early years of the block grant system three patterns of 
grant receipt function occurred. These are shown in Figure 2 for 
three authorities, A, B, and C, their grant receipt functions being 
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DA, AF2A , OB 1BP-B and OC, CC;, respectively. From Equation 9 
it can be seen that the amount of fixed element component of block 
grant depends partly on the size of the authority's GRE. Threshold is 
set at approximately ten per cent above GRE, and corresponds to the 
kinks A? B and Ce. on each schedule. It can therefore be seen from 
the diagram that authority A has the highest GRE and fixed element, 
and C has the lowest. 
The most important determinant of the slope of the schedules, 
expressed in Equation 8 is the authority's rateable value per head, 
GRV. Authority A has the largest rateable value per head, which gen- 
erates negative marginal grant on all its expenditure above its fixed 
element, with the rate of loss increasing beyond threshold. Authority 
B has the lowest rateable value per head and receives positive margin- 
al grant on all expenditure, although at a decreased rate above 
threshold. Authority C is intermediate with respect to rateable value 
per head and receives positive marginal grant below threshold, and 
negative marginal grant above threshold. (1) 
The block grant equations affect the budget constraint for a local 
authority area by supplementing total local resources. Assuming, for 
simplicity, that block grant is financed from central funds not col- 
lected from the local authority area, the local resources of the area 
per head can either be spent on local government expenditure per head 
(TE), or private goods per head (Yd). If the level of resources 
before grant is Y, the local budget constraint can be written as: 
Y+BG=TE+Yd (10) 
(1) Authorities with grant receipts functions like authority C could 
therefore receive over part of the range, the same level of grant 
for two different expenditure levels. 
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Substituting for BG from (7) and re-arranging gives: 
Yd =Y- GRP(TE). GRV (11) 
100 
- subject again to the two constraints that a negative GRP is replaced 
by zero, and block grant cannot be negative. 
This relationship is shown in Figure 3. In this figure 
YI = Ye =Y are distinguished for descriptive purposes. 
YxA, 
_AAY represents 
the local budget constraint. The section 
Y,. A, corresponds to OAS in Figure 1, where local government expen- 
diture is entirely financed by grant. A, A2 corresponds to A, A-, in 
Figure 1 and likewise for AeAa. The portion AaYe corresponds to 
A, Z in Figure 1, where no block grant is paid. 
Implicit in this budget constraint is a range of choices for the 
council on rates and expenditure. How does the authority make these 
choices? Institutionally the framework is as follows. 
LOCAL AUTHORITY BUDGET DECISION-MAKING 
Formally the local authority budget decision is made by its coun- 
cillors. This Chapter examines budget decision-making within a utili- 
ty maximising framework, it will therefore be of interest to focus on 
the utility function of the median Councillor. 
A local authority's budget, with its implied rate levy is usually 
decided by Council in its March meeting. (1) The budget, which is 
presented to Council for approval is the product of estimates from 
spending departments which typically have been subject to scrutiny and 
revision by the Finance Committee with the assistance of the Treasur- 
(1) Danziger (1978, p150) 
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Figure 2: Alternative Patterns of Grant Receipt 
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er. The median Councillor's preferences are therefore likely to come 
under bureaucratic influences of the form outlined in Chapter 1. Cen- 
tral government influence is also possible. A report will often be 
produced by the Treasurer setting out Government guidelines, such as 
the authority's GRE and Target and sometimes sketching out the impli- 
cations of following these guidelines. (1) Greenwood (1981) found that 
councillors' responses to Government guidelines varied between author- 
ity in his sample of twenty authorities - in one authority councillors 
consistently denied their importance - and it is difficult to view 
conformity to often-conflicting guidelines yielding any strong utility 
to councillors. 
The median Councillor is likely to be at least partly motivated by 
the desire to be re-elected and will to this extent attempt to follow 
the preferences of the median voter. Because elections occur infre- 
quently, and are held for bundles of issues, there is scope for the 
pursuit of Party objectives that may not be desired by the elector in 
addition to the influence of central government, bureaucrats and other 
interest groups. 
Models of local authority budgetary decision-making constructed by 
economists and political scientists frequently involve utility 
maximisation, though there are differences in the source of the pref- 
erence structure. Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980, p. 288) take a 
median voter approach: 
... we shall simply assume that 
local government expenditure 
decisions do reflect the preference of the local community. We 
shall further identify the local community with some average or 
representative voter whose preferences and financial resources 
are taken as characteristics of the community as a whole. 
(1) Greenwood (1981, p82) 
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However, Wilde (1968, pp. 340-341) relies simply upon a more permis- 
sive approach: 
Assume that this local governing body has a set of preferences 
for goods and services, both social and private, and that such 
preferences are consistent. Such consistency would mean that a 
normal indifference map could be taken to represent those pref- 
erences. (lt should be noted that this indifference map resem- 
bles that of an individual in being convex to the origin and 
non-intersecting, but is not assumed to be part of a "social 
map" or part of a "social welfare function". This map is not 
assumed (necessarily) to represent the true preferences of the 
citizenry) ... 
In the model proposed here, decision-making is assumed to be vested 
in an individual local authority decision-maker whose preferences 
reflect those of both the median Councillor and the other interests 
suggested above, and who aims to maximise utility subject to the local 
authority budget constraint. 
It is well known that budgeting procedures usually work from the 
previous year's budget as a base(1) and the importance of the existing 
budget is recognised here in that it is assumed that key elements in 
the decision-maker's utility function are changes in the local 
authority's expenditure and changes in its rate poundage. The bud- 
get constraint is therefore re-stated in the next section, firstly in 
terms of feasible rate-expenditure combinations, and then in terms 
of feasible changes in rates and expenditure. 
THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT IN TERMS OF RATES AND EXPENDITURE 
In Figure 4 rate poundage (GRP) is shown as a function of total 
expenditure by a rate-expenditure (RE) function . The points 
OA1A, 2AoZ correspond to points OAlABAaZ in Figure 1 and to 
YiAiAPAaYp in Figure 3. Thus on the section OA,. no rate 
(1) Danziger 1978 
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poundage is levied, as Equation 5 would indicate a negative GRP (as 
shown by the dotted line projected below the horizontal axis) and this 
is prevented by statute. OA: t is equal to the fixed element of grant 
defined above. On the section A,. A,?, rate poundage rises by 
s.. =dGRP/dTE for every pound per head increase in TE. On the section 
APA3 expenditure is above threshold and poundage rises at the rate 
of se until at point As all grant is exhausted, and the poundage 
then rises at the rate 100/GRV. (1) The dotted projection of AeAs 
represents negative block grant that can be generated by Equations 6 
and 7 but is prevented by statute. Figure 4 is determined by Equa- 
tions (5) and (6), plus the two constraints on non-negative GRP and 
BG. 
Figure 5 is similar to Figure 4 but shows the relationship between 
rate poundages and expenditure for a hypothetical local authority for 
two successive years - A. tB, for year t and AL+1B,. 1 for year t+l. 
The authority has a higher threshold in the second year (T,, 1), than 
in the first year (Tt). As drawn, dGRP/dTE is the same in both years, 
and thus the two RE functions are parallel. The difference between 
the RE functions is in threshold and fixed element. 
The difference in fixed element, determined by Equation 9 is com- 
posed of a rise in GRE that has increased threshold, and an increase 
in GRP*. For simplicity zero population change is assumed. 
Figure 6 can be derived from Figure 5 to show the relationship 
between expenditure changes and rate poundage changes (ýRcE). 
Thus, the vertical axis of Figure 6 shows changes in rate poundages 
(1) For authorities of type B in Figure 2 this last section is absent 
as the section AeA; a is less steep than OAS and thus does not 
ever cross OAa . 
I 
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and the horizontal axis shows changes in expenditure levels per head. 
In order to generate the ^R°E function of Figure 6 some initial level 
of expenditure for year t must be assumed. Assume therefore that OL 
is the budget in year t. The resulting rate level for year t (Or) is 
read off the RE function in Figure 5 at M. Starting from this rate 
level in year t, a zero expenditure change in year t+1 will lead to a 
rate increase of MN - shown in both Figure 5 and Figure 6. As expen- 
diture is increased along the horizontal axis from the origin on 
Figure 6, rates rise according to the slope of OA. t_º., KBk. 1Z and -R°E 
is traced out. In effect OAt.. fr. jKB, ,. Z is drawn out on Figure 6 with 
the point M in Figure 5 moved to the origin of Figure 6. 
The equation of the ^-4R'-"E function can be derived algebraically as 
follows. Define 
r= GRP,., - GRP t (12) 
and 
e= TEti. ýx - TEt (13) 
where time t is defined such that at time t, GRP, and TEt are 
pre-determined, but TE,,, is a choice variable to the local authori- 
ty. Thus the authority has a range of budget options for TE, and 
the consequent GRP,,, which are determined by the function drawn in 
Figure 6. This function changes above threshold. Below threshold, 
along the segment AT, TEt+i <_ THRt--, (i. e. e _< THRLtt - TE >. 
Substituting from (5) for GRPt. 1 3r= GRPt_1.1- GRPt can be 
written as: 
r= GRP -,,. ý 1+ s1 (TE,,. +., - GRE,;. ý,. ) - GRP. r. 
Substituting from (13) for TEb, l and re-arranging gives 
r= s1 e+ GRP" ti.,.. 1 - GRP,; +s l(TE t- GRE t,., ) 
e <_ THRt-1 - TEt 
(14) 
(15) 
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The last three terms of (15) are all pre-determined at time t or set 
by central government. If these three terms are denoted by c, (15) 
becomes 
r= sie + cl t lb) 
e _< THR,,, - TE,. 
Hence r is a linear function of e. 
Similar algebra for expenditure increases above THRt,, (along seg- 
ment TB in Figure 6) yields a second linear function of e: 
l" - se +C 
e> THRt., 1 - TES; 
where 
(17) 
C= GRP, *t, _ ,- GRPt + sl (THR. t,. 4-1 - GRVE, --, )+ s2 (TE., - THRt.,.. 1). 
The segments OA (in Figure 6) corresponding to a zero rate 
poundage, and BZ corresponding to zero block grant, although shown in 
Figure 6, are not relevant to the later empirical work as no local 
authorities in the sample were located on this part of their budget 
constraint. The relevant budget constraint to the local authority 
decision-maker, ATE is therefore piecewise-linear and, because 
s0sp, the budget set is convex. 
Suppose now that the local authority decision-maker discussed above 
can be characterised as seeking to maximise a strictly quasi-concave 
utility function U(e)r), where increases in expenditure, e, are con- 
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sidered as "goods" and increases in rate poundage, r, are considered 
"bads"(1) so that Ute, >0 and U,. - < 0. The budget constraint for the 
decision-maker will be (16) below threshold and (17) above threshold. 
Consider the case where equilibrium is reached below threshold, as 
shown in Figure 7. Dropping the 1 subscript, the problem for the 
local authority decision-maker can be written as max U(e, r) s. t. 
-se+r = c. 
Forming the Lagrangian L= U(e, r) + A(c + se - r), the first-order 
conditions are: 
Lý =c + se -r =0 (18a) 
Lý = U, + AS =0 (18b) 
L, - = U, - - 
2. =0ý (18c) 
which gives s= -UL/Ur at the tangency point (e, r). 
At the equilibrium 
c+ se -r0 (19a) 
U,. (e, r) + iss 0 (19b) 
U,. -(e, r) --0. 
(19c) 
Taking the total differential yields: 
sde - d'r = -eds - dc (20a) 
sda + Uý, de + U, -dr- = -Xds 
(20b) 
-d? + U, -ade + Ur., _dF = 0. 
(20c) 
To investigate the comparative statics of this model, consider 
first the effect of a change in intercept c. To do this let ds =0 to 
keep the slope constant in (20) above, and divide through by dc. In 
matrix form this yields: 
(1) This approach follows Sondheimer (1986). See Buchanan and Lee 
(1982) for a similar assumption used in a different context. 
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5 u, ,Ur aeJ& o 
ac-I 
which can be solved via Cramer's rule to give: 
(21) 
e=1s U«- (22) 
11 
-1 U, r- 
and 
i= -1 5 Uexc:. 
UJI 
-1 U, -L- 
where 1J1 is 
0s -1 
5`+! 
PU "v T- 
-1 Ur-fe Urr- 
(23) 
How are these equations to be interpreted? The constant c is the 
level of increase of rates that must be charged for a zero increase in 
expenditure. As c rises, the budget of the decision-maker available 
to finance either expenditure increases or rate reductions, falls. 
The constant c is therefore analogous to the negative of income in 
price theory. For this reason the marginal utility of an increase in 
the constraint c, represented by A is negative, as from Equation 19c, 
= U, _( e, 
r) and U, - <0 by assumption. It is assumed here that 
rate-reductions and expenditure-increases are both superior goods(1) 
and that consequently de/3c < 0. This sign is the opposite to the 
income effect of consumer theory as c represents negative income. 
(1) i. e. an increase in income leads to an increase in consumption - 
see Intriligator (1971, p159) 
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Pursuing the analogy with consumer theory, s is the rate increase 
"price" of increasing expenditure. To consider the effect of a change 
in price s, let dc =0 and divide the equations (20) by ds: 
0s j) _ -e 
s U00 
cl? 
Uf. 
%V" 
-1U, Urr rlý O 
Solving for Üetý s by Cramer's rule gives 
-8 -E. =esU., - -0 -1 as 131 131 
-1 Ury -1 Urr 
(24) 
(25) 
This result is analogous to the Slutsky equation of consumer theo- 
ry. The first term is the income effect of the price change of the 
good expenditure-increases, e, whose price is an increase in the rates 
of s for every unit of e. This can be verified by noting that the 
first term is equal to e times Equation 22. The second term is the 
income-compensated price effect, and this latter point can be shown by 
setting the income change resulting from a price change: -eds = 0, as 
well as -dc =0 in Equation (20a). Equation (24) then becomes 
0 0 
s Uw. 1 UI>,. aeis -ý 
-1 Urres Urr 
irläs 01 
- 
Solving for e/ s by Cramer's rule gives 
-1 U, -, 
compensated 
(26) 
(27) 
As shown above h<0, and : J. ' is positive if the second-order condi- 
tions for utility maximisation are assumed satisfied, hence the income- 
compensated substitution effect is negative. 
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Equation (25) may be re-written as 
e= ae e 
U5 as 
compensated 
(28) 
The overall effect is negative, ae is negative by the assumption äG 
that e can be considered as a superior good, and c can be considered 
as negative income, and it has been demonstrated that 
1aeý 
as compenaatod is negative. 
These effects-can be shown diagrammatically. In Figure 8 the 
effect of a change in slope of the budget line is split into an income 
and substitution effect. To simplify the diagram, only the portion of 
the budget constraint corresponding to AB in Figure 7 is shown. The 
initial budget constraint is AB and equilibrium is at X. The rate 
price of extra spending sx is then assumed to rise and the budget 
line becomes AC with a steeper slope. The point A is obtained by 
solving the two ^-4R, -"E functions generated by Equation 15 with the two 
values for s,, for common r and e, and can be shown to occur at 
r= GRP-t+, - GRP, and e= TEt - GREt_, 1. (1) The change in slope 
has an income effect for all points on the new budget constraint other 
than A. The pure effect of a slope-change can be seen by consider- 
ing the compensated slope change, represented by the budget line DE 
which has the new steeper value for s, but has c adjusted so that 
utility remains constant. The compensated equilibrium moves to Y. 
Hence XY represents the substitution effect of an increase in sl and 
(1) The point A may not exist in terms of actual grant payments if the 
constraint BG >_ 0 which generates the horizontal portion of the 
^xR°E function (as shown in Figure 6) comes into play before the 
two functions cross. Nevertheless the point A is still valid as a 
geometric construction point. 
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is negative. If the income compensation is then removed, the budget 
constraint becomes AC and the income effect of the price change is 
represented by YZ. The total effect of the price change is XZ, made 
up of a negative substitution effect XY and an income effect (assumed 
negative). 
To summarise the above discussion, the options available to a local 
authority's decision-makers have been shown to be expressible in the 
form of ^-RýE functions. These functions are piecewise-linear and, on 
any section, firstly expenditure has been shown to be negatively 
affected by the slope of the ARSE curve with be/3s <0 and secondly 
expenditure has been assumed to be susceptible to a superior income 
effect (Intriligator, 1971, p. 159) in being negatively affected by 
the height of the curve Relic < 0. However, the budget constraint, as 
set out so far leaves out the effect of targets and penalties, a major 
element of the system as operated up to 1985/86. These are now 
described. 
(ii) Expenditure Targets and Grant Penalties 
Expenditure targets are set for each local authority by the gov- 
ernment on the basis of past expenditure. Exceeding target expendi- 
TABLE 7: GRANT PENALTIES 1982/83 TO 1985/86: RATE OF ADDITION TO GRP 
Percentage Expenditure Rate of addition to GRP per 
above target percentage point overspend 
1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 
0f, -17. 3p ip 2p 
7p 
1'I. -2Y. 3p lp 4p 
8p 
2'f. -3% 3p 5p 8p 
9p 
3'/t-4'f. 3p 5p 9p 4p 
4%-5% 3p 5p 9p 9p 
Each subsequent 14 zero 5p 9p 
9p 
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ture invokes small grant penalties from authorities classified as low 
spenders and larger grant penalties from authorities classified as 
high spenders. (1) The criterion for this classification has been pre- 
vious budgeted expenditure in relation to target and/or GRE, with GRE 
becoming relatively more important in the later rules. (2) 
Grant penalties take the form of an addition to GRP in the block 
grant claim Equation 7. The addition depends on the percentage expen- 
diture above target. Penalties have become larger in each successive 
year and their effect on the marginal rate of grant has become much 
heavier than the effect of taper above threshold on grant support. 
Table 7 shows the additions to GRP for overspending target at the 
ratepayer level for the financial years 1982/83 to 1985/86. 
The reason why penalties have become more severe year by year has 
been put as follows in a commentary on the 1985/86 RSG settlement: 
First targets must get tougher year by year if they are to have 
any effect. Once an authority has incurred a penalty it is 
built into its rate demand, and, all other things being equal, 
it could incur a similar level of penalty the next year without 
increasing its rate. Secondly, the increased severity of the 
penalties is designed to eradicate overspending caused by a 
large number of authorities exceeding their target by up to 
2%". (3) 
(1) Association of County Councils, 1984. 
(2) There has been a tendency, caused by the basing of targets on pre- 
vious budgets, combined with constraints on the year-on-year 
reductions required, for the increase in targets to be positively 
related to past expenditure increases. This has left a pattern 
where the relationship of target to GRE depends predominantly on 
past spending patterns by an authority. High spending by 
authorities in relation to GRE tends to result in targets well 
above GRE, and vice versa for low spending authorities, and this 
has resulted in targets being relatively large in relation to GRE 
in London and relatively low for non-metropolitan Counties. Audit 
Commission (1984). 
(3) Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1985, p. 11 
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Targets and grant penalties have introduced further detail into the 
relationship between expenditure and rates set out above under the 
basic block grant system. The penalty for the first increment of 
overspending target changes the slope and the intercept of the RE 
function although it remains linear. Hence if target is above thresh- 
old, Equation 6 for the RE function becomes 
GRP = GRP- + s1(THR - GRE) + sa(TE - THR) + 100. P. (TE - TGT) (29) 
TGT 
where P is the appropriate rate of addition to GRP selected from 
Table 7. Thus, in Figure 4 the RE function for 1983/84 will have six 
linear segments instead of four linear segments as shown, the extra 
two segments being at target and at target plus two per cent. It fol- 
lows from this that each ^Rlý, E function will have six kinks in 1983/84. 
In 1984/85 the number of kinks increased to seven. The equations of 
the ^-R°E functions can be derived as: 
r= (s,.; + 100 . P) .e+ cu + 100 .P (TEt - TGT,. +., ) 
TGTt,, TGT. _F. 1 
(30) 
where TGTtiý, is the target for year t+1 and k=1, or 2, depending 
on whether the authority is above or below threshold. The ^W'-, E budget 
constraint will be of the form ABCDEFGH of Figure 9. It remains 
piecewise-linear, and because successive penalties increase its 
slope(1) the budget set remains convex over its relevant range BGDEFG 
in Figure 9. (2) 
(1) An exception to this occurs for the year 1982/83 which is the 
authorities that spent above GRE and over 5% above Target. 12 
(out of 36) metropolitan Districts and 9 (out of 39) 
non-metropolitan Counties came into this category in 1982/83 and 
for this year these authorities' budget sets are not convex. 
(2) The increases in the slope of the RE function, and hence the slope 
of the °R°E functions, are greater than those induced by the block 
grant taper discussed above. Thus, in 1984/85, after splitting 
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Locally, over each segment the comparative statics results obtained 
from that optimisation, cue/6s <0 and öe/Öc < 0, will hold. Further- 
more, the discussion by Moffitt (1986) shows that for a 
piecewise-linear budget constraint, defining a convex budget set, the 
comparative statics results obtained above hold, with the exception 
that income and price effects may also be zero if the local authority 
decision-maker "sticks" at a kink on the budget constraint. The com- 
parative statics results become be/6s <_ 0 and ae/ac _< 0. 
How is the effect of this complicated budget constraint to be 
incorporated in the expenditure modelling? One way of proceeding is 
to bring the full constraint explicitly into the estimation procedure 
using maximum-likelihood methods. (1) In this chapter however, a more 
limited task is undertaken based on the use of approximations to 
express the budget constraint. The method used, similar to that of 
Barnett (1986), is now discussed. Recall that Figure 9 shows the ^R^E 
curve augmented by the full effects of the target penalties. Instead 
of one intercept and one slope of the discussion of the utility 
maximisation model above, there are six slopes and six intercepts for 
the ratepayer level addition to GRP in non-metropolitan areas, the 
penalty addition to GRP for non-metropolitan Counties per percent- 
age point of spending above target was 1.7471p for up to one per 
cent overspend, 3.4942p for the second percentage overspend, 
6.9885p for the third percentage point overspend, and 7.8620p 
above this. In 1984/85 the average GRE for the non-metropolitan 
Counties was £340 per head and average target was £330 per head. 
The slope of the °R-E function, in the absence of targets and 
penalties, would be either s,. = 0.6 or s=0.75, depending upon 
whether the authority was above or below threshold. If the 
authority was in the third per cent above threshold the additional 
slope caused by target penalties would be 
100P/TGT = 100x6.9885/330 = 2.12 for a County with average target, 
which dwarfs the effect of si or se. 
(1) Barnett, Levaggi and Smith (1988) 
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the function. The approach to estimation taken here is to approximate 
to the ^R°E curve by using just one slope term and one intercept term. 
The intercept term is an expression of the height of the budget 
constraint. If there is just one linear relationship it does not mat- 
ter where on the horizontal axis this height is measured, so long as 
it is the same for each authority. The natural ordinate for measuring 
the intercept is along e=0. However, as a method of approximating 
to the height of the budget constraint, projecting back to the inter- 
N 
cept at vertical axis is likely to increase error as these intercepts 
diverge widely. In comparing the constraints facing different 
authorities, a measure of the height of the budget constraint taken 
nearer to the authorities actual expenditure is likely to reduce the 
divergence. In his model, Barnett (1986) measures the height of the 
budget constraint at i, where i is the rate of expenditure increase 
that would preserve in real terms the expenditure plans of the last 
period. (1) Table 8 sets out the average values for e actually 
budgeted for by metropolitan Districts and non-metropolitan Counties 
(the authorities studied in the empirical work) and the values for 
CRPb and CRPa selected for this study. Essentially the values for 
expenditure change CRPb and CRPa have been selected on an ad hoc 
basis to be in the neighbourhood of average actual expenditure change 
of the authorities considered. The measure used in this study is CRPb 
(Change in Rate Poundage b) of Figure 9, which can be seen from 
Table 8 to be close to the average observed values for the authorities 
considered. (2) The slope of the budget constraint is measured by 
(1) Barnett (1986, p136) 
(2) In some regressions CRPa is used. 
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TABLE 8: ACTUAL EXPENDITURE INCREASES (%) AND EXPENDITURE INCREASES 
USED IN FISCAL PRESSURE MEASURES 
Average Expenditure Increase 
Metropolitan 
Year Districts 
1982/83 5.98 
1983/84 3.81 
1984/85 2.42 
Non-Metropolitan 
Counties CRPb CRPa 
8.59 9 5 
4.49 5 3 
3.02 3 0 
comparing the height of the ^R^E curve over an interval around the 
actual e budgeted by authorities. The approximation to the height of 
the constraint measured at CRPb is called fiscal pressure in this 
study. Secondly, the approximation to the slope of the °R^-E curve 
between CRPa and CRPb (CRPb-CRPa) is called marginal fiscal 
pressure. 
The a priori expectations, based upon the discussion of local 
authority optimisation above are that local authority expenditure 
increases will vary inversely with both average and marginal fiscal 
pressure. These fiscal pressure measures are clearly an imperfect 
expression of the complicated budget constraint that confronts local 
authorities. However, as approximations, it is expected that they 
will show the hypothesised negative relation to local authority expen- 
diture increases. The main barrier to confidence in the applicability 
of the comparative statics results derived above would be the 
non-convexity shown by the ^R°E functions where the constraint on 
non-negative block grant operates. (1) However, none of the 
authorities in the observation sets used (non-metropolitan Counties 
and metropolitan Districts) spent in this region of the budget con- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1) i. e. segment GH in Figure 9. 
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straint. As mentioned above, a non-convexity problem does exist for 
the 12 metropolitan Districts and 9 non-metropolitan Counties spending 
above GRE and more than five per cent above target in 1982/83, which 
may impair the performance of the model in this year. 
Other variables are likely to influence the local authority 
decision-maker's utility function. Three of these variables are 
discussed below - namely (1) local politics (2) targets, and (3) GREs. 
OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN THE EXPENDITURE MODEL 
Local Politics 
Debate over the years 1982-83 to 1984-85 would lead to an expecta- 
Lion that local politics was a major influence on expenditure and 
expenditure changes during these years. Although there is a large 
literature on the measurement of political control, it has included a 
number of contributions which have been sceptical about the relative 
importance of local politics - especially in the less politicised 
shire Counties. To the some extent this body of opinion arose from 
the fact that a number of studies which found significant effects for 
urban authorities were unable to find such effects for the 
non-metropolitan(1) or their predecessor administrative Counties 
(Karran, 1982). However, there are weaknesses in both works cited. 
In Ashford, Berne and Schramm (1976), as has been noted above, the 
model specifies that marginal rate of grant was zero for all 
authorities, thus ignoring the effects of resources element. Karran 
uses the level of grant to explain expenditure, but does not take 
account of the effect of expenditure in determining grant. Newton and 
(1) Ashford, Berne and Schramm, 1976. 
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Sharpe (1984) show that a simple cross-tabulation of published finan- 
cial data by party control reveals fairly obvious differences between 
administrative Counties under different party control. 
Another feature of this literature has been the debate about the 
best way to measure political variables. In a number of studies there 
has been no noticeable improvement derived from using size of majority 
as opposed to dummy (zero-one) variables to register the fact of which 
party has control (if any). In the model estimated here, zero-one 
variables are used and three types of political control are distin- 
guished: Labour control, Conservative control, and No Overall Control 
(including Liberal control). The results from the use of these vari- 
ables is of interest because the consensus among commentators was that 
large differences arose during these years between local parties of 
the same colour in different areas. 
GRE changes 
From Equations 5,6 and 7 above it can be seen that the 
Government's assessment of the expenditure needs of each local author- 
ity (GRE) is a major determinant of the grant received for a given 
level of spending as BG/ GRE = s,,. This GRE effect is already 
embodied in the fiscal pressure variables. Nevertheless, there is 
another potential expenditure influence exercised by GRE and GRE 
changes, in that GRE may be regarded as a normative guideline to local 
authorities on spending. Such an effect was emphasised by critics of 
the Government's intention to publish GREs at the time of the intro- 
duction of the block grant system. It was argued that the central 
assessment of each authority's needs would override or be used as a 
substitute for local judgment on expenditure levels both in total and 
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for individual services. 
The measure used in this study is the change in GRE compared to the 
previous budget of the authority. It is expected that the effect of 
an increase in GRE will be positive. 
Target/Expenditure Guidance 
Target change compared to previous budget is the other major deter- 
minant of the fiscal pressure experienced by different local 
authorities, and thus its potential expenditure effect is embodied in 
the fiscal pressure variables. However, it is conceivable that target 
exerts an additional expenditure effect because of the step changes it 
introduces into the local authority budget constraint and because of 
the prominence it receives in budgetary discussion. If a positive and 
significant effect is found for the target increase variable this sug- 
Bests that authorities are budgeting closer to target than would be 
expected from consideration of the fiscal pressure and other variables 
alone. In theory such a finding is compatible with two separate types 
of behaviour - strategic budgeting (i. e. attempting to ensure that 
next year's target is based on a large budget) or treating target as a 
normative guideline on spending which the authority has attempted to 
follow. However only the former seems a credible interpretation given 
the predominance of authorities budgeting over target compared to 
those below target. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis of local authority behaviour was undertaken 
on annual changes in local authorities' total expenditure in 1982/83, 
1983/84 and 1984/85. 
Specifically, the dependent variable, e, was the year-on-year 
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change in an authority's total expenditure. Three sets of the depen- 
dent variable were collected for the three years studied, as follows: 
For the 1982/83 regressions: the percentage change in the 
local authority's total expenditure between 1981/82 budgets and 
1982/83 budgets 
For the 1983/84 regressions: the percentage change in the 
local authority's total expenditure between 1982/83 budgets and 
1983/84 budgets 
For the 1984/85 regressions: the percentage change in the 
local authority's total expenditure between 1983/84 budgets and 
1984/85 budgets 
Seven explanatory variables were used in the estimation of expendi- 
ture change functions to represent the factors argued to be of impor- 
tance above. They are listed below, and their predicted signs are 
given in parentheses. For each of the three years, three fiscal pres- 
sure variables were used as follows: 
CRPb - the change in rate poundage for a 9% cash increase in 
total expenditure in 1982/83, and for a 5% cash increase in 
1983/84, and for a 3% cash increase in 1984/85 (given zero use 
of balances and zero provision for clawback) (-) 
CRPa - the change in rate poundage for a 5% cash increase in 
total expenditure in 1982/83, and for a 3% cash increase in 
1983/84, and for a 0% cash increase in 1984/85 (given zero use 
of balances and zero provision for clawback) (-) 
CRPb-CRPa (marginal fiscal pressure) - the increase in the 
change in rate poundage for the increase in the change in 
expenditure used to define the CRPs (see above) (-) 
Divergences between target and budget and GRE and budget were 
measured as follows: 
PCT - the percentage change in target compared to previous bud- 
get (+) 
PCG - the percentage change in GRE compared to previous budget 
(+> 
Lastly, political dummies were used: 
CON - equal 
party (-) 
to I when majority of seats held by Conservative 
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NOC - equal to 1 when no party holding a majority of seats (or 
where majority of seats held by Liberal party). (-) 
The model can be summarised as follows: the utility function of 
the local decisionmaker is indexed by political control (CON3 NOC) and 
by the target variable PCT and the GRE variable PCG to give: 
U(e)r ' CON, NGC, PCT, PCG). (31) 
The basic model estimated is: 
e= f(CRPa, CRPb-CRPa, PCG) PCT, CON, NOC), (32) 
with 3 CB/aCRPa <_ 0, c CB/ý(CRPb-CRPa) 1_ 0, GCB/DPCG > 0, a CB/ýPCT> 0, 
and with the shift dummies CON and NOC exerting a negative effect 
on e. Linearity is assumed and the coefficients of the variables are 
estimated by ordinary least squares. 
The model is applied to metropolitan Districts and non-metropolitan 
Counties. The results indicated that all seven variables had some 
role as determinants of changes in local authorities' expenditure. 
However, consideration of these results led to the estimation of 
expenditure functions for local authorities disaggregated into three 
groups by political control. 
Figure 10 shows schematically the sets of regressions which are 
presented below. 
FIGURE 10: Regression Results - Summary of Sets of Regressions 
Metropolitan 
Districts (36) 
Labour 
controlled 
Non-Labour 
controlled 
Non-metropolitan 
Counties (39) 
Labour Conservative 
controlled controlled 
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TABLE 9 REGRESSION RESULTS, ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE - 
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 
--------------Explanatory Variables-----------------> 
Year! Gunst CRPb CR, P'a CRPb PCG PCT CON NOC RE 
Regre=- -CRPa 
Sion 
Number 
82133. 
1.10.74 -. 18(a) . 331 (-4.10) 
2.11.33 -. 16(al -. 23[b) . 334 (-: 3.62) {-1.36) 
3.5"96 
"22(a1  17 . 
215 
(2.06) (-. 45) 
4.10.55 -. 151a) . 04 . 01 -1.3 (cl 1.09 4 . mau {-2.43) (. 33) (. 03) (-. 89) {. 53} 
5.11.57 -. 141al -. 26(b) . 05 -1.64[{] 0. '96 . 372 (-2.22) {-1.42 (. 56) (-1.05) (. 51) 
83184: 
1.3.86 -. 041cl . 042 {-1.22) 
2. `. 19 . 02 -. 18(a) . 164 
(. 47i {-2.530 
3.2.21 -. 13* . 68(3) . 408 
03.29) (Y77) 
4.3.47 . 01 -. 10* . 62(a1 -. 71(c) -.? Olcl . 449 (. 41) R 2.111) (3.33) (-1.07) (-1.16) 
V. 6.94 . 01 -. 37[a) -. 13* -. 77ir3 -1.18(b) . 461 
(. 31) (-3.67) (-2.45) (-1.17) (-1.62) 
841ßK: 
1.3.66 -. 03[al . 544 
{6.370 
2.3.93 -. 06(a3 -. 10Ia) . 594 
(012) (6.43) 
3.2.41 
. 07[a) . 18(b] . 574 
(2.33) 1.53) 
4.3.32 -. 05(al .0 (a) . 177 -. 50[2] -. 15 . 673 
02.65) r; ) (-1.29) {-. 38) 
5.3.46 - 0`[al -. 051b] 08t -. 9[Cl -. 21 . 570 (-2.82) (-1., 93) (2 
.5) 
(-11.27) (-. 51) 
Notes; [al, [bl and [cl denote regression coefficients signif- 
icantly different from zero in a one-tailed test at the . 
05, 
. 10 and 
. 
25 
J` levels respectively. 41 "L. * denotes "wrong' Sign, 
significantly different from zero in a two-tailed test at the 
. 10 level. n=36 
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TAKLE if) REGRESSIGN RESULTS, ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE 
ON-. 1E? EOEOL ITH N COUNTIES 
-----Explanatory Variable=------------------- ---)- 
Year/ COnst CRPb C;; P a CRP PCa3 PCT CCI] NOC F2 
1q 
Es -W a 
Sion 
Nummb? r 
PHIL 
1. 8.82 -. 01 005 
4-. 45} 
2. 8.70 . 00 -. 01 . 006 (. 03) ( -. 44) 3. 5.09 
. 
28(a) 
. 
91a) 
. 
276 
(1.91) (3,32) 
4. 7.87 -. 02(c) . 40(a) . 55[b] -4.61(a] -1.30[] . 523 
Q1.11) (2.74) (1.83) (-3.56) (-. 82) 
t. 7.31 . 03 -. 02[c] . 55(a] -4.37(a1 -. 46(c] . 478 02) (-1 A) (3.31) {-ß. 11J (". 79) 
19E3f84 : 
1. 5.80 -. 11[a] . 31? 
{-4.14) 
2. 6.16 -. 081a] -. 20[a] AS 
-:. 22 t-3.54 cit 
3. 3.54 
. 
131E ] 
. 
16(8] 
. 
357 
(1.30) (. 70) 
4. 5.28 -. 06[al . 16[al . 22[c] -1.76[a] -1,83[a] . 601 (-1.88 (1.80) (1.04) (-3.63) (-3.66) 
5. 6.6 -. 061a] . 
002 
. 
1703 -1.77[al -l. 8 [a] . 
598 
-2.12) (-1.46) (1.92) 
(-3.56) (-3.67) 
1984/B5 : 
1. 4.02 -. 111a1 . 467 
{-5.69) 
2. 3.99 -. 12(a) -, 11ta) . 468 
(-3.49) (-5.55) 
3. 2.21 . 09[c] . 21[c] . 372 
(1.12) (1.09) 
4. 4.06 -. 10[a) . 02 . 19(c] -0.92(b) -. 
20 . 542 
P2.69) (. 20) (. 86) (-1.,; 3) (-. 
35) 
`. 4.08 -. 11(a1 -. 11[al . 06[cI -. 68(b) -. 01 . 
531 
i-2.90) (2.15) (. 77) (-1.17) (-. 00) 
Notes: [aIjb] and Lc] 
denote regressi on coef ficien 
ts signif- 
icantly differe nt from zero in a one-tailed te st at the . 05. 
. 10 and . 25 levels resp ectively . n=37. 
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OVERALL REGRESSIONS 
The two sets of overall regressions results are given in Table 9 
for the metropolitan Districts and Table 10 for the non-metropolitan 
Counties. In each case five regressions per class are shown for each 
year. The approach used was to try to identify first the contribution 
of fiscal pressure variables alone (regressions 1 and 2), and then to 
compare this with the total effect of the GRE and Target variables 
(regression 3). Political variables are added in order to assess 
their importance (regressions 4 and 5). Regression number 4 excluded 
the marginal fiscal pressure variable and regression number 5 excluded 
the Target variable because they were usually highly correlated. High 
correlations also occurred between some other combinations of vari- 
ables, and this signalled a potential difficulty in separating the 
independent effect of all the variables. 
Because a priori expectations have been established for the 
signs of the coefficients, one-tailed tests are used in considering 
the results. One of the tests Cc] is unusually high in size, set at 
the 0.25 level. It is included as being of some interest given the 
difficulty of working on cross-section data on changes. 
Looking at the results, generally the level of explanation in the 
regressions is reasonable given that the dependent variable measures 
such short-term changes in expenditure. When the maximum number of 
five explanatory variables was included (i. e. regressions 4 or 5) the 
coefficient of multiple determination ranged between . 364 and . 673 for 
the metropolitan Districts, and between . 478 and . 601 for the 
non-metropolitan Counties. 
The level of fiscal pressure appeared to be a significant and 
important determinant in all cases except for the metropolitan Dis- 
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tricts in 1983/84 (and in this case marginal fiscal pressure 
appeared to be important) and for the Counties in 1982/83. In addi- 
tion marginal fiscal pressure often had a significantly negative 
effect on expenditure changes in the regressions. For the 
non-metropolitan Counties, the zero-order relation between the level 
of fiscal pressure and expenditure change as measured by regression 1, 
has increased strongly from 1982/83 (Rr=. 005) to 1984/85 (R2=. 467). 
This may be an example of a long period of taking up slack before 
changes in the financial environment began to take effect. 
Political control variables were statistically significant in most 
of the six regressions in which they were tried. Conservative control 
always appeared to exert a significant negative effect on expenditure 
change, with the possible exception of the metropolitan Districts in 
1982/83. The quantitative importance of Conservative control relative 
to the average trend in expenditure appeared to increase over the 
period for the metropolitan Districts. The effect of political con- 
tral though was larger in the non-metropolitan Counties than in the 
metropolitan Districts throughout the period - it amounted to over a 
four per cent change in expenditure compared to Labour control in the 
readjustment phase of 1982/83. The explanation for this is probably 
the unusually large proportion of authorities that had had changes in 
political control and were undertaking expenditure readjustments. (1) 
After changes in political control, the importance of the politi- 
cal control dummy would be expected to be greater than usual. The 
importance of political control variables is seen as an interesting 
(1) The theory underlying this is given in Gibson (1985) - see also 
Jones and Stewart (1982, p52. ) 
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finding, given past difficulties in discerning such political effects 
for the non-metropolitan Counties. The effect of the no overall con- 
trol variable was usually less important and statistically significant 
- but only in one case did it have the "wrong" sign. 
It is important to make a distinction between a coefficient's quan- 
titative size and its statistical significance in relation to the GRE 
and Target variables. The coefficients on GRE and target were 
statistically significant throughout the period in the Counties becom- 
ing less strongly significant in 1984/85. For the metropolitan Dis- 
tricts Target appeared to be highly significant in 1983/84 and less 
strongly significant in 1984/85 whereas GRE became highly significant 
in 1984/85. However the quantitative effect of each one per cent 
change in GRE was never large in relation to the underlying upward 
trend in nominal expenditure - represented here by the size of the 
constant. In fact despite remaining statistically significant in the 
Counties the coefficient on PCG (the percentage change in GRE compared 
to previous budget) became smaller arithmetically than the coefficient 
on the (one penny) change in fiscal pressure by 1984/85, whereas it 
had been larger in 1982/83 and 1983/84. 
In the Districts the statistically significant coefficient on GRE 
in 1984/85 represented a small quantitative guideline reaction of 
under one tenth of each percentage change in GRE. One important anom- 
alous effect is the strongly established wrong signs on PCG for metro- 
politan Districts in 1983/84. 
Overall, apart from this last finding, the results follow the a 
priori expectations from earlier discussion and it is suggested that 
the level of explanation is satisfactory for cross-section estimation 
on expenditure changes. The lowest levels of explanation are for 
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1993/84, and the violation of the convexity assumption, mentioned 
above, that occurred for just over one quarter of the observations for 
this year may have some responsibility for this. 
In the next section it is investigated whether there were differ- 
ences in the structural reaction of groups of authorities under dif- 
ferent political control. The a priori hypothesis postulated was 
that Labour authorities would be less influenced by any guideline 
effect via the GRE or Target variables than non-Labour authorities. 
AUTHORITIES DISAGGREGATED BY POLITICAL CONTROL 
The five sets of disaggregated regressions are presented in 
Tables 11 to 15. Metropolitan Districts were split into two groups: 
Labour controlled and non-Labour controlled for each of the three 
years studied. In non-Metropolitan Counties, the relatively numerous 
hung authorities made it possible to split the data into three groups: 
Labour controlled, Conservative controlled and authorities with no 
overall control. Each of these tables is discussed briefly before 
before an overall summary of these regressions is made. 
Table 11 gives the results for Labour controlled metropolitan Dis- 
trict councils. These authorities appeared to react mainly to fiscal 
pressure. There was very little sign of GRE or Target having a 
guideline effect until GRE in 1984/85. In fact the strongest associa- 
tion with GRE was a negative one, as found in the aggregate regres- 
sions above in 1983/84, caused by the fact that those Districts 
spending furthest above GRE increased their spending most. 
In 1983/84 there was a very significant positive reaction to tar- 
get, but this may have been merely a proxy measure of the effect via 
marginal fiscal pressure which was also highly significant. Despite 
-126- 
CHAPTER TWO: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
TABLE it: REGRESSION RESULTS, ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE 
LABOUR CONTROLLED METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 
----- EnpIariatory VaE i; b1_=. ------: i 
Year/ C onstant CRPb CRPa CRPb P CO PCT Re 
Regression -CRP: 
tdurüer 
1982/83: 
1. li. 35 -. fatal .33 
2. 12.72 -. 171a7 -. 3! [U3 . 356 
(-3.37) (-1.42) 
6.0a . E`[tý] -. l` . 311 
(1.93? {-. 31i 
4. 10.91 -. 17ta) . 04 . 36 . 35j 
(-2.22) (.? 7) (-. 08) 
J. £C. 
3 
:7 1. )[L+3 -. 'ý, [t<! Oi y: 
(-1.42) (. 50) 
1983/S4 
1. 4.71 -. 03[c] . 025 
(-. 73) 
2. 5.25 . 02 -. 13(b] . 09 8 
(. 43) (-1.4) 
j, 2,9iß= . 
10* 
, 
481,3} 
. 243 
11 -l. '4? 
(2.56) 
4. 2.81 0l . 10* . 501ßt . 249 
F:. 16: t-1.31) 2.3i} 
ý. 6.48 . 01 -. 33[aß -. 13ý . 282 
(. 21) 711 
f Dr ,! L, J: 
4 3,63 . ioLai 
{-1.31} 
2. 3.90 .0 [aý "1 its] , L-1 
3. 2.49 . OBta} , 1ýE_1 ,5` 
(1.97) (1.33) 
4. 3.48 -. 5L'al . 071a] . 
00 . 661 
(-2.62) (1.0) (. 01} 
J. 3.4 r -, ttila] L JLL`" 
y,, 
. 
71b) a 
. 
661 
[-cac`, I {-i. ö3} X1.3"} 
Notes: n=27 0982l33i; n=23 '19831ä 4i; n= 4 
1 17 r'Lsý Ial, [ü 
and [e3 denote regr ession coefficien ts signif icantly different 
from zero in a one-tailed test at th e . 
0151, 
.1 
0 and . 
25 levels 
respectively. * de notes 'wrong' sig n, signif icatilly differ- 
ent fr;. zerr, in a two-tailed test a t the . 10 level. 
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TABLE lE: REGRESSION RESULTS, ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE 
NON LABOUR CONTROLLED METROPOLIT ,N DISTRICTS 
-----Explanator 
Pearl Constant CRFb CRPa CRPb PC8 PCT RI? 
Regression -CRPa 
Number 
1982183: 
1. 8.78 -. 09Cc] . 
104 
(. 90) 
2. 8.95 -. 07 -. 11 . 105 
PAS PAS 
3. 6.32 . 12 -. 09 . 12 
(. 69) (-. 16) 
4. 7.41 -. 04 . 08 -. 04 37 
{-. 29) (. 32) (-. 06) 
5. 6.97 -. 05 . 01 . () 3 . 140 
(-. 35) (. 02) (. 45) 
1983184: 
1. 3.91 -. 07[c] AN 
] A. 29) 
2. 5.33 . 01 -. 31[a) . 516 
. 11) t-3.16) 
3. 1.66 -. 09 . 741a] . 537 
. 
83) (2.49) 
4. 1.48 . 
01 -. 07 . 
75t. -. 1 . 
528 
. 18) (-. 82) (2.30) 
5. 6.85 -. 00 -. 47[8] -. 11 . 546 
i-. 0) f-2.541 1-1.02) 
1ß84/L5: 
t. 4.04 -. 13[a) . 337 
(-12 
L. 
5) 
2. 4.33 -. 09[b] -. 15Eä] . 
454 
"', -1.46/ ? -2.651 
3. 2.42 
. 081c] . 10 . 
549 
(1.18) (. 38) 
'fr. 3.01 i 
ftL _. ": 
rt. LI . 
U, i . 
cLLJ rr: 
. 
r7Q ý 
i-. 97) ;. 12i ". CÜ) 5. L'. o1 . l}4 -. 03 . 101411 . 564 
(-. 58) ! -. 28) (1.41) 
Notes: n=9 (1982/33 ); Ei-13 (1 83/84 ){ n=12 (1984/85 ) Ea , 
Eb] 
and Cc] den ote regression coefficien ts signi ficantly differen t 
from zero i na one-tailed te st at th e . 05, . 10 and . 25 levels 
respectivel y. 
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TABLE 1 REGRESSION RESULTS), RESULTS), ANNUAL C hiI E"_ IN E PENDIT RE 
LABOUR CONTROLLED NON-It COUNTIES 
( -----Explanatory Variables ------ ) 
Year/ C onstant CRPb CRRP`a CRPb PCG PCT Fig 
Regression -CRPa 
I4u Sb er 
1982/83: 
1. 10.78 -. 02 . 038 {-.. Ju 
2. 11.77 -. 06 -. 02 . 043 
K. 24) ß-. 55i 
3, 5.022 'ýý . 49[c] 1.21[c] . 547 
f 1.09) (1.06) 
4. 6.10 -. 02[c] . 55(c] 1.11(c] . 601 
(-. 91) (1.18) (. 96) 
5. 3.93 . 11 -. 02[c] . 94(äl . 571 
(. 55) (-. 86) (2.72) 
1983184: 
1, 6.94 . 15(a] . 733 P5.63) 
2. 8.19 -. 12[a] -. 29(a] . 864 
(-3.92) (-3.5? ) 
3. 4.06 . 14 . k9[r] . 666 
(. 41) (. 78) 
4, 5.71 . iiC_] . 02 . 31  8 7 (-3.21) (. 10) 
( 74) 
5. 7.20 
-. bi[a] -. 
19[c] 
. 10 . 
870 
P3,27) K. 911 (. 51) 
1. 4.5J -. 141a] . 70-D 
j-4.32) 
2. 4.32 -. 15[al -, 13t. -ß] . 702 
(-3.70) (-ß. 31) 
3. 2.14 . 16 . 08 . 240 
(. 69) (. 15) 
4. 4.59 -. lv[a] . 
04 -. L_ . 
716 
i-3.17) (. 26) 4-. 54) 
5. 4.11 . 141x] -. 121b] . 02 .7 
09 
t-? . 12} (-1.54) (. 15) 
Not&S 
; =10 (a], (b) and Ic] 
denote regression coef ficients 
significantly different from zero in a orte-tailed test at the 
. O'd, . 10 and . 25 levels resp ective y . 
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TABLE l4-, REGRESSION RESULTS! ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXPENDITURE 
-CJ SER; VATIVE CONTROLLED NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES 
t----- Explar{atoº y Variables------> 
'aari Constant CRA CR'P'a C : F'b PCG PCT 5 
REgr2=_-_iun -CRP'a 
Number 
1982/33: 
1. 11.79 -. 26[. ] . 531 
(-4.64) 
2. 11.84 -. 22[a) -. 301a] . 535 P2.08) (-2.65) 
3. 1.34 . 68[17 . 16 . 421 
(3.51) (. 67) 
4. 9.81 . 221a] 315 . 04 . 537 
-2.06) (. 46) (. 18) 
5. 
10.42 . 
22[a 
-. 
23 
. 
11 
. 
536 
P2.02) P. 65 (. 14) 
1923134; 
1. 5.21 -. 06 [cl . 037 (-. 85) 
2. 6.06 -. Dutt] -. 24(b] . 113 
(-. 81) i-1.48) 
3. 3.11 . 20(b) . 13 . 209 
t1.75i (. 30) 
4. 3.32 -. 02 . 19[ü] . 14 . 214 
(-. 33) (1.52 {. 33) 
5. 4.15 -. 10. . 
08 
. 
19(b) 
. 
214 
t-. 34) (-. 41) (1.48) 
1984//5 
1. 4.! ); i -. 15(a) . 
241 
t-ß, _91 
2. 5.21 -. 04(c) . 32(a) . 642 
(-. 94) : -5.64) 
3. 0.24 
. 
09(c) 
.? 
O(a) 
. 
682 
; 1.31: (4.17) 
4. 0.3J 0.35 _. 01 1 . 
03 r-[c] rn ý 
. 
89(] 
.68 
ný 3 
-. 16) (1.11) (3.81) 
5. 3.96 -. 01 . 
25(a) 
. 
12(b] 
. 
694 
(. 12) t-3.78) (IM ) 
Nctiesi 
nn'21 
Ia), [b) and [c] denot e regression coe 
fficients 
Eignifiranti y differ ent from zero in a one-tailed test at the 
A . 10 and . 25 lev els respective 
ly. 
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riLE 1115c, REGRESSION u RESULTS, ANI ýi rrzi TrB, ANNUAL CHANGES IN EXFENDI URE 
NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES UNDER NO OVERALL CONTROL 
-----Explanatory Variables ---- ---- 
't'ear/ Constan t CFPb CFFa CRPb PCG PICT Re 
REgresE. ion -Cilia 
Number 
1982/8" 
1. 12.69 r. 
. 053 P. 53) 
2. 10.93 -. 17 . 22 . 067 K§5) {. c5? 
3. 9.03 . 30EL1 2. Z6Ea . 778 
1.30) (4.02 
,, r. 74 . ätß - .1 2.50131 "ý_' . 792 
(. 50) ( -. 34) (3.40) 
5. -21.04 . 13 2.10[b] 1.29[b] . 492 
(. 43) (1.65) (1.83) 
1783184; 
1. 5.4- -. iSEbJ . 
294 
2. 6.30 . 12{b] -. 431~i7 . 879 
(1.72) 06.00', 
3. 2.44 . 141c] . 371c] . 805 
(. 76) (. 87) 
4. 0.16 . 
12 
. 
08 
. 
77[c) 
. 
871 
(1.42) (. 45) (1 1 
Jc . 
5.71 . trt_} 't . 
li 1t -.. otC3 :Jc .f 
rr 
1882 
(1.47) i-l. 56) (. 29) 
4..;, 85 
1. 4. E5 -. 09[e] . 202 
'-I. E3t 
2. 3.5 -. l6[b] -. 082.7 . 327 
P154) (-1.06) 
3. 3.77 . 60Ea] -1.88* . 631 t (-2L591 
4. 2.83? 
. 
08 
. 
77(b] 
_r2j . 
21 
. 
664 
(. 47) (1.76) (-1.93) 
5. -2.02 -. 0! . 
32 
. 
45Cb] 
. 
450 
(-. 05) 41.49) (1. '92) 
Nütes: ri=1 tal, [E1 and Cc] denote regress=ion coeffi cients 
Sigriii iraritil y different from . ero in a one-ta iled te st at th e 
. 05 . iss and . 25 le vels resp ectively. * deno tes 'wr ong' 
signs signif icantly differen t from zero in a two-tai letd test 
at the . 10 l evel. 
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this, the level of explanation achieved in 1983/84 was low and relied 
partly on the perverse association between GRE and spending. The 
degree of explanation was very high in 1984/85, and satisfactory in 
1982/83 and was mostly due to the level of fiscal pressure. 
Table 12 gives the results for non-Labour controlled metropolitan 
District councils. The level of explanation for these authorities was 
low in 1'982/83. In 1983/84 either marginal fiscal pressure or Target 
was the key variable and explained over fifty per cent of variation. 
In regressions including both variables (not shown here), marginal 
fiscal pressure appeared to be the more important variable. In 
1984/85 all the variables appeared to have some importance - certainly 
GRE was statistically significant for the first time. 
Table 13 gives the results for Labour controlled non-metropolitan 
Counties. Average fiscal pressure seemed to be the dominant variable 
in 1983/84 and 1984/85 but GRE and Target jointly had an important 
influence both statistically and quantitatively in 1982/83 only. Lev- 
els of explanation were very high throughout. 
Table 14 gives the results for Conservative controlled 
non-metropolitan Counties. For these authorities the fiscal pressure 
variables were the most important in 1982/83, but in 1983/84 GRE was 
significant and its coefficient quite large. In 1984/85 marginal fis- 
cal pressure, target and GRE all appeared important. 
Lastly Table 15 gives the results for non-metropolitan Counties 
under no overall control. These authorities were markedly different 
from the other groups in 1982/83 with Target being the key variable. 
As this group usually budgeted above Target it can be inferred that 
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there was a strong "strategic budgeting"(1) effect exhibited. Howev- 
er, in 1983/84 this effect was not present, and by 1984/85 it was 
replaced by the largest reaction to GRE seen in any of the sets of 
regressions. This was accompanied by some fairly strongly established 
wrong signs for the target variable. 
In general non-metropolitan Counties under no overall control 
reacted most strongly to target and GRE variables, and reacted in the 
opposite way to a 
--priori expectations 
for Target in 1984/85. Only 
in 1483/84 did there appear to be a possible reaction to fiscal pres- 
sure rather than to GRE or Target. 
Overall, there was more reaction to GRE amongst non-Labour groups 
of authorities and by 1984/85 it had seemed to become a more important 
factor compared to Target - perhaps the increasing severity of grant 
penalties had by then made strategic budgeting too expensive or per- 
hags authorities were aware by then that the target methodology was 
less rewarding to such behaviour. Except in the case of the "hung" 
Counties fiscal pressure was again usually a consistently important 
and statistically significant variable - the exceptions being in 
1982/88 in two of the other four groups - Labour controlled 
non-Metropolitan Counties and non-Labour controlled Metropolitan Dis- 
tricts. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter has discussed the main features of local government 
current expenditure in recent years. Education expenditure represents 
(l7 The practice of budgeting over target in the hope of generating a 
favourable target for the next year which would be expected to be 
based on the previous year's target. 
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the largest share but has been falling over time whilst social securi- 
ty spending has risen sharply in the same period. The most dramatic 
real cuts over the period have been in housing in 1981-82. In general 
a tendency for planned cuts not to be realised in outcomes has been 
noted and some reasons for this have been suggested. 
The primary purpose of the chapter has been to specify and estimate 
a model of local authority expenditure change. Existing models of 
expenditure change have been surveyed and elements of these models, 
particularly that of Barnett (1986) have been used to specify the mod- 
el tested in the later part of the chapter. 
An extensive analysis of various expressions of the budget con- 
straint confronting local authority decision-makers has been carried 
out. This has been combined with a simple utility maximisation model 
concerned with choice over expenditure-increases seen as "goods" and 
rate-increases seen as "bads". Simple approximations, termed fiscal 
pressure and marginal fiscal pressure, have been used to represent the 
complicated local authority budget constraint and a model of budget 
decision-making, augmented by consideration of politics and GRE and 
Target guidelines has been estimated. 
The empirical results presented here have shown the importance of 
fiscal pressure, GRE, Target, and political control. Local 
authorities were found to respond to increases in both the level and 
the rate of increase of fiscal pressure with respect to expenditure 
increase, by either decreasing their expenditure, or decreasing the 
rate at which they increased it year on year. Year-on-year expendi- 
ture increase was also generally negatively influenced by Conservative 
Political control, and, in a less well established way, by lack of 
overall control. GRE and Target had some limited role in influencing 
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the expenditure of some groups of authorities, but usually a smaller 
role than fiscal pressure. 
Although current expenditure is the largest category of local gov- 
ernment expenditure, capital expenditure is of major importance. The 
next chapter is concerned with central government's record of inter- 
vention and control of capital expenditure. 
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CHAPTER THREES 
THE CONTROL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter attention is turned from the consideration of local 
authorities' current expenditure of Chapter 2 to a consideration of 
local authorities' capital expenditure. Amongst the questions raised 
are: What is the case for control of local authority capital expendi- 
tune? Is this case convincing? What has been the recent practical 
experience of control? The chapter focusses on the system of local 
authority capital expenditure control introduced by the Local Govern- 
meet, Planning and Land Act 1980, although a brief description of the 
system it replaced is given. It ends with a discussion of the propos- 
als for reform put forward in a recent Green Paper (HMSO 1986) and an 
associated consultation paper (Department of the Environment 1986). 
THE NEED TO CONTROL THE LEVEL OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
The most recent expression of the Government's reasons for wishing 
to control the level of capital expenditure by local authorities 
appears in the Green Paper, Paying for Local Government (HMSO, 1986 
p44) in the following two-point statement: 
() This chapter is partly based on P. A. Watt, The Control of Local 
Authority Capital Expenditure" Local Government Studies, B 
(3), May/June 1982 pp 91-95. The author wishes to thank 
J. G. Gibson, K. Hartley, R. A. Jackman, I. G. McBrayne and J. D. Stewart 
for helpful comment but retains responsibility for views expressed 
and error. 
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-The Government is committed to eliminating inflation, which 
requires continuing downward pressure on monetary growth and 
lower public borrowing as a share of GDP. 
-Tight control of public spending is vital to provide the scope 
for reducing the burden of taxation, which is an essential 
ingredient in improving motivation and efficiency and thus 
increasing employment. 
An earlier and more detailed expression of a government view 
appears in the Treasury's evidence to the Layfield enquiry (Local Gov- 
ernment Finance 1976) appendix 6, pp 14-47. Here it is stated that 
As already explained, the central government is concerned with 
the total demand on resources of public expenditure and has the 
responsibility to strike the balance between the claims on 
resources of the balance of payments, investment, public expen- 
diture and private consumption. (l) 
and 
Within what is judged an acceptable rate of growth of public 
expenditure, Ministers decide how much is to be spent on each 
major programme over the period ahead. These decisions will of 
course reflect the political, economic and social priorities of 
the ministers concerned. For those programmes in the execution 
of which local authorities are concerned, the allocations will 
involve judgements about the local authority spending which 
will flow from the broad policies laid down by the government. 
It follows that the system does not involve a government deci- 
sion that a given amount of expenditure shall be allocated to 
all local authorities. The total emerges as the sum of the 
decisions on particular programmes. (2) 
On capital spending, the Treasury add that 
The case for the control over capital spending is, first, that 
this is one of the principal means by which the government can 
ensure the implementation of national policies in the main ser- 
vices which local authorities undertake ... secondly 
it is an 
indirect means of moderating the growth of current expenditure; 
for capital expenditure frequently generates the need for addi- 
tional staff and running expenses... 
From these quotations the following motivations for the control of 
capital expenditure can be discerned: 
1. The desire to control inflation 
2. Supply side arguments about taxation burden 
(1) p 15 
(2) p 14 
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3. The desire to influence the private sector/public sector 
ratio 
4. The desire to influence the content of local policies in the 
direction of national priorities 
To this list may be added a fifth argument 
5. The objective of macroeconomic control and stabilisation 
A number of academic writers have commented on the need for the 
Government to control local authority expenditure. (i) As these writ- 
ers point out, central Government's role in control of local govern- 
ment behaviour for purposes of macroeconomic stabilisation depends 
upon which particular macroeconomic theory is held to be correct. 
This is also true of the role of government in the control of infla- 
tion. 
Jackman (1982) argues that, given the present government's 
monetarist approach, monetarism may be the most useful theoretical 
approach to explore. He puts the simple implications of monetarism 
clearly: 
For much of the postwar period, monetarism has been associated 
with the proposition that the level of aggregate demand in the 
economy is determined primarily by the quantity of money in 
circulation. On this interpretation of monetarism, it follows 
immediately that, since local authorities cannot print money, 
they cannot have any impact on aggregate demand. 
As Jackman points out, however, the Government would argue that 
high public borrowing makes the task of satisfactorily controlling the 
money supply difficult or impossible. (2) The reason for this diffi- 
culty is bound up with the finance of the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR). The PSBR must be financed by some combination of 
(1) See Jackman (1982), Barlow (1981), Jackson (1484), Foster et al 
(1980), and King (1984) 
(2) For a Government view see Walters (1984, p273): "one could con- 
trol the monetary expansion only if the demands of the public sec- 
tor for funds were also suitably controlled" 
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borrowing from abroad, borrowing from the banking sector, or by 
borrowing from the private sector. None of these three alternatives 
is attractive to the Government. Borrowing from abroad leads to 
interest payments leaving the country, borrowing from the banking sec- 
for involves expanding the money supply and borrowing from the private 
sector leads to competition with other borrowers and a rise in inter- 
est rates. Local authority borrowing forms a part of the PSBR and 
hence there is a case for controlling borrowing. An indirect method 
of influencing local authority borrowing is to control local author- 
ity capital expenditure as part of this is financed by borrowing. (1) 
Thus a somewhat tortuous case is established for the control of local 
authority capital expenditure. 
An annual capital expenditure control enables the Government to 
have some influence over the amount of net external borrowing 
by local government(2) 
The case for the control of the total of local authority borrowing or 
indirectly the total of local authority capital expenditure is 
established as a consequence of motivations one and five: high local 
authority borrowing makes control of the money supply difficult and 
control of the money supply is necessary to control aggregate demand 
and inflation. However, the arguments so far presented only suggest a 
need to control the overall level of borrowing and not its 
distribution between authorities nor what it is spent on. If the 
desired control of borrowing is attempted via capital expenditure, 
the need is only to control that part of expenditure financed by 
borrowing. In practice the control is of capital expenditure however 
(1) Forty-six per cent is forecast for 1987-88. This figure is calcu- 
lated from HMSO (1987) p361) table 4.7 as (100 x row3)/row 6. 
(2) Mr Terry Heiser, Department of the Environment Permanent Secretary 
replying to Q2673 in Committee of Public Accounts, Minutes pl 
Department of the Environment 1986 
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financed and extends to the distribution between authorities and what 
the money is spent on. As will be seen later, the control of 
borrowing is in practice rather weak. Thus the macroeconomic objec- 
tives one and five so far discussed do not adequately explain the 
Government's capital expenditure control policy, and it will be neces- 
sary to examine motives two to four in what follows. In analysing 
these other motives that have been advanced for Government control of 
capital expenditure a public choice viewpoint will be helpful. This 
approach is introduced in the next section. 
A PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS 
Implicit in the above discussion about macroeconomic motivations 
for central control of local government capital expenditure is what 
has been called the traditional economists' "benevolent despot" 
model(t) of government. Under this view, the government is to be 
likened to a benevolent despot who gathers advice on the best policy 
from economists and then faithfully implements it. Thus it is only 
necessary for the best policy to be explained to the government for it 
to be put into action, and as a corollary, to explain the actions of 
government one must seek to find reasons why the policy adopted is the 
most sensible. 
In contrast, the public choice approach lies in taking the view 
that the government is made up of individuals who, whilst having a 
mind to the public interest(2), also respond to whatever other incen- 
tines exist in the situation they find themselves in. The difference 
between the two viewpoints is well put in the following quotation: 
The simple fact that governments are run by human beings with 
(1) Tullock (1976) p2) 
(2) Hayek (1974) p42-45, amongst others, would argue that it is most 
unlikely that the public interest will be known or even can be 
known. 
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the normal human desire for personal well-being and individual 
or institutional aggrandisement must be insisted upon only 
because of a long intellectual tradition of implicitly treating 
government as a special exception to such incentives and con- 
straints. This tradition stretches from the impartial "philos- 
opher king" of Plato to the exalted "statesman" of the 
mercantilist literature of two or three centuries ago to the 
public spirited government as conceived in modern tracts that 
bill themselves as "empirical social science and not value 
statements"(1) 
Under the public choice approach, political behaviour is modelled 
as if the actors were driven by self interest as has long been assumed 
in economic modelling of the market. (2) Using this approach the 
demand for the cöntrol of local authority capital expenditure may be 
viewed as coming from national politicians who desire to gain votes 
from a national electorate and money for party funds, and from central 
government bureaucrats to the extent that they are able to undertake 
discretionary(3) behaviour as agents of the politicians. 
(1) Sowell (1980 p146). Sowell's gives Dahl and Lindblohm (1976) as 
an example of such a modern tract 
(2) Schumpeter (1942, p282) quoted in Downs (1957) provides an early 
statement of this point: "In observing human societies we do not 
as a rule find it difficult to specify, at least in a rough 
commonsense manner, the various ends that the societies under 
study struggle to attain. these ends may be said to provide the 
rationale or meaning of corresponding individual activities. But 
it does not follow that the social meaning of a type of activity 
will necessarily provide the motive power, hence explanation of 
the latter. If it does not, a theory that contents itself with an 
analysis of the social end or need to be served cannot be accepted 
as an adequate account of the activities that serve it. For 
instance, the reason why there is such a thing as economic activi- 
ty is of course that people want to eat, to clothe themselves and 
so on. To provide the means to satisfy those wants is the social 
end or meaning of production. Nevertheless we all agree that this 
proposition would make most unrealistic starting point for theory 
of economic activity in commercial society and that we shall do 
much better if we start from propositions about profits. Similar- 
ly the social meaning or function of parliamentary activity is no 
doubt to turn out legislation and, in part, administrative mea- 
sures. But in order to understand how democratic politics serve 
this social end, we must start from the competitive struggle for 
power and office and realise that the social function is 
fulfilled, as it were, incidentally - in the same sense as produc- 
tion is incidental to the making of profits. 
(3) This word is used in the sense of Williamson (1963) 
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From this alternative perspective the demand for stabilisation and 
control of inflation may be seen as coming from individual voters, 
from interest groups who may be particularly concerned, and from 
administrators in Whitehall who have an interest in the Government 
having a role in stabilisation. (1) A public choice approach has been 
applied to the related question of analysing the behaviour of central 
bank administrators by Acheson and Chant (1973) and Chant and Acheson 
(1973). They argue that bureaucrats will have survival of the bureau 
as an important objective. One argument supporting this is the evolu- 
tionary argument that bureaus whose members are not interested in its 
survival will cease to exist. From the public choice viewpoint it can 
be seen that it is not necessary for the Government actually to have, 
in a technical sense, a role in these matters for it to adopt one. 
Thus it may take actions in the name of stabilisation that do not have 
stabilising effects. A public choice analysis would predict that Gov- 
ernment bureaucrats would take an active role in the control of local 
authority capital expenditure, and that it would continue even if 
unsuccessful. Reason for this would be firstly the employment preser- 
vation interests of bureaucrats and secondly various interest groups 
may wish to trade political support for certain types of administra- 
tive action. 
The following extract from a letter from the Prime Minister to the 
Chairmen of the local authority associations in November 1982 serves 
to illustrate how interest groups may well have views on matters usu- 
ally placed under the heading of stabilisation: 
I am concerned to learn that after underspending on capital 
substantially in 1981/82 local authorities show every sign of 
doing the same in 1982/83 because they are making little use of 
their capital receipts. As local authorities have some 1.5 
billion of capital receipts, the scope for additional invest- 
(1) Musgrave (1959) defines stabilisation as "maintaining a high level 
of resource utilisation and a stable value of money. " 
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meet is very considerable indeed. 
I recently met the Group of Eight, the body which represents 
all sides and parts of the construction industry, and they drew 
particular attention to the way in which local authority (and 
nationalised industry) capital investment is falling below the 
Government's public expenditure provision. (l) 
The subsequent overspend(2) in the next financial year raises at least 
a doubt over the strict technical necessity of such interventions. 
Whilst a public choice approach may throw some light on events such as 
this by drawing attention to the role of interest groups such as the 
Group of Eight, it is on issues three to five that the approach is 
most illuminating. The issue of accountability raised in the 
Layfield report(3) is of key importance to these issues. Accountabil- 
ity it is argued here is a concept that is closely related in spirit 
to a public choice approach. The reason for this is that discussion 
of accountability proceeds in terms of the costs and benefits to indi- 
vidual voters acting in accord with self-interest. This is also the 
approach of the public choice school. 
Essentially the accountability approach lies in asking the ques- 
tion: Why are the above five issues matters of national interest 
rather than matters of purely local interest? Thus whilst inflation 
and macroeconomic stabilisation are clearly national matters, the 
effect of the local authority on the burden of taxation and the 
private/public balance are matters for local voters as a fortiori 
must be the content of local policies. Why should persons other than 
the local voter have concerns over such issues? Ideally they should 
not, but inappropriate financial arrangements may generate such con- 
(1) Quoted in Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1984, Appendix 
B) 
(2) See table 1 below 
(3) Local Government Finance (1976). Accountability is also discussed 
at some length in Jackman (1982) on which some of this discussion 
is based 
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terns. The problem is that inappropriate financial arrangements can 
give a local voter an interest in the decisions of other local 
authorities, or can cause the voters of other authorities to have an 
interest in the decisions of his authority. The route for political 
pressure in expression of these interests is then central Government. 
There are two mechanisms by which the national voter will have a stake 
in local decision-making. 
First, the burden of non-domestic rates, and that portion of domes- 
tic rates not borne by the local voter(1), is likely to be spread well 
outside the locality. Secondly, under the rate support grant system 
the matching element of the grant distorts the cost of marginal expen- 
diture. Until the 1986/87 settlement this second effect meant that 
for many authorities extra spending would be subsidised by persons 
from outside their jurisdiction. (2) However, under the 1986/87 set- 
tlement, rates of matching have been almost entirely negative. (3) 
The view presented here is therefore that arguments two, three and 
four on taxation burden, the private/public sector ratio and the con- 
tent of local policies only have force as a result of an entirely 
implicit argument that there is an absence of accountability in local 
decision making leading to the national voter having a financial 
interest in local voters' decisions. (4) The private/public ratio, and 
(1) i. e. paid for by rate rebates or social security benefits. 
(2) Under block grant at the time of introduction, many authorities 
enjoyed positive rates of matching at the margin although this 
effect was reduced by the penalties levied for overshooting tar- 
gets. 
(3) This, of course, still generates an interest from the individual 
as a national voter, only in the reverse direction. Thus voters 
outside a local authority with negative rates of matching have an 
interest in that authority increasing their current expenditure as 
this will attract less grant. 
(4) There is however an argument that remains for influencing the con- 
tent of local policies in the direction of national priorities and 
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the burden of taxation to the local voter are not to be decided purely 
by the local voter because it is not just the local voter that pays. 
Mechanisms of expenditure control exist to give some say to the 
national voter who is footing a large part of the bill. 
It is therefore concluded that the case for control of local 
authority borrowing lies first in macroeconomic arguments about the 
need to control the public sector borrowing requirement, of which the 
local authority borrowing requirement forms a part, and secondly as an 
indirect tactic for mitigating the root problem of lack of account- 
ability for capital expenditure caused by inappropriate local authori- 
ty financial arrangements. This tactic does not solve the account- 
ability problem and the results are not likely to be the same as a 
direct solution. The direct solution is to place responsibility for 
finance of local expenditure entirely with the local voter. 
Having set out the somewhat tortuous reasoning behind the control 
of local authority borrowing, the question of how this control is 
exercised is now examined. The account begins with a brief descrip- 
tion of the system replaced in 1981. 
THE OLD SYSTEM OF LOAN SANCTION 
Before 1981, the basis of central control of local authority capi- 
tal expenditure was the loan sanction system. This system had its 
origins in a desire to ensure financial propriety in the raising of 
loans and grew into an administrative mechanism for expenditure con- 
trol. (1) Capital expenditure plans were submitted to the appropriate 
that is the argument that persons move around the country from 
time to time and have an interest in some degree of uniformity of 
national standards. However it is argued here that this argument 
is of minor importance to most local voters in relation to main 
process of adjustment of provision to their preferences. 
(1) See Local Government Finance (1976) 
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government department within the key sector, (1) for consideration for 
loan sanction. Loan sanctions would be granted for individual proj- 
ects or sometimes blocks of projects within a sector and by these 
decisions central government could influence both the total and 
distribution of local authority capital expenditure. 
Because control was exercised over borrowing, the control over 
expenditure was neither complete nor precise: for instance local 
authorities were free to finance schemes from revenue or capital 
receipts without the need for approval from central government depart- 
ments. Also, the loan sanction system only exercised control over 
starts which had to be made in the year the sanction was granted. 
Once the project had begun capital payments were determined by the 
physical progress of the project. Because of this lack of control 
over timing and amount the resulting control over the local authority 
borrowing requirement was regarded as too imprecise: "[The new sys- 
tem] ... will enable central government to ensure that the total of 
local authority capital spending each year is consistent with national 
expenditure plans, which is not possible under the present system. "(2) 
This lack of precision led the Government to institute a system of 
control over local authorities' capital expenditure. 
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CONTROL 
The present system of capital expenditure control was introduced in 
April 1981 under the provisions of the Local Government, Planning and 
(1) "Key sector" services are those for which ministers have special 
responsibility - most importantly: housing, transport, education, 
police and personal social services. Block borrowing approvals 
were also allocated for locally determined schemes and authorities 
were also authorised to borrow for subsidiary sector schemes with- 
out seeking approval. See Department of the Environment (1976) 
(2) Press notice accompanying Department of the Environment (1979). 
See also HMSO Paying for Local Government (1986, p45) 
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Land Act 1980 although some of its features were already embodied in 
the Housing Strategies and Investment Programmes (HIPs) and Transport 
Policies and Programmes (TPPs) procedures. In different ways the 
present system both increased and reduced the autonomy enjoyed by 
local authorities under the old system. (1) Under the present system, 
control is exercised not on loans but on capital payments(2) whether 
financed by loans or from revenue. There is thus a significant reduc- 
tion in the local autonomy that previously existed in the open-ended 
freedom of local authorities to finance capital expenditure from reve- 
nue. Each local authority submits expenditure plans to the relevant 
central department for a maximum of four categories of expenditure: 
housing, education, transport and the personal social services and is 
notified of its allocation at around the time of the Rate Support 
Grant settlement. For a fifth block, "other services", no expenditure 
plans are submitted: allocations are made by a method determined by 
the Department of the Environment after consultation with the local 
authority associations. A sixth block, for urban aid was created from 
part of the "other services" in 1984-85. Further variety is added by 
the retention of the old system of loan sanction for expenditure with- 
in the ambit of the Home Office: i. e. capital expenditure on police, 
magistrates' courts and probation services. 
(1) The present system of capital expenditure control was described on 
its introduction in Department of the Environment (1981). Minor 
amendments were made in Department of the Environment (1982). 
These circulars were superseded by Department of the Environment 
(1983) which was itself updated in certain respects by Department 
of the Environment (1984) and Department of the Environment 
(1985). For a discussion of the system see Raine (1980). There 
have been a number of Department of the Environment Circulars on 
HIPs eg 18/77,63/77 and TPPs for Transport Supplementary Grant eg 
104/73,60/74,125/75. 
(2) i. e. payments made for "prescribed" expenditure, defined in 
Schedule 12 to the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 to 
include most items of capital expenditure. 
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Administratively the present system of control integrates with the 
cash limits system of public expenditure control introduced by the 
Treasury in 1976. (1) Central government concern focusses on the 
Department of the Environment LA1 cash limit now printed in the Public 
Expenditure White Papers. This net provision for local authority cap- 
ital spending is arrived at by forecasting what percentage of local 
authorities' spending power, deriving mainly from accumulated capital 
receipts, in-year receipts and allocations, will be spent and adding 
to this forecast non-prescribed spending. The main interest is the 
total of this spending. (2) Correspondingly, in a concession granted 
between the printing of the first and second Bill(3) each local 
authority is allowed to aggregate its allocations into a single block 
and distribute expenditure within this total as it wishes -a facility 
termed one hundred per cent virement in discussion. Thus, to quote 
the Minister for Local Government, Mr Tom King, 
In return for the overall ceiling on capital expenditure there 
should be greater freedom within the local authorities and less 
interference from Whitehall, with authorities determining exactly 
how allocations should be spent and deciding between the 
priorities naturally found in individual authorities(4) 
Objective four identified at the beginning of this chapter, was there- 
fore given a lower priority than the other objectives which, directly 
or indirectly, are linked to the total of expenditure. 
Although the ceiling that the authority faces is based on its total 
(1) See Bevan (1980) 
(2) see HMSO (1981, p20 and 1982, p90) 
(3) see Local Government Planning and Land Bill H. L. (1979) and Local 
Government Planning and Land Bill No 2 Bill (1980). Changes in 
government thinking can also be followed by comparing Department 
of the Environment (1979) and Department of the Environment 
(1980a) 
(4) See Local Government Planning and Land Bill No 2 Bill 
(1980), Standing Committee D minutes, column 1159, April 15. 
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of allocations, there are possibilities to "enhance" the ceiling. 
Thus a year-to-year tolerance of ten per cent is allowed and in addi- 
tion, profits from trading undertakings can be added, allocations can 
be transferred between authorities and there is also scope for the use 
of capital receipts. 
Unlike the loan sanction system, where payments, once the project 
has started, can extend indefinitely into the future, the present sys- 
tem allocates a total for payments for a year at a time. This places 
new emphasis on the scheduling of capital projects and, under the old 
loan sanction system, local authorities' record on this was not 
impressive. A CIPFA survey found that for seventy-nine per cent of 
authorities who responded to their questionnaire the approved capital 
programme was not normally achieved within the timescale provided(1) 
However, only limited inference can be drawn from this finding. The 
old loan sanction system operating when the survey was made did not 
penalise programme slippage. Hence it might well have made sense for 
authorities to set an ambitious time scale for their capital 
programme, seeing the nominal slippage thereby resulting as, if any- 
thing, a spur to progress. 
THE OPERATION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE CONTROL 
Table 1 shows the overall experience of control of capital expendi- 
ture by local authorities since the introduction of the present sys- 
tem. In each of the columns the top figure is the planned level of 
capital expenditure, the next figure below is the estimated outturn, 
and any figures appearing below the are outturns and subsequent revi- 
sions. The figure at the foot of the columns shows the percentage 
divergence of the plan from the latest figure for outturn. 
(1) Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (1981) 
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TABLE 1 THE RECENT PATTERN OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
PLANS AND OUTCOMES 
Millions of Pounds Cash 
Year Year Year Year Year Year 
White Paper 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 
March 1981 3068 
March 1982 2537 3252 
Feb. 1983 2459 2049 2982 
Feb. 1984 2535 2687 2840 2729 
Jan. 1985 2539 2779 3184 3108 2213 
Jan. 1986 
- 
2549 
---------- 
2784 
----------- 
3442 
---- - 
3556 3026 2652 
Diver gence -17'% -147. 
- -- 
15% 
--------- 
30% 
-------- 
37% 
from plan 
Source: computed from Cmnd 8494 -II1 8789-11,9143-II, 9428-11, and 
9702-II a See also Comptroller and Auditor General (1986) where a sim- 
ilar computation has been made. Planned expenditure for 1981-82 has 
been computed from information in Table 3, p11, Audit Commission 
(1985). "Divergence" relates to the difference between the planned 
figure at the top of each column, and the latest figure for outcome 
(at the bottom of each column). 
From this table it can be seen that the first two years of opera- 
tion of the system resulted in a large shortfall in net spending on 
the capital programme, and the next three years led to a large 
overspend(1). 
The reason underspends and overspends are possible is that nei- 
ther the amount of capital receipts generated by sales nor the amount 
of these capital receipts used to justify capital expenditure are 
known in advance by the Government and hence must be the object of 
some form of forecasting exercise at the time plans are made. This is 
explained in Comptroller and Auditor General (1986, p8) 
The main element in the over-spending in subsequent years was a 
wide discrepancy between the detailed controls applied to indi- 
vidual authorities and the global provisions they were intended 
to protect. In determining the total amounts available for 
distribution to local authorities as allocations of prescribed 
(1) Reasons for this are discussed in the next section on the timing 
of intervention. 
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expenditure Department of the Environment did not take full 
account of the extent to which those allocations could legiti- 
mately be enhanced by the use of capital receipts and other 
means. This was done as a calculated risk, on the assumption 
that authorities in aggregate would not spend up to their maxi- 
mum permitted limits. This was a valid assumption in that in 
the early years of the system authorities used only about 65 
per cent of their total spending power, and even now are using 
no more than about 75 per cent. 
This calculated risk proved to be greater than expected in later 
years because of the spending of accumulated capital gains and because 
of the way the year-on-year virernent(l) possibility was interpreted 
after the Department of the Environment took Counsel's opinion in 
1984. At first they had believed that the ten percent tolerance would 
merely act as a transfer between adjacent years, but as a result of 
Counsel's opinion it is now interpreted in a way that can lead to an 
overall increase in allocations. The Comptroller and Auditor General 
goes on to illustrate this problem: (2) 
For example, the Cash Limit for 1983-84 was based on a gross 
expenditure figure of 4,731 million, of which 4,075 million 
was distributed as allocations of prescribed expenditure; but 
on the basis of the best available estimates local authorities 
could, by making full use of all the available sources of 
enhancement ... legitimately have incurred gross capital 
expenditure totalling some 7,700 million without exceeding 
their individual spending limits. Actual outturn of gross cap- 
ital expenditure was 5,506 million. 
As the first of the quotations from the report of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General notes, authorities have only been spending 65 to 
75 per cent of the amount they are empowered to spend(3) so in this 
sense local authorities' spending is not strictly being controlled. 
(1) To avoid confusion with inter-block virement, the Department of 
the Environment has adopted the practice of calling year-on-year 
virement tolerance. 
(2) Comptroller and Auditor General (1986, p9) 
(3) Since the Comptroller and Auditor General's Report the percentage 
use of spending power has continued to grow. For 1987-88 the 
Department of the Environment are forecasting 82% - see Table 2. 
line 7. 
-153- 
CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTROL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
The outturn total capital expenditure that is compared with the cash 
limit is net of all capital receipts. Why the net figure is used is 
speculated upon in the Sixth Treasury and Civil Service Committee 
report (session 1984-85) as follows: 
We find it strange that the Government did not foresee the 
problems inherent in this accounting treatment for these trans- 
actions, or its scale. We are left with the impression that 
the rationale for the existing arrangements has had everything 
to do with the Government's desire to reduce the apparent size 
of the PSBR, and too little to do with the rational use of 
local authority assets. (1) 
To summarise the control process, the Government has as its instru- 
ments the allocations given to local authorities and some control over 
the enhancements that may be attached to them. It can use these 
instruments to generate a distribution of capital expenditure powers 
to local authorities. About 25 to 35 per cent of this power to spend 
is not taken up. The proportion of capital expenditure empowerment 
that is actually spent plus the amount of non-prescribed capital 
expenditure adds up to the outturn of total gross capital expenditure. 
From this is subtracted the total of all in-year capital receipts to 
arrive at the target of total net capital spending, which is compared 
with the cash limit. 
Table 2 shows how the cash limit is made up for 1987-88. Enhance- 
ments to allocations have been described briefly above, and it has 
been noted that capital receipts cause difficulty in predicting the 
total gross capital spending "empowerment". Firstly, the level of 
capital receipts is not known at the time allocations are made. Sec- 
ondly it is not known what proportion of capital receipts local 
authorities will decide to spend. However, by statute, the Secretary 
of State can set a maximum "prescribed" proportion for spending 
(1) Treasury and Civil Service Committee (1985 p. xvi), quoted in 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 1986. 
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TABLE 2: SPENDING POWER AND PROVISION FOR DOE/LA1 IN 1987-88 OUTCOMES 
million 
1 Spending power from accumulated receipts 2150 387k 
2 Spending power from in-year receipts 588 10'/. 
3 Allocations'. 2584 46% 
4 Tolerance 258 5% 
5 Trading Profits 40 1% 
6 Total Spending Power' 5620 100/. 
7 multiply by assumed usage of spending power 0.82 
8 equals forecast spending from spending power 4608 
9 less receipts netted off gross provision -165 
10 plus non-prescribed spending 430 
11 plus allocations for passenger transport 
authorities' rolling stock 55 
12 equals Total gross provision for spending on DOE/LA1 4928 
tx) excluding 55m transferred to local authority capital to help 
passenger transport authorities purchase rolling stock - line 11. 
Source: Department of the Environment (1987, p361) 
in-year and accumulated capital receipts. The prescribed proportion 
has been successively tightened over recent years. The prescribed 
proportion was 50 per cent in 1981-82 and 1982-83 for housing 
receipts. In 1983-84 the prescribed proportion of 50 per cent was 
extended to most other services. In 1984-85 it was reduced to 40 per 
cent for most housing receipts and for 1985-86 and 1986-87 the propor- 
Lions were again reduced to 20 per cent for housing services and 30 
per cent for other services. (1) These reductions in the prescribed 
percentage increase control but as has been noted, (2) how far this 
reduction conflicts, in practice, with another of the Government's 
objectives - encouragement of asset sales - is not established. 
Because of the way the statutory provisions are interpreted, the 
prescribed proportion at present only delays, rather than prevents, 
capital receipts over and above the prescribed proportion being spent. 
(1) See Comptroller and Auditor General (1986) p17) 
(2) See for instance Committee of Public Accounts (1986, p xiii) 
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This is because according to the "cascade" principle the prescribed 
proportion of the remaining balances of capital receipts may be spent 
in future years until the whole of the capital receipts are eventually 
spent. 
Because capital receipts reduce net capital spending in the year 
they are received, it has been argued by commentators(1) that when 
they are spent they only increase capital spending by an amount equal 
to the amount they previously reduced it by, leaving no overall 
change. Ward (1985) clarifies the issue as follows: 
The problem seems to be one of timing, with capital receipts 
gained in one year being used to finance expenditure in a later 
year. Whether this is important for Government fiscal and mon- 
etary policy is by no means clear. On the Government's own 
philosophy it arguably ought not to be, since authorities have 
already accumulated the finance for such expenditure, so pre- 
sumably it will not cause borrowing difficulties. At the same 
time, the recession in the construction industry is so severe 
that possible problems of excess demand for its output are 
unlikely to arise. The one problem seems to be that it might 
push up the PSBR as measured in particular years, but then this 
is only the inevitable counterpart of unspent receipts reducing 
the PSBR in other years and it is questionable how far it mat- 
ters, except to those who attach almost mystical significance 
to the figure. (2) 
Essentially the government can be viewed as being happy about the 
short term reduction in capital expenditure, as measured, and can be 
viewed as being unhappy about concomitant increases in capital expen- 
diture, as measured, when this is spent. This can be explained by 
seeing the motivation of the Government as more to do with a desire to 
reduce the size of the public sector than with macroeconomic control. 
However, the Government is limited in the extent to which it can move 
to prevent spending of capital receipts as the power to spend receipts 
is a major incentive to asset disposal. 
(1) Ward (1985, p52) 
(2) Ward(1985, p 52) 
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THE TIMING OF INTERVENTION 
One of the problems any administered system of capital expenditure 
control must overcome is that of the timing of intervention, and of 
ensuring that it is in the right direction in the presence of substan- 
tial lags in the system. 
Although control over timing was emphasised when the present system 
of capital expenditure control was introduced(1), because of the long 
term nature of capital programmes(2) tight control may not be possi- 
ble. In fact recent history suggests that attempts to stabilise local 
authority capital spending by central intervention may well be 
counterproductive. An example is the imposition of a six month mora- 
torium on housing investment in October 1980, (3) which was followed by 
the prospect of a major underspend for housing in 1981/82 and exhorta- 
tions in March 1982 by the Secretary of State for the Environment for 
expenditure on housing investment: 
"The freedom to spend is yours ... the object of the exercise is 
to use the benefit of those programmes to get extra construction 
work(4) 
Although the moratorium on housing investment is likely to have 
contributed to the housing underspend in 1981-82, (5) underspending was 
not confined to housing as can be seen from Table 3 which provides a 
breakdown of plans and outturns in the different sectors. Several 
further reasons can be advanced for the underspend of seventeen per- 
(1) See Department of the Environment, Press Notice 479 (1979) 
(2) CIPFA (1980, p8)) found the most favoured time scale to be three 
years 
(3) Department of the Environment (1980b) 
(4) Heseltine (1982, p384) 
(5) Strictly, the term underspending should only be applied to the 
total of capital expenditure as one hundred percent virement 
between blocks is permitted 
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TABLE 3: PLAN AND OUTTURN FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES' CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
BY SERVICE 
Millions of Pounds Cash 
1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 
Out- Out- Out- 
------------------------ 
Plan 
---- 
turn 
------ 
Diff 
----- 
Plan 
----- 
turn 
------ 
Diff Plan turn Diff 
Agriculture, fisheries, 98 114 16%: 115 
- 
113 
------ 
-2%: 
------ 
50 
----- 
69 
----- 
38% 
food and forestry 
Industry, energy, trade 36 4 -89'/,; 48 5 -90%; 47 4 -91% 
and employment 
Arts and libraries 17 20 18'l.; 17 28 65% 18 40 122% 
1 , 
Roads and Transport 677 618 -9Y.; 722 725 0Y.; 766 794 4% 
1 1 
Housing 1262 767 -39%: 1258 584 -54%: 1096 1259 15% 
Other environmental 450 501 11'!.: 575 734 28%. 487 670 38'!. 
services 
Law, order and 95 92 -3% 106 114 8%: 127 109 -14% 
protective services 
Education and science 355 362 2%: 310 413 33%: 283 424 50% 
Health and personal 90 '70 -227. 102 67 -34%; 108 73 -32% 
social services 
----------------------- --- - ----- ----- ------- 
Total 3080 2548 -17%; 3253 2783 -14'h 2982 3442 15% 
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General (1986) 
cent in 1981-82 and fourteen percent in 1982-83. 
Firstly, capital receipts have been about 500m higher than fore- 
cast in the Public Expenditure Survey(1). Because of the unpredict- 
able nature of capital receipts, spending them in the same year is a 
difficult exercise. Secondly, the unfamiliarity of the new controls 
and the new emphasis on timing increase both the likelihood of 
slippage and the need to avoid it. Thirdly, there is the restraint 
that stems from the revenue implications of capital expenditure at a 
(1) Department of the Environment (1982) 
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time when revenue expenditure is being squeezed by targets and 
penalties. Fourthly, there is the problem of the lateness of notifi- 
cation of allocations subsequent to submission of programmes to cen- 
tral departments in comparison with the timescale for the preparation 
of a capital programme(1) 
As the operation of the new system has continued, large underspends 
in 1981-82 and 1982-83 have been converted into even larger overspends 
in 1983-84,1984-85 and 1985-86. Two reasons for this can be 
mentioned. Firstly, over time, local authorities began to spend their 
accumulated capital receipts. (2) Secondly they had been encouraged to 
spend by ministers' statements (see above) for example) and indeed by 
a letter from the Prime Minister in November 1982 to the local author- 
ity associations. (3) 
The experience with housing underspend, seen in conjunction with 
the 15 per cent overspend in 1983-84 may be an example of the possible 
destabilising effect of government intervention postulated by Friedman 
and discussed by Jackman. (4) Friedman notes three lags that may 
affect government's "stabilising" actions: 
(1) the lag between the need for action and the recognition of 
this need; (2) the lag between recognition of the need for 
action and the taking of action; and (3) the lag between the 
action and its effects(5) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1) See CIPFA (1981, p17) 
(2) See Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1984, p11). 
Accumulated capital receipts, unlike in-year capital receipts are 
not subtracted off local authorities' net capital expenditure, the 
total of which nationally is subject to cash limits. See HMSO 
Paying for Local Government, (1986 pages 10 and 45). 
(3) See Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1984, Appendix B). 
(4) See Jackman (1982 p75) and Friedman (1953) 
(5) Friedman (1953, p145) 
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Given these lags, which may be considerable, (1) by the time an action 
is having an effect it may be in the wrong direction. Friedman also 
shows(2) that even if corrective action is more frequently in the 
right than in the wrong direction, if it is too great in magnitude, it 
will still be destabilising. 
With Friedman's views in mind, it is instructive to examine the 
special interventions by the Department of the Environment that have 
been described in Comptroller and Auditor General (1986, p19). Thus 
in October 1982 it appeared that the 1982-83 Cash Limit would be 
underspent. This was a correct view as Table 1 shows. Authorities 
were invited to submit bids for supplementary allocations for that 
year and were empowered to make unlimited additional expenditure on 
housing improvement grants which would be covered by retrospective 
allocations. 
Although this helped reduce the expected underspending for 1982-83, 
its continuing effects are thought by the Comptroller and Auditor Gen- 
eral (1986, p19) to have contributed to the substantial overspend of 
cash limit for 1983-84 of fifteen per cent shown in Table I. 
As a result of an expectation of underspending of the Cash Limit 
for 1983-84 a two per cent addition was made to allocations of 
prescribed expenditure for 1984-85. However, in the event the outturn 
was as shown in Table 1, an overspend of fifteen per cent in 1983-84 
and thirty per cent in 1984-85. 
At the very least, the above is strong evidence that intervention 
is not always stabilising in its effect. 
(1) For instance central government receives details of capital pay- 
ments quarterly in arrears, and even relatively small schemes can 
take 15-20 months before contracts are let. (Audit Commission, 
1985 p. 40 and p. 37) 
(2) Friedman (1953) p132) 
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THE LINK BETWEEN CONTROL OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND THE LOCAL 
AUTHORITY BORROWING REQUIREMENT 
So far the discussion of the operation of the present system has 
focussed an the experience of control of local authorities' capital 
expenditure. Two reasons for the need to control capital expenditure 
were advanced: first as a means of indirectly controlling the local 
authority borrowing requirement, and secondly because incorrect mecha- 
nisms of accountability meant that reducing capital expenditure was 
seen as a legitimate end in itself. 
There is therefore a need to consider, with respect to the first of 
these reasons, the nature of the presumed link between local authority 
capital expenditure and the local authority borrowing requirement. 
The evidence available on this question suggests that 
The revised arrangements introduced from 1981-82 to improve 
controls over both revenue and capital spending appear in prac- 
tice to have had very little practical effect on the LABR 
outturn, which has continued to show very wide fluctuations, in 
both directions, from the budget forecasts. (1) 
These fluctuations are shown in Table 4 for the United Kingdom as a 
whole. The reason the fluctuations are so large is that the local 
authority borrowing requirement is determined by "the difference 
between two very large numbers"(2): overall annual local authority 
income and annual local authority expenditure. The Department of the 
Environment view is therefore reported to be that the aim can only be 
to influence the LABR over time, rather than attempt to control it for 
individual years. (3) 
From the analysis presented in this section of the chapter it is 
clear that the Government's attempts to control the aggregate of local 
(1) Comptroller and Auditor General (1986, p1O) 
l2) ibid. 
t3) ibid. 
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TABLE 4: OUTTURN ON LABR FOR UNITED KINGDOM 
million 
Year Budget Forecast Outturn % Deviation 
1979-80 1.2 2.9 141.67 
1980-81 1.4 2.3 64.29 
1981-82 1.0 -0.1 -110.00 1982-83 0.6 0.4 -33.33 1983-84 -0.2 1.4 800.00 
1984-85 1.3 2.4 84.62 
1985-86 1.5 2.11 40.00 
Source: Comptroller and Auditor General (1986) Table 4. (1) from 
correspondence with the Department of the Environment. 
authorities' capital expenditure has not been a marked success and the 
effect of its intervention may have at times, been destabilising. The 
Government is itself dissatisfied with the operation of the system and 
has put forward suggested options for change in its Green Paper 
"Paying for Local Government". These are now discussed. 
THE PROPOSALS OF THE GREEN PAPER 
In its Green Paper and associated Consultation Paper(1) the Govern- 
ment has set out some possible lines for reform of the present system 
of control of local authority capital expenditure. The Government 
sees two possible new methods of control: control over external 
borrowing limits or control over gross capital expenditure. These 
will be discussed in turn. 
External Borrowing Limits 
Under this proposed system, the Government would set controls over 
a local authority's external borrowing for capital purposes. As has 
(1) Paying for Local Government (HMSO 1986) and Department of the 
Environment 1986. Some local authority reactions are contained in 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities (1986) and Association of 
District Councils (1986). 
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been shown above the arguments that exist for the control of capital 
expenditure revolve around the effect on the local authority borrowing 
requirement so it would seem more logical to control local authority 
borrowing directly rather than expenditure. 
Typically a local authority's borrowing fluctuates greatly from 
year to year and as authorities pool their borrowing and lending 
transactions for both revenue and capital purposes to optimise cash 
flow it is not always even very clear in any particular instance 
whether borrowing is for capital or revenue purposes. 
The Government therefore views controlling external borrowing as 
probably impractical because of a likely mismatch between borrowing 
allocations it would make for each authority and the authorities' vol- 
atile borrowing requirements. Implicit in the Green Paper's discus- 
sion is the view that it would be necessary to set an allocation for 
each authority to have control over the total. However an alternative 
is the use of a price mechanism as discussed above to control the 
total of borrowing in the medium term without the need to set limits 
for any authority. 
Controls over Gross Capital Expenditure 
As discussed above, overspending and underspending on the local 
authority Cash Limit for capital spending has in part been caused by 
problems in predicting capital receipts and the lack of control over 
their subsequent spending of accumulated receipts. Under the second 
scheme proposed in the Green Paper the Government would fix its cash 
limit for local authority capital expenditure in gross terms. Thus 
this total would be unaffected by in-year capital receipts. 
Allocations for capital expenditure would be made to local 
authorities that would either include capital expenditure financed 
by 
capital receipts, or allow such expenditure as a supplement. 
If the 
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allocation included an allowance for that part of the expenditure to 
be financed by capital receipts, this would represent an important 
reduction in local authorities' freedom as this would necessarily 
involve the Government in prescribing a level of expected capital 
receipts for each authority. 
The method proposed in the Green Paper is that the receipts element 
of the allocation would be based on some proportion of the capital 
receipts over the previous three years. The Green Paper also proposes 
as an alternative, a method similar to that used at present of 
specifying a prescribed proportion for spending capital receipts, and 
in addition disallowing the spending of any portion of capital 
receipts in the year that they arose. Here again, the main criticism 
advanced in this study is of the need for the extensive central 
planning used in this method of trying to control a national aggre- 
gate. 
However, central Government not only attempts to control the over- 
all level of capital expenditure but also, as has been noted, applies 
a detailed process of scrutiny of local authority plans in order to 
try to take account of "need" in its subsequent issue of allocations. 
The value of such a procedure is questioned in the next section. 
THE NEED FOR SUBMISSION OF PLANS 
It can be argued that the need for submission of plans to central 
departments is the weakest element of the present system of capital 
expenditure control. Although local authorities are required to make 
detailed submissions of their capital expenditure plans to the rele- 
vant central government department as detailed above, an implication 
of the one hundred per cent virement concession is that there is no 
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necessity that expenditure plans be carried out in practice. (1) Local 
authorities may, therefore, see advantage in allowing some divergence 
between plans submitted for approval and plans actually carried out. 
particular case of such divergence is the overbidding that was 
believed to exist under the old loan sanction system(2) 
However, the major question over submission of plans is whether 
central departments have the knowledge and information necessary to 
make allocations. (3) For example housing investment programme alloca- 
tions are made to the nearest thousand pounds and are based on minis- 
terial discretion and the generalised capital need index. (4) The 
generalised need index is based on information that is at least four 
years old and the two major factors it aims to take account of are 
derived from the English House Condition Survey "which might cover ten 
houses in an average authority"(5) The Audit Commission (1985, p 37) 
has serious doubts about this central planning process: 
Every year, a total of over 1,200 separate allocations of capi- 
tal expenditure is issued to local authorities by a combination 
of the central government departments involved ... these allo- 
cations vary significantly from local authorities' bids and in 
unpredictable ways. Part of the variation may be due to 
exaggerated bids being submitted in the first place, by 
authorities anticipating reductions. Whatever the cause, cen- 
tral government is telling authorities in very considerable 
detail (i. e. to the nearest one-twentieth of a house in the 
case of housing) what it can afford. It is also in effect 
influencing local priorities, since in practice ... 
authorities are reluctant to move expenditure (i. e. to vice) 
between expenditure blocks since they fear subsequent problems 
with the sponsoring department. ... CT]he "discount 
from bid" 
(1) Whilst there is no necessity to stick to plans, there is evidence 
that local authorities fear to vice extensively as they expect 
this to lead to problems with the department whose allocation has 
been underspent. (Audit Commission 1985) p37) 
(2) See Judge (1975) 
(3) The problems here are a particular form of the problems of social- 
ist planning which have been raised by Hayek (1935) and others. 
(4) See Audit Commission 1985, p41) 
(5) ibid. 
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varies not only from year to year but also from block to block. 
Such an approach is prone to the well-known problems of central 
planning: central government officials, operating with an 
inevitably limited and often out-of-date information, and 
lacking detailed local knowledge cannot be expected to be bet- 
ter judges of local needs and priorities than members account- 
able to the local electorate. 
The new procedure of allowing one hundred per cent virement effec- 
tively concedes the point that local authorities are better equipped 
to judge local priorities than central departments. Once this conces- 
sion has been made the next logical step is dropping the submission of 
programmes to central departments. At the individual project level, 
in housing, there has already been much simplification, the latest in 
April 1985 after the Audit Commission Report went to press(t) 
... successive Secretaries of State since 1980 in my Department 
have pressed very hard for simplification and we have gone a 
long way down the track with housing to simplify things. There 
are 367 housing authorities and 279 now out of subsidy are not 
subject to any project control; only 88 authorities in subsidy 
are subject to project control. All that is involved initially 
is the submission of one single sheet of paper. The Department 
is under obligation, if it wants to intervene at all to call 
for more information, to act within 20 days. So we have actu- 
ally got a fairly simple system in our Department and we are 
working further to see whether we can simplify it again. We 
have reduced project control very, very markedly compared with 
the period before 1980. (2) 
From the public choice perspective Departments may well have an 
interest in continuing to scrutinise capital expenditure submissions, 
as even if this scrutiny has no valid function sudden abandonment of 
established procedures might lead to undesired redundancies. 
A POSSIBLE SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION 
If Government abandoned its concern to judge centrally the merits 
of the contents of individual local authorities plans its control 
(1) See HMSO, Paying for Local Government, 1986, p47 
(2) Mr Terry Heiser, Department of the Environment Permanent Secretary 
replying to Q2733 in Committee of Public Accounts, Minutes p13 
Department of the Environment 1986 
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requirements would then be satisfied by a system for allocating a giv- 
en total sum of capital between authorities. Such a system is 
mentioned in Layfield(1) and several schemes have been suggested by 
Harrison(2) The simplest scheme would be to remove controls and let 
the market allocate through the interest rate. If the government held 
that this would generate "too much" local authority capital expendi- 
tune, a premium could be added to the interest rate, or authorities 
could be compelled to finance a fixed proportion of investment from 
revenue, or be compelled to bid for shares in a fixed total quota of 
investment. These schemes are all forms of price rationing and argu- 
ments against price rationing often suggest injustice may occur as a 
result of differences in ability to pay. However, with the move 
towards full equalisation under the block grant system the force of 
such arguments is reduced. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Five reasons for control of local authority capital expenditure 
were listed at the beginning of this chapter. Reasons one and five 
relate to the macroeconomic motivations of control of inflation and 
stabilisation. The argument is that local authority borrowing is 
important in that it forms part of the PSBR and a large PSBR makes 
control of the money supply difficult. However it is difficult to 
attach much credibility to this motive for control. Firstly, control 
is exercised on expenditure rather than borrowing. Secondly, the 
control of expenditure relies on local authorities voluntarily not 
spending up to their empowered spending levels, so the whole idea of 
control is thrown into doubt. Thirdly, the relation between expendi- 
(1) Local Government Finance (1976, p250) 
(2) Harrison (1980) 
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ture and borrowing is subject to enormous variation from year to year 
as the evidence of Table 4 suggests. It therefore seems extremely 
dubious whether control has in fact been exercised macroeconomically, 
and whether there is any need for such control. 
This therefore leaves the motivations of reducing the burden of 
taxation, reducing the size of the public sector and influence over 
the content of local policies. Here the root cause is the lack of 
accountability in local government finance that involves national gov- 
ernment in issues of essentially local interest. Concern to reduce 
the size of the public sector explains the government's apparently 
schizophrenic attitude to gross and net capital spending. Thus 
although the presentational interest is in the lower, net capital 
spending aggregates, the underlying government concern is with keeping 
down gross spending, as the increasing restriction on the use of capi- 
tal receipts indicates. 
The overall conclusion is that accountability lies at the heart of 
the question of capital expenditure control. The Secretary of State 
is therefore wise to link reform with the proposed change to community 
charge(i) which seeks to address the accountability question directly. 
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CHAPTER FOUR- 
MODELLING LOCAL AUTHORITY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE CHANGE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 of this thesis has examined overall local authority cur- 
rent expenditure and Chapter 3 has examined local authority capital 
expenditure. In this chapter consideration turns to modelling the 
education budget; quantitatively the most important branch of the 
local government current expenditure budget. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. First education 
spending is discussed in the context of aggregate local government 
spending. Second, existing work on expenditure modelling is surveyed, 
and thirdly a model of local authority education expenditure change 
based on the approach to aggregate expenditure modelling of Chapter 2, 
is developed and estimated on data for 1982/83 to 1984/85. 
THE FINANCIAL CONTEXT OF EDUCATION BUDGETS 
In 1980/81 the block grant replaced the previous needs and 
resources rate support grant elements. A part of the new system was 
(*) This chapter is partly based on J. G. Gibson and P. A. Watt, "A Mod- 
el of Education Expenditure Change in English Local Authorities", 
in Thomas, H. and Simpkins, T(Eds) Economics and the Management of 
Education: Emerging Themes, Falmer Press, Lewes 1987(b). 
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the introduction of Grant-Related Expenditure Assessments (GREs) . 
These were assessments of an authority's need to spend, based broadly 
on prices attached to numbers for client groups. GREs replaced the 
former Assessed Spending Needs (ASNs) which were calculated for the 
pooled expenditure needs of both upper and lower tiers of local 
authority and were calculated for aggregate spending rather than ser- 
vice by service. 
The newly introduced GREs, in contrast, were calculated for each 
authority, both upper and lower tier, and because services provided 
differed between tiers, it was necessary to disaggregate GREs for each 
service for each authority. Thus whilst the previous ASNs gave only a 
global figure for all services, GREs were "service based". An educa- 
Lion GRE for example would be computed for each local education 
authority. The disaggregation of needs assessment gave rise to hopes 
amongst those concerned with low levels of education provision in some 
authorities that publication of education GREs would encourage 
increases in provision, although given the Government's plans for 
cuts, greater uniformity in education spending was a more feasible 
hope. 
Seen from the centre, on the other hand, service GREs provided a 
possible instrument of influence within the framework of a general 
grant system where the freedom of local authorities to ignore the 
wishes of Education ministers to spend upon specific programmes - such 
as in-service training - had emerged as an issue in the later 1970s. 
The disaggregated assessment of GREs on a service-by-service basis 
was a major point of criticism of the new grant system by many in 
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local government who were concerned to preserve local freedom with 
respect to service priorities. For them the composition of local bud- 
gets should be entirely a matter of local preferences. 
As events turned out, any concern for increasing provision of low 
spenders was overridden by the Government's first priority of reducing 
expenditure. The Government decided that it needed real cuts in 
expenditure by all authorities rather than just from those spending 
above GRE and for this purpose introduced expenditure targets and 
grant penalties for spending above taraet. (1) Grant penalties 
withdrew grant from individual authorities as they spent over target. 
This concern with the expenditure of individual authorities was a 
departure from previous practice that was not clearly spelt out by the 
Government when the block grant proposals were proceeding through Par- 
liament during 1980. In fact, the grant penalties had to be given 
legality retrospectively through the Local Government Finance Act of 
1982. 
Grant penalties increased in size each year from 1981/82 to 
1985/86, but despite this, local government overspending persisted 
both on its aggregate current expenditure and education current expen- 
diture. This is shown in Table 4.1 which gives aggregate overspend as 
column 7 and education overspend as column 8. Also, as Table 4.2 
shows, the Government had consistently revised upwards its plans for 
spending in order to make them appear more attainable. Local govern- 
ment actually increased its current expenditure in 1982/83 and 
(1) See Chapter 2 for more detail 
-174- 
-I 
CHAPTER FOUR: MODELLING LOCAL AUTHORITY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE CHANGE 
TABLE 4.1 CURRENT EXPENDITURE, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT (£m. cash) 
Provision: Budgets: Overspend: 
Aggr. Educ. Aggr. Educ. Aggr. Educ. 
Crrnt Crrnt 2/1 Crrnt Crrnt 5/4 4 on 15 on 2 
Year Expd. Expd. '/. Expd. Expd. '/, %. 14 
12 3 4 56 78 
81/82 16180 8333 51.50 17534 8862 50.54 8.37 6.35 
82/83 18000 9190 51.06 19260 9601 49.85 7.00 4.47 
83/84 19692 9882 50.18 20550 10331 50.27 4.36 4.54 
84/85 20389 10123 49.65 21439 10489 48.92 5.15 3.62 
Source: Extracted fr om Association of C ounty Councils: Rate Support 
Grant various years. 
1983/84. The second successive increase was regarded by the Govern- 
ment as the final straw, and in response the Rates Bill was introduced 
in 1984 which enabled limits to be set o n the rate level s of selected 
authorities. 
TABLE 4.2 REVISIONS T O GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR LOCAL GOVERN MENT CURRENT 
EXPENDITURE, ENGLAND 
£m. 1983/84 PRICES 
White Paper 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Cmnd 8175 (Mar 81) 18226 17852 17700 
Cmnd 8494 (Mar 82) 18902 18720 18558 
Cmnd 8789 (Feb 83) 19620 19142 
Cmnd 9143 (Feb 84) 19543 
Within this context, real spending an primary education fell 
throughout the period and was more or less static for secondary educa- 
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tion. This is shown in Table 4.3. The totals hide large differences 
between authorities in spending changes. Travers(1986) has calculated 
using 1983/84 prices, that real spending on primary schools fell by 
19.6 per cent in South Tyneside between 1979/80 and 1984/85 and by 
18.4 per cent in Leeds and 16.4 per cent in Trafford, whereas Hounslow 
spent 12.1 per cent more, Nottinghamshire 5.9 per cent more and 
Waltham Forest 5.2 per cent. In secondary education Richmond reduced 
spending by 23.4 per cent, Bromley by 17.0 per cent, and Harrow by 
15.4 per cent; increases took place in Leeds (9.2 per cent), Wigan 
(7.6 per cent) and Bradford (7.3 per cent). Thus within the totals 
there has been wide diversity. 
A feature of the grant system as it evolved from 1981/82 was that 
TABLE 4.3 REAL CURRENT EXPENDITURE: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
(Emn. 1984/85 costs) 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1992/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Primary 2751 2702 2615 2548 2518 2535 
Secondary 3796 3824 3827 3844 3876 3880 
targets tended to be lowest for those authorities already spending at 
the lowest levels relative to GRE, the shire Counties. Table 4.4 
gives the data for 1483/84 which shows how much more severe targets 
were for the low spending shire counties. This would be expected to 
increase spending disparities. 
The reason for low targets being assigned to low spending 
authorities was twofold: (1) targets were related to previous 
budgets, and (2) the higher spending authorities included a number 
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TABLE 4.4 : COMPARISON of 1983/84 TARGETS AND GREs 
Sum of Sum of Excess of No. of authorities 
Targets GREs Sum of with Target: 
Targets over below at or 
Sum of GREs GRE above 
GRE 
Class of Authority £m £m 
London Precepting 1,673 1,343 24.6 - 3 
Inner London Boroughs 898 695 29.2 1 12 
Outer London Boroughs 1,719 1,615 6.4 2 18 
Metropolitan Counties 1,104 928 19.0 - 6 
Metropolitan Districts 4,057 3,891 4.3 11 25 
Non-Met Counties 9,237 9,287 -0.5 23 16 
Non-Met Districts 1,446 1,471 -1.7 199 98 
ENGLAND 20,134 19,230 4.7 
who ignored grant penalties or were not subject to them - such as 
ILEA(1? - whereas the low spending counties tended to respond to the 
restraint of targets. 
The above discussion raises a number of interesting questions for 
empirical work. First, did the new service based GREs appear to 
influence the pattern of spending of local authorities on education? 
Second, what was the influence of Targets? Third, did an authority's 
aggregate GRE change, year-on-year affect education expenditure? 
Before examining these questions empirically, previous statistical 
work is reviewed. 
EXISTING WORK IN EDUCATION EXPENDITURE MODELLING 
There have been a number of papers published that set out to 
explain the level of Local Authority spending on education. 
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Dawson (1976) constructed models seeking to explain expenditure per 
school pupil. Her models explained 48 per cent of the variation of 
expenditure per primary school pupil for all local education 
authorities in England and Wales, and 59 per cent of the variation in 
expenditure per secondary school pupil. Primary and secondary educa- 
tion were considered separately. The most important variables in the 
study of primary education were an index indicating the extent to 
which small schools featured in an authority's service and a variable 
measuring the percentage of teachers employed to meet special educa- 
tional needs. For secondary schools the most important variables were 
those indicating the mix of school type and the course of study 
followed by older pupils. For all the regressions a dummy variable, 
set to one if the authority was in Greater London and zero otherwise, 
indicated a significant positive effect on expenditure. 
Using a broadly similar approach Faster, Jackman and Perlman 
(1980, p270) reported the following results for the (then) County Bor- 
oughs: 
XPRI = 107.50 - 0.24PROPO + 0.008Y + 0.11PRI 
(0.09) (0.003) (0.05) 
-2.28CON + 36.68ILLEG + 3.29LAB R2 = 0.24 
(2.47) (24.58) (3.25) 
and 
XSEC = 222.94 - 0.59PROPO + 0.022Y - 7.05CON 
(0.25) (0.009) (5.31) 
+67.27ILLEG + 1.30DEC - 10.65HIGHD - 0.90NEDGR Rz = 0.15 
(66.34) (0.78) (7.28) (0.63) 
-178- 
CHAPTER FOUR: MODELLING LOCAL AUTHORITY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE CHANGE 
where PROPO measured the proportion of owner-occupiers, Y measured 
household income regionally, CON and LAB measured the proportion of 
councillors in the Conservative and Labour parties, PRI was the number 
of primary school children in the authority, DEC was the rate of 
decline of population, HIGHD the proportion of the population in 
densely populated wards and parishes, ILLEG measured the proportion of 
illegitimate births, and NEDGR the receipt of needs grant per head of 
population. 
Jackman and Papadachi (1981) estimated a model to explain education 
expenditure for the 104 education authorities in England and Wales for 
1978/79. They found more success in explaining primary education 
expenditure than secondary education expenditure with multiple corre- 
lation coefficients of 0.74 and 0.60 respectively. They classified 
their explanatory variables as representing three factors: a cost 
factor, a preference factor (percentage Labour or other left council- 
lors) and budgetary factors, such as the share of marginal expenditure 
met by domestic rates, the level of lump sum grants per schoolchild 
and a measure of regional income. 
Most recently Jesson et al. (1985) have estimated a model which 
explains 71.3 per cent of expenditure per secondary school pupil in 
the 96 English LEAs in 1981/82. They report the following regression: 
EXP = 1,305 + 2.24BA - 4.73CH - 6.110S + 3.35GRADS 
(2.8) (-3.9) (-4.2) (2.9) 
+ 9.5AS - 7.23CONTACT 
(2.1) (-2.0) 
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where BA measures the percentage of children born outside the UK, 
Ireland, USA and the old Commonwealth or in households whose head was 
similarly born, CH measures the percentage change in numbers of 11-16 
year old pupils on the LEA roll over the five years preceding 1982, OS 
measures the percentage of oversize classes, GRAD measures the per- 
centage of graduate teachers employed, AS measures the percentage of 
"additional" teaching staff employed other than on the permanent 
staff, and CONTACT measures the class-contact ratio: the proportion 
of school staff actually teaching at any given time. 
A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE CHANGE 
The model of education expenditure developed in this chapter dif- 
fers from the models discussed above in taking as its focus the 
incremental change in education budgets. This attempt to model 
year-on-year changes in education expenditure is made firstly because 
of the intrinsic policy interest of such an approach in a world where 
planning is largely carried out incrementally, secondly because the 
effects of GREs and Targets may be expected to show up in year-on-year 
changes, and thirdly because the Government itself focusses on expen- 
Biture changes in policy debate. 
A major factor to take account of in modelling the determinants of 
change of education expenditure is the effect of the grant system. 
The amount of grant paid to a local authority determines the level of 
local rates which must be set for any given level of expenditure and 
thus affects the rate "price" of education spending. This effect has 
been discussed in Chapter 2 and is shown in Figure 4 on page 97. 
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For empirical study a measure of the impact of grant changes is 
required, preferably one that is invariant with respect to the expen- 
diture behaviour of individual authorities. A suitable measure is 
that given by the fiscal pressure variables(l) and defined and 
discussed in Chapter 2. To recall that discussion, fiscal pressure is 
defined as the rate poundage change required for maintaining a con- 
scant, or given, volume of expenditure. The fiscal pressure variables 
derived there answer the question: "If each authority increased its 
expenditure by x per cent, what would be the consequent rise (fall) in 
rates for each authority? " 
These fiscal pressure variables are used in the model of education 
expenditure change developed here. The model follows the approach 
developed in Chapter 2 for aggregate local authority expenditure 
change. Its hypothesised form is as follows: 
CHEDB=f[ALIGN, CEDGR, -CRPb, -(CRPb-CRPa), PCT, PCG9-C5-N7 (1) 
The definitions of the variables for the regressions explaining the 
change in education budgets from 1982/83 to 1983/84 are given 
below. (2) 
Dependent variable: 
CHEDB - the percentage year-on-year change in the education bud- 
get 1982/83 to 1983/84. 
(1) Gibson, Smith and Watt (1987a) 
(2) Definitions of the variables for the regressions explaining the 
change in education budgets from 1983/84 to 1984/85 may be deduced 
by simply moving all years in the definitions one year forward. 
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Explanatory variables: 
ALIGN - the change in education budget that would make 
education's share of the local authority budget in 1983/84 the 
same as education GRE's share of total GRE in 1982/83. 
CEDGR - the percentage change in education GRE between 1982/83 
and 1983/84. 
CRPb - the change in rate poundage for a5 per cent cash increase 
in 1983/84, (and for a3 per cent cash increase in 1984/85) - 
given zero use of balances and zero provision for clawback. 
CRPa - the change in rate poundage for a3 per cent cash increase 
in 1983/84, (and for a0 per cent cash increase in 1984/85) - 
given zero use of balances and zero provision for clawback. 
CRPb-CRPa - the increase in the change in rate poundage for the 
increase in the change in expenditure used to define the CRPs 
(see above) 
PCT - the percentage change: 1983/84 target compared to 1982/83 
budget 
PCG - the percentage change: 1983/84 GRE compared to 1982/83 
budget 
CON - equal to 1 when majority of seats held by Conservative par- 
ty mid 1982 (Mid 1983 for 83/84 to 84/85 regressions). 
PNOC - equal to 1 when no party holding a majority of seats (or 
where majority of seats held by Liberal party) mid 1982 (Mid 1983 
for 83/84 to 84/85 regressions). 
Fiscal pressure is measured by the variables CRPb and (CRPb-CRPa). 
The first is a measure of the level of fiscal pressure facing the 
authority - the expected rate rise if expenditure were raised by a 
hypothetical 5 per cent by every authority in 1983/84, and for the 
second of the two time periods studied, the expected rate rise if 
expenditure were raised by a hypothetical 3 per cent by every authori- 
ty in 1984/5. The second fiscal pressure variable is a measure of 
marginal fiscal pressure. It indicates the extent of the change in 
rate rise expected on moving from a low hypothesised across-the-board 
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expenditure increase (CRPa as defined above) to a higher hypothesised 
expenditure increase (CRPb). 
Both the level of fiscal pressure and marginal fiscal pressure are 
expected to be negatively related to increases in authorities' total 
expenditure and hence they are also expected to be negatively related 
to changes in what is usually the major part of total expenditure: 
education expenditure. 
Four more variables are included because of their likely effect on 
the overall budget and hence, indirectly, on the education budget. 
Firstly there are two financial guideline variables: PCT - the per- 
tentage change in target compared to previous budget and PCG - the 
percentage change in GRE compared to previous budget. These two vari- 
ables - the grant/fiscal effects of which are already embodied in the 
fiscal pressure variables - are expected to be positively related to 
increases in the education budget to the extent that authorities treat 
them as guidelines. Secondly two variables measure political influ- 
ence: CON, a dummy variable representing Conservative control of a 
local authority, and NOC a dummy variable indicating where an authori- 
ty is subject to no overall political control. 
Education specific effects are measured by two variables: ALIGN 
and CEDGR. Before discussing CEDGR, the construction of ALIGN is 
explained at some length. The variable ALIGN is included to test for 
the presence of convergence/divergence between local authority educa- 
tion budgets and education GREs. Education GREs attempt to be the 
best objective measure of the costs of providing education services to 
a similar standard in different local authorities. The ALIGN variable 
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is derived as follows. Consider a local authority for which the edu- 
cation budget represents 45 per cent of the total local authority bud- 
get, but for which education GRE represents 50 per cent of the total 
GRE for the authority. For this authority there is a substantial 
divergence between education's share of the budget and education's 
share of GRE. Now consider the possibility that a local authority 
might use GRE as a guideline and, in particular, wishes to remove this 
divergence next year. 
If the local authority wished to adjust its spending to remove 
entirely the last observed divergence between education's share of its 
GRE and education's share of its budget it would need to raise its 
education budget in the next year to 50 per cent of its total budget. 
Of course spending on other budgets may change, but for simplicity 
assume that other budgets remain constant. The question then is, by 
what percentage must spending on education rise so that education bud- 
get share equals education GRE share? Let this percentage rise in 
education budget be denoted by the variable ALIGN, then algebraically 
the relation is 
EDGRE1 EDB1+[(ALIGN / 100). EDB11 
------ ------------------------- (2) 
TGRE1 TB1 
where EDGRE1 is education GRE in year 1, TGRE1 is total GRE in year 1, 
EDB1 is education budget in year 1 and TB1 is total budget in year 1. 
Rearranging (2) above yields: 
ALIGN = 100. [(EDGRE1 / TGRE1) / (EDB1 / TB1)-1J (3) 
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Thus for the numerical example described, the education budget 
would need to be increased by 11.1% to remove the divergence between 
education GRE share and education budget share. In practice such 
adjustment, where it occurs, is expected to be both less than-complete 
and not accomplished entirely in one year. The coefficient on this 
variable is therefore expected to be positive but considerably below 
the figure of unity that would indicate full adjustment. 
Finally, the variable CHEDGR, the percentage year-an-year change in 
education GRE is included to test whether changes in education GRE are 
reflected in changes in education expenditure. Because education GRE 
is calculated by the Government to take account of changes in need as 
reflected in changing pupil numbers it also has the role of indicating 
changing demographic factors in the model. 
SHE DATA 
The tables below show these data for all education authorities 
except the ILEA, i. e. outer-London Boroughs, Metropolitan Districts 
and non-Metropolitan Counties. 
Table 4.5 shows the data, means, maxima and minima and standard 
deviations for outer-London Boroughs for 1982/3 to 1983/4, and 
Table 4.6 shows the corresponding figures for 1983/4 to 1984/5. 
Hillingdon has the highest year-on-year increase in education budget 
in the first pair of years considered, and, it is interesting to note 
the highest decrease in education budget in the second of the pair of 
years considered. Also of note in these two tables is that Haringey 
combines two extremes -a large gap between its total spending and 
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TABLE 4.5 DATA FOR OUTER-LONDON BOROUGHS 1982/3 TO 1983/4 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
% % -CRPa Y. '/, 0 0 
N C 
Barking 9.03 1.93 4.23 31.09 5.69 3.75 -7.41 0 0 Barnet 6.17 -6.38 -1.27 19.83 3.70 4.37 1.09 1 0 
Bexley 3.18 0.08 4.11 20.54 9.86 0.44 -3.84 1 0 Brent 9.84 2.43 1.71 23.86 13.15 -0.65 -13.88 0 1 Bromley 3.15 -0.50 1.58 21.72 3.48 4.37 4.30 1 0 
Croydon 5.85 -6.61 0.77 31.06 3.57 4.37 11.36 1 0 
Ealing 1.77 -3.44 2.52 17.13 4.49 4.20 3.35 1 0 
Enfield 1.74 -0.73 5.80 17.68 7.26 2.29 1.84 1 0 
Haringey 5.82 11.02 1.95 31.05 13.62 -0.65 -21.00 0 0 
Harrow 1.41 2.49 1.75 26.61 10.87 -0.65 -8.73 1 0 
Havering 3.35 -3.88 2.85 13.57 3.26 5.37 -1.11 1 0 
Hillingdon 11.99 -3.06 3.15 19.41 6.74 2.71 -6.01 1 0 
Hounslow 3.65 1.27 2.40 33.98 11.41 -0.65 -9.07 0 0 
Kingston 3.07 -8.93 3.14 20.92 3.00 6.98 5.07 1 0 
Merton 5.46 2.62 1.94 19.90 3.88 4.37 3.99 1 0 
Newham 10.33 7.22 5.26 12.29 13.66 -0.65 -8.55 0 0 
Redbridge 7.27 0.64 4.21 19.59 3.71 4.37 4.51 1 0 
Richmond 4.33 -15.04 3.09 25.69 3.20 4.37 0.66 0 1 
Sutton 7.69 2.67 -0.02 18.67 3.59 4.37 3.88 1 0 
Waltham Forest 5.07 11.00 4.84 27.15 12.83 -0.65 -15.86 0 1 
Mean 5.51 -0.26 2.70 22.59 7.04 2.62 -2.77 .7 .2 
Std Dev. 3.05 6.29 1.77 6.03 4.12 2.52 8.31 .5 .4 
Max. 11.99 11.02 5.80 33.98 13.66 6.98 11.36 1 1 
Min. 1.41 -15.04 -1.27 12.29 3.00 -0.65 -21.00 0 0 
its GRE and target, putting it under great fiscal pressure, and a 
large difference between education's share of the budget and its GRE 
share. Table 4.7 shows the data, means, maxima and minima and stan- 
dard deviations for Metropolitan Districts for 1982/3 to 1983/4, and 
Table 4.8 shows the corresponding figures for 1983/4 to 1984/5. The 
average increase in education budgets for both successive pairs of 
years is slightly above the corresponding averages for the 
outer-London Boroughs. For the first pair of years Newcastle shows 
the greatest increase in education budget, and interestingly has the 
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TABLE 4.6 DATA FOR OUTER-LONDON BOROUGHS 1983/4 TO 1984/5 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
'1. % -CRPa %. % 0 0 
N C 
Barking 6.60 -5.73 2.56 25.23 7.68 2.16 -9.38 0 0 
Barnet 3.74 -10.09 5.00 11.27 5.26 2.16 -2.16 1 0 
Bexley 2.12 -2.84 4.05 8.05 10.87 0.23 -3.92 1 0 
Brent 6.67 -1.09 3.98 13,34 28.42 -4.15 -16.78 0 1 
Bromley 4.53 -0.44 2.36 9.21 4.48 2.66 2.68 1 0 
Croydon 2.95 -10.29 2.35 17.98 4.67 2.66 9.10 1 0 
Ealing 4.55 -3.10 3.27 9.92 6.25 2.24 0.01 1 0 
Enfield 4.98 1.14 2.97 14.21 8.40 0.52 -1.13 1 0 
Haringey -0.99 11.02 3.04 42.43 29.35 -6.06 -25.70 0 0 
Harrow , 1.29 0.47 4.63 7.37 11.86 0.16 -7.77 1 0 
Havering 3.57 -3.55 3.12 6.72 5.68 2.16 -3.85 1 0 
Hillingdon -7.74 -11.43 1.86 13.62 11.10 0.43 -8.86 1 0 
Hounslow 12.40 -0.63 3.81 27.02 21.22 -1.66 -11.87 0 0 
Kingston 4.89 -7.81 3.68 14.15 5.21 2.16 -0.41 1 0 
Merton 1.48 -0.67 3.40 1.64 7.10 1.14 0.98 1 0 
Newham 7.64 1.31 1.90 33.82 28.34 -3.76 -14.04 0 0 
Redbridge 4.07 -4.26 2.23 7.49 4.75 2.66 3.12 1 0 
Richmond 1.45 -12.75 4.20 10.27 12.43 -0.40 -4.49 0 1 
Sutton 4.11 -4.23 4.74 6.46 5.16 2.16 2.83 1 0 
Waltham Forest 5.42 1.89 3.03 23.43 10.65 1.47 -15.94 0 1 
Mean 3.69 -3.15 3.31 15.18 11.44 0.45 -5.38 .7 .2 
Std Dev. 3.90 5.59 0.94 10.31 8.43 2.52 8.42 .5 .4 
Max. 12.40 11.02 5.00 42.43 29.35 2.66 9.10 1 1 
Min. -7.74 -12.75 1.86 1.64 4.48 -6.06 -25.70 0 0 
budget share for education most below GRE share, as reflected by the 
ALIGN variable. 
Table 4.9 shows the data, means, maxima and minima and standard 
deviations for non-Metropolitan Counties for 1982/3 to 1983/4, and 
Table 4.10 shows the corresponding figures for 1983/4 to 1984/5. The 
average increase in education budgets for both successive pairs of 
years is slightly above the corresponding averages for both the Metro- 
politan Districts and the outer-London Boroughs. 
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TABLE 4.7 DATA FOR METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1982/3 TO 1983/4 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
% % % -CRPa % % 0 0 
N C 
Birmingham 4.27 9.79 4.47 -0.06 5.01 4.37 7.67 1 0 
Coventry 3.45 5.81 1.74 1.05 4.96 4.37 1.55 0 0 
Dudley 4.81 -1.28 5.38 8.07 4.19 4.37 13.03 1 0 
Sandwell 5.20 -0.88 5.77 -0.56 5.25 3.74 6.18 0 0 
Solihull 4.19 -1.56 3.64 3.20 4.29 4.37 11.21 1 0 
Walsall 6.17 7.88 6.71 9.26 12.88 -0.65 -1.69 0 1 
Wolverhampton 5.66 -1.32 4.42 6.35 5.15 4.37 4.85 0 0 
Knowsley 6.61 -0.67 1.28 22.31 9.82 2.17 -2.34 0 0 
Liverpool 7.72 -2.37 1.56 8.95 6.88 2.40 -4.00 0 1 
St Helens 5.28 2.55 2.72 10.50 11.14 1.65 -1.30 0 0 
Sefton 2.54 -1.37 1.20 13.14 4.29 4.37 10.76 1 0 
Wirral 6.85 5.44 1.90 8.23 4.56 4.37 3.78 1 0 
Bolton 5.78 1.82 2.87 6.11 4.50 4.37 6.65 0 0 
Bury 3.86 2.15 2.06 18.31 12.01 -0.65 -4.66 1 0 
Manchester 10.22 6.99 -1.65 8.59 7.99 4.07 -16.04 0 0 
Oldham 6.35 5.70 2.44 7.33 4.83 4.37 5.49 0 0 
Rochdale 4.86 6.15 3.75 16.96 14.35 -0.65 -9.91 0 1 
Salford 6.82 5.74 1.50 8.94 4.75 3.49 -2.76 0 0 
Stockport 2.93 0.98 1.72 16.26 4.32 4.37 4.68 1 0 
Tameside 3.87 5.43 3.13 21.83 13.16 -0.65 -5.51 0 0 
Trafford 4.60 5.56 -1.25 22.00 4.57 4.37 4.80 1 0 
Wigan 8.49 4.31 2.07 17.74 12.85 -0.65 -5.16 0 0 
Barnsley 3.99 4.28 3.36 20.95 12.68 0.70 -7.76 0 0 
Doncaster 5.84 5.68 3.74 14.42 11.00 1.95 -7.12 0 0 
Rotherham 7.94 7.00 4.52 13.27 4.66 4.37 0.53 0 0 
Sheffield 7.46 12.90 3.88 21.14 13.86 -0.65 -16.00 0 0 
Bradford 6.59 2.19 5.28 27.83 12.51 -0.65 -2.64 0 1 
Calderdale 5.77 4.07 5.27 31.69 12.13 -0.65 -2.93 0 1 
Kirklees 5.22 1.28 4.19 19.03 4.73 4.37 5.19 0 0 
Leeds 6.56 1.59 2.37 19.98 4.40 4.37 2.58 0 0 
Wakefield 5.49 0.39 3.75 6.82 4.31 4.37 2.59 0 0 
Gateshead 6.33 6.33 2.91 7.78 5.29 3.63 -3.06 0 0 
Newcastle 11.84 16.05 0.31 29.39 14.72 -0.65 -20.68 0 0 
North Tyneside 6.13 6.69 3.43 30.33 13.71 -0.65 -13.54 0 0 
South Tyneside 6.39 1.45 0.78 25.23 9.16 2.46 -5.51 0 0 
Sunderland 10.05 10.54 3.93 22.98 12.86 -0.61 -4.25 0 0 
Mean 6.00 4.09 2.92 14.59 8.27 2.35 -1.25 .2 .1 
Std Dev. 2.00 4.23 1.84 8.84 3.96 2.21 7.87 .4 .4 
Max. 11.84 16.05 6.71 31.69 14.72 4.37 13.03 1 1 
Min. 2.54 -2.37 -1.65 -0.56 4.19 -0.65 -20.68 0 0 
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TABLE 4.8 DATA FOR METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1983/4 TO 1984/5 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
% Y. % -CRPa % % 0 0 
N C 
Birmingham 4.18 3.25 2.05 9.84 6.45 3.96 10.76 1 0 
Coventry 8.78 6.04 1.31 15.46 7.17 2.16 -2.30 0 0 
Dudley 3.93 -3.02 4.24 1.32 5.07 3.78 12.86 1 0 
Sandwell -1.52 -4.14 3.77 5.69 6.50 2.66 5.70 0 0 
Solihull 2.16 -2.33 4.17 4.36 5.31 2.66 8.99 1 0 
Walsall 8.43 2.47 3.29 10.15 20.31 -0.67 -1.56 0 1 
Wolverhampton 2.97 -2.93 0.16 10.60 6.86 2.63 2.26 0 0 
Knowsley 4.12 -2.03 1.99 19.20 15.52 -0.17 -4.20 0 0 
Liverpool 1.01 -5.77 0.68 19.50 14.36 -0.49 -8.75 0 0 
St Helens 5.31 0.95 3.10 20.75 25.07 -1.83 -5.58 0 0 
Sefton 4.51 0.85 0.75 12.57 5.49 2.66 6.06 1 0 
Wirral 6.20 2.15 1.79 10.19 9.49 0.90 0.78 1 0 
Bolton 3.05 -1.71 3.63 3.62 6.07 2.66 6.16 0 0 
Bury 2.33 -2.58 2.52 9.94 11.59 0.38 -3.79 1 0 
Manchester 1.97 -0.83 1.02 12.89 15.07 0.79 -19.78 0 0 
Oldham 4.58 0.91 4.09 10.70 6.65 2.66 4.09 0 0 
Rochdale 2.63 2.14 1.60 15.84 21.65 -0.75 -10.09 0 1 
Salford 1.85 3.37 2.11 27.20 17.35 -0.65 -6.09 0 0 
Stockport 3.82 0.70 3.13 11.05 5.43 2.66 3.55 0 1 
Tameside 5.68 3.86 3.62 7.96 21.14 -1.08 -5.30 0 0 
Trafford 2.39 3.12 2.68 8.04 5.93 2.58 3.48 1 0 
Wigan 4.73 -3.46 5.77 -7.50 12.22 0.49 -3.05 0 0 
Barnsley 3.42 3.48 2.31 12.07 15.61 -0.13 -7.37 0 0 
Doncaster 3.05 4.50 4.96 13.31 20.01 -0.75 -7.16 0 0 
Rotherham 3.29 1.89 3.54 10.05 7.09 1.99 -0.34 0 0 
Sheffield 5.25 10.02 4.14 36.34 31.82 -4.46 -17.43 0 0 
Bradford 4.82 -3.28 5.27 2.23 11.30 0.45 2.75 0 1 
Calderdale 1.54 -1.12 5.18 10.25 14.34 0.10 0.94 0 1 
Kirklees 5.64 1.49 4.81 20.91 9.93 0.95 3.47 0 0 
Leeds 4.52 -1.12 3.02 12.80 5.84 2.59 2.34 0 0 
Wakefield 6.69 -1.53 5.78 5.86 6.23 2.17 . 2.78 
0 0 
Gateshead 4.68 5.65 -0.45 41.78 27.74 -2.25 -12.74 0 0 
Newcastle 8.38 4.22 1.95 27.99 31.37 -2.31 -22.01 0 0 
North Tyneside 2.99 4.10 3.27 36.74 31.39 -3.81 -15.61 0 0 
South Tyneside 4.65 -1.69 -0.51 35.30 16.04 -0.08 -9.11 0 0 
Sunderland 5.32 2.82 2.91 27.77 28.49 -2.36 -5.22 0 0 
Mean 4.09 0.84 2.88 14.80 14.10 0.56 -2.51 .2 .1 
Std Dev. 2.11 3.41 1.66 11.00 8.57 2.10 8.36 .4 .4 
Max. 8.78 10.02 5.78 41.78 31.82 3.96 12.86 1 1 
Min. -1.52 -5.77 -0.51 -7.50 5.07 -4.46 -22.01 0 0 
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TABLE 4.9 DATA FOR NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES 1982/3 TO 1983/4 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
% % -CRPa '/, Y. 0 0 
N C 
Avon 8.98 4.63 1.75 17.00 12.29 -0.65 -5.29 0 0 
Bedfordshire 1.19 0.16 5.32 13.63 13.20 -0.64 -4.68 0 1 
Berkshire 7.35 2.03 3.89 10.08 11.84 1.41 0.78 1 0 
Bucks 8.73 -3.04 6.28 0.48 4.41 4.37 7.78 1 0 
Cambridge 8.30 0.20 4.49 10.61 4.37 4.37 7.52 1 0 
Cheshire 5.65 4.92 3.63 26.54 12.93 -0.64 -3.81 0 1 
Cleveland 4.12 0.93 3.78 31.82 14.11 -0.65 -4.77 0 0 
Cornwall 5.92 -0.49 2.93 11.45 4.35 4.37 10.53 0 1 
Cumbria 5.30 -0.61 2.67 7.59 10.11 1.95 1.28 0 0 
Derbyshire 6.11 1.30 4.31 8.17 8.59 2.39 2.72 0 0 
Devon 6.79 -1.16 2.73 8.14 4.25 4.37 7.95 1 0 
Dorset 6.27 2.47 3.25 5.09 4.24 4.37 4.93 1 0 
Durham 7.82 4.16 2.96 16.68 10.07 1.92 -1.19 0 0 
East 6.82 -0.12 3.13 7.21 4.12 4.37 5.76 1 0 
Essex 7.31 2.77 4.41 10.07 4.40 4.37 6.52 1 0 
Gloucs 6.86 3.79 1.77 8.50 4.45 4.37 4.36 1 0 
Hampshire 5.81 2.42 3.29 9.70 4.44 4.37 4.66 1 0 
Hereford &W 3.64 4.91 4.28 5.56 4.50 4.37 5.83 1 0 
Hertfordshire 6.13 0.14 1.18 8.94 4.51 4.37 3.00 1 0 
Humberside 6.59 1.90 3.83 20.26 13.00 -0.65 -2.35 0 0 
Isle of Wight 6.97 -5.47 2.59 9.82 4.51 4.37 5.22 0 0 
Kent 8.10 3.35 4.72 3.90 4.32 4.37 11.36 1 0 
Lancashire 9.15 5.86 2.70 14.68 4.79 4.37 5.49 0 0 
Leicester 9.58 4.13 3.64 9.02 4.70 4.37 5.51 0 1 
Lincolnshire 5.69 5.51 4.03 15.11 4.54 4.37 6.09 1 0 
Norfolk 4.86 0.48 3.27 13.00 4.27 4.37 7.93 1 0 
North Yorks 3.90 -0.39 2.26 13.67 4.41 4.37 3.49 
1 0 
Northants 10.23 -1.68 5.72 5.12 4.74 4.37 
6.62 0 1 
Northumberland 10.36 7.58 2.83 2.12 9.84 2.07 1.67 0 0 
Notts 6.70 4.71 3.06 34.79 12.85 -0.65 -3.05 0 0 
Oxfordshire 4.11 1.80 2.58 6.16 4.26 4.37 3.93 1 0 
Shropshire 6.67 1.45 4.20 8.11 4.55 4.37 8.24 0 1 
Somerset 9.88 9.21 0.63 16.48 4.38 4.37 2.94 1 0 
Staffordshire 5.31 -2.24 4.25 8.90 5.01 4.00 
3.76 0 0 
Suffolk 6.15 -0.99 4.16 7.33 4.32 4.37 
4.71 1 0 
Surrey 5.50 0.47 3.24 13.93 3.89 4.37 6.44 1 0 
Warwickshire 7.81 5.56 2.67 8.89 4.52 4.37 4.51 0 1 
West 6.25 4.64 4.13 9.60 3.90 4.37 8.82 1 0 
Wiltshire 7.89 4.57 2.83 10.91 4.44 4.37 6.73 1 0 
Mean 6.69 2.05 3.42 11.51 6.47 3.28 3.90 .5 .8 
Std Dev. 1.94 3.05 1.15 7.12 3.45 1.88 4.24 .5 .4 
Max. 10.36 9.21 6.28 34.79 14.11 4.37 11.36 1 
1 
Min. 1.19 -5.47 0.63 0.48 3.89 -0.64 -5.28 
0 0 
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TABLE 4.10 DATA FOR NON-METROPOLITAN COUNTIES 1983/4 TO 1984/5 
Authority CHEDB ALIGN CEDGR CRPb CRPb PCT PCG C N 
% '/1 % -CRPa % '/, 0 0 
N C 
Avon 6.00 -0.77 4.89 25.46 29.75 -2.84 -3.97 0 0 
Bedfordshire 2.44 -0.06 4.83 12.82 15.10 0.18 -0.60 0 1 
Berkshire 4.24 -2.24 6.27 7.88 15.65 -0.08 4.41 1 0 
Bucks 6.92 -5.01 5.61 2.73 6.74 1.97 6.02 1 0 
Cambridge 4.89 -2.80 7.28 3.81 5.50 2.66 8.50 1 0 
Cheshire 3.67 0.66 4.70 11.23 21.08 -0.74 -1.26 0 1 
Cleveland 3.56 -1.22 3.02 9.82 26.28 -1.43 -1.43 0 0 
Cornwall 6.99 -1.97 6.19 -1.46 5.52 2.66 10.58 0 1 
Cumbria 3.43 -1.18 0.46 32.62 28.77 -2.43 -2.54 0 0 
Derbyshire 5.67 0.64 5.72 16.07 26.38 -1.78 2.10 0 0 
Devon 5.24 -2.02 6.14 5.25 5.41 2.66 7.76 1 0 
Dorset 7.29 -0.82 4.68 2.38 5.19 2.66 5.80 1 0 
Durham 3.47 -1.00 3.79 22.67 17.91 -0.33 0.15 0 0 
East 3.94 -4.82 5.84 3.37 5.17 2.66 8.52 1 0 
Essex 5.06 -1.73 5.21 5.87 5.52 2.66 7.72 1 0 
Gioucs 4.79 -1.21 4.14 4.05 5.63 2.57 6.09 1 0 
Hampshire 4.28 -0.29 5.12 4.90 5.86 2.47 6.47 1 0 
Hereford &W 5.83 4.11 5.87 0.46 5.64 2.66 7.57 1 0 
Hertfordshire 3.09 -2.69 3.69 7.08 7.60 1.56 2.88 1 0 
Humberside 2.02 -2.25 4.53 16.18 26.50 -1.64 0.98 0 0 
Isle of Wight 3.46 -8.70 7.06 7.79 7.49 1.66 5.91 0 0 
Kent 3.42 0.36 4.99 1.57 5.52 2.66 10.70 1 0 
Lancashire 4.94 0.52 4.20 11.90 8.42 1.39 5.21 0 0 
Leicester 6.53 -2.56 5.23 5.57 5.96 2.66 7.24 0 1 
Lincolnshire 4.04 2.50 5.34 8.97 5.75 2.66 7.85 1 0 
Norfolk 4.29 -1.92 5.74 6.69 5.32 2.66 9.26 1 0 
North Yorks 5.77 -1.12 2.60 13.89 6.29 2.16 3.33 1 0 
Northants 5.01 -7.66 7.77 2.09 5.99 2.66 9.99 0 1 
Northumberland 7.26 1.09 -0.60 17.90 24.76 -1.50 -3.24 0 0 
Notts -1.01 -1.98 4.49 10.49 17.90 -0.28 1.58 0 0 
Oxfordshire 4.23 0.94 3.89 8.81 6.02 2.16 4.21 1 0 
Shropshire 6.52 -2.68 4.05 8.41 5.81 2.66 8.56 0 1 
Somerset 9.85 3.66 6.34 14.01 13.41 0.16 3.78 1 0 
Staffordshire 3.71 -2.55 5.32 11.44 13.07 0.35 3.72 0 0 
Suffolk 4.15 -2.83 4.42 3.96 6.22 2.16 5.12 1 0 
Surrey 2.67 0.04 4.09 4.66 5.56 2.24 5.07 1 0 
Warwickshire 3.45 1.36 5.88 4.93 7.74 1.51 5.25 0 1 
West 4.90 1.22 6.47 1,48 4.79 2.66 13.26 1 0 
Wiltshire 6.21 -0.31 5.10 6.58 5.50 2.66 8.22 1 0 
Mean 4.67 -1.21 4.88 8.83 11.10 1.27 4.89 .5 .2 
Std Dev. 1.85 2.56 1.61 7.11 8.08 1.73 4.14 .5 .4 
Max. 9.85 4.11 7.77 32.62 29.75 2.65 13.26 1 1 
Min. -1.01 -8.70 -0.60 -1.46 4.79 -2.83 -3.97 
0 0 
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THE RESULTS 
The task of modelling expenditure changes is more ambitious than 
that of modelling expenditure levels because one would expect to see 
greater randomness in year-on-year changes if only because of data 
measurement errors. However, in view of this it is argued that the 
results from testing the model are satisfactory in terms of their 
overall explanatory power. 
Table 4.11 gives the regression results of the model used to 
explain the increase in education budgets for 1983/84 over 1982/83 for 
TABLE 4.11 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1982/83 TO 1983/84, DEPENDENT VARI- 
ABLE CHEDB 
Met Dists 
Coeff t 
non-Met Counties 
Coeff t 
Outer-London 
Coeff t 
ALIGN . 158b 1.759 . 267a 2.521 . 106 . 530 
CEDGR -. 125 -. 459 -. 099 -. 297 -. 398d -. 766 
CRPb . 013 . 293 -. 059d -. 947 -. 180 -1.052 
CRPb-CRPa -. 325d -. 923 . 141 . 257 -. 056 -. 054 
PCT -. 290 -. 482 . 233 . 220 . 211 . 150 
PCG -. 107d -1.129 . 188d 1.026 -. 024 -. 102 
CON -1.520c -1.692 -1.839b -2.088 -3.987d -1.285 
NOC . 259 . 266 -1.039d -1.067 -. 
701 -. 245 
CONST 9.074b 2.010 5.924d . 803 13.154d . 980 
RP- . 494 . 
322 . 254 
R2 . 344 . 
142 -. 288 
No of Obs 36 39 20 
SSR 71.031 97.259 131.772 
a, b, c and d denote regression coefficients significantly different 
from zero in a one tailed test at the . 01, . 05, . 10 and . 
25 levels 
respectively. 
Metropolitan Districts, non-Metropolitan Counties and outer-London 
Boroughs. Table 4.12 gives the corresponding regression results for 
increases in education budgets for 1984/85 over 1983/84. ALIGN 
has 
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the expected sign in all six regressions and is usually significantly 
TABLE 4.12 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1983/4 TO 1984/5, DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CHEDB 
Met Dists non-Met Counties Outer- London 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
ALIGN . 322b 2.349 . 143d 1.065 . 388a 3.241 
CEDGR -. 139 -. 408 -. 072 -. 224 1.853a 2.927 
CRPb -. 051d -. 752 . 738d . 827 . 038 . 332 CRPb-CRPa . 075 . 451 . 572 . 219 1.304a 3.727 PCT . 059 . 081 . 069 . 047 4.264a 3.950 
PCG . 058 . 583 . 189d . 851 . 466a 3.440 CON -. 809d -. 701 1.497d 1.103 -6.188b -2.134 
NOC -. 050 -. 044 1.587d 1.165 -1.873d -. 786 
CONST 4.189d 1.214 1.766 . 331 -11.822c -1.584 
RP- . 233 . 145 . 819 
R . 006 -. 083 . 687 No of Obs 36 39 20 
SSR 120.088 110.718 52.107 
a, b, c and d denote regression coefficients significantly different 
from zero in a one tailed test at the . 01, . 05, . 10 and . 25 levels 
respectively. 
different from zero. CEDGR, the percentage year-on-year change in 
education GRE is less successful, usually not being significantly dif- 
ferent from zero, though it does carry the correct sign in the one 
regression where its significance is firmly established: in 
outer-London Boroughs for 1983/84 on 1984/85. In fact the regression 
as a whole for outer-London Boroughs for 1933/84 on 1984/85 stands out 
from all the other regressions in having by far the highest value for 
R and having all coefficients significant except the level of fiscal 
pressure and with their expected signs. It is not known if this 
result is due to other than sampling variation. 
Generally the level of fiscal pressure (CRPb) and marginal fiscal 
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pressure (CRPb-CRPa) variables are not very successful, usually being 
not significantly different from zero, the exception being marginal 
fiscal pressure in the outer-London Boroughs regression just 
mentioned. This story is repeated for PCT (percentage change from 
target to budget) and PCG (percentage change from GRE to budget), 
which generally show up poorly again except for outer-London Boroughs 
in the second time period. In contrast, the political variables CON 
and to a lesser extent NOC are usually significant with generally the 
expected negative signs, except in the case of non-Metropolitan 
Counties in 1983/4 to 1984/85 where the effect is quite strongly in 
the direction opposite to that expected. 
Given the rather low t ratios for NOC generally it might seem to be 
TABLE 4.13 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1982/3 TO 198314, DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CHEDB, LAB USED INSTEAD OF CON, NOC 
Met Dists non-Met Counties Outer-London 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
ALIGN . 114c 1.334 . 227b 2.132 . 037 . 
192 
CEDGR . 017 . 080 -. 131 -. 396 -. 
277 -. 524 
CRPb . 011 . 240 -. 056d -. 875 -. 
124d -. 759 
CRPb-CRPa -. 409c -1.160 . 213 . 382 . 068 . 
066 
PCT -. 420 -. 695 . 270 . 250 . 357 . 
253 
PCG -. 169b -1.978 . 197d 1.050 -. 124 -. 
574 
LAB . 707d 1.021 
1.285c 1.460 2.101d . 820 
CONST 9.043b 2.057 3.955 . 537 6.898 . 
580 
Rrxý . 457 . 273 . 
177 
R2 . 322 . 109 -. 
302 
No of Obs 36 39 20 
SSR 76.112 104.353 145.318 
a, b, c and d denote regression coefficients significantly different 
from zero in a one tailed test at the . 01, . 05, . 
10 and . 25 levels 
respectively. 
preferable to express political effects in a less detailed way - by 
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just using a labour dummy (LAB) on its own for instance. This is 
tried in the tables of regressions in Tables 4.13 and 4.14. On bal- 
ance it is worth keeping both CON and NOC in the regressions as the 
reduction in R' that arises from just using LAB is marked. 
TABLE 4.14 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1983/4 TO 1984/5, DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CHEDB, LAB USED INSTEAD OF CON3 NOC 
Met Dists non-Met Counties Outer-London 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
ALIGN . 311b 2.319 . 138d 1.099 . 315b 2.453 CEDGR -. 101 -. 307 -. 068 -. 216 2.075a 2.957 
CRPb -. 050d -. 758 . 074d . 840 . 081 . 644 CRPb-CRPa . 077 . 466 . 060 . 234 1.601a 4.472 PCT . 046 . 064 . 076 . 520 5.082a 4.507 PCG . 050 . 512 . 187d . 860 . 366b 2.547 LAB . 417 . 461 -1.541d -1.217 2.714d 1.027 
CONST 3.610d 1.111 3.239 . 622 -22.644 -3.947 
R 
. 224 . 145 . 750 R 
. 030 -. 048 . 604 No of Obs 36 39 20 
SSR 121.476 110.757 71.914 
a, b, c and d denote regression coefficients significantly different 
from zero in a one tailed test at the . 01, . 05, . 10 and . 25 levels 
respectively. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The model described above is directed at the task of explaining not 
levels of education budgets but year-on-year changes in the education 
budget. It has been argued that this is at once more difficult, but 
more interesting in a policy context. It is therefore pleasing that 
the levels of explanation obtained are quite high. In general the 
ALIGN variable works well. Overall its coefficients suggest that when 
budget share for education is out of line with GRE share, budget 
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changes are made in the following year that on average remove about 
one third of the discrepancy. A second finding is that the effect of 
politics is generally well established in these models with Conserva- 
tive, or no overall control having a negative effect on changes in 
education budgets. 
The effect of change in education GRE (CEDGRE) is less well 
established with all coefficients carrying the "wrong" signs though 
insignificantly different from zero except for outer-London Boroughs 
in 1983/84 to 1984/85. Fiscal pressure measures are not very success- 
ful in these models. The chain of causation with these variables is 
indirect in that they were included because of their likely effect on 
the total budget and hence by implication a partial effect on the edu- 
cation budget. These variables are far more successful in explaining 
changes in overall local authority budgets as seen in Chapter 2. 
Changes in overall GRE and target also have limited explanatory power 
except for the regressions for outer-London Boroughs in 1983/84 to 
1984/85 where they are very successful. 
In fact the regressions for outer-London Boroughs in 1983/84 to 
1984/85 perform outstandingly well for reasons that are not entirely 
c1 ear . 
How do these results compare with the studies mentioned earlier? A 
major difference in approach is that the present study attempts to 
explain year-on-year changes, whereas Dawson (1976), Foster, Jackman 
and Perlman (1980), Jackman and Papadachi (1981) and Jesson et al 
(1985) all attempt to explain levels. Nevertheless, there is a con- 
Sistency with Foster, Jackman and Perlman and Jackman and Papadachi in 
-196- 
CHAPTER FOUR: MODELLING LOCAL AUTHORITY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE CHANGE 
finding negative effects on expenditure of Conservative control. 
The models estimated here have laid more emphasis on the factors 
that impinge on local government from central government - the fiscal 
pressure experienced, the extent to which their education budget share 
differs from their GRE share and the overall budget effect of the 
divergence of their budget from target and GRE. The models reviewed 
in the brief survey above place more emphasis on demographic factors 
such as pupil numbers and cost factors such as the proportion of grad- 
uate teachers. In this study, changes in cost and demographic factors 
are represented by the change in education GRE. 
It is concluded that the extent to which expenditure changes can be 
explained by the mainly financial factors and also political used here 
is encouraging. Future work may generate closely fitting models that 
combine such financial measures with a greater range of cost and demo- 
graphic factors than are used here. 
In the next chapter the housing branch of the capital expenditure 
budget is examined. 
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A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING INVESTMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
So far, the chapters in this thesis have examined general government 
expenditure and aggregate local authority expenditure, both current 
(Chapter 3) and capital (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5 the education 
branch of the local authority current expenditure budget was examined. 
In this chapter, housing, the most important branch of the local 
authority capital expenditure budget is examined. 
Capital expenditure on housing has for many years accounted for 
more than fifty per cent of the local authority capital expenditure 
budget. (1) 
This chapter develops a model proposed in Nicholson and Topham 
(1971) as a theoretical basis for examining the investment decisions 
of local authorities in Great Britain. It provides an analysis of the 
determinants of investment in housing by what were, until the 1974 
reorganization, the four tiers of local authority responsible for 
#> This Chapter is based on R. J. Nicholson, N. Topham and P. A. Watt, 
"Housing Investment by Different Types of Local Authority", Bulle- 
tin of Economic Research, II November 1975, pp 65-86. 
(1) In 1967/68 it stood at 57% of the capital expenditure of local 
authorities in England and Wales. Some figures for other years 
are 1975/76; 63'/., 1979/80: 547., 1982/83: 54%, 1984/85 56*% 
(Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics - vari- 
ous years). 
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housing; County Boroughs (CBs), Non-County Boroughs (NCBs), Urban Dis- 
tricts (UDs) and Rural Districts (RDs). (1) These authorities differed 
widely in size, sociological and economic composition, local resources 
etc., and represented different levels of local government organiza- 
tion and administration. The purpose of the investigation is to 
establish what the determinants of investment in housing are for these 
four tiers of local authority and find if they differ significantly 
between tiers. (2) Such information is of value to central governments 
who wish to implement a housing programme when the various areas of 
local government may react differently to different stimuli. 
BACKGROUND 
1.1 THE MODEL 
Briefly, the model represents a simple welfare maximizing process 
which treats investment decisions by local governments in a way 
analagous to that employed in conventional investment analysis of 
profit making industry but, in the present context, with the emphasis 
on social costs and benefits. 
The level of investment is seen as determined by two interacting 
schedules called the social marginal efficiency of investment (SMEI) 
and social marginal cost of funds (SMCF) - schedules. The SMEI sched- 
ule reflects the real rate of return on marginal projects. It is 
(1) London Boroughs were not included in this study because the 
reorganisation of the authorities into the G. L. C., which occurred 
during the sample period, resulted in major discontinuities in 
statistical series. 
(2) The possible effect of size of local authorities as a factor 
affecting investment decisions is considered in Nicholson and 
Topham (1972). Statistical tests for differences between the 
tiers are carried out in Appendix III to this chapter. 
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related to such factors as the size and condition of housing stock, 
overcrowding, population growth, age and socio-economic composition 
which determine the net benefits from capital expenditure on housing 
and, it may be argued, ultimately falls as investment increases. The 
SMCF schedule parallels the marginal cost of funds schedule in conven- 
tional analysis and indicates the risk rate (including political risk) 
associated with the financial implications of the capital programme. 
It is related to factors which give rise to financial pressure on an 
authority as investment increases and would be affected by, for exam- 
pie, the product of the penny rate per head. It is presumed that 
authorities continue investment until project return is equated with 
the risk rate at the margin. 
Investment decisions are also affected by local influences; for 
example local drive, local tastes and local authority attitudes. The 
classification of these influences involves the important question of 
whose social welfare function is the relevant one in the welfare 
maximizing process, the central government's or the local 
government's? The two may not be the same since the latter is a func- 
tion of local tastes and local priorities which may in some respects 
be at variance with central government priorities. The present study 
has classified as SMEI variables those which reflect central govern- 
ment priorities as indicated by central government policy statements. 
All local influences are classified together as Local factors. If 
Local factors are important they may be taken as indicating local 
divergences from the central government's welfare function and, from 
the point of view of central government, making for non-optimal deci- 
lions. However so far as these factors represent specific local 
tastes they are directly relevant to local SMEI schedules and 
their 
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inclusion certainly contributes to optimal allocation from the point 
of view of the local community. Not all local influences necessarily 
make for optimal allocation and one possibly distorting influence, 
"Impetus", is included in the analysis. 
Formally the model may be set out in the following way. I denotes 
the level of investment; rm and rc the rate of return and risk rate 
associated with the marginal project; x,, xa,... factors specifi- 
cally affecting the SMEI schedule; y,, y,,... factors specifically 
affecting the SMCF schedule; and z1, z,,... factors (including 
Local factors) which can affect either schedule. 
SMEI schedule rm = f,. (i, xz7x,..., z 
SMCF schedule rc-. = fF. (I 5 yx , yj 
Equilibrating condition: r- = r- =r 
(e and n) stochastic disturbance variables) 
It is assumed that the x..., y..., z... factors relevant to the 
local authority's decision taking process are known factors on which 
the authority takes its decision, (1) and econometrically are exogenous 
variables. The endogenous variables in the model are the level of 
investment I and the equilibrating rate of return r. Thus there are 
two reduced form relations: 
I = ga. (Xi , ..., ys,... zz> ... 'u) 
(1) 
r = ge(x1 3 ... 9Yi 3... Za> ... 9v) 
(2) 
(1) Or, less strongly, that the conditions which motivate investment 
are described by these ex ante variables 
-202- 
CHAPTER FIVE: A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING INVESTMENT 
(u and v, stochastic disturbance variables) 
r is in practice unmeasurable and so it is not possible to estimate 
(2) or the parameters in the SMEI and SMCF schedules. All the follow- 
ing work is devoted to an examination of (1), the reduced form invest- 
ment function in which investment is expressed as a function of all 
the explanatory exogenous variables. 
1.2 THE BASIC DATA 
Investment for each local authority is measured by the annual capi- 
tal payments for housing per thousand population, at constant prices, 
averaged over the years 1962-8. This average has been calculated for 
all 82 CBs and for a sample of lower tiers consisting of 143 NCBs, 112 
UDs and 86 RDs. (1) The analysis is therefore a cross-section one and 
the concern is with the variation in capital expenditure as between 
local authorities. 
A major task has been the selection and construction, for all 423 
authorities, of measurable variables which reflect the factors 
believed to influence the investment decision. Altogether over forty 
separate variables were compiled and these are listed in Appendix 1. 
It was never intended that all of them would be included together in 
the estimated investment functions, but since little work has been 
done in this area of public investment it has been necessary to exam- 
ine a wide range of variables to decide which, on institutional and 
economic grounds, are the most relevant ones in the decision taking 
(1) An initial random sample for each tier was taken from IMTA 
records, but certain authorities whose boundaries had been changed 
during the years 1962-68 were replaced by other authorities also 
randomly selected. The sampling fractions in round terms were: 
NCBs 0.5, UDs 0.2, RDs 0.2. 
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process, and which are statistically the most reliable and useful ones 
to represent these decision factors. (1) Detailed provisional analyses 
resulted in a final selection" of seventeen variables which are 
described in the following paragraphs and given short names for refer- 
ence in subsequent discussion. 
SMEI VARIABLES 
Adequacy of the existing housing stock 
(1) The estimated number of houses declared unfit in 1955 as a propor- 
tion of total housing stock in an area. (UNFITNESS) 
This is an indicator of the quantity of low quality housing as 
perceived by the public health inspector. It is possible that the 
figure understates the true incidence of unfitness in areas with par- 
ticularly severe housing problems as the inspector may unofficially 
bear in mind and be limited by the ability of the local authority to 
replace those houses he declares unfit. 
(2) The number of households in an authority without or sharing hot 
water supply as a per cent of all households. (HOT WATER LACK) 
This variable is introduced as an indicator of lack of amenities in 
the existing housing stock. 
(3) The number of dwellings in an authority with rateable value under 
10 as per cent of all dwellings in that area. (LOW RV) 
(1) All the variables together with quadratic forms of some of them 
were used in Nicholson and Topham (1971), and the reasons they 
were selected and the decision hypotheses associated with them are 
set out in that paper. A detailed study of the statistical prob- 
lem of multicollinearity arising from the use of such a large num- 
ber of variables was given in Nicholson and Topham (1973). Both 
of these studies were for County Boroughs only. 
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The implications of this variable are complex. Low rateable value 
housing may, in certain areas, be poor or inadequate housing and hence 
be an indicator of housing need. The variable is to be interpreted in 
this way in the investment functions of CBs, NCBs and UDs. But in RDs 
a large proportion of housing of low rateable value does not necessar- 
ily indicate inadequate housing: it indicates a large stock of small 
houses or houses which, because of their situation, have low letting 
value. In this situation the variable is more an indicator of limited 
local financial resources since an authority's available tax base is 
the total rateable value of the properties in its area. The lower the 
total rateable value per head, the greater the pressure in raising 
finances locally through the rates. In this sense, as pointed out in 
Appendix 2, LOW RV has affinities with variable 10 (below) relating to 
the Rate Deficiency Grant, and is to be classified as an SMCF vari- 
able. However for the tiers other than RDs the SMCF aspect of LOW RV 
is in general better picked out by variables 10 and 11, LOW RV being 
interpreted as an SME1 variable. 
(4) An overcrowding index given by the percentage of households in an 
authority living at a density of more than one person per 
room. (OVERCROWDING) 
Demographic 
(5) Population growth rate (total), 1951-61, per cent per 
year. (POPN. GR. TOT) 
(6) Population growth rate (balance), 1951-61, per cent per 
year. (POPN. GR BAL) This is the excess (or deficit) of population 
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growth rate (total) over the rate of natural increase by births and 
deaths, and hence is the migration rate into or out of an authority. 
(7) Actual population of the authority at the 1961 Census of Popula- 
tion. (POPULATION) 
This variable is introduced in an attempt to detect any effects 
resulting from the size of the local authority. 
(8) The number of persons per acre. (POPN. DENSITY) This variable was 
originally introduced as a possible indirect indicator of housing 
needs, on the hypothesis that a high population density might be 
associated with dense and poorly arranged housing. In practice, how- 
ever, it has been more useful as an indicator which distinguishes 
between different kinds of authority (see Section 1.3). The variable 
is highly correlated with actual population size. 
SMCF VARIABLES 
Financial Resources 
(9) The Percentage of an authority's total current expenditure met by 
the Rate Deficiency Grant. (RDG) 
This variable is discussed in Appendix 2. It is in principle a 
measure of the lack of local resources. 
(10) The product of the penny rate per head, 1961. (PENNY RATE PROD- 
UCT) 
This is an indicator of the strength of the local tax base, and 
hence of local resources. It measures the total rate income per head 
to a local authority arising from a levy of a one-penny in the pound 
rate on its taxable properties. If an authority's total rateable val- 
ue per head is low, the PENNY RATE PRODUCT will also be 
low. The 
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variable is, therefore, in general a more sensitive indicator of the 
financial pressures which are associated with a weak tax base than LOW 
RV (except) perhaps, in the special circumstances of RDs, discussed 
above) since this relates to only a Proportion of the tax base. 
LOCAL VARIABLES 
The rationale of sub-national government is that there is signifi- 
cant variation in tastes and choice patterns between local 
communities. Variables 11 to 16 are included to take account of these 
differing attitudes. Local tastes are reflected in local welfare 
functions and so are relevant to local SMEI functions and contribute 
to local optimal allocation decisions. 
Local Tastes and Attitudes 
(11) A socio-economic index given by the percentage of heads of house- 
holds included in the 1961 Census of Population socia-economic classes 
1,2,3,4 and 13. (SOCIO-ECON) 
This is an index of the proportion of a local authority's popula- 
tion in the "higher" socio-economic groups. It is presumed that resi- 
dents in those groups would prefer housing in the private rather than 
the public sector. The lower the proportion, the greater that sector 
of the population which might be expected to demand local authority 
housing. 
(12) Housing propensity: the total local authority stock as a per 
cent of the total stock of all dwellings in the area. (HOUSING PROPEN) 
This variable is taken as an indicator of the authority's propensity 
to provide local authority housing in its area. It is governed by the 
demand for local authority housing in earlier years, and the 
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authority's response to it. If this response is maintained, the vari- 
able reflects a long term "attitude" of the local authority. 
(13) The proportion of total government seats held by the Labour party 
1955-64. (LABOUR) 
This variable, which ranges from 0 to over 0.8, was introduced to 
test whether local political "colour" was significantly associated 
with housing investment. 
Type of Area 
The following three variables were introduced to indicate certain 
socio-economic characteristics of each local authority. They may be 
regarded as coming broadly within the classification of local choice 
variables. 
(14) Industrialization Index: the percentage of total rateable value 
accounted for by factories, mills, etc., 1963-4. (IND. INDEX) 
(15) Domestic property index: the percentage of total rateable value 
accounted for by houses, maisonettes, flats, etc., 
1963-4. (DOM. INDEX) 
(16) Commercialization Index: the percentage of total rateable value 
accounted for by shops, offices and other commercial buildings, 
1963-4. (COMM. INDEX) 
Local Impetus 
(17) 1958-61 addition to local authority housing stock as per cent of 
total post-1945 local authority housing stock. (IMPETUS) 
This variable, in association with the dependent variable, measures 
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the importance of an on-going housing programme. It is introduced to 
indicate the dynamic of the town-hall machine. This influence on 
local housing investment is discussed more fully in Nicholson and 
Topham (1971, p. 285). The important point is that it may not be whol- 
ly a function of local community tastes, but one reflecting decisions 
of a strong executive team attempting to pursue its own goals. To 
this extent it makes for non-optimal allocation. 
Regional Variations 
A set of eight regional dummy variables. These are discussed in 
Section 2.1. 
It will be appreciated that there are inter-correlations among many 
of these variables. However, in choosing them from the original bank 
of variables listed in Appendix 1, the attempt has been to use repre- 
sentative series and so control, as far as possible, the statistical 
consequences of inter-correlation. All the variables are, in terms of 
the model proposed, exogenous. With four exceptions they relate to 
years prior to the capital expenditure period of 1962-8 and are, 
therefore, known decision taking variables. The exceptions, RDG and 
the Industrialization, Domestic Property, and Commercialization 
indexes are for the years 1963-4 but may be taken as exogenous for the 
purpose of the model. 
1.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TIERS 
The means of all the variables used in the subsequent analyses are 
given, for each tier, in Table 1. These reveal social and economic 
differences between the tiers an appreciation of which is important 
for understanding the influences which govern local authorities' deci- 
lions to invest in housing. In what follows, CBs, NCBs and UDs are 
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TABLE 1: MEANS OF THE VARIABLES BY TIER 
Rural Districts 
High Low 
County Non- Urban Agri- Agri- 
Variable Boroughs County Districts All cultural cultural 
Boroughs Index Index 
Dependent Variable 
HOUSING 8.34 8.79 7.21 5.12 4.31 5.94 
EXPENDITURE 
thousands 
Explanatory Variables 
SMEI Variables 
1 Unfitness 8.44 5.58 4.38 6.17 6.97 5.38 
2 Hot Water Lack 24.49 21.8 17.8 26.14 30.77 21.51 
3 Low RV 16.21 16.25 18.05 32.82 40.23 25.42 
4 Overcrowding 10.61 7.83 7.66 9.15 8.24 10.05 
5 Popn. Gr. Tot. 0.12 0.63 1.55 0.63 -0.12 1.37 
6 Popn. Gr. Bal. -0.28 0.38 1.27 0.17 -0.50 0.83 
7 Population* 16.30 3.02 1.95 2.09 1.22 2.96 
8 Popn. Density 12.04 6.65 4.76 0.43 0.17 0.70 
SMCF Variables 
9 RDG 15.02 20.04 22.22 38.14 47.98 28.3 
10 Penny Rate Prod 5.95 5.95 5.18 4.20 3.69 4.72 
LOCAL VARIABLES 
11 Socio-Econ 11.47 15.66 17.62 17.36 18.89 15.83 
12 Housing Propen 26.97 24.50 22.52 18.40 16.47 20.33 
13 Labour 0.60 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.12 
14 Ind. Index 16.78 13.47 11.88 7.82 3.79 11.86 
15 Dom. Index 46.28 52.28 57.04 59.58 64.92 54.24 
16 Comm. Index 23.56 20.79 16.46 9.97 11.37 8.56 
17 Impetus 15.35 12.56 10.56 9.86 7.66 12.06 
* ten thousands 
referred to collectively as the urban tiers, distinguishing them from 
the RDs. 
County Boroughs 
These are on average the largest and most densely populated 
authorities in the survey, and include all the large city slum dis- 
tricts. The average quality of housing stock as indicated by the 
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incidence of unfitness and poorness of amenities (hot water lack) is 
the lowest and the overcrowding index is the highest of the urban 
tiers. Their socio-economic pattern is indicated by the lowest pro- 
portion of population in the high socio-economic groups, the highest 
industrialization and commercialization indexes, and the highest pro- 
portion of total housing stock in the public sector, of all tiers. 
Politically they are mainly Labour controlled. They show the lowest 
rate of population growth and, indeed, are characterized by net out- 
ward movement of population. 
Non-County Boroughs 
These are smaller authorities, with population density less than 
half that of CBs. There is lower incidence of unfitness or poorness 
of amenities in the housing stock, and less overcrowding. The 
socio-economic index is higher and the industrialization and 
commercialization indexes are lower, indicating that these authorities 
are more residential in character. The rate of population increase is 
higher than for CBs and, perhaps more important from a housing point 
of view, there is a net movement into these authorities. 
Urban Districts 
These are the smallest of the urban tiers and have the lowest popu- 
lation density. They exhibit all the characteristics of "desirable 
residential areas". Compared with CBs and NCBs they have the highest 
socio-economic index, the lowest incidence of unfitness and poor 
amenities in the housing stock, least overcrowding, and the highest 
incidence of residential property. The proportion of total housing 
stock accounted for by local authority housing is lower, and capital 
expenditure on housing by local authorities is lower, than in either 
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CBs or NCBs. These authorities show, on average, a high rate of 
growth of population which reflects considerable movement of popula- 
tion into the areas. Rural Districts RDs form a special case. It 
became apparent from preliminary results that there were two distinct 
types; those with small populations scattered over large areas and 
comprising predominantly farming communities, and the more compact 
ones with greater local financial resources developing as residential 
rather than agricultural areas. Accordingly the authorities were 
classified into two equal sub-groups by a specially constructed 
agriculturalization index refecting the percentage of the authority's 
total rateable value accounted for by agricultural property. The 
means of the variables in these classes are shown in Table 1. 
Compared with the urban tiers, the incidence of unfitness of hous- 
ing stock, poor amenities and overcrowding is higher than in NCBs or 
UDs. Indeed HOT WATER LACK is higher than in any other tier. Within 
RDs, unfitness and lack of amenities is higher in the more agricultur- 
al areas, but overcrowding higher in the more residential, low agri- 
cultural, areas. Nevertheless, in spite of these indications of 
inadequacies in their housing stocks, investment in housing per head 
is substantially lower in RDs -particularly in the more agricultural 
RDs -than in any of the urban tiers. Some reasons for this may be 
traditional, coupled with the fact that it is difficult to build up a 
housing programme in scattered rural areas where requirements may be 
for a few houses here and a few there. Certainly the proportion of 
housing stock accounted for by local authority housing (again, partic- 
ularly in the more agricultural RDs) is lower than in any of the urban 
tiers. A contributory factor may be that housing investment in RDs is 
inhibited by lack of local resources : the product of a penny rate 
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which measures the strength of the local tax base is lower in both 
groups of RDs than in the urban tiers and the proportion of total 
expenditure financed from the Rate Deficiency Grant is approximately 
twice as high. These two indicators show also that the thinly 
populated high agricultural RDs are poorer than the more urban-type of 
RDs. In this context it is at first sight strange that the 
Socio-Economic index of the RDs is higher than that of any of the 
urban tiers, with that of the agricultural RDs highest of all. Unfor- 
tunately the index in this respect is misleading since the grouping of 
occupations made by the Census of Population which constitutes this 
index includes farmers, many of whom are small, independent, 
owner-occupiers with very limited resources. (1) Finally, population 
is declining in the more agricultural RDs from which there is a net 
outflow, but increasing in the residential-type RDs which experience 
on average a net inflow of population second only to that of the UDs. 
As a broad conclusion, the characteristics of the residential, low 
agricultural, RDs are comparable in many respects with those of the 
urban tiers; it is the high agricultural RDs which stand out as having 
quite special characteristics. 
1.4 STATISTICAL PROCEDURE 
A linear investment function was assumed, permitting estimation by 
simple linear regression of the dependent variable (capital payments 
for housing per head) on the explanatory (exogenous) variables. 
Because of the differences between the tiers it was not to be expected 
that all variables would be equally appropriate in the individual 
(1) See for example Wilson (1973) 
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investment functions. The problem, therefore, was that of 
constructing the most appropriate function from the bank of explanato- 
ry variables. The method chosen was that of Optimum Regression 
proposed by Beale, Kendall and Mann (1967) which selects from the 
available explanatory variables that combination giving, for a 
specified number, n, of explanatory variables, the highest value of 
R2. By varying the control parameter, n, models of different size 
could be estimated making possible an assessment of the stability of 
the coefficients. This was considered a reasonable procedure since 
the bank of seventeen variables had already been pre-selected in the 
light of their economic and institutional relevance to the decision 
taking process. The maximum possible values of R°, using all vari- 
ables, are shown in Table 2. 
Figure 1 shows how the optimal values of (excluding regions) rise 
TABLE 2: VALUES OF RP- USING 17 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND REGIONAL 
DUMMIES 
Excluding regional 
dummies 
CBs 
NCBs 
UDs 
RDs all 
High agricultural 
Low agricultural 
0.533 
0.367 
0.355 
0.345 
0.579 
0.445 
Including regional 
dummies 
0.616 
0.411 
0.415 
0.414 
* There were too few observations in these sub-groups to make a 
regional analysis possible 
to the maximum as the number of explanatory variables is increased. 
The curve traced out by the for each tier first rises quite rapidly as 
further variables are introduced, but subsequently tends 
to fatten 
out. Ranked by the models for the CBs show the highest explanatory 
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power, and those for UDs the lowest. The for the two more homogeneous 
groups of RDs are higher than that for all RDs together. Results 
obtained by adding the variables to the regional dummies showed the 
same patterns. 
In the light of these results it was decided to concentrate on mod- 
"a 
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"6 
"S 
"4 
"3 
.2 
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FIGURE 1 
CD 
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els which included five or six of the basic explanatory variables 
(i. e. not counting regional dummies). These models were large enough 
to allow selection of the most appropriate group of variables for each 
individual tier. They were also as large as could be achieved before 
the "flat" part of the R-ý curve was encountered. Statistically, this 
means that additional variables beyond the 6 would have been either 
unimportant ones in the decision process, or so inter-correlated with 
the included ones that individual. coefficients would have become 
unstable and no reasonable significance tests of hypotheses could have 
been carried out. 
All data are used in standardized form (i. e. scaled to zero mean 
and unit standard deviation) so that the regression coefficients can 
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be compared among themselves and between tiers. In this respect, how- 
ever, it must be appreciated that they are all subject to sampling 
error . 
THE ANALYSES 
2.1 REGIONAL VARIATIONS 
In order to find if there was any specifically regional explanation 
of variation in capital payments per head on housing the authorities 
were classified into nine regions based an the New Standard Regions of 
Great Britain. (l) 
Significant regional differences could arise from regional policy, 
in which case they would be regarded as contributing to optimum allo- 
TABLE 3: REGIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES 
ENGLAND 
Yorks and .` 4' WALES 
North Humberside Mids East West Mids West Anglia 
CBs 10 13 5 10 5 11 21 3 4 
NCBs 7 14 8 35 19 10 24 10 16 
UDs 10 13 6 18 12 9 25 8 11 
RDs 13 14 5 20 12 2 7 5 8 
cation from the national and, it is to be hoped, the local points of 
view. Regional variations could also reflect the fact that important 
causal factors (e. g., levels of building costs) are themselves 
distributed in some significant regional pattern. From this stand- 
point all seventeen variables described in Section 1.2 were examined 
by analysis of variance using the 9-region factor of 
(1) See for example, the Abstract of Regional Statistics, no 
6,1970, 
HMSO, London 
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classification. (1) Four variables in particular stood out as having 
in all tiers significant regional association: OVERCROWDING, HOT 
WATER LACK (the amenity indicator), LOW RV, and RDG. Since in subse- 
quent analyses these influences are taken care of by specific vari- 
ables, a regional effect is important only if regional variables have 
some further, net, explanatory power, that is to say if regional anal- 
ysis picks up influences for which specific measures have not been 
included. 
Eight regional dummy variables taking the values 1 or 0 were 
introduced to incorporate the 9-regional classification. Such vari- 
ables when included in regression analysis act as regional "shift" 
indicators. As a first step the dependent variable was regressed on 
the eight regional dummies only and the values of Rý achieved were 
CBs . 089, NCBs . 008, UDs . 178 and RDs . 148. 
These correlations are all low and, even with these sample sizes, 
only that for UDs reaches marginal 'significance at the 5 per cent lev- 
ei. The values of indicate the maximum explanatory power of the 
regional classification since no other variables (with which the 
regional dummies might be correlated) are included. The conclusion is 
that specifically regional variation arising from whatever source 
(regional policy or omitted variables) is not a significant part of 
the explanation. 
There remains the possibility that one or two individual regions 
might have a significant shift effect when incorporated with other 
(1) This procedure was suggested by comments made by Professor Sir Ray 
Allen in Nicholson and Topham (1971, p307). The treatment of dum- 
my variables is explained in most Econometrics texts; for example 
Johnston (1973). 
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variables. This was tested by forcing all regional dummies into the 
regression models, but it was found that in no case did any of the 
regional variables appear as significant, nor did their addition sig- 
nificantly increase the explanatory power of the models. In general 
their presence merely increases the standard errors of the coeffi- 
cients of the other variables or makes the coefficients unstable 
because of the intercorrelations between variables and regions. (1) 
For this reason the models given in the following sections concentrate 
on the optimum regression results derived from the seventeen basic 
variables only. However, for comparison, models including all region- 
al dummies are also shown. 
2.2 COUNTY BOROUGHS 
The results of the six variable models are given in Table 4. The 
same six variables appear in both models and neither the coefficients 
nor their t values are much affected by the inclusion of the regions. 
The values of are 0.473 or 0.544 if the regional dummies are included. 
The functions include important SMEI variables. The first two, 
UNFITNESS and HOT WATER LACK make it clear that need for replacement 
and improvement of housing stock are important determinants of housing 
investment. A further one is OVERCROWDING, indicating the relevance 
of the inadequacy of existing stock for housing an authority's popula- 
tion. The coefficient of this variable is particularly strongly 
established. The inclusion of LOW RV with positive sign, acting as an 
indicator of the presence of low quality housing and hence of housing 
need (Section 1.2), underlines the importance of the state of the 
(11 See, for example, the result for HOT WATER LACK in the model 
for 
UDs, section 2.4. 
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TABLE 4: CBs: HOUSING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
Excluding regions Including regions 
Coefft : t., Coefft ; t; 
Unfitness 0.325 3.46 0.328 3.09 
Hot Water Lack 0.189 1.96 0.190 1.65 
Low Rv 0.214 1.57 0.270 1.83 
Overcrowding 0.338 3.51 0.400 3.22 
RDG -0.344 2.57 -0.400 2.80 
Impetus 0.239 2.76 0.255 2.93 
R=. 688 R-c-2=. 473 R=. 744 Rý-=. 544 
existing housing stock as a determinant. 
On the SMCF side there is clear indication that differential finan- 
cial pressures in the CBs are important; RDG is well established with 
a negative coefficient, showing that lack of local resources inhibits 
housing expenditure. 
Finally, the local IMPETUS variable is well established, providing 
evidence that housing investment is higher in those areas with a 
continuing, on-going, housing programme. 
It is noticeable that population growth does not appear as a deter- 
minant. As shown in Table 1 there is, in fact, a net movement of pop- 
ulation out of these authorities. Thus the determinants of investment 
reflect the social and economic characteristics of these areas as 
outlined in Section 1.3 with the dominating need for housing arising 
from inadequate housing stock rather than from population growth. (1) 
(1) These conclusions are supported by the more detailed analysis of 
the forty explanatory variables in Nicholson and Topham (1971, 
p295-6). This correspondence justifies use of the present smaller 
scale models and our confidence in the result. The earlier models 
were less satisfactory in the way the attempted to represent the 
SMCF forces. The RDG variable used in the present work was not 
included in earlier work. 
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TABLE 5: NCBs: HOUSING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
Excluding regions Including regions 
Coefft 'It; Coeff 
Hot Water Lack 0.181 2.28 - - Low RV 0.230 2.09 0.291 2.65 
Popn. Gr. Tot. 0.433 5.38 0.405 5.13 
Population -0.224 2.92 -0.272 3.20 
RDG -0.267 2.76 -0.264 2.42 
Socio-Econ - - -0.201 2.45 
Impetus 0.241 3.26 0.229 3.04 
R=. 571 Rl'=. 326 R=. 624 W: --=. 389 
2.3 NON-COUNTY BOROUGHS 
The two six variable models shown in Table 5 have five variables in 
common and in this respect are consistent with each other. All coef- 
ficients are significant but the values of Rte, 0.326 excluding 
regions and 0.389 including regions are lower than those for CBs. 
Table 1 has illustrated two important differences between the char- 
acteristics of CBs and NCBs. The incidence of poor quality or inade- 
quate housing stock is lower in the NCBs, and whereas CBs exhibit net 
population movements outwards, NCBs are growing areas with net move- 
ment of population into them. This difference is reflected in the 
determinants of housing investment, for the two functions in Table 4 
are dominated by POPN. GR. TOT. The need to provide housing for a 
growing population is, in a sense, more urgent than that for replace- 
ment and condition of stock purposes since people must be housed 
whereas replacement of poor stock can be (and often is) deferred. 
Nevertheless although pressure from inadequate housing stock is lower 
than for CHs, there is some evidence that it is relevant. The 
poorness of amenities indicator HOT WATER LACK appears in the function 
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which excludes regions and is as well established as in the CB models. 
Other NCB models (obtained using step-wise regression and a components 
approach) have also included this variable as a significant determi- 
nant. The relevance of stock condition is also indicated by the 
inclusion of LOW RV in both models with positive sign (as in the CB 
models). 
On the SMCF side there is evidence that differences in local 
resources are important. RDG enters both models with a significant 
negative coefficient the magnitude of which is, however, a little low- 
er than that in the CB models. 
Finally there are two Local factors. In the model including 
regions the amenities variable HOT WATER LACK does not appear because 
of its inter-correlation with the regional dummies (see Section 2.1) 
which have been forced in. Instead the SOCIO-ECON index is included 
suggesting that local tastes are important in determining local opti- 
mum allocation. The index has negative sign showing that per head 
investment in local authority housing is less in the areas of high 
socio-economic composition. The IMPETUS variable appears in both mod- 
els and indicates the importance of a continuing on-going programme. 
The dominating SMEI variable in the NCB models is unquestionably 
population growth. But a striking feature is the inclusion of POPULA- 
TION which is well established in both models with a significant nega- 
tive coefficient. Other NCB models constructed from other approaches 
have also included POPULATION as a significant variable. It is diffi- 
cult to interpret this with certainty. Superficially, it is tempting 
to regard it as a scale variable indicating that the larger the 
authority the lower the cost per head of local authority housing. 
However there is no direct evidence that this is the case and it is 
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striking that, if economics of scale are important, the variable does 
not turn up in the CB models or indeed those of any other tier. 
Alternatively POPULATION may be acting as a surrogate for some omitted 
variable(s), but it is not obvious which. 
2.4 URBAN DISTRICTS 
The picture which emerges from the investment functions for UDs 
given in Table 6 is not so clear cut as that for CBs and NCBs. 
Although the two-six variable models have five variables in common the 
coefficients and t values of two of them, RDG and LOW RV, differ rath- 
er widely between the models, and the negative sign of HOT WATER LACK 
in the model including regions is misleading being a statistical con- 
sequence of inter-correlation between this variable and the regional 
dummies. (1) 
Table I has shown that of the three urban tiers, UDs have the 
lowest incidence of unfitness, lack of amenities and overcrowding, but 
the highest population growth rates with evidence of considerable 
inward population movement. Hence, in the light of the relative 
importance of these determinants in CBs and NCBs it might have been 
expected that population growth would dominate the UD models, with 
stock replacement and improvement being of considerably less impor- 
tance. In fact this result does not occur and the population growth 
variables do not appear at all. There is evidence that unfitness of 
housing stock is a determining variable and this is supported by the 
fact that the proportion of low rateable value housing, LOW RV, enters 
(1) When this model was run excluding regional dummies HOT WATER LACK 
appeared with positive sign. The result illustrates the statisti- 
cal problem of multi-collinearity which arises when the regional 
dummies are considered (see Section 2.1) 
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TABLE 6: UDs: HOUSING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
Excluding regions Including regions 
Coefft ; t; Coeff ;t" 
Unfitness 0.187 1.98 0.178 1.84 
Hot Water Lack - - -0.267 1.67 
Low RV 0.181 1.67 0.363 2.37 
RDG -0.216 1.98 -0.163 1.32 
Housing Propen 0.287 3.17 0.266 2.73 
Comm. Index 0.084 0.98 - - 
Impetus 0.254 2.75 0.216 2.33 
R=. 548 M'=. 300 R=. 630 R2=. 397 
both models with positive sign as a "needs" indicator, as in the other 
two urban tiers. Other models constructed using step-wise regression 
and components have each indicated that lack of amenities, HOT WATER 
LACK, is also a positive determinant (see for example the previous 
footnote). 
UDs have less in the way of local financial resources than CBs or 
NCBs. Their penny rate product is lower and reliance on RDG support 
in total expenditure is greater than in C8s or NCBs. Not unexpectedly 
therefore on the StCR side RDG enters both models (as it does those 
for CBs and NCBs) with negative sign, indicating that housing is 
inhibited by limitation of local resources. However, neither the 
standardized coefficients nor the associated t values are as high as 
those in the other urban tier models. 
What is striking, and this may prove to be the essence of the mat- 
ter, is the importance of local factors. In both models that aspect 
of local tastes reflected in HOUSING PROPENSITY, an optimizing influ- 
ence from the local standpoint, is firmly established as a determi- 
nant, and the importance of a local on-going programme is indicated by 
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IMPETUS - though this may not necessarily make for optimal allocation. 
These are the two most strongly established variables, and ones which 
have also proved to be important in other models constructed for this 
tier. 
As already stated the surprising result is that population growth 
rates do not appear in the models, whereas in NCBs somewhat lower 
growth rates were, in fact, the dominating determinants. A possible 
explanation is that there may be more spare housing available in UDs. 
Certainly the Households/Dwellings ratio in 1961 was lower in UDs than 
in the other two urban tiers (though the difference was only fraction- 
al and may not be significant), and it is suggestive that UDs have the 
lowest incidence of overcrowding. However, it is possible that the 
explanation lies in the preference of the growing population for pri- 
vate sector housing - another facet of local tastes. UDs have the 
highest social class index of the urban tiers and have already been 
described as having the characteristics of "desirable residential 
areas" (Section 2.4). It may be that households in these areas are in 
the higher social groups which are likely to prefer private to public 
sector housing. There are a number of factors supporting this possi- 
bility. First, the average percentage of total housing stock in the 
public sector is the lowest of the urban tiers, as is the actual 
amount per head spent on housing (Table 1). Secondly, the ratio of 
the total number of local authority houses to the total number of pri- 
vate houses under construction in June 1964 (the middle of the period 
covered by this study) was lower in UDs than in the other urban 
tiers. (1) Finally it is interesting to note that although the popula- 
! 1) The ratios are: CBs 2.23, NCBs . 85 and UDs . 
52 
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tion growth rates are on average higher than those of NCBs their vari- 
ation over authorities is not correlated with capital payments per 
head on housing whereas in NCBs the correlation is positive and sig- 
nificant. (1) 
The picture which emerges is of areas with reasonably good housing 
stock albeit with a large proportion of (small) low value housing, but 
with growing populations more inclined to the private housing sector; 
areas which have limited resources and whose housing expenditure pat- 
terns are dominated by local factors, tastes and impetus, but which 
are affected also by the general need for replacement of inadequate 
stock. 
2.5 RURAL DISTRICTS 
The six variable optimal regression models for the full sample of 
RDs (corresponding to those reported for the urban tiers) caused prob- 
lems of interpretation because of the inter-correlation between POPU- 
LATION and POPN. DENSITY. After considerable experimentation with 
variable combinations, it was found that the most clearly established 
models were five variable ones selected from a reduced bank obtained 
by excluding these two population variables from the original set. 
These models are given in Table 7, and it is seen that each of them 
contains the same variables. 
Two clear-cut SMEI variables are included. The amenities indicator 
HOT WATER LACK, which has a higher incidence in RDs than in any of the 
urban tiers, is strongly established, indicating that need to improve 
(1) The correlations between capital payments per head on housing and 
population growth rate (total) and population growth rate (bal- 
ance) respectively are for NCBs . 314 and . 256, and 
for UDs . 009 
and -. 020. 
-225- 
CHAPTER FIVE: A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING INVESTMENT 
TABLE 7: ALL RDs: HOUSING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
Excluding regions Including regions 
Coefft ;t: Coeff t 
Hot Water Lack 0.472 3.98 0.51 2.84 
Pop. Gr. Bal 0.284 2.18 0.35 2.17 
Low RV -0.278 1.9 -0.34 1.70 
Socio Econ -0.200 1.8 -0.20 1.70 
Housing Propen 0.231 2.02 0.28 2.23 
R=. 554 R2=. 307 R=. 607 Ra=, 368 
the quality of stock is an important determinant of housing expendi- 
ture. RDs taken all together have, on average, populations growing at 
the same rate as those of NCBs. In the present models population 
growth is represented by POPN. GR BAL which is shown to be a well 
established determinant. In this respect population growth acts in 
the same way as a determinant of housing expenditure as in NCBs (with 
UDs different from either). 
RDs have substantially less local resources at their disposal than 
urban tiers. Their total rateable values are more dependent on domes- 
tic hereditaments, and a much higher proportion of the housing stock 
is of low rateable value, these factors being reflected in the lower 
penny rate product. The dependence on RDG support is also higher. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that there should be some restriction on 
housing expenditure coming from the SMCF side (in part reflected in 
the generally lower level of housing expenditure by these 
authorities). What is interesting is that for RDs the SMCF restric- 
tion is indicated by LOW RV (taking its significance here as an indi- 
cator of a limited local tax base as described in Section 1.2) which 
enters the functions with negative coefficients. In the urban tiers 
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this role was taken by RDG, and LOW RV entered with positive sign as 
an indicator of inadequate housing which induced capital expenditure, 
but in RDs the large proportion of low rateable value housing indi- 
cates more the predominance of smaller houses than a stock of inade- 
quate housing. 
Finally, two facets of local tastes are represented in the models 
by SOCIO-ECON and HOUSING PROPENSITY, the former being more in the 
nature of a current demand variable relating to preferences between 
private and public sector housing, the latter representing long run 
attitudes reflected by local authorities. 
Further light is shed on these determinants by separate analyses of 
the data for the high and low agricultural density RDs described in 
Section 1.3. The model shown in Table 7 for all RDs and separate 
"own" models were estimated for each sub-group and the results are 
given in Table 8. The values of R2 for these more homogeneous 
sub-groups are higher than those for all RDs together, and those for 
the "own" models higher than those for the imposed total model. Both 
sets emphasize the importance of the amenities indicator HOT WATER 
LACK, but it appears more important in the low agricultural, more res- 
idential, RDs than in the predominantly agricultural ones. Population 
movements are also included but again with higher coefficients in the 
low than in the high agricultural RDs. Table 1 has shown population 
to be increasing with inward migration in the former but falling with 
outward migration in the latter. The positive coefficients of the 
population growth rate variables mean, therefore, that growing popula- 
tion is an incentive to local authority housing investment in low 
agricultural areas, but that population outflow reduces housing 
investment in high agricultural areas. 
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TABLE 8: HIGH AND LOW AGRICULTURAL DENSITY RDS: HOUSING INVESTMENT 
FUNCTIONS 
Total RD models 
Unfitness 
Hot Water Lack 
Popn Gr. Tot. 
Popn Gr. Bal. 
Socio-Econ 
Low RV 
Housing Propen. 
Dom. Index 
R 
RP- 
High 
agricultural 
Low 
agricultural 
Own models 
High 
agricultural 
Coefft ;t: Coefft t; Coefft 
0.49 3.29 0.67 3.5 0.33 
- - - - 0.19 
0.22 1.34 0.35 1.59 - 
-0.02 0.14 -0.22 1.13 -0.19 
-0.16 0.87 -0.39 1.84 - 
0.14 0.86 0.36 2.11 0.13 
- - - - 0.38 
0.561 
0.314 
0.586 
0.343 
0.607 
0.368 
ItI 
2.31 
1.27 
1.04 
0.92 
2.29 
Low 
agricultural 
Coefft It 
0.18 1.16 
0.69 3.63 
0.22 1.15 
-0.52 
0.45 
2.3 
3.15 
0.593 
0.352 
Restriction on investment from the SMCF side, indicated by the neg- 
ative coefficient of LOW RV is more noticeable in the low agricultur- 
al, more residential, RDs, no doubt because these are the ones with 
the higher levels of expenditure and more strongly established "needs" 
indicators and more likely, therefore, to be feeling the pressure of 
local limitation of financial resources. Lastly, in each sub-group 
local factors are indicated. In the low agricultural RDs the tastes 
indicator HOUSING PROPENSITY is strongly established. In the high 
agricultural RDs the significance of DOM. INDEX (the domestic proper- 
ty index) shows that local authorities tend to invest more the higher 
the domestic property proportion of total rateable value. The obverse 
of this is that the more agricultural the RD the less likely is the 
local authority to undertake housing. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE MODELS 
The values of R' achieved by the functions range from 0.300 to 
0.554. That is to say they explain something between 30 per cent and 
55 per cent of the variation in investment expenditure in housing, 
measured by capital payments per head, by local authorities. This is 
an encouraging result but obviously leaves considerable variation 
unexplained. It is encouraging because it shows that, although local 
authorities act autonomously as providers of public sector housing, 
they also exhibit some common response to generally accepted indica- 
tors of housing need. There is evidence that they all regard replace- 
ment and improvement of stock, and demand for housing from a growing 
population as important. These are criteria featuring in the central 
government's social welfare function. But demand for housing in local 
areas also reflects local tastes for public sector as against private 
sector housing and the inclusion of variables to incorporate local 
tastes adds significantly to the explanatory power of the models in 
all tiers and hence reflect the influence of local optima. Another 
local factor, impetus, the impact of an on-going programme is also 
significant, though its implications for optimum allocation are uncer- 
tain. Finally it is demonstrated in all tiers that local financial 
resources are relevant in the decision process, investment expenditure 
being inhibited in the poorest authorities. 
Different functions, involving different determinants of housing 
investment, have been obtained for the different tiers, and the values 
of R2 achieved for the CB models are higher than those for any other 
tier. It may be asked if these are real differences or whether 
they 
are the result of random effects. The question arises because all 
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coefficients are subject to sampling error and because, although the 
models are optimal, other combinations of variables might yield values 
of R nearly as high. As one way of exploring the second possibili- 
ty, each tier's own optimal models were compared with models obtained 
using the variables included in the optimal models of the other tiers 
estimated with the first tier's data. In all cases the tier's own 
model stood out as the best, with the highest Rý and most clearly 
established coefficients. This question of whether there are signifi- 
cant differences in the housing investment behaviour of different 
tiers is investigated formally in Appendix III to this chapter. It is 
concluded that the differences between the functions found are real 
ones and reflect the different characteristics of the tiers as they 
affect housing decisions. Other estimating procedures have also 
established that the values of R2 for CBs are higher than those of 
other tiers. There are two possible explanations. The first is that 
CBs make more systematic decisions in line with generally accepted 
criteria relating to the need for housing, the decision of the lower 
tiers being more affected by random influences. If this be correct 
the conclusion has important implications for local housing policy for 
the CBs are the largest authorities and might be expected to have more 
efficient town hall machinery. The second is that decisions of the 
smaller tiers are no less systematic but are related to local factors 
which have not taken into account. 
3.2 WHY ARE THE CORRELATIONS LOW? 
The fact that none of the functions estimated (excluding regional 
dummies) have R greater than 0.47 is disappointing. But the maximum 
correlations given in Table 2 on page 214 do not exceed 0.53 and these 
-230- 
CHAPTER FIVE: A MODEL OF LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING INVESTMENT 
may be regarded as the highest correlations which can be achieved with 
the type of explanatory variable used here. It would, however, be 
erroneous to conclude that the residual variation indicates the extent 
of randomness associated with the decision taking process in providing 
local authority housing. In the first instance not all the relevant 
variables have been included. Availability and price of land, and 
other specific local problems such as limitations caused by the provi- 
sion or availability of drainage and sewers, which have been stressed 
to us by local government officers as being important, have not been 
considered. Nor have we taken specific account in the models of 
building in the private sector. In general there may well be a range 
of essentially local determinants which govern and in some areas domi- 
nate local decisions. Some of the influences might conceivably be 
measured in a way in which they could be incorporated into the present 
type of analysis; others could only be explored on an individual 
authority case study basis. However, it is probably in a study of 
these local factors that improvements in the explanatory powers of the 
models lie. 
A second source of imprecision is that the variables actually used 
do not measure the influences associated with them sufficiently accu- 
rately. For instance, discussion with Chief Officers has convinced us 
that differences in local attitudes and local enthusiasm are impor- 
tant, but all these subtle differences may not have been captured in 
the HOUSING PROPENSITY and IMPETUS variables. However, it is in con- 
nection with the SMCF variables that difficulty of measurement has 
been greatest. Appendix 1 lists a number of variables which have 
been 
explored but ultimately discarded, leaving only RDG and PENNY RATE 
PRODUCT as indicators. The whole area of the financial side of 
local 
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authority investment decisions certainly merits further examination. 
Finally, there is the problem of "lumpiness" in the expenditure 
figures. Such short time series as have been examined indicate that 
expenditure on housing does not proceed in a steady way in all 
authorities; there are humps and troughs resulting from housing drives 
or from the completion of stages in housing programmes. On a cross 
section analysis such as the present one, there is always the danger 
that the authorities in a sample will be at different points in their 
patterns of investment expenditure, so that the dependent variable may 
itself involve imprecision This is more likely to occur the smaller 
the authority and may in part explain why the Res of the smaller 
authorities are lower than those of CBs. 
3.3 THE RELEVANCE OF THE UNDERLYING MODEL 
All the above factors must be allowed for, and the functions made 
as comprehensive as possible to achieve maximum explanatory power, 
before the magnitude of the genuinely random influences affecting the 
decision taking process can be recognized. It is important to recall 
in this context, therefore, that the underlying econometric model from 
which the present analysis has been developed is a welfare maximizing 
model, paralleling models developed from the theory of the firm in 
connexion with investment expenditure in private industry. The impli- 
cation of such a model is that the balancing of forces incorporated 
in 
the SMEI and SMCF schedules ensure that optimum decisions are 
taken, 
reactions from local public opinion - paralleling the reactions of 
shareholders in private industry - being such that the purely random 
elements in decision taking resulting from planners' 
idiosyncrasies 
will always be held in check. Such an assumption about 
the optimizing 
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of decisions in private industry is reasonable, since firms must 
respond to shareholders' pressures which may be sharp and consider- 
able. But in the area of local authority capital expenditure a 
greater departure from optimum allocation than would be tolerated in 
private industry might occur because the acid test of profitability 
does not have to be met in the public sector. There is in this situa- 
tion more scope for randomness or divergence from the optimum. It is 
important that the magnitude of this random element in housing invest- 
meat, which the present study suggests may be significantly large, be 
known because the greater it is the greater are the deviations from 
optimal housing decisions and hence the greater is the social cost. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF THE VARIABLES EXAMINED 
SMEI VARIABLES 
UNFITNESS 
HOT WATER LACK 
LOW RV 
OVERCROWDING 
Percentage of dwellings without a fixed 
bath 
Percentage of dwellings with rateable 
values below C 18 
Percentage of population aged over 6o 
years 
Average weekly income per regional 
household 1961-3 
Total LA rent income as a percentage of 
total gross values of dwellings in the 
housing revenue account (HRA) 
j-Regional unemployment percentage in 
construction industry (1961) 
tRegional unemployment percentage in 
construction industry, average (I 861- 
68) 
POPN GR. TOT. 
POPN GR. BAL. 
POPULATION 
POPN DENSITY 
Ratio of households (1961) to dwellings 
(196 1) 
Ratio of estimated households 0971) to 
dwellings (196 1) 
Ratio of estimated households (I g8 I) to 
dwellings (196 1) 
SMCF VARIABLES 
RDG 
PENNY RATE PRODUCT 
Interest paid per £i rateable value, 196 1 
Average rate of interest on all debt, 196 I 
Debt charges on housing revenue account 
(HRA) per Cz total gross values on 
that account 
Exchequer subsidy on HRA per ci loan 
charges on that account 
Ratio of current expenditure on HRA to 
potential income (196 t subsidy basis) 
Total ratefund contribution to HRA 
divided by product of penny rate 
LOCAL VARIABLES 
SOCIO-ECON 
HOUSG PROPEN. 
Post-1945 LA dwellings as a percentage 
of total housing stock 
LABOUR 
tNumber of years with labour majority 
in period 1955-64 
Poundage of area (196 1) 
Anticipated demolitions 1955-6o as a 
percentage of dwellings 
IND. INDEX 
DOM. INDEX 
COMM. INDEX 
IMPETUS 
Post-1945 dwellings as a percentage of all 
LA dwellings 
1958-61 addition to LA stock as a 
percentage of all LA dwellings 
REGIONS 
A set of 8 dummy variables discussed in 
text (section 2.1) 
* The variables retained in the present study are shown by the code names given in Section 2.2. 
t Variable available only for County Boroughs. 
-234- 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CHAPTER FIVE: APPENDIX 2: THE RATE DEFICIENCY GRANT 
The rate deficiency grant is an earlier version of what became the 
resources element of the rate support grant. Allocation of the grant 
involves a comparison of the penny rate product per head of England 
and Wales as a whole with that of each local authority. The grant is 
paid to any local authority whose level of resources thus measured is 
below this national average. For these authorities the central gov- 
ernment acts as a ratepayer, serving in effect to raise their penny 
rate product per head to the national average. 
RDG, the variable used in the present study, is the percentage that 
is applied to the authority's rate-borne expenditure(1) to determine 
the amount of grant and is calculated as follows: 
RDG(%) = (o-H)/A 
where 
A= National Penny Rate Product per head 
B= Authority Penny Rate Product per Head 
and the actual amount of grant an authority receives is: 
(Rate-borne expenditure of the authority). RDG(%)/100 
As thus expressed the grant is open ended: the more an eligible 
authority increases its rate-borne expenditure the larger will be the 
grant it receives. For this reason RDG is seen as an indicator of 
lack of financial resources. 
However, this open-endedness is limited by a complicated system of 
constraints. Broadly the result is that if an authority's expenditure 
(1) Rate-borne expenditure denotes the total of expenditure met out of 
the rates and also by the rate deficiency grant. Loan financed 
capital expenditure is therefore excluded. See Local Government 
Act, 1958, Part 1, Section 5, Subsection 6. 
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is above the average deemed appropriate for its tier and population 
size the excess expenditure will not qualify for the grant. In the 
absence of these constraints a poor authority will be raised through 
grant aid to a position on a par with an authority having a national 
average level of resources. If however, the local authority has a 
high, or rapidly rising level of expenditure, its qualification for 
the rate-deficiency grant will denote a low level of resources though, 
because of the constraints, this deficiency may not necessarily be 
fully made up. 
Two other variables, LOW RV and PENNY RATE PRODUCT can be viewed as 
possible alternatives to RDS as a measure of financial resources. Of 
the two, LOW RV is, in the three urban tiers, more clearly associated 
with the quality of housing and PENNY RATE PRODUCT, whilst having the 
advantage of straightforwardness was found to be inferior to RDG in 
its explanatory power in the investment functions. 
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LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING INVESTMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 5 the question was raised of whether there are signifi- 
cant differences in the housing investment behaviour of the four 
classes of local authority examined: the County Boroughs, the 
0 Non-County Boroughs, the Urban Districts and the Rural Districts. In 
this appendix the question is pursued formally. Tests for change of 
structure are applied to investment functions estimated for the four 
classes of authority. The testing procedure relates to that described 
on page 64 in Appendix II to Chapter 1 of this thesis, (1) though in 
contrast to the exposition set out there a dummy variable technique is 
used in the computations. The equivalence of these two techniques is 
shown in Stewart (1976). 
STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Testing for difference in the investment functions of the different 
classes of authority involves examining by means of an F test, reduc- 
tions in the sum of squared errors obtained by using successively more 
t, 
I 
(1) For instance, expression 9 on page 64 is the appropriate test 
` statistic for the third null hypothesis tested below. 
i 
a 
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elaborate models. The following computations are involved. (1) 
Firstly the data for the four tiers is pooled and the classical 
linear regression model of the form 
Y= xa +u (1) 
is estimated. In this formulation the intercept term and slope coef- 
ficients of the investment function are constrained to be the same for 
each tier. It may be the case, however, that whilst the slope coeffi- 
cients are truly equal, the intercept term is different for each tier 
of local authority. This may be allowed for by using a modified func- 
tion of the form 
Y= Da + Xß +u (2) 
where D is a matrix of three dummy variables indicating tier member- 
ship. (2). The null hypothesis that there is no difference in intercept 
terms between tiers, i. e. a=0 is then tested by using an F test to 
establish whether the sum of squared errors decreases significantly 
between (1) and (2). 
A second possibility is that allowing the intercepts to vary 
between tiers is not sufficient, and that the slope coefficients are 
also different for each tier. To examine this question, four separate 
regressions of the form 
Y; 
_ = 
X,. bs. + rý. i=1,4 t3) 
are run; one for each tier, and the total of the sum of squared errors 
(1) A detailed account of the procedures used appears in Johnston 
(1973) pp. 192-207. Alternative treatments are in Dhrymes (1971) 
Appendix B pp. 142-147 and Almon (1967) pp. 132-139. 
(E) See Johnston (1973) pp. 176-186 for an explanation of the use of 
dummy variables. No dummy variable is used to denote County Bor- 
oughs in order to avoid singularity of the dummy variable matrix 
as this information is contained in the other three variables. 
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I 
for the four tiers is obtained. A test is then made to establish 
whether this total sum of squared errors is significantly less than 
the sum of squared errors obtained using (2). 
A final test which establishes whether there is a significant 
decrease in the residual sum of squares when moving from (1) to (3) 
indicates whether the slope coefficients and constants are, when taken 
as a whole, significantly different across tier classes. 
THE INVESTMENT FUNCTION 
The basis of the investment function to use for this testing lies 
in the functions estimated for the different classes of authority in 
Chapter 5. Recall from page 216 that optimal regression(1) was used 
to select explanatory variables for the investment functions for each 
tier from a bank of seventeen possible candidates. The number of 
explanatory variables in the selected subsets was limited to six for 
County Boroughs, Non-County Boroughs and Urban District Councils and 
five for Rural District Councils as it was found that further vari- 
ables did not contribute greatly in terms of Rte. The resulting 
investment functions are given in Table 1. The short names given to 
the explanatory variables are defined in pages 205-210 of Chapter 5. 
The regression coefficients given in both Table 1 and Table 2 follow- 
ing are in fact standardised beta coefficients, (2) the regression com- 
putations having been performed on the correlation matrix. An advan- 
(1) Beale, Kendall and Mann (1967) 
(2) The standardisation of each observation of a variable is carried 
out by subtracting from it the mean of the variable and dividing 
by the variable's standard deviation. When multiplied by Sy/Sx 
standardised beta coefficients become ordinary regression coeffi- 
cients. 
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_,,, 
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r 
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3f7 
tage of standardised beta coefficients is that they are scale free and 
may therefore be directly compared. Because standardised variables 
have zero means the constant term for these regressions is also zero. 
It can be seen from Table 1 that, of the original seventeen, twelve 
variables appeared in one or more of the subsets. As the testing for 
change of structure requires that the same set of variables be used 
for each subset of data it was decided to use all of these twelve 
variables to estimate a function for all the classes of authority. 
The use of all twelve variables introduces the problem of 
multicollinearity with a consequent loss of reliability in the indi- 
vidual beta coefficients. In this study, however, it is the overall 
explanatory power as measured by the sum of squared errors that is of 
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importance and unreliability of individual coefficients may be 
tolerated. 
THE RESULTS 
The results of the various regressions necessary for carrying out 
the analysis of covariance procedure outlined above in Section II are 
given in Table 2. 
Moving from the left of this table, the first pair of columns gives 
TABLE TWEE ! yitýVARIABLE Lri 
lNi, ithN r 
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the standardised beta coefficients and t statistics of the pooled 
regression in which intercepts(l) and slope coefficients are 
constrained to be equal for each tier. In the next pair of columns 
the results of allowing the individual tier intercepts to vary whilst 
holding the slope coefficients equal for each tier are given. Here 
the coefficients of the dummy variables represent shifts in the con- 
stant term from the County Borough base of zero. (2) The last eight 
columns contain the results of performing a separate regression for 
the data of each tier. 
With these results available it is now possible to move to the for- 
mal testing of the homogeneity of the housing investment functions 
between tiers. The three null hypotheses which may be tested are as 
follows. 
(1) Assuming the slope coefficients to be equal, that the inter- 
cept terms do not change between tiers. 
(2) Allowing the intercepts to be different for each tier, that 
the slope coefficients do not change between tiers. 
(3) That the slopes and intercepts do not, as a whole, change 
between tiers. 
The results of these tests are given in Table 3. 
It is apparent from this table that the null hypotheses two and 
three are both rejected at the 1% and 5/ levels of significance, but 
that null hypothesis one is not rejected at either of these levels. 
(1) Because standardised variables are used, the mean of each variable 
is zero and the intercept term is thus also zero. 
(z) The t statistics associated with these coefficients are liable to 
mislead as they reflect only the difference between the tier they 
represent and the base tier, County Boroughs. Thus in a situation 
where the intercepts were close together apart from a common dif- 
ference with County Boroughs, the three t statistics would be 
high, possibly giving the impression of a wider variation in 
intercepts than was the case. See Johnston (1973) p. 179. 
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SE ä' RES J' - `OF TEST'S T A, Ot L" ! ". 
M! 
l EfegreE5 of Critical Ps-; an at hypzi". h sLS 
Hypothesis F Freedom 1% 5% Rejected? 
1 1.411 (4O ) 
22.60 
3.78 NO 
2 2.07 0027) 1,70 1.46 YE: 
3 2.03 (0387) 1.70 1,46 ES YES 
The conclusion drawn from the rejection of hypothesis three is that, 
taken together, there is a significant difference between the slopes 
and intercepts of the investment functions of the four tiers. The 
combination of the rejection of hypothesis two and the non-rejection 
of hypothesis one allows the more detailed conclusion that the overall 
difference is predominantly due to differences in the slope coeffi- 
cients rather than intercepts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Formal testing has established the existence of significant differ- 
ences in the housing investment behaviour of different tiers of local 
authority. It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that the investment 
function for County Boroughs has a markedly higher value of Rte' than 
those of the other four tiers. (1) It is of course not possible to 
tell from this study whether a lower value of Rt-' can be attributed to 
a higher degree of true randomness in a tier's investment function or 
to the effect of omitted variables, but if the former alternative is 
correct the conclusion is that County Boroughs are more systematic in 
(1) All the values of R are quite low. This is discussed in 
Chapter 5 above, pp 231-233. 
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their housing investment decisions than the smaller tiers of authori- 
ty. 
To distinguish further between the tiers it is necessary to examine 
the coefficients of the individual variables in the tier regressions, 
and this is hazardous because of the presence of multicollinearity 
already mentioned. Bearing this in mind it may be noted that County 
Boroughs appear to react most strongly to unfitness and overcrowding, 
two clear indicators of need. This, however, may be merely a reflec- 
t 
tion of the fact that County Boroughs have the highest mean values for 
these two variables. 
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PROFITS, REGULATION AND THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the effect of government intervention on the 
aerospace industry since the war in Britain. 
The first five chapters of this thesis have each examined some 
aspect of central or local government expenditure. For reasons of 
length the subject of taxation as a whole is not considered. However, 
clearly taxation and expenditure on goods, services and transfers are 
not the only ways the government can intervene to affect the alloca- 
tion of resources in the economy. Beginning with this chapter, each 
of the last three chapters is concerned with some of these other forms 
of government intervention. 
The government can, for instance, affect the allocation of 
resources by paying subsidies to private producers. Thus Chapter 7 
looks at the Direct Grant schools which received a per pupil subsidy 
from the government. It can be said to incur tax expenditures 
when it makes exemptions in its levying of taxes. Chapter 8 examines 
tax expenditures on owner-occupied housing. 
t) This chapter is based on K. Hartley and P. A. Watt, "Profits, Regu- 
lation and the UK Aerospace Industry", Journal of Industrial Eco- 
nomics, XXIX, June 1981, pp413-428. 
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Further forms of government intervention are considered in this 
chapter. The government can induce changes in the behaviour of pri- 
vate agents by passing laws, or by a threat of passing laws or by use 
of market power. These forms of government intervention are important 
in the aerospace industry which has a long history of government sub- 
silly, intervention over profit rates and the use of government 
monopsony power to influence structure. 
Few studies exist on the determination of profitability in UK Gov- 
ernment regulated industries. (1) Aerospace is an ideal industry to 
study since it is dependent on Government contracts which have 
state-determined profit rates. Various hypotheses on the industry's 
profitability have been suggested. Critics allege that profits depend 
an wars and domestic military work. Firms claimed that until 1968, 
the state's profit rules failed to recognize that technical progress 
was resulting in shorter production runs and greater emphasis on less 
profitable development work. Questions also arise about the effects 
on profits of the mergers of 1959-60 and the Review Board for Govern- 
ment Contracts established in 1968. These variables and the features 
of both the industry and Government procurement policy relevant to 
explaining profitability are outlined and incorporated into estimating 
equations. Consideration is also given to the effects of profit con- 
trols on wages and unregulated outputs. 
(1) There have been some studies of profits in the US aerospace indus- 
try. See, e. g., Poirier and Garber (1974); also Agapos and 
Gallaway (1970). For a more general survey, see Wynn (1975). 
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THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY AND MARKETS 
The UK aerospace industry consists of airframe, engine, electronics 
and equipment firms involved in the design, development and production 
of military and civil aircraft, helicopters and missiles. Some of the 
industry's performance indicators for the period of the study are 
shown in Table I. Real output rose in the early 1950s, fluctuated 
around a plateau until 1969 and then declined. Employment reached a 
peak in 1957, followed by a long-run decline to 1973 by which time the 
labour force had fallen by over 100,000. Real productivity peaked in 
1965-66 and, for the whole period, rose by no more than 30%. There 
was also a change in the output mix as shown by sales to the UK Gov- 
ernment and exports. Even so, the industry depends on British Govern- 
ment orders and finance for both military and civil work. For most of 
the period, UK Government sales accounted for 50% or more of the 
industry's output. Rising export proportions give a misleading 
impression of independence from the UK Government since overseas sales 
are usually of aircraft which have been wholly, or partly, 
state-financed. Also, home market civil sales often involve the state 
through the nationalized airline. 
The UK industry operates in a dynamic market subject to state pro- 
tection and regulation. Most of the industry was privately owned 
until the nationalization of Rolls Royce Engines in 1971 and the 
airframe firms in 1977. Under private ownership, Governments have 
affected profitability directly through the profit rules for pricing 
state contracts. Traditionally, their procurement policy has offered 
higher profit rates for production work than for R&D contracts, 
hence the importance of output mix as a determinant of profitability. 
In addition, British Governments have affected profitability indirect- 
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TABLE 1: THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
Index of Percentage of Aer o- 
output -sales to UK Exports space Profits on 
at Government a=_ % profits capital for 
constant Employ- ------------- ------ - of tot on glanu- 
Output price-, bent Procurement Total sales capital facturing 
Year (MI) t19`6=1303 (000s) () (} M {%1 (U 
1949 136 58 183.3 62.5 79.4 14.7 18.0 
1950 143 57 179.5 54.5 75.5 14.7 18.6 
1951 163 58 193.2 59.5 80.9 13.5 22.8 
1952 225 73 236.4 68.0 84.4 10.7 19.7 
1953 301 95 261.7 63.5 78.4 16.6 18.0 
1954 35(ý 107 278.9 68.6 85.7 11.4 13.7 
1955 338 97 294.9 63.0 82.2 14.2 18.4 17.9 
1956 365 97 307.6 49.3 72.6 20.6 18.5 16.4 
1957 400 101 311.9 42.5 66.3 23.8 15.7 15.6 
1958 405 100 301.4 34.6 ; 5.6 32.1 12.6 14.4 
1959 405 98 292.5 37.5 59.8 30.1 10.6 15.4 
1960 435 100 292.1 42.5 60.9 31.0 9.4 15.7 
1961 500 110 303.4 40.0 60.0 29.0 5.9 13.4 
1962 470 101 291.6 45.8 69.1 23.4 7.0 12.1 
1963 475 100 269.8 44.2 67.4 24.2 8.7 12.9 
1964 520 104 267.3 40.4 63.5 20.2 6.3 14.2 
1965 590 110 258.2 36.4 59.3 26.3 9.2 13.4 
1966 625 110 253.9 33.6 55.2 36.0 7.0 11.8 
1967 595 103 254. (+ 33.6 55.4 32.8 6.5 11.9 
19 68 660 186 249.1 31.8 `51. ` 31.8 7.1 13.7 
1969 695 105 245.6 27.3 48.2 38.1 6.1 13.3 
1970 645 88 235.1 27.1 50.4 34.9 5.0 12.1 
1971 655 82 217.8 25.9 48.9 35.9 10.2 13.1 
1973 755 86 217.5 23.2 44.4 41.1 15.6 15.4 
1973 8005 Be 231.7 27.9 46.6 44.1 20.2 17.7 
Notes; 
(i) Total UK Govern ent sales consist of military and civil R It D work for the UK Government plus 
proCUreSLnt=. of equipent for the UK Services ; i. e. UK military production business). Sale., to UK 
state-owned airlines are not included in UK Government sales. Output is net of duplication. 
Iii) The aerospace profit rates on capital are before tax, dividends and appropriations to reserves 
but after char ing depreciation and R&D to the extent written off in the accounts. Capital employed 
is the arithmetic averagec of the net assets shown by companyf balance sheets at the beginning and end 
of financial years. The data for 1949-64 were published in Cmnd. 2853, Report of the Com; ýittee of 
Inquiry( into the Aircraft Industry( (Plowden) (1%5)- Data for 1960-73 were published in Business Moni- 
tor, 'Survey of the UK Aerospace Industry' (1975) ; but the published data are for airframe and heli- 
copter companies onlyf, excluding engines. Correspondence with Rolls Royce Ltd. resulted in data on 
profits and capital for both RR and Bristol Sidde. ey Engines Ltd., 1960-73; but no information is 
available for 1970 due to the appointment of a Receiver in February 1771 before completion of the 1970 
accounts: hence 1970 figures were estimated using a linear interpolation between adjacent years. The 
resulting profit and capital figures for engines were added to those for airframes. and helicopters to 
eroduce a continuous series 1941-773 (latest published figure). However, the Plowden data and adjusted 
Pusiners Monitor -series overlap between 1960 and 1964, producin alternative profit figures. The 
Plowden figures for 1949-64 are used in Table 1, although for 1960-4, the adjusted Business Monitor 
profit rates were 8.8,3.2,5.8,8.0 and 5.1%. 
(iii) Profits on capital for manufacturing are net income - net assets for the largest listed UK 
manufacturing companies. Net income is gross income minus short term interest and depreciation at 
book values (before tax) ; net assets are gross asset=, minus accumulated depreciation. 
Sources; Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, 1964-65 (Plowden) M651) 
Business Monitor (1975); Department of Industry, 'Companies' rate of return on capital employed', 
Trade and Industry, October 24th, 19751. 
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ly through their monopsony influence on market demand and structure, 
including the extent of competition for state business. (1) As 
monopsonists, UK Governments have used procurement policy to determine 
projects and hence technical progress, as well as the size and struc- 
ture of the industry, entry and exit, together with prices, profits 
(via bargaining), technical efficiency and export performance. The 
volume of domestic military orders affects total output and employ- 
ment. Their character also determines technical progress as the UK 
Services have demanded more complex, and hence costlier, weapons. (2) 
The rising cost of aircraft has resulted in shorter production runs 
and a relatively greater proportion of R&D costs in the total. 
Between 1945 and 1955, the output of UK military aircraft usually 
exceeded 600 units, with over 1000 and up to some 3800 units not 
unknown(3) 
In the 1970s, the typical UK output was some 200-300 units, an 
exception being the collaborative three-nation Tornado with a planned 
output of 805 units. Output is significant for unit costs. Not only 
is there the "spreading" of R&D outlays, but learning economies mean 
that unit production costs decline by about 10% for each-doubling in 
cumulative output. 
Governments have determined market structure. The industry was 
(1) Hartley (1974). 
(2) The increasing complexity of modern combat aircraft has been 
reflected in their electronics inputs which typically account for 
20% of unit production cost, with 35-50V. not unknown. These 
figures were based on an interview study of European and US firms 
which also suggested that engines might be some 30%, and the 
airframes 50'!. of unit production costs. 
(3) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry 
1964-65 (1965) p. 17 
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subject to a Government-promoted structural change in 1959-60 when 16 
airframe and helicopter firms and six engine companies were merged to 
form five major groups: two each for airframes and engines and one 
for helicopters. The aim was to create the largest groups consistent 
with the maintenance of the minimum number of firms required for 
domestic competition. (1) Following the mergers, the industry did not 
reach its pre-merger profitability until the early 1970s! Questions 
arise as to whether this decline in profitability reflected other 
influences within the market. 
Table 1 shows that for aerospace two periods of profitability can 
be distinguished, namely, the 1950s and 1960s with profit rates 
highest in the earlier years, but with distinct "breaks" in 1956 and 
1970. For 1949-56, profit rates averaged 18-5'/. There was rising 
real output and employment with a relatively high proportion of volume 
production work for the UK Services as a result of the Korean War and 
the re-equipment programme. After 1956, profit rates declined and 
remained at a low level until 1970. Volume production work for UK 
procurement fell substantially and exports became relatively more 
important. Defence Reviews in 1957 and 1965-68 were associated with 
reductions in profitability and a rise in export shares. Real output 
fluctuated around a relatively high level in the 1960s when there was 
an increasing share of development work in UK Government sales and a 
greater volume of civil R&D business. Inevitably, the trend towards 
shorter production runs created difficulties in maintaining efficient 
capacity working. For civil aircraft, Government policy in the 1960s 
(1) Hartley (1965). Later, Rolls Royce acquired Bristol Siddeley 
Engines creating one UK engine company and four major groups by 
1966. 
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was to contribute up to 50% of the estimated launching costs with 
the industry contributing the remainder. After 1965, civil aircraft 
policy was dominated by financial assistance for R&D on Concorde and 
the RB211 engine. In the circumstances, it has been hypothesized that 
the increased private funding of civil R&D adversely affected the 
industry's profitability(1). A further factor might have been a more 
effective policing and control of costs and profits on Government con- 
tracts. In fact, the 1960s were characterized by the Ferranti and 
Bristol Siddeley Engines "excessive" profits cases which culminated in 
a major revision of state profit policy and the formation of the 
Review Board for Government Contracts (1968)(2) A formal link was 
created between the profitability of Government non-competitive con- 
tracts and UK manufacturing industry. As a result, profitability rose 
in the early 1970s. This was also a period of falling output, a rela- 
tively low proportion of domestic military orders and a rising share 
of exports. Interestingly, a graph. of aerospace profits and the 
industry's real output for the whole period suggests an inverse 
relationship. 
One of the arguments for a revision of the profit rules on Govern- 
ment contracts was based on a comparison of aerospace profitability 
with other industries. Table 1 shows that average profit rates in 
aerospace were generally lower than in the rest of British industry, 
averaging 10.5% and some 14'/., respectively. As well as being lower, 
(1) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry 
1964-65 (1965) p. 127) 
(2) See Second Report of the Inquiry into Pricing of Ministry of Avia- 
tion Contracts (1965) and Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Certain Contracts made with Bristol Siddeley Engines (1968). 
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rates were also more volatile. They fluctuated within a 13% point 
range between 1955-73, compared with approximately 6% points for the 
rest of UK industry. Such comparisons were one of the elements in the 
Government's new profit rules of 1968. 
Industry profit rates also conceal a diversity of experience 
between markets and firms. In the early 1960s, the profit rates of 
the engine companies generally exceeded those of the airframe 
firms. (1) By 1964 profits for the main airframe, missile and helicop- 
ter groups were a mere 2.4'h! This reflected the relatively low 
profitability of the airframe and missile firms only (following the 
mergers): helicopters were the leading profit sector for 1960-67, as 
shown by the record of Westland in Table II. After 1966 relative 
profitability was reversed with the airframe, missile and helicopter 
units being more profitable than engines, although within this 
grouping helicopter profitability fell. 
Variations in profitability also exist between specialist and 
diversified companies. In the early 1950s, the profit records of the 
Hawker Siddeley Group and Westland were better than the industry aver- 
age. This was when Hawker Siddeley made virtually no civil aircraft 
and its profit rates were two to three times greater than firms with 
both military and civil aircraft(2). Hawker Siddeley is a useful case 
study since by the 1960s it was a diversified firm with engineering as 
well as military and civil aircraft and missile activities. The 
Group's share of aerospace in its total sales declined from some 75V. 
(1) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry 
1964-65 (1965 p. 127 
(2) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry 
1964-65 (1965 p. 127) 
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TABLE II: AEROSPACE PROFITS, 1960-73 (PERCENTAGE PROFITS ON CAPITAL) 
Airframes Hawker Westland 
Aerospace missiles & Aero- Siddeley Helicopter 
Year Industry helicopters engines Group Group 
1960 9.4 8.0 10.2 na 20.6 
1961 5.9 3.6 2.6 9.9 20.7 
1962 7.0 6.3 5.2 11.3 19.7 
1963 8.7 6.8 9.6 11.6 16.5 
1964 6.3 2.4 8.9 10.9 15.9 
1965 9.2 9.3 9.1 11.2 15.6 
1966 7.0 6.9 6.9 10.1 15.1 
1967 6.5 10.4 3.5 12.0 12.3 
1968 7.1 13.5 3.0 13.8 11.8 
1969 6.1 14.2 0.4 10.0 7.7 
1970 5.0 8.1 Receiver 9.7 5.6 
1971 10.2 14.6 4.7 13.3 7.1 
1972 15.6 20.4 11.1 19.6 8.8 
1973 20.2 28.6 13.1 20.9 11.9 
Notes 
(i) Profits are before tax. 
(ii) Rolls Royce experience with the RB211 engine resulted in Receiv- 
ership in February 1971 and no accounts were completed for 1970. 
(iii) The 1960 accounts for Hawker Siddeley were for a 17-month period 
and they have been omitted. 
Sources: Business Monitor (1975 p. 39); Hawker Siddeley Group, Annu- 
al Reports, St. James's Square, London; Westland Aircraft Ltd., Annu- 
al Reports, Yeovil, Somerset. 
in the early 196os to 45% in 1973: hence, it provides evidence on the 
relative profitability of a diversified aerospace company. Every year 
between 1961 and 1973, the firm's profitability exceeded that for the 
aerospace industry, and was usually greater than for the main 
airframe, missile and helicopter firms (Table II). None the less, 
like the rest of the aerospace industry, Hawker's profit rates were 
usually less than for UK manufacturing industry. This brings us to 
the aims of the Government's profit formula. 
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PROCUREMENT POLICY, REGULATION AND FIRM BEHAVIOUR 
UK Government purchases of military aerospace equipment usually 
involve non-competitive contracts, with the supplier and state 
negotiating a price based on actual or estimated costs and a 
state-determined profit margin. (1) Contracts distinguish between 
development and production work. For development projects where 
uncertainty is prevalent, some form of cost reimbursement contract 
(cost-plus) is usually adopted, whereby the firm tends to recover all 
its costs, regardless of their level. In this case, the state bears 
most, if not all, of the risks. (2) With production work, where the 
uncertainties have been removed and the task can be clearly specified 
ex ante, fixed price contracts based on estimated costs are typi- 
cal. These provide efficiency incentive during the production run, so 
placing the contractor at risk. 
The profit element in the pricing of both cost reimbursement and 
fixed price contracts is determined by the state's profit formula for 
non-competitive work. This distinguishes between risk and non-risk 
contracts (i. e. fixed price and cost-plus, respectively) and reflects 
the Government's concern with negotiating "fair and reasonable" 
prices. Until 1968, the state's basic profit formula provided for a 
return of 7.5% on capital and up to 2'/ on costs for risk and 27,, on 
costs for contractor performance. (3) There was a constraint that 
(1) The extent of competition is analysed in Hartley (1967) and 
Hartley (1974). 
(2) Such "blank cheque" contracts are believed to provide the finan-- 
cial framework for cost escalation and labour hoarding: Hartley 
and Cubitt (1976-77); also Hartley and Corcoran (1975). 
(3) Hartley (1969) 
-254- 
CHAPTER SIX: PROFITS, REGULATION AND THE UK. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
returns on capital for non-competitive contracts should not exceed 15'/. 
for risk work and 10/. for non-risk work. Following the "excessive" 
profits cases of the 1960s and industry criticisms, changes occurred 
in 1968 with the establishment of a specialist regulatory agency, 
namely the Review Board for Government Contracts. This Board 
reinforced the "policing and monitoring" functions of the Ministry of 
Defence procurement agency. The 1968 changes also introduced equality 
of information, post-costing and a revised profit formula aimed at 
providing defence contractors with a "fair" return on capital 
employed, defined as "... a return equal on average to the overall 
return earned by British industry"(1) The Review Board was an indepen- 
dent body responsible for reviewing the operation of the profit formu- 
la, normally every three years. In 1968, the formula aimed at an 
annual target return on the historic cost of capital of 14%, equiva- 
lent to a real net return on equity of 6.8%.. In 1970, the target rate 
was raised slightly to 14.3% and remained unchanged until 1975. Dif- 
ferential profit rates are allowed between risk and non-risk business 
and in the early 1970s, the target rates were 16.1 and 10.7%, respec- 
tively. In addition, the Review Board acts as a referee where either 
party to a contract considers that its outcome shows that the price 
negotiated was not "fair and reasonable". Between 1968 and 1975, 
individual contracts could be referred to the Review Board for inves- 
tigation and possible re-negotiation where profit rates exceeded 27.5% 
or where losses were greater than 15% on capital. (2) 
(1) See Review Board for Government Contracts (1977) Appendix A, 
p. 39. 
(2) Review Board for Government Contracts (1974 p. 38). Also, by 
1975, accelerating inflation raised doubts about the basic fea- 
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The operation of the Review Hoard is worth a separate study. Its 
criteria for "excessive" profits and efficiency could be compared with 
those used by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. For our 
purposes, it is-only necessary to identify the main features of UK 
procurement policy, 1949-73. These include profit constraints, dif- 
ferential returns between risk and non-risk contracts, the creation of 
the Review Board and the subsequent formal link between defence prof- 
its and UK industry. Thus, UK aerospace firms operate in a regulated, 
imperfect and protected market, where there are opportunities for dis- 
cretionary behaviour. Utility-maximizing models predict that with 
profit regulation, firms are likely to substitute increased expendi- 
tures for profits in the controlled sector. They might also substi- 
tute any relatively profitable unregulated activities for regulated 
ones in an effort to achieve preferred combinations of profits and 
other "goods" (e. g. staff) managerial emoluments). (1) Much depends 
on the actual form of managerial preference functions and the explana- 
tion of regulation. Some models of regulation suggest that it might 
benefit the industry rather than society. (2) On this view, the "pack- 
age" which the UK Government offered the aerospace industry might have 
been a preferred combination for the manufacturers. The package 
contained specified profit rates on Government contracts, preferential 
tures of the 1968 profit formula - e. g. its 
whether past profit experience was a suitabl, 
whether the profitability of UK industry was 
terion for an "efficient and viable" defence 
issues are outside the period of our study: 
ernment Contracts (1974 p. 19). 
historic cost basis, 
yardstick and 
the appropriate cri- 
industry; but such 
Review Board for Gov- 
(1) Williamson (1965) ; also Averch and Johnson (1962). 
(2) Stigler (1971). 
-256- 
CHAPTER SIX: PROFITS, REGULATION AND THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
purchasing and protection in the domestic market, including a general 
commitment to support the UK industry. To firms, such characteristics 
could be perceived as a low risk package which might explain their 
initial acceptance of relatively low profits in the 1960s, with a 
later upward adjustment which was to the advantage of the industry. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The difficulties inherent in empirical work were especially acute for 
this study. Profits and capital are subject to the flexible defini- 
tions of accountants, and for diversified aircraft firms problems 
arise in isolating the contribution of aerospace. Also, following the 
mergers, a substantial amount of the profits and capital employed were 
allocated to the accounts of the principal shareholding companies, 
rather than to the newly created units. Even the official profit fig- 
ures suffer from a discontinuity with the major engine company 
excluded after 1964. Nevertheless, empirical work in this area is 
justified by the frequency with which policy-makers use published data 
to make statements about profitability, its determinants and the role 
of the Review Board. In this context, the policy emphasis is on the 
level of profit rates, rather than changes or absolute amounts. 
Hypotheses on the industry's profitability were tested using stan- 
dard econometric techniques. The characteristics of both the market 
and UK procurement and regulatory policy suggested a model in which 
the aerospace industry's profitability was determined by output, the 
sales "mix", factor proportions, relative competitiveness, the 
profitability of manufacturing industry and the "policing" function of 
the Review Board. Two factors specific to aerospace were identified, 
namely the Korean War and the mergers. The resulting estimating equa- 
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tion is of the general form: 
n/K = f(Q, a/Q, K/L, C, M, PRI, W, RB, t) 
n/K = UK aerospace industry's rate of return on capital employed 
0= output of the aerospace industry 
a/Q = output "mix" 
K/L = factor proportions represented by the ratio of capital to labour 
C= international competitiveness 
M= dummy variable for mergers 
PRl = profitability of UK manufacturing industry 
W= dummy variable for Korean War 
RB = dummy variable representing the Review Board for Government Con- 
tracts 
t=a time-trend 
Ambiguities arise in the interpretation of some of the variables 
and their predicted signs. At the firm level, the predicted relation- 
ship between profits and output will depend on the objective function, 
market and entry conditions(1) and the extent to which firms are in 
short- or long-run equilibrium, or in transitory disequilibrium. At 
the industry level, the regulated nature of the market is a further 
complication. Moreover, with private venture research and Government 
work, profits can be received in "lumps" following the sale of a proj- 
ect, so distorting the relationship between current sales and 
profitability. Indeed, the reverse causation from profits to sales is 
not implausible. Lags are a possible solution, but they are unable to 
reflect accurately some of the delays in price-fixing for defence con- 
tracts. For example, the final price for the Blue Steel development 
contract was not agreed until seven years after the work ended! (2). 
Also, if Governments require a specific aerospace capacity in the UK, 
they have to cover its supply price as reflected in the average 
(1) With restricted entry, aircraft firms can adjust their output lev- 
els either internally or through variations in the amount of 
subcontracting. 
(2) Eighth Report from the Public Accounts Committee (1973 p. xvi) 
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profitability of manufacturing industry. As a result, the aerospace 
industry's profits will reflect the performance and output of the rest 
the economy: hence, even if there is a relationship between aerospace 
profits and output, it might differ from that in other British firms. 
In view of the plotted relationship between profits and output, a neg- 
ative sign was expected. 
Negative coefficients were also predicted for the proportion of 
R&D sales, the capital-labour ratio and the mergers. Positive rela- 
tionships were expected for the proportion of UK procurement sales, 
competitiveness, manufacturing profits and the Korean War. 
Exports and the Review Board were more debatable. For 
profit-maximizers which are price-makers in the UK and price-takers 
overseas, an increase in exports might have an adverse effect on 
profitability. (1) Alternatively, overseas markets are not subject to 
UK Government profit regulations(2). Interviews with industry execu- 
tives suggested that on military work, profit rates on exports are 
greater than on domestic sales due to the absence of profit controls. 
On one military aircraft, a profit rate of 25% on capital was obtained 
on overseas sales, compared with a maximum of 15% from the UK Govern- 
ment. and, if there is a temporary monopoly, exports might favourably 
affect profits. Similarly, the regulatory function of the Review 
Hoard should have a negative impact, but this might be difficult to 
separate from the 1968 policy of linking profits directly to the aver- 
age performance of manufacturing industry. 
(1) Cooper and Hartley (1470, Ch 4). 
(2) Exports of UK Government-financed aerospace projects are subject 
to a levy on sales; - see: Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Aircraft Industry 1964-65 (1965, p. p26) 
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Some equations included a time-trend as a means of distinguishing 
any "other influences". Time is sometimes used to reflect technical 
progress. Indeed, the industry's criticisms of Government contracting 
suggested that technical progress might have had a negative impact on 
profitability. However, this effect should be captured by the share 
of R&D work in total output. If so, time will reflect "other influ- 
ences" and its meaning and predicted sign become ambiguous. Both lin- 
ear and log-linear equations were estimated and examples of the 
former(1) are shown in Table III. The equations explained over 80'/, of 
the variations in profitability, but multicollinearity was a problem. 
A principal component analysis of the data suggested that models with 
more than six explanatory variables would have substantial 
multicollinearity and that this might also arise with a smaller number 
of variables; hence there were constraints on the range of estimating 
equations. Significant coefficients with the expected signs were 
often obtained for output, the share of procurement, the 
capital-labour ratio and the profitability of manufacturing industry. 
There was also evidence of a positive time-trend. Strong support 
emerged for a negative impact of structural change, confirming the 
results of other studies of post-merger performance(2) Table III shows 
that, ceteris paribus, mergers might have reduced the industry's 
(1) The log-linear equations generally gave the same or fewer signifi- 
cant coefficients. 
(2) A Review of Monopolies and Merger Policy (1978 p 17). The mergers 
were associated with a rise in the degree of concentration at the 
industry level, and a substantial rise in concentration within the 
airframe sector-e. g. in 1958,14 enterprises accounted for most 
of the employment in airframes; by 1963, three groups employed 
over 80% of the sector's labour force. Thus, the mergers led to 
increased concentration and lower profit rates: see also Table II 
for airframe profits. 
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profit rates by about 6% points. Since similar results were obtained 
for the sub-period 1949-64 (Table III, equation 3), there was no evi- 
dence that the findings reflected the modification in the official 
profit series in 1964. They might, of course, reflect some of the 
accounting changes associated with the mergers, but these affected 
only a few firms in the industry. On the contrary, in 1965 an offi- 
cial Report concluded that the "reorganization of the industry follow- 
ing the mergers ... was slow and is still incomplete"(1). Another 
study also found a substantial post-merger adjustment period, typical- 
ly five years, with one major aircraft firm estimating 12 years and 
"substantial" adjustment costs associated with integrating different 
organisations. (2) Slow adjustment might be explained by the pricing 
and regulatory system for UK Government contracts. On such work, a 
firm's fixed outlays are recovered through an overhead recovery rate 
within a framework of admissible costs. With a long-run decline in 
the demand for military aircraft, this method tends to result in the 
state financing excess capacity in the industry, so reducing the 
incentive for firms to adjust downwards their plant capacity and over- 
head labour. Indeed, the pricing system and profit constraints pro- 
vide firms with an inducement to accumulate capital at the state's 
expense. (3) The negative sign on the capital-labour ratio provides 
(1) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry 
1964-65 (1965, p. 22) 
(2) Hartley and Corcoran (1976). 
(3) Averch and Johnson (1962). The system for recovering overheads 
can lead to a contract carrying expenses incurred on another proj- 
ect (e. g. military versions of civil aircraft) and the inclusion 
of a proportion of a firm's private venture R&D as part of the 
costs on Government work - See: Third Report from the Public 
Accounts Committee (1970 pp. xxix-xxxi). 
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further support, suggesting that labour is the factor which the indus- 
try uses for downward adjustments. If valid, this explanation pro- 
duces the interesting result that the UK Government's pricing system 
financed capital accumulation and excess capacity which adversely 
affected the industry's profitability in the 1960s, so providing it 
with a case for the upward adjustment in profit rates in 1968! 
The remaining results were either less conclusive or unexpected. 
There was only tentative support for a positive impact of the Korean 
War, and insignificant coefficients were more typical. Doubts, there- 
fore, arise about the empirical validity of the "war profiteering" 
hypothesis. Some other results were unexpected. Research intensity, 
export shares and the industry's international competitiveness made no 
apparent contribution to variations in profitability. Nor was the 
Review Board found to have a significant negative effect. Indeed, a 
few equations suggested that the Board might have had a positive 
impact. At the same time, the evidence shows that policy has success- 
fully linked aerospace and manufacturing industry profit rates. 
Further tests were undertaken to identify the contribution of other 
possible explanatory factors. These included capacity-utilization, a 
political dummy for the UK Government and a lagged dependent 
variable. (1) Capacity-use was included because of the assertion that 
higher utilization raises profitability, but there was no support for 
the hypothesis. Profits might be further affected by whether a Labour 
(1) Similar equations were estimated for the US aircraft industry, 
1961-76. both output and research intensity made no apparent con- 
tribution to explaining profitability, but significant and nega- 
tive coefficients were obtained for export shares and the ratio of 
the number of military to civil aircraft produced-i. e. exports 
and military output had an adverse effect on profit rates in the 
US industry. 
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or Conservative Government is in office, with the former being more 
critical of defence profits. However, the political dummy had no sig- 
nificant effect on profitability. A lagged dependent variable was 
also incorporated to test for delays in the adjustment of actual to 
desired profits. Both linear and log-linear equations gave a signifi- 
cant and positive coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. 
SOME FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Three further'questions were considered. First, does diversifica- 
tion "protect" an aerospace company's profits? Second, are the deter- 
minants of profits in the regulated aerospace industry different from 
the rest of the UK economy? Third, does regulation have any effect on 
wages or other product markets ? 
(1) Diversification 
Hawker Siddeley is a diversified aerospace group whose non-aircraft 
business could "protect" its overall profitability. If so, a negative 
relationship would be expected between the proportion of aerospace 
business in total sales and the group's profit rates. Empirical tests 
provided no support for this diversification hypothesis. (1) An exam- 
ple is: 
(1) The restricted form of the equation reflects data limitations. 
Profit rates on capital were only available for the Group; other 
data available were aerospace sales and profits, and Group sales. 
A significant and positive coefficient for the proportion of aero- 
space sales might have indicated that the Group had been relative- 
ly more successful (profitable) with its aerospace product mix: 
either it produced a given aerospace mix relatively more effi- 
ciently or, it had a more profitable mix with, say, a greater 
emphasis on production rather than research work and/or a differ- 
ent proportion of exports in its total aviation sales. 
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HSG n/K = 19.60-" - 0.15'''"'0 + 111.17'"-tr/S + 0.02A/HSG 
(3.85) (0.04) (16.14) (0.04) 
R=0.89 DW = 1.84 
where 
HSG n/K = Hawker Siddeley Group's profit rates on capital 
employed. 
0= UK aerospace industry's output in constant prices, 1958 =100. 
n/S = profit rate on Hawker Siddeley's aerospace sales. 
A/HSG = Hawker Siddeley's aerospace sales as a percentage of 
total Group sales (an indicator of diversification). 
n= 13; 1961-73. Remaining details as in Table III. 
(2) Is Aerospace Different? 
It is possible that the determinants of aerospace profits are 
unique compared with the rest of the UK economy. This can be tested 
by estimating a profits model for other British industries and then 
comparing the explanatory variables. In particular, the elasticity of 
profit rates with respect to output might differ between regulated 
defence contractors and other firms, with the latter expected to have 
higher elasticities. However, attempts to estimate a model on limited 
cross-section data for manufacturing were unsuccessful. The explana- 
tory power was extremely low and the model was not considered suffi- 
ciently well established to form a basis for comparison with aero- 
space. (1) 
(1) Data were collected from the Times Top 1000 Companies, 1971 on 
rates of return on capital, sales (Q, in thousands, 1971), exports 
(X), employment (L) and capital. The cross-section sample 
consisted of 86 firms. An example of one of the best equations 
is: 
n/K = 18.59- + 0.00000389 + 15.94X/Q - 0.00006*L 
(1.73) (0.0000024) (10.39) (0.00003) 
R' = 0.04. Remaining details as in Table III. 
No significant relationships were estimated between profit rates 
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(3) Regulation, Wages and other Markets 
Regulated firms have an incentive to substitute discretionary 
expenditures for profits, especially on non-competitive and cost-based 
Government contracts. Wages are a major outlay. It can be 
hypothesized that pay increases in the regulated aerospace industry 
with cost-based Government contracts are likely to be resisted less 
vigorously than they would be in a commercial market. A crude test of 
this hypothesis used data on wage increases in aerospace compared with 
other industries. Aerospace was never at the "top of the league" for 
pay increases and there were other industries, operating in 
unregulated commercial markets, with greater rises. (1) Thus, there 
was no support for the hypothesis of "excessive" pay increases in the 
regulated aerospace market. 
Satisfactory tests of models of the regulated firm require a 
and sales for the manufacturing firms, a result which was in com- 
plete contrast to the findings for the aerospace industry: But 
such results might reflect the differences between estimating from 
time-series data for a single industry and cross-section data for 
large manufacturing firms. 
(1) The percentage change in average annual wages was obtained for 
aircraft; chemicals; electrical engineering; food, drink and 
tobacco; metal manufacturing; motor vehicles and motor-cycles; 
shipbuilding; and all manufacturing. Data were obtained for three 
periods, namely 1954-58,1963-68 and 1958-68. Aerospace was usu- 
ally around, or even below, the average for UK manufacturing. For 
example, for 1958-68, annual wages rose by 71.7% in aerospace; 
75.1% for all manufacturing; 80'h for chemicals and 78.5% for food, 
etc. The results could reflect data problems - e. g. data relate 
to the whole industry and not to plants working on Government con- 
tracts. There are also difficulties of holding constant other 
relevant variables - e. g. demand, unions, human capital. 
Alternatively, the Government's procurement agency might be rela- 
tively successful in regulating wage increases (i. e. a clearly 
observable variable). If so, regulated firms might respond by 
raising non-wage expenditures (e. g. on job leisure) or expanding 
their employment of human capital. A US study reached a similar 
conclusion. Peck and Scherer (1962, p. 524). 
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detailed study of enterprise behaviour embracing all aspects of both 
inputs and outputs. In the absence of published data, a limited 
interview survey was used to obtain further qualitative evidence on 
behaviour in related, but unregulated, markets. (1) The interviews 
concentrated on the relative profitability of various outputs, namely 
civil sales and exports, including licensed production and spares: 
these are possible substitute markets for a regulated enterprise. The 
interviews provided no overwhelming support for the hypothesis that 
civil aerospace sales are more profitable than military work. Two 
responses were illuminating, both from American firms and each 
illustrating the diversity of experience and behaviour at the 
micro-level. One executive claimed that civil aircraft sales are more 
profitable for a successful airliner, but that the civil market is 
risky. Another respondent regarded military work as more profitable, 
since the firm's civil aircraft sales were in a highly competitive 
market and its airliner prices had actually been reduced below average 
total cost but above variable costs: the firm recovered these costs 
on its military sales. However, this firm had planned to use its 
civil aircraft business to obtain greater volume so spreading over- 
heads and "allowing the company to be more competitive on military 
contracts". 
With exports, the interviews provided support for all plausible 
possibilities! Similar numbers of firms claimed that exports were 
(1) The interviews were undertaken as part of Keith Hartley's NATO 
Research Fellowship for a general study of weapons procurement 
policies in NATO. The sample embraced all the major airframe 
companies in the UK, Europe and the USA. The questions explored 
the relative profitability of different markets, using a 
structured questionnaire. 
-267- 
CHAPTER SIX: PROFITS, REGULATION AND THE UK AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
more, less or as profitable as domestic sales. One UK executive 
explained that exports were "much more profitable" since home sales to 
the Government involved "careful monitoring of excess profits". Fur- 
they profit opportunities arise with licensed production and the 
pricing-of spares in unregulated markets. Firms in the UK, USA and 
France were almost unanimous in stating that licensed production, 
including co-production and industrial collaboration, was usually as 
profitable for the licensor as domestic military aircraft work. (1) 
Spares pricing is a more controversial issue and has to be analysed in 
the context of each firm's pricing strategy over the life-cycle of its 
products. European industry, for example, often alleges that US aero- 
space equipment sold abroad is "cheap, but you pay for the spares". 
American companies were questioned on this point. Some US companies 
accepted that for aircraft exports they raised the prices of spares on 
later orders. Foreign spares prices might be 15-20% higher than for 
sales to the US Government. But the explanations for this policy were 
diverse. They included the search for higher profit rates, the fact 
that exports involve special requirements and that foreigners often 
buy spares at the end of a production run or require them urgently, as 
well as the US Government's levy on foreign military sales. One Amer- 
ican firm stressed that since US regulatory rules do not apply to for- 
eign sales, its export prices for aircraft and spares reflect "what 
the market will bear", including any monopoly position. But not all 
US firms raised prices on spares exports. References were made to the 
(1) Licensed production involves awarding a licence to a foreign firm 
allowing it to manufacture the innovating company's aircraft. 
These results are probably reliable since there might be a bias 
towards claiming that such work is less profitable. 
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"loss of consumer goodwill" and the fact that rivals can compete on 
both spares and new aircraft. In other words, the interview study 
confirmed the diversity of experience amongst firms, a finding which 
shows the limitations of industry level studies. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has shown that there are opportunities for the empirical 
investigation of aerospace as a regulated industry. The econometric 
work showed the influence of output, the share of procurement and fac- 
tor proportions. The clear link between UK aerospace profitability 
and manufacturing industry profitability might be interpreted as an 
indicator of the "success" of Government procurement policy, although 
this is offset by the negative impact of the state induced mergers. 
Further opportunities remain for empirical work. Questions arise as 
to whether changes in the Government's procurement agency have had any 
effect on profit regulation, on whether firms have responded to regu- 
lation by hoarding floorspace, and on the behaviour of regulated firms 
towards "free" markets. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN-- 
COST FUNCTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT GRANT-AIDED SCHOOLS 
INTRODUCTION: 
The state has played a major role in education for over a century. 
Currently most education is provided by local education authorities 
who finance and administer the system of state schools. The way their 
budgetary decisions are influenced by the financial environment they 
are placed in by central government, by the views of local 
politicians, and by demographic change was analysed in Chapter 4. 
However, until the system was abolished in 1976, the government also 
supported nearly two hundred Direct Grant schools in the private sec- 
tor to which it paid a capitation grant. This chapter investigates 
the relationship between the size of these Direct Grant schools and 
their average cost of output. There are a number of reasons why this 
relationship is of interest. First, if a certain size of school mini- 
mizes unit cost there is scope for what may be in aggregate consider- 
able savings in education expenditure. Secondly, costs are relevant 
to the education vouchers discussion and more recently the debate over 
() This chapter is based on P. A. Watt "Economies of Scale in Schools: 
Some Evidence from the Private Sector",. Applied Economics, 12, 
1980, pp 235-242. The author is grateful to A. J. Buxton, 
K. Hartley, A. Maynard and G. B. Stafford for helpful comments but 
retains responsibility for error. 
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the proposal that schools be enabled to "opt out" from local authority 
control and receive direct per capita funding from the government. To 
the extent that such schemes are competitive, the form of the cost 
function is relevant because if unit costs fall continuously it is 
well known that no competitive equilibrium will exist. (1) Thirdly the 
cost function is relevant to discussion of inter-regional educational 
equality. (2) With the existence of different sizes of school and 
non-constant average costs, a simple equalization of per pupil expen- 
diture will not lead to equal exposure to the educational process. 
The majority of existing empirical work is American and is briefly 
reviewed in the next section. 
EXISTING STUDIES 
An important problem for much American work on education costs, (3) 
as Riew (19 6) and Wales (1973) have pointed out, is that for many 
states data are only available at the school district rather than 
school level, and a school district may contain many schools. (4) Riew 
(1966) avoids this problem, at a possible cost of making his sample 
unrepresentative, by excluding districts containing more than one 
school. His results are reproduced in Table 1. 
Riew concludes from his results that the cost minimizing school 
size is 1675 pupils. Wales (1973) argues that this result may stem 
largely from Riew's use of a quadratic cost function, finding in his 
(1) See e. g. Friedman (1962) p93) 
(2) See Michelson (1972) 
(3) e. g. Schmandt and Stevens (1960), Hirsch (1960) 
(4) Thus the largest school district in the Schmandt and Stevens study 
contained 80,485 pupils 
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TABLE 1: RIEW'S ESTIMATED COST FUNCTIONS FOR WISCONSIN SCHOOLS 
Y= 10.31 - . 402X -+Xa+ . 107X3- + . 995X, + - 13.62Xn + . 618X. - - . 102X-7 (. 062) (. 000023) (. 013) (. 640) (11.95) (. 189) (. 109) 
Note: R2 _ . 557, a Denotes significance at the . 01 level. 
errors in parentheses. 
Riew's variables were defined as follows: 
Y= operating expenditures per pupil year, 
Xe= no. of pupils, 
X3 = average teacher's salary' 
X, = no of courses offered, 
Xa. S = average no. of courses taught per teacher, 
XF, = percentage change in enrolment 1957-60, 
X-, = percentage of classrooms built after 1930. 
Standard 
own analysis of teacher salary costs that although the quadratic form 
gives a reasonably good fit, a rectangular hyperbola indicating con- 
stantly decreasing costs fits much better. 
Both Riew and Wales endeavour to allow for differences in the qual- 
ity of output of schools. Riew by the inclusion of variables X3, X4 
and Xa, (see Table 1) and Wales by the inclusion of a variable 
measuring teacher experience. These, however, are input measures of 
quality. Data availability strongly favours this approach but theo- 
retically it is not ideal as the question of whether these inputs are 
fully converted into outputs remains unexamined. Output measures are 
used by Cohn (1974) who regresses the percentage change over two years 
in pupils' average scores in an educational development test on a set 
of input measures of school quality similar to those used by Riew. 
However an R° of only . 07 is obtained and Cohn chooses to return to 
input measures for his estimation of cost functions, obtaining results 
comparable with those of Riew. 
The only study that exists for the U. K. is that of Glennerster and 
Wilson (1970) who adopt an approach similar to Riew's and use input 
measures of quality. One output measure of quality, the average num- 
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ber of passes obtained by 'A' level candidates is tried but found to 
be unsuccessful. The results of the regressions are not given direct- 
ly but discussed qualitatively in the text. They conclude that 'size 
is not significantly associated with cost per pupil'. (I) 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The model adopted here is essentially that suggested by Cohn and Riew 
(1974). It is assumed that school governors set out to minimize total 
costs subject to'the realization of a desired level of quality per 
pupil, Qo. A production function of the form 0= Q(Y1... Yn: S, 
XI... Xm) is assumed, where quality per pupil, Q, depends upon a vec- 
for of school inputs Y and a vector of exogenous factors S, Xl... Xm. 
S denotes the number of pupils which, it is assumed, the school is not 
free to vary. In the short run the number of classrooms will be fixed 
and if, as seems likely, the rate of utilization of classrooms does 
not vary greatly over time then the assumption may be reasonably real- 
istic. (2) From the Lagrangean 
L(Y.... Yýý 1) = p,. Yi... p,, Yr, -1(Q(Y, .. , Y,. "S, X,.. , . Xmý Qmm, ) ) 
the (n + 1) functions expressing the necessary(3) conditions for an 
extremum may be solved to yield a system of equations in which the 
cost minimizing inputs Y ,; i=1, n are expressed as explicit func- 
(1) Glennerster and Wilson (1970, p. 166) 
(2) In Cohn and Riew's model, S is included amongst the school's 
choice variables. The school is assumed to minimise total cost 
subject to a constraint stated in terms of quantity per pupil. 
If total costs always decrease with size this formulation will 
clearly not lead to useful results. The problem is avoided in the 
solution of the maximisation problem by their implicit treatment 
of S as fixed. 
(3) It is assumed that the second order sufficient conditions for 
minimisation are satisfied. See Chiang (1974) p. 389. 
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tions of the exogenous variables. Substitution of these functions 
into the total cost function and division by the level of output 
yields the following general form for minimised average cost AC-: 
AC* = h(S! X,, ... X,; Qo, Pi ... prti) 
on which estimation will be based. The advantages of estimating aver- 
age rather than total cost functions in reducing multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity have been pointed out by Feldstein (1967, p63) in 
another connection. 
THE DATA 
There is a severe lack of data in this area. The private sector 
was chosen because most education authorities do not keep separate 
accounts for each school, (1) and it was necessary to go back to 1968 
to obtain the systematic data collected by the Public Schools Commis- 
sinn (1970). The boys' and girls' direct grant grammar schools were 
chosen for study as representing a fairly homogeneous group, reducing 
the need to correct for quality differences. Quality differences may 
also be reduced by the requirement that these schools be scrutinized 
and approved by the D. E. S. with the aim of ensuring that expenditure 
is generally no higher than for comparable maintained and direct grant 
schools. (2) This scrutinization, and competition between the schools 
is also likely to reduce possible X-inefficiency, lending validity to 
the assumption of cost minimization. To avoid problems of possible 
cross-subsidization between day and boarding schools, the forty boys' 
(1) Glennerster and Wilson (1970, p119) 
(2) Glennerster and Wilson (1970, p66) 
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and twenty-one girls' schools that accept a proportion of boarders 
were excluded from the sample, as were the (two) co-educational 
schools. 
The variables used can be classified using the average cost func- 
tion (see Equation 1). The measure of scale, S, in various functional 
forms is used and exogenous factors X3... X.. are represented by the 
age of the school measured by the date of foundation FN, and the pro- 
portion of students financed by the local authority, LA/S. This lat- 
ter variable is likely to indicate the degree of control a local 
authority exerts over a school and is expected to be negatively relat- 
ed to average costs. No direct measure of output quality was avail- 
able. Hence as in the American studies, various input measures were 
used as indicators of Q.: teacher pupil ratio (T/S), proportion of 
teachers with an M. A. degree (MA/T) and the proportion of pupils in 
the sixth form (VI/S). The measurement of quality by the proportion 
of staff with a Master's degree may be criticized as being weighted by 
purchased Oxford and Cambridge M. A. s, but this measure is retained for 
lack of an alternative. Table 2 gives the means of the variables col- 
lected. 
The boys' schools are on average larger, have larger sixth forms 
and a slightly higher proportion of local authority financed pupils. 
Girls' schools have the higher teacher pupil ratio. 
As no direct data on costs were available, measurement of the 
dependent variable is based on the fees charged by the schools. This 
could cause error in two ways. First, there is the possibility that 
fees may be set above costs and the surplus used for discretionary 
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TABLE 2: 
Variable 
School Fees 
No. of Pupils 
Teacher pupil ratio 
Percentage local authority 
financed pupils 
Proportion of sixth form 
Proportion of governors' 
financed places 
Date of foundation 
Proportion of teachers with 
M. A. degree 
Note: No of pupils in smallest school: boys' 397, girls' 183. 
No of pupils in largest school: boys' 1414, girls 947. 
Sources: Public Schools Commission (1970) vol. Il, Appendix 2, and 
Burnet (1968). this variable, collected from Burnet (1968) was 
available for only 24 of the boys' direct grant schools. 
non-educational expenditure by governors. (1) Competition, and the 
D. E. S. scrutinizing process may prevent this. Secondly, so that fees 
do not understate costs, corrections must be made for subsidies which 
cause fees to diverge from costs and allowance must be made for free 
places. These corrections are now discussed. 
Total costs in direct grant schools are met by fees paid by 
parents, fees paid by local authorities, grants from the D. E. S. and 
only three per cent from other sources - mainly foundation income. (2) 
A percentage of pupils (LA/S) have their fees paid entirely by the 
local education authority. This does not affect the use of fees as a 
measure of average cost as school still receives the fee. Nor does 
the fact that parents are charged a variable proportion of the total 
fee according to their income, as the difference is made up to the 
(1) In analogy with the managers of Williamson (1967) 
(2) Public Schools Commission (1970, vol I, p. 54) 
MEANS OF VARIABLES USED AND THEIR ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviation Boys' Girls' Combined 
FEE 176.5 173.3 174.8 
S 721.5 582.5 597.3 
T/S 0.0603 0.0622 0.0615 
LA/S 64.51 62.78 63.4 
VI/S 0.266 0.217 0.234 
G/S 0.0089 0.0052 0.0065 
FN 1606 - - 
MA/T 0.3115- - 
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school by a full matching D. E. S. grant. A very small proportion, G/S 
of pupils are awarded free 'governors places' and the fees variable 
has therefore been divided by the factor El + (G/S)] . The effect of 
this adjustment is slight. 
It is necessary to take account of D. E. S. capitation grants. In 
19613 these were =84 per sixth former and =52 for other pupils. (1) 
Average variable costs per pupil are therefore calculated using the 
following formula: 
AVC= {FEE x 1 )+ C52 x (1 - VI/S)] + (84 x VI/S) 
(1 + G/S) 
This has been termed average variable cost because fixed costs in the 
form of loan charges are largely excluded from fees being mostly met 
from such sources as appeals or endowment funds. (2) 
RESULTS 
Regressions were estimated for several forms of cost function for 
boys' and girls' schools. Results for the boys' schools are given in 
Table 3. The explanatory power is very low for the boys' schools. (3) 
Equation I implies a cost minimising size of school of 906 pupils(4) 
but it is difficult to place any reliance on this statistic because of 
the low explanatory power of the regression it derives from and 
(1) Glennerster and Wilson (1970, p61) 
(2) Glennerster and Wilson (1970, p77) 
(3) The poor fit of the regressions for the boys' schools suggests 
possible heteroskedasticity associated with school size. However, 
when a test suggested by Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) was performed 
on the equations in Tables 3 and 4 the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity was not rejected. 
(4) Setting dAVC/dS = -. 0886 + (2 x . 00004895) =0 and solving 
for S. 
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TABLE 3: BOYS' SCHOOL COST FUNCTIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE AVC) 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
S -0.0866 -. 0107 -. 169 
(1.22) (0.73) (1.51) 
S 0.0000489 . 000112 (1.10) (1.60) 
1/S 
V1/S 48.2 74.7 76.5 -201 
(0.59) (1.03) (0.99) (1.10) 
T/S 91.5 39.9 25.8 131 
(0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.12) 
LA/S -0.271 -0.273 -0.293 -0.224 
(2.19)' (2.23)' (2.40)" (0.65) 
MALT 71.9 
(1.36) 
FN 0.0618 
(1.33) 
CONST 230 178 199 193 
(3.17)b (4.33)b (4.90)1' (2.08)°' 
0.246 0.238 0.221 0.227 
No. of 
observations 41 41 41 24 
Note: : t: appears in pare ntheses. 
indicates a coefficient significantly different from zero in a one 
tailed test at the five per cent level. 
b indicates a coefficient significantly different from zero in a one 
tailed test at the one per cent level. 
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TABLE 4: GIRLS' SCHOOLS COST FUNCTIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE AVC) 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
S 0.0473 
(0.89) 
S -0.0000452 
(0.99) 
1/S 
V1/S 
T/S 
LA/S 
CONST 
RE 
No. of 
observations 
96.1 
(2.88)b 
745 
(2.97)'' 
-0.234 
(3.90)' 
127 
(5.29) b 
0.613 
74 
-1420 
(0.62) 
84 
(2.50)' 
801 
(3.20)b 
-0.261 
(4.68)' 
142 
(10.28) 
0.608 
74 
-0.00421 
(0.41) 
99.3 
(2.98)4 
673 
(2.81 )b 
-0.240 
(4.05)b 
144 
(9.17) 4 
0.607 
74 
h denotes a coefficient significantly different from zero in a one tailed 
test at the one per cent level. 
because this size is outside the size range of schools sampled. Equa- 
tions 2 and 3 show that very different functional forms for S give 
little difference in fit. LA/S is generally found to have a signifi- 
cantly negative effect on fees. In Equation 4, NF and MA/T, available 
for a subset of the boys' schools fail to reach significance. 
The explanatory power for the girls' schools (Table 4) is much 
higher. Here, measures of output quality VI/S and T/S are found to 
have a significantly positive effect on costs. However, it again is 
difficult to draw conclusions on the effects of scale, as Equation 1 
implies a cost maximizing size of 523 and as in the case of the 
boys' schools, different functional forms have little effect on fit. 
LA/S again has a marked negative effect on costs. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In nearly all the equations estimated, the proportion of pupils 
financed by local authorities has a strong negative effect on costs. 
This may be due to the use of monopsony power by local authorities, or 
if, as seems likely, not all quality differences have been taken 
account of by the indicators used in this study, the variable may 
indicate a tendency for local authorities to choose lower quality 
schools. 
There is nothing to choose between the various functional forms 
tried for scale effects and none of the coefficients of the scale 
variables tried reach significance. This lack of difference between 
the various functional forms tried lends support to the view of Wales 
(1973, p. 714) that the consideration of only the quadratic form in 
other studies may have yielded misleading results. 
Although there are strong a priori reasons for believing in the 
likely importance of economies of scale in the very smallest educa- 
tional units, such economies may be exhausted fairly rapidly, for in 
the range of school sizes considered in this study(1) the hypothesis 
no support. 
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING MARKET 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines government intervention in the owner-occupied 
housing market in the form of the subsidy it grants to 
owner-occupiers. The chapter begins with discussion of alternative 
definitions of this subsidy and then surveys existing work on its mea- 
surement. In the final part of the chapter empirical work is 
presented in which subsidies to recent buyers in Birmingham are 
measured. 
THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDIES TO OWNER-OCCUPIERS 
In what sense is it true to say that the owner-occupier in Britain 
is in receipt of a subsidy from the government? 
Grey et al. (1981, p. 30) define housing subsidy as: 
any reduction in the price paid by individual consumers of 
housing as a direct or indirect result of government interven- 
tion ... It makes no difference whether the governments contri- 
(*) This chapter is based upon chapters contributed by the author to 
J. Doling, V. A. Karn and P. A. Watt, The Reform of Housing Finance: 
Its Impact on Low Income Owner-Occupiers, Report to the Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, 1984, and also J. Doling, and P. A. Watt, "Hous- 
ing Finance and the Owner-Occupied Sector" in Lundqvist, L. J. and 
Wiktorin, M. (eds), Current Trends in British Housing, Bulletin 
M83: 17, National Swedish Institute for Building Research, Gavle 
1983. 
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bution takes the form of a cash payment or a reduction in tax 
liability. 
In practice the government will always be expected to intervene in 
the economy by levying taxes, so this definition may be narrowed down 
by defining subsidy as the difference between the tax owner-occupiers 
would pay if the benefits of owner occupation were taxed consistently 
with other income and the tax they are actually required to pay 
(Doling and Watt 1983). The reason for focussing on inconsistency 
of taxation is that there are strong arguments for taxing all goods 
the same on grounds of horizontal equity. (1) However, stopping short 
of reforming the entire tax system from top to bottom, overall consis- 
tency is not possible. An important reason for this is the tax 
system's differential treatment of consumption goods and investment 
goods. Consumption goods confer their benefits at once and investment 
goods confer their benefits as a stream of services over time. Whilst 
the distinction is clear in principle, in practice it is difficult to 
draw the line between these two categories. Discussion of tax reform 
usually begins by categorising housing as either an investment good or 
a consumption good and then arguing for consistency of treatment of 
housing with other goods within that category(2) 
Consideration of subsidy to owner-occupiers therefore hinges on the 
prior question of whether housing should be categorised as a consump- 
tion good or an investment good. Because a house yields its flow of 
housing services over time to the purchaser, economic theory indicates 
that housing should be considered as an investment good. From this 
(1) Whitehead 1980, p. 86. 
(2) Dept. of the Environment (1977 part 11 p. 13) and Grey et al. 
(1981). 
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standpoint reform of housing finance should aim at treating housing in 
the same way as other investment goods. However in practice there are 
many cases of investment goods being treated as consumption goods by 
the British tax system - for example, cars, refrigerators and durable 
goods in general, which, like houses, yield a flow of services over 
time. Acceptance of this argument leads to the contrary view that 
houses should be classified as consumption goods because the tax sys- 
tem fails to classify other durable goods correctly. Whilst this is 
true, it can be argued that housing, at least, should be correctly 
classified as an investment good because it is the most important 
investment good that most households purchase. Rather than attempting 
to settle the argument finally, this chapter will set out the implica- 
tions for tax reform of considering housing first as a consumption 
good and secondly as an investment good. A third possibility, that of 
treating a house as a financial asset, will not be considered as it 
has aroused very little interest in debate and is the least easily 
justified view. 
(i) The House as a Consumption Good 
If a house is considered to be a consumption good, the 
inconsistency in treatment of housing, and hence the subsidy, lies in 
the treatment of loans for house purchase. Whilst interest on loans 
obtained to finance consumption does not qualify for tax exemption, 
interest paid an loans to finance house buying does. The tax exemp- 
tion applies to the householder's principal house (should he have more 
than one) and applies at his marginal tax rate. Thus the larger the 
loan obtained by the purchaser the higher the subsidy, and similarly 
the higher the marginal rate of income tax (and by implication, 
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income) the higher the rate of subsidy. The subsidy therefore con- 
sists of the homeowner's mortgage interest tax relief and is regres- 
sive in form. Under this definition, depending on the view of housing 
as being a consumption good, the subsidy is relatively visible and its 
identification does not involve such exercises as the imputation of 
"housing income". Probably because of this, calls for the abolition 
of mortgage interest tax relief are the most frequently heard sugges- 
tions for reform of the tax treatment of housing. 
New building, and improvement of dwellings does not attract VAT, 
and whilst in this respect housing is treated inconsistently, voices 
are not heard suggesting the removal of this concession, perhaps 
because zero VAT rating for housing was explicitly designed from the 
outset to encourage house building (Whitehead 1980). Repair work, 
solicitors fees and estate agents fees are all charged at the standard 
rate. 
Whilst viewing housing as a consumption good results in a simple 
analysis, it has already been argued that the view of housing as an 
investment good is more logical and in the next section the implica- 
tions of such a view are explained. 
(ii) The house as an investment good 
If owner-occupied housing is classed as an investment good, removal 
of subsidy would consist in treating housing consistently with other 
investment goods for tax purposes. Owners of investment goods are 
taxed on the flow of income the investment generates and on any capi- 
tal gains made. If a loan has been taken out to finance purchase of 
the investment, interest payments can be offset against taxable 
income. 
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Thus investors in industry will receive tax relief on any loans 
taken out to purchase plant and machinery for example, and will pay 
tax on any profits and any capital gains which they make in the course 
of their operations. In the case of owner-occupation, the money value 
of the flow of benefits generated by investment in the house is called 
its imputed rent, with the implication, if the house is seen as an 
investment good, that this rent be taxed. In addition a tax should be 
levied on any gains in the market value of the dwelling by analogy 
with capital gains tax on investment. Here a distinction should be 
made between real and nominal capital gains. This was recognised in 
April 1983 when the Chancellor moved to a system of taxing real capi- 
tal gains by allowing nominal capital gains to be written down by 
inflation. 
The final implication of viewing a house as an investment good is 
that while extending taxation to the imputed rent and real capital 
gains accruing to owners, the present mortgage interest tax relief 
should be retained. In contrast to the position obtaining when the 
house is viewed as a consumption good, interest payable on a mortgage 
used to finance investment in the house is a legitimate business 
expense. 
To summarise, viewing a house as an investment good leads to the 
definition of the subsidy to owner-occupiers as the absence of tax on 
imputed rent and capital gains, whereas viewing a house as a consump- 
tion good leads to the definition of the subsidy as mortgage interest 
tax relief plus, possibly, the benefit of its zero VAT rating. 
Before examining some attempts to measure subsidy under these 
alternative categorisations of housing as a consumption good versus an 
investment good, it will be useful to examine how subsidies may be 
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capitalised into the selling price of a house. In the next section, 
subsidies are first of all examined in the context of a rental market, 
and the relation between the rental price of a house and its selling 
price is then set out in the next sections. 
THE EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES 
Supply and demand analysis can be used to consider the effect of a 
subsidy on the housing market. Assume for example that 
owner-occupiers receive a subsidy proportional in size to the price 
paid for the housing. Suppose for the moment that they pay a rent for 
their housing. At equilibrium in Figure 1 this rent will be R, and 
the equilibrium quantity will be Q. If the rate at which the subsidy 
is paid is s, then if the consumer was prepared to pay R per unit of 
housing before the subsidy is paid, then after the subsidy he will be 
prepared to pay (R+sR) per unit of housing. A new demand curve 
D-, D'1 is constructed that includes the subsidy in the price the con- 
sumer will be prepared to offer. This is done in Figure 1. The two 
R 
R 
R2 
Q Ql 
FIGURE 1 
curves diverge because the subsidy, being proportional to rent, is 
higher at higher rent levels. With the subsidy the equilibrium price 
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_ will rise from R to R1 the quantity will rise from 5 to Q, and the 
subsidy paid will be sR, per unit. Although the market price rises 
from R to R-L this rise is less than sR, so the consumer's contribu- 
tion falls, and is represented in Figure 1 by R,. 
The extent to which the rise in the market rent caused by the sub- 
sidy is capitalised depends upon the elasticities of the supply and 
demand curves. Of key importance is the elasticity of supply of hous- 
ing. How supply elasticity relates to tax capitalisation can be seen 
by considering the two extreme cases (a) totally inelastic supply and 
(b) infinitely elastic supply. 
(a) Totally inelastic supply 
Figure 2 represents the case where supply is totally inelastic. In 
such a case the subsidy will be totally capitalised and there will be 
no effect on the quantity of housing. 
The totally inelastic supply curve SS' is vertical and the equilib- 
R, 
R 
FIGURE 2 
rium price rises from R to R, _ (R+sR}, therefore the increase is 
exactly equal to the subsidy sR. Hence zero supply elasticity leads 
to 100'/, capitalisation. The subsidy will not affect the quantity of 
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housing consumed but will be totally absorbed in a rise in prices of 
the existing stock of houses. The owners of the houses at the time 
the subsidy is introduced (or more precisely, at the time it is 
announced), will experience a once and for all gain in the price they 
can sell their house for. If the subsidy is paid by the government 
then this once and for all gain to existing owners is a cost to tax- 
payers in general. Those who purchase houses after the subsidy has 
been introduced, however, will receive no such gain because they face 
prices which have capitalized the subsidy. In so far as they are tax- 
payers they, like other non-owners, will have experienced a net loss 
from the introduction of the subsidy. 
(b) Infinitely elastic supply 
Suppose now the elasticity of supply is not equal to zero but 
infinity. This case is illustrated in Figure 3. In this case supply 
FIGURE 3 
responds fully to the newly increased demand conditions after the sub- 
sidy is introduced, and the quantity of housing services consumed 
arises from Q to Ql. On the other hand there is no increase in 
rents, which remain fixed at and consequently no capitalisation. The 
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whole of the subsidy is passed on to individual owners who now pay 
only R-sR for their housing. 
The effects of different possible supply elasticities on the effec- 
tiveness of subsidies are discussed at greater length in Welham (1982) 
and White and White (1977), However, at present there is a vacuum of 
knowledge on the actual magnitude of the elasticity of supply of hous- 
ing. This lack of information is a serious deficiency as it is clear 
from the analysis that knowledge of the elasticity of supply of hous- 
ing is of key importance in the discussion of housing subsidy policy. 
THE SELLING PRICE OF A HOUSE OF GIVEN RENTAL VALUE 
So far the analysis has worked in terms of a rental price for hous- 
ing. Although this simplifies the analysis, very few houses are 
rented in the private sector in Britain(1) and by definition, no 
owner-occupied housing. Because a house is an expensive durable good 
which yields its benefits only slowly over time a wide variety of ways 
of purchasing this output has developed. These different ways of 
buying property rights relating to the occupation of housing corre- 
spond to different forms of tenure (see Pennance 1969). Tenure can 
vary from outright ownership in perpetuity to an overnight lodging. 
Buying a house can be seen as making one single payment equivalent to 
a stream of rent payments extending into the future. The amount paid 
will represent the worth, at the time of payment, of the future stream 
of rent payments that will be saved by purchase. If the house is 
expected to last N years and command a rent of R per year, then if the 
interest rate is i, the present value or price P of the house can be 
(1) 11.5% in 1983 (Minford, Peel and Ashton 1987, p48) 
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written as follows. 
P= R/(1+i) + R/(1+i) + R/(1+i)3 + ... + R/(1+i)N (1) 
dividing (1) by (1+i) yields 
P/(l+i) = R/(l+i) + R/(1+i)3 + ... + R/(l+i) + R/(1+i)N+'- (2) 
subtracting (2) from (1) gives 
P- P/(l+i) = R/(l+i) - R/(l+i)ýýl (3) 
i. e. 
P(l+i-1)/(l+i) = R/(1+i) (4) 
multiplying by (1+i) gives 
Pi =R- R/ti+i)M (5) 
thus, the price of a house that commands a rent of R can be stated as: 
P= R11 - 1/(l+i)"'7/i (6) 
Furthermore, if the life of the house is assumed to be infinite 
(1 + i)N will be infinite and 1/(1 + i)N will be zero, so the 
expression can again be simplified to 
P= R/i t7) 
Thus with the aid of formulae (b) and (7) a rent stream can be 
capitalised into a selling price for a house. (1) Similarly a stream 
of future subsidy payments can also be capitalised into an addition to 
the price. 
(1) As an example of the use of these formulae, suppose that a house 
can be rented out for £1000 a year and let the rate of interest be 
3Y,. If the house were assumed to have an infinite life it could 
be sold according to formula 3, for a price of £1000/. 03 = 
£33,333. 
Using formula (6), if the house had a life of 100 years it 
could be sold for 
£1000 (1 - . 05203) = £31,599 (where . 05203 = 1/(1.03)'0c 
. 03 
and if the house had a life of 50 years it could be sold for 
£1000 (1 - . 2281) = £25,729 (where . 2281 = 1/(1.03)50) 
. 03 
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The next section reviews attempts made, under one or another theo- 
retical definition of subsidy, to measure its actual magnitude using 
data for the UK. 
A SURVEY OF ESTIMATES OF SUBSIDIES TO OWNER-OCCUPIERS IN THE UK. 
An early attempt to calculate the subsidy to owner-occupation was 
that of Odling-Smee (1975). Odling-Smee viewed housing as an invest- 
meat good. He started from the premise that the subsidy to 
owner-occupiers could be measured by comparing: 
the actual costs of owner-occupation with those that would be 
incurred if the owner-occupier were both tenant and landlord in 
[a] hypothetical neutral government policy system. 
In the case of housing, neutral government policy would lead to a 
market rent being charged, as one of the features of government neu- 
trality would be that government policies designed to hold rents down 
would be absent. Hence Odling-Smee's ideal government-neutral 
benchmark system would have the owner-occupier paying income tax on an 
imputed gross market rent for his property. He would be allowed to 
set interest charges as well as maintenance and administration costs 
against this income. In addition he would be liable to pay capital 
gains tax on the property. Comparing this benchmark with what 
owner-occupiers actually pay, the subsidy is seen to amount to the sum 
of (unpaid) taxes on imputed income and imputed accruals of capital 
gains. 
Odling-Smee calculates imputed net rent to owner-occupiers as aiP, 
where P is the average price of owner-occupied housing i is the dis- 
count rate and a 1/(1-1/(1+i)"4) with N set to an assumed average 
life of housing of 50 years. The use of this formula may be under- 
stood by with reference to formula (6) derived above for calculating 
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the price (P) that would be paid for a house that commanded a rent 
stream of R per year. (1) 
The formula generates a price from a rent stream, but it can be re- 
arranged to yield a rent stream from a price - Odling-Smee's imputa- 
tion process. Thus (6) may be re-arranged to give 
R= iP/(1-1/(1+i)r4) (8) 
or using Odling-Smee's definition for a, 
R= aiP (9) 
his imputation formula. To use this formula Odling-Smee needs esti- 
mates for the parameters i, P and N in Equation (8). The average 
price of owner-occupied housing, P is obtained from the average price 
of dwellings mortgaged with building societies in the U. K. in 1973 
which was £9,942(2) Odling-Smee rounds this figure up to £10,000. The 
appropriate discount rate, i, is the difference between ice, the over- 
all money rate of return, and the annual rate of growth of house 
prices, which are assumed to be 11 and 8 per cent respectively. N, 
the average remaining life of housing is assumed to be 50 years. 
These assumptions give a value of ai of approximately . 04. Hence the 
imputed net market rent is £10,000 x . 04 which would attract a tax at 
the rate of 30 per cent, of £120. Before 1977-78, capital gains tax 
was likely to be levied at a rate lower than the 30 per cent basic 
rate. Thus if capital gains did not exceed £5,000 tax was limited to 
approximately the taxpayer's top income tax rate on half the capital 
gains for the year. (3) Capital gains tax is assumed to be nearer the 
(1) Recall (b) as P= 
(2) Housing and Construction Statistics no. 11, Table 38 
(3) Sinclair (1983) 
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lower end of the possible range of 15 to 30 per cent at 20 per cent 
and with house prices assumed to be rising at 8 per cent per year, the 
imputed capital gains tax is £160 = 0.2 x . 08 x £10,000. The total 
subsidy is therefore £280 on a £10,000 house. 
Odling-Smee's work can be criticised in that the imputed rent he 
calculates is in the nature of a real rather than a nominal rent, 
and the UK tax system, with the exception of the move to taxation of 
real capital gains announced in the March 1983 budget, is based on 
taxing nominal income. Whilst there is a strong case in logic for 
basing taxation on real rather than nominal magnitudes, reform 
stopping short of changing the whole system of taxation would suggest 
a more limited aim of consistency of nominal taxation. 
Robinson (1981) adopts essentially the same framework as 
Odling-Smee for his study, viewing the house as an investment good, 
but computes imputed rent as a nominal magnitude, applying a rate of 
14'/. to capital value to obtain the imputed rent of the house. He uses 
a more sophisticated method of obtaining capital values than 
Odling-Smee. These are computed from gross rateable values given in 
the Family Expenditure Survey (1977) using a predicting equation 
estimated from data in the Department of the Environment's Survey of 
Building Society Mortgages. (1) 
Two estimates for subsidy to owner occupiers are computed in 
Robinson's study. The two estimates arise because the subsidy inher- 
ent in not taxing capital gains cannot be calculated in a simple way 
because the taxpayer may pay capital gains tax at different rates 
(1) This predicting equation was P= 8164 + . 09898RVM with rateable 
value appearing as its square. This equation produced a very 
close fit with Rz = . 99. 
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depending on his total capital gains during the year. Hence 
Robinson's estimates correspond to assuming, in turn, minimum and max- 
imum liability to capital gains taxation. Average subsidy will lie 
somewhere between Robinson's upper estimate of £463 under maximum cap- 
ital gains taxation and £338 with minimum capital gains taxation (1977 
prices). 
Robinson computes results by income class and finds that 
for the 70% of households in the middle income range (i. e. 
£2080-7799 pa), [in 1977], the subsidy is almost a lump sum 
receipt. 
Assistance falls rapidly for those below this range and rises rap- 
idly for those above. Essentially this is a consequence of the mar- 
ginal tax rates implicit in the tax system. Robinson also performs 
separate calculations for outright owners and for owners with a mort- 
gage and finds that assistance is greater for owners with a mortgage 
both at the lower and upper ends of the income scale although in the 
middle income range outright owners received more. Robinson's results 
are for 1977 and in his discussion he notes that his results imply the 
existence of a much higher level of subsidization to owner occupiers 
than the Government's Housing Policy Review(1) of 1974/75 suggests, 
even allowing for price changes between the two years. 
The most important reason for this is the different theoretical 
standpoint adopted in defining housing subsidy. Earlier in this chap- 
ter it was shown that there were arguments for defining housing as 
either an investment good or a consumption good, although the economic 
case for the investment good definition was stronger. As noted, 
Robinson's and Odling-Smee's studies are based on defining housing as 
(1) DOE (1977) 
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an investment good. In contrast, the Housing Policy Review calculated 
the subsidy to housing by viewing housing as a consumption good. 
Under this view it identified the subsidy as mortgage interest tax 
relief. 
The results of the Housing Policy Review calculations for housing 
subsidy are given in Table 1. 
The Housing Policy Review argues that 
For the owner occupied sector, average tax relief and option 
mortgage subsidy rose steadily with income though not propor- 
tionately. 
This statement, with its implication that the housing subsidy is pro- 
gressive in effect, is disputed by Wilkinson and Wilkinson (1982), who 
TABLE 1: TAX RELIEF ON MORTGAGE INTEREST AND OPTION MORTGAGE SUBSIDY 
1974/75 BY INCOME RANGE 
Income of Household 
Head and Wife 
f- 
Average tax 
relief or subsidy 
per household 
Under £1,000 
£1,000 - £1,499 
£1,500 - £1,999 
£2,000 - £2,499 
£2,500 - £2,999 
£3,000 - £3,499 
£3,500 - £3,999 
£4,000 - £4,999 
£5,000 - £5,999 
£6,000 or over 
59 
73 
91 
104 
101 
129 
129 
148 
179 
369 
Source: Extracted from Table IV. 34 Housing Policy Review, Technical 
Volume I, p. 214. 
present an expanded version of the Table 1 which is presented here as 
Table 2. They calculate the percentage of income that the subsidy 
represents by taking the arithmetic mean of each income class. For 
income above £6,000, which is given as an open ended class in the 
Housing Policy Review work, they use Inland Revenue Data to estimate a 
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median of £7,711 and an arithmetic mean of £9,232. Use of these esti- 
mates, leads to estimates of subsidy as a percentage of income for 
this top income class of 4.8% if the median income is used or 4.0% if 
the mean income is used. 
TABLE 2 ESTIMATE OF MORTGAGE INTEREST PAYMENTS, GROSS AND NET OF 
TAX RELIEF AND OPTION MORTGAGE SUBSIDY 
ENGLAND AND WALES 1974-75 
Income of head of Average tax relief 
household or subsidy of income 
and wife 
Under £1,000 59 6.9 
£1,000 - £1,499 73 5.8 
£1,500 - £1,999 91 5.2 
£2,000 - £2,499 104 4.6 
£2,500 - £2,999 101 3.7 
£3,000 - £3,499 129 4.0 
£3,500 - £3,999 129 3.4 
£4,000 - £4,999 148 3.3 
£5,000 - £5,999 179 3.3 
£6,000 or over 
est av. £7,711* 369 4.8 
or , 2.32 
f 
4.0 
* median 
t arithmetic mean 
On the basis of these calculations, Wilkinson and Wilkinson 
argue that 
if the three lowest income classes which contain less than 13% 
of households with mortgages are excluded, a different picture 
emerges with the subsidy being roughly in proportion to income 
over a very wide range of incomes, and at the top end of the 
range relief appears to be regressive. 
Welham (1982), like Wilkinson and Wilkinson, also suggests that 
subsidies to owner-occupiers are likely to be regressive, but his cal- 
culations are performed on a different basis from that of the Housing 
Policy Review and of Wilkinson and Wilkinson. Welham identifies fail- 
ure to tax imputed rent as the subsidy to housing and thus like 
Odling-Smee (1975) and Robinson (1981) implicitly views housing as an 
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investment good. However he makes no mention of income from capital 
gains, concentrating purely on imputed rent. Table 3 extracts some of 
his results for imputed rent for 1973-4 for different income groups. 
These data for imputed rent are based on rateable values and, he 
notes, there is reason to believe these may underestimate market rents 
by a factor of two. Welham points out that income groups above £4,000 
gained most, stating: 
fairly confidently that the benefits of the subsidy accrue 
mainly to-higher income groups and/or existing 
owner-occupiers. (1) 
TABLE 3: IMPUTED RENT 1973-74 
Range of Total Estimate Tax relief Tax relief/as 
Personal Imputed of marginal a percentage of 
income - rent rate of tax income 
lower limit 
£ £m Y. £m 
<595 45 - - - 
595 66 30 20 1.3 
750 148 30 44 1.5 
1,000 102 30 31 1.1 
1,250 78 30 23 .8 
1,500 96 30 29 .8 
1,750 113 30 34 .9 
2,000 270 30 81 1.0 
2,500 319 30 96 1.3 
3,000 429 30 129 1.6 
4,000 211 30 63 2.0 
5,000 82 34 28 2.2 
6,000 80 45 36 2.6 
8,000 41 54 22 2.9 
10,000 18 59 11 2.0 
12,000 44 70 31 1.9 
Source: extracted from Welham (1982) Table 2, p151 
Further evidence on the regressive nature of housing subsidies is 
presented by Atkinson and King (1980). In contrast to the studies so 
(1) Welham (1982, p 151) 
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far discussed, Atkinson and King examine the cost of the 
owner-occupier's equity in his house. Table 4 shows part of a table 
presented in Atkinson and King illustrating how the cost of equity in 
housing declines to an owner-occupier as his income rises. (1) The 
reason for this decline in equity cost is that as an owner-occupier's 
income rises, his marginal tax rate will rise by steps as well. As 
the owner-occupier's marginal tax rate rises, a subsidy in the form of 
a tax exemption becomes correspondingly more valuable. The overall 
effect of this is to make it cheaper for an owner-occupier to put mon- 
ey into housing the higher his income rises. 
Work by Hills (1980,1982) is closer to that of Odling-Smee (1975) 
TABLE 4: CAPITAL COSTS OF OWNER-OCCUPIERS 
Opportunity Cost of Marginal tax rate of owner-occupier 
owner's equity (per cent) 
25 30 40 50 60 
Value of one unit of equity in owner-occupation 
9% . 55 -. 02 1.16 -2.30 -3.44 
12% 1.00 . 40 . 80 -2.00 -3.20 
15% 1.45 . 82 . 44 -1.70 -2.96 
Source: Table 3, Atkinson and King (1980), mortgage is assumed to be 
80% of value of the house, the mortgage rate is assumed to be 12% and 
the average annual rate of increase of house prices 8%. 
and Robinson (1981). He views housing as an investment good and 
defines subsidy as the difference between existing financial flows to 
and from owner-occupiers under the existing system and those that 
would ensue under a hypothetical comprehensive income tax with the 
(1) The owner-occupier's equity is his stake in the house. It is the 
amount left for the owner if the house is sold and any lenders 
repaid. 
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TABLE 5: Subsidies to Owner-Occupiers 
£m 1979/80 
Total tax relief (in real terms) 3,720 
Comprising: Income tax exemption on 1,545 
imputed rents 
Capital gains tax exemption 525 
Mortgage interest relief plus 1,650 
option mortgage subsidy 
Total: if VAT exemption at £1,105 m 4,825 
treated as subsidy 
if gross rates of £1,900 m 1,820 
offset against subsidy 
if VAT exemption added, and 
gross rates subtracted 2,925 
(i. e. both adjustments) 
Source: Hills (1982) Table 5 
same structure of tax rates as the actual system in 1978/79, including 
an expenditure tax at the standard VAT rate of eight per cent. The 
comprehensive income tax would be based on real income, and hence 
Hills's estimates of capital gains are low compared to those of 
Robinson and Odling-Smee who estimate nominal capital gains. 
Table 5 reproduces his results for owner-occupiers. 
Unlike Robinson and Odling-5mee, it can be seen from Table 5 that 
Hills includes mortgage interest tax relief as a subsidy to 
owner-occupiers, even though when housing is seen as an investment 
good, this is a legitimate expense to be set against imputed rental 
income. The reason Hills includes this as a subsidy is because he 
focusses in real gains and expenses rather than nominal gains and 
expenses. This also explains his low estimate for capital gains 
exemption. Thus real capital gains are lower than nominal capital 
gains, but as a quid pro quo, real interest paid will be much lower 
than nominal interest. In fact for the year in question, 1978/79, 
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Hills argues that the real rate of interest after deducting infla- 
tion was less than zero. Under this view zero tax relief should be 
allowed as no real interest was paid. Hence the whole of mortgage 
interest tax relief actually allowed can be viewed as a subsidy. 
Hills also calculates the implications of viewing VAT exemption on 
housing as a subsidy, and of viewing local rates as a tax on housing, 
and these results are included in Table 5. 
Many of these approaches to calculation of subsidy to 
owner-occupiers are embraced in a comprehensive study by Hughes (1981) 
who calculates four alternative measures of housing subsidy which he 
labels Sx to S,. Hughes's four measures of housing subsidy are: 
Sx the failure to tax the (real) rate of return on housing wealth, 
Se equal to S1 plus the subsidy inherent in the failure to tax gains 
made by homeowners as a result of inflation reducing the real value of 
their mortgage debt, Sa equal to the failure to tax the nominal 
return to housing wealth and S4 the familiar mortgage interest tax 
relief. 
These subsidies are defined algebraically by Hughes as follows: 
S1_ = t,. r'H 
Se = t2(rH+iD) 
S=t (r+i)H 
S4 t (r+i)D 
His variables are defined as follows: 
H= current value of owner-occupied house. 
D= outstanding mortgage debt. 
r= real rate of interest on mortgage debt, assumed to be 
equal to the real rate of return on other assets available 
to the household. 
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i= Rate of inflation. 
ti., i=1,4 is the relevant marginal tax rate. 
TABLE 6: AVERAGE SUBSIDY OF OWNER-OCCUPIERS (estimates per household 
for 1973 in £p. a. ) 
No mortgage with mortgage 
Si 66 86 
Se 66 157 
S. 289 312 
S4 0 96 
Source: Hughes (1981) Table 1 
Table 6 extracts Hughes's results for owner-occupiers under the 
various definitions and Table 7 his results for income distribution. 
Hughes notes that the subsidy varies little for incomes between £1,000 
and £4,000 but rises rapidly thereafter as a result of the progressive 
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSING SUBSIDIES TO OWNER-OCCUPIERS BY 
INCOME GROUP 
Income Subsidy defn. S, Sa Sa S, S4 Sa S4 
£1- 3 136 50 53 115 49 
£ 500 - 31 222 73 107 281 40 
£ 1,000 - 91 304 90 137 278 59 
£ 1,500 - 77 288 72 124 257 70 
£ 2,000 - 81 309 75 134 270 80 
£ 2,500 - 89 331 78 144 287 91 
£ 3,000 - 82 303 87 184 319 107 
£ 3,500 - 106 434 88 165 321 106 
£ 4,000 - 111 430 104 203 384 136 
£ 5,000 - 136 548 140 288 569 195 
£ 7,500 - 225 909 240 483 944 320 
£10,000 - 655 2,449 309 770 1,175 626 
Average 66 289 86 157 312 96 
Source: Hughes (1981) Table 2 
marginal rates of tax on higher incomes. He finds that 
owner-occupiers at the lower end of the income distribution receive 
much lower subsidies than owner-occupiers in general because most of 
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the former households pay no income tax. It is not clear whether 
Hughes took account of option mortgages, although these were not wide- 
ly taken up and are unlikely to affect the results very much. 
THE GAINS AND LOSSES FROM TAX REFORM 
The studies so far discussed have been concerned with defining and 
quantifying subsidy to owner-occupiers. A further step is to consider 
the gains and losses that would result from removal of subsidy and to 
assess the overall desirability of such a change. One of the most 
complete studies of this kind has been carried out by King (1981, 
1983c). King considers the gains and losses to households of revenue 
neutral reforms of housing taxation. A revenue neutral tax reform 
occurs when a combination of tax changes leaves the total revenue col- 
lected by the government unchanged. King considers the case where the 
removal of housing subsidies is balanced by a reduction of taxation in 
the form of an equal lump sum paid to each household. 
The removal of subsidy that King (1981) considers is the introduc- 
tion of a tax on imputed rental income. Rental income of 
owner-occupiers is measured by the household's gross rateable value 
minus an estimate of depreciation and maintenance. King goes further 
than other UK studies by looking at the tax reform under two alterna- 
tive regimes. First he takes the case where behaviour is assumed to 
be unchanged as a result of the tax reform. Thus housing consumption 
is assumed to remain unaltered after the removal of the subsidy and 
computations yield the "first-round" effects of the change. This is 
the methodology implicit in all the other computations of housing sub- 
sidy surveyed in this chapter. However King performs further calcula- 
tions in which he allows for post-reform behavioural changes in the 
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form of supply and demand adjustments. King uses results of his esti- 
mates for the demand for housing from King (1980) and for supply con- 
ditions performs calculations under two alternative assumptions: that 
the elasticity of supply of housing is infinite, and, secondly, that 
the elasticity of supply is 2.0. Under an infinite elasticity of sup- 
ply, it will be recalled from the discussion of Figure 3 earlier that 
no price change will occur when the demand curve is shifted from 
D1D1' to DD' by removal of the subsidy. Thus the removal of subsidy 
reduces the quantity of housing from Q, to i5 but the price of housing 
remains unaltered at 
In contrast, under King's alternative assumption of an elasticity 
of supply of 2.0, imputed rents will fall after the reform from i to 
R as was shown in Figure 1 above. 
King computes the "first-round" gain to households after the remov- 
al of the subsidy, which he calls the cash gain. However he also com- 
putes a measure of the benefit of the change which takes into account 
ensuing adjustments in supply and demand. This he calls the 
equivalent gain, which is defined as the sum of money which the 
household would have accepted in the initial position as an alterna- 
tive to the reform, a sum that would make it just as well off and in 
this sense a sum equivalent to the impact of the reform. (1) 
If the sum of all households' equivalent gains is positive this 
positive amount shows the losses from the distorting effects of the 
pre-reform subsidy - the deadweight loss or excess burden - and effi- 
ciency gains will result from its removal. The tax reform King con- 
(1) Equivalent gain is dependent upon the assumption of a particular 
utility function for the consumer. King assumes a homothetic 
translog indirect utility function. 
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siders is revenue neutral and the average equivalent gain is 16.6p per 
week (at 1973 prices, or 48.2p per week at 1980 prices), which is 0.4% 
of mean household income. But as King points out, in addition to 
questions of efficiency gains there are considerations of vertical and 
horizontal equity to be examined. 
Vertical equity considerations would enter in a case where, for 
instance, the sum of equivalent gains might be positive but generated 
by a combination of losses to the poor and gains to the rich. To 
examine this question King computes the Atkinson (1970) inequality 
index before and after the removal of subsidy. Atkinson's inequality 
index requires that the policy evaluator choose a parameter e that 
expresses his aversion to inequality. If he sets e=0 this implies 
that he has no aversion to inequality. The higher he sets e the more 
averse he is to inequality. The idea of the inequality aversion 
parameter can be clarified with an example. Suppose household (a) has 
an income four times that of household (b), then if a policymaker sets 
the inequality aversion parameter to 1/2 this means he values giving 
£1 to household (b) as equivalent to taking 41'2- =2 pounds from 
household (a) the richer household. If e is set to 1 he will value 
giving the poorer household £1 equivalently to taking 41 =4 pounds 
from the richer household. 
King presents the following results for inequality indices for the 
pre- and post-tax reform positions, reproduced in Table 9.8. These 
results are for the case where the elasticity of supply is assumed 
infinite, i. e. there will be no price effect of the removal of the 
subsidy. 
The inequality indexes of Table 8 can be interpreted in the follow- 
ing way. For the post reform case with e=2.0 the inequality parameter 
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TABLE 8: VERTICAL INEQUALITY INDEXES FOR 1973 REMOVAL OF OWNER- 
OCCUPIERS SUBSIDY F. E. S. DATA (King 1981) 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
0.0 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.087 0.082 
e 1.0 0.171 0.161 
2.0 0.330 0.311 
5.0 0.635 0.596 
is . 311. This means that if incomes were equally distributed, the 
same level of social welfare could be achieved with only (1.0 - . 311) 
_ . 689, or 68.9'I of the post reform level of income. With e=0 
policymaker attaches no importance to income distribution and the 
index is therefore zero. It can be seen from Table 10 below that 
removal of current owner-occupiers' subsidies reduces inequality for 
all of the range of values of inequality aversion parameters 
discussed. 
Tax reforms can also have effects on horizontal equity, and King 
(1983a) has developed an index to express this effect. King argues 
that changes in horizontal equity are associated with changes in the 
ranking of households with respect to well-being. Thus, he argues, if 
the best off and worst off household change places, there has been a 
change in horizontal equity. If the first ranking was considered 
ethically correct then such a change will reduce horizontal equity. 
Alternatively if one baulks at making such ethical judgements it nev- 
ertheless appears likely that complaints from the losing households 
will be more strident than gratitude from the benefitting households, 
and because of this, the scope for altering the ranking of households 
may be limited by political feasibility. King's index may then be 
thought of as relating to political feasibility. 
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King's index is analogous to Atkinson's vertical inequality index 
in requiring the specification by a policymaker of an inequality aver- 
sion parameter. Suppose individuals i and j swap positions in the 
income distribution, then a measure of the magnitude of this change is 
the magnitude of the difference between i's income before the change 
and j's income after the change, divided by average income. If this 
magnitude is called s, i. e. s= : yf-yj: /y and the inequality aver- 
lion parameter is labelled as n, then the social value, as a propor- 
tion of an individual's income, of a change in ranking of magnitude s 
is given by 1-e---. Thus to quote the example given by King if s= 
10% = 0.1 and n=0.1 this change is considered to be equivalent in 
social valuation terms to a reduction in income of 
1-e""ý"''"ý =I- . 99 = . 01 = 1%. Table 9 reproduces King's result 
for his index of horizontal equality. 
The entities in this table may be interpreted along the lines of 
TABLE 9: HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY INDEXES FOR 1973: REMOVAL OF OWNER- 
OCCUPIERS SUBSIDY IMPLICIT IN FAILURE TO TAX IMPUTED RENT (King 1981) 
n 
.51.0 
2.0 5.0 
0.0 . 006 . 012 . 
024 . 058 
0.5 . 006 . 011 . 023 . 
055 
1.0 . 005 . 010 . 
020 . 050 
2.0 . 004 . 008 . 
015 . 038 
5.0 . 001 . 002 . 
005 . 012 
the following example. Taking the case where e=0.0 and n=5.0 
i. e. no aversion to vertical inequality combined with high aversion 
to horizontal equity, the level of social welfare maintained in the 
absence of the reform could be obtained with (1.0 - . 058) = . 942 or 
94.2% of the post reform level of income. 
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TABLE 10: INDEX OF OVERALL INEQUALITY 
OCCUPIERS' SUBSIDY (King) 1981) 
'Pre reform; 
0.0 0.5 
0.0 . 000 . 000 . 006 
0.5 . 087 . 082 . 087 
e 1.0 . 171 . 161 . 166 
2.0 . 330 . 311 . 313 
5.0 1 . 635 . 596 . 597 
FOR REMOVAL OF OWNER- 
Post reform 
n 
1.0 2.0 5.0 
. 012 . 024 . 058 
. 092 . 103 . 133 
. 170 . 179 . 204 
. 316 . 321 . 337 
. 597 . 598 . 601 
King combines these two indexes into a single combined index of 
horizontal and vertical equity and this index is reproduced in 
Table 10. 
It can be seen from this table that when combined with vertical 
inequality aversion (e) low, overall inequality is higher in the 
post-reform state than the pre-reform state, but with higher vertical 
inequality aversion (e = 2.0 or 5.0), gains in vertical equity lead 
the post reform state to have less overall inequality than the 
pre-reform state. 
King tabulates the "social value" of the reform for different val- 
ues of horizontal and vertical inequality aversion parameter into 
pounds per week. His results are reproduced here in Table 11. 
It can be seen that if there is no aversion to horizontal inequity 
TABLE 11: SOCIAL GAIN OF REMOVAL OF OWNER-OCCUPIERS' SUBSIDY £1 WEEK 
PER KING 1981 HOUSEHOLD 
n 
0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 
0.0 1 . 165 -. 101 -. 
367 -. 894 -2.414 
0.5 . 317 . 109 -. 098 -. 
506 -1.685 
e 1.0 . 443 . 289 . 136 -. 
165 -1.039 
2.0 . 620 . 544 . 468 . 
318 -0.122 
5.0 . 787 . 778 . 767 . 
746 0.884 
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(n = 0.0) the social gains of removal of owner-occupiers' subsidy are 
positive and increase with the policymakers aversion to vertical 
inequity. 
This major work by King has been followed up by Hughes (1981) in 
the latter part of his work already discussed above. Hughes also cal- 
culates the indices of horizontal and vertical equity introduced and 
used by King. Although in his earlier work (Hughes 1975) he favours a 
move to real rather than nominal based housing taxation, in Hughes 
(1981) calculations are provided of the effect of reform under a range 
of different definitions of housing subsidy which embrace both real 
and nominal orientations. 
To investigate the gains and losses from eliminating housing 
subsidies, Hughes examines three methods of returning the unpaid sub- 
sidy to households after the reform to ensure revenue neutrality: 
A- lowering all marginal tax rates by the same absolute amount 
B- raising all tax allowances by the same percentage 
C- making a uniform lump-sum post-tax transfer to all house- 
holds 
The specific amounts involved under the three alternatives, calculated 
for each of Hughes's four subsidy measures SL-S4 are reproduced from 
Hughes's paper in Table 12. He argues that the reductions in taxation 
possible show how there is 
a very substantial commitment of public resources, which 
... achieves little in terms of improving the distribution of 
income or of achieving a better allocation of resources in 
fulfilling individual or social preferences. (1) 
(1) Hughes (1981) p100) 
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TABLE 12: ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF REMOVAL OF DIFFERENT 
DEFINITIONS OF HOUSING SUBSIDY 
Reduction in standard 
marginal tax rate from 
30% to t%) 
!. increase in all tax 
allowances 
Post-tax lump sum 
transfer (f pa) 
Source: Hughes (1981) 
Implied adjustment from 
Type of subsidy to be eliminated 
SI. Se S. 3 S4 
23.5 22.3 17.4 24.5 
35.5 44.0 88.0 29.5 
66.7 82.7 168.9 53.9 
When, however, Hughes uses Atkinson and King's vertical and hori- 
zontal inequality indices shown in Table 13 he finds that the results 
show conclusively that 
the removal of all housing subsidies cannot in itself be 
justified by the argument that it will improve the distribution 
- no matter which measure of subsidies is adopted. (1) 
The reason for the divergence between King's work, which favours 
the removal of subsidies, and Hughes's work which concludes that such 
a move is not justified on distributional grounds is that Hughes 
examines the effect of the removal of subsidy to all tenures, where- 
as King only considers removal of subsidies from owner-occupiers. In 
King's study therefore, there is considerable redistribution of income 
from owner-occupiers to those holding other tenures. It is this 
redistribution from the generally richer owner-occupiers to the gener- 
ally poorer holders of other tenures that makes reform show up weil in 
King's study in terms of inequality reduction. 
(1) Hughes (1981, p 108) 
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It is clear that there is room for a variety of interpretations and 
measurements of housing subsidy. Taking an overall view it can be 
said that the studies surveyed above together suggest that housing 
subsidies are at present large, regressive, and that the effects of 
removing them are likely to be on balance, beneficial. One might ask 
therefore, why they are not removed. Here a public choice viewpoint 
is informative. It would suggest that owner-occupiers form a substan- 
tial interest group of considerable political importance and the pros- 
pects of the removal of subsidies from this interest group are low. 
The studies surveyed above are similar in that they make estimates 
TABLE 13: INEQUALITY INDICES FOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF NET REAL INCOME 
AFTER ALTERNATIVE REFORMS 
Index of 
Vertical Indices of Horizontal 
Inequality Inequality due to Reform 
n=0.5 n=2.0 
1. Pre-Reform Distribution 
= 1.0 0.151 
= 2.0 0.289 
2. Removal of Se subsidy with lower marginal tax rates 
= 1.0 0.175 0.019 0.076 
= 2.0 0.338 0.019 0.074 
3. Removal of S subsidy with higher tax allowances 
= 1.0 0.167 0.019 0.072 
= 2.0 0.330 0.019 0.075 
4. Removal of S. subsidy with lump sum transfer 
= 1.0 0.145 0.017 0.066 
= 2.0 0.277 0.017 0.069 
5. Removal of S1 subsidy with higher tax allowances 
= 1.0 0.169 0.016 0.062 
= 2.0 0.332 0.018 0.070 
6. Removal of Sý subsidy with higher tax allowances 
= 1.0 0.167 0.031 0.117 
= 2.0 0.332 0.026 0.106 
7. Removal of S4 subsidy with higher tax allowances 
= 1.0 0.164 0.018 0.071 
= 2.0 0.321 0.019 0.075 
Source: Hughes (1981) 
Indices of Overall 
Inequality for Reform 
n=0.5 n=2.0 
0.191 0.237 
0.350 0.387 
0.182 0.227 
0.343 0.381 
0.160 0.202 
0.289 0.327 
0.182 0.221 
0.344 0.379 
0.193 0.265 
0.350 0.403 
0.179 0.223 
0.334 0.372 
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of the size of subsidies to owner-occupiers as a whole. However, 
estimates of subsidies to particular types of owners may be of inter- 
est. As owner-occupation grows as a form of tenure and extends down 
the income scale, many new owner-occupiers purchase in inner-city 
areas. In the next section estimates are made of the subsidy to these 
owner-occupiers. Specifically the following section estimates the 
subsidy to recent buyers of houses in inner-city Birmingham 
SUBSIDIES TO RECENT-BUYERS IN INNER-CITY BIRMINGHAM 
The study of subsidy to owner-occupiers described here takes advan- 
tage of the existence of a particularly detailed survey of recent 
house-buyers in inner-city Birmingham - the Inner City Home Ownership 
Project (Karp, Kemeny and Williams, 1984). This survey does not pro- 
vide a comprehensive view of the subsidy effects an all 
owner-occupiers but as argued above, in the context of the many esti- 
mates of overall subsidy it is of interest to examine the effects on a 
particular sub-group. It has been frequently advocated that one 
objective of reform of housing finance should be the abolition of sub- 
sidy. In debate over this reform, evidence on how much subsidy par- 
ticular groups currently receive is likely to be of interest. Fur- 
then, the estimates of subsidies to owner-occupiers surveyed above are 
handicapped by relatively poor information on the value of houses - 
usually supplied by rateable value. (Hills 1980) Robinson 1981, King 
1981). An advantage of the Birmingham data used here is that it is a 
survey of recent buyers and the market price and date of purchase are 
recorded. In the course of the Inner survey, a large amount of infor- 
mation was collected for a sample of recent house buyers in five 
"inner-city" areas of Birmingham: Sparkhill, Soho, Saltley and 
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Handsworth. Details of the sample are given in Appendix I which is 
extracted from Karn, Kemeny and Williams (1984). 
Using Karns Kemeny and Williams's data, estimates of housing subsi- 
dy are made under the alternative views of housing as a consumer good 
and as an investment good. 
The study is presented in the next three sections. In the first 
section, estimates are made of mortgage interest tax relief - the sub- 
sidy to home owners implicit in viewing the home as a consumption 
good. The second two sections present estimates of imputed rent and 
capital gains. Failure to tax these constitutes the subsidy to home 
owners implicit in viewing the home as an investment good. 
MORTGAGE INTEREST TAX RELIEF 
In this section the results of investigating the level of mortgage 
interest tax relief received by recent buyers in inner-city 
Birmingham. 
The initial survey was not designed with the purposes of 
investigating tax relief to owner-occupiers, but rather their overall 
financial circumstances. (Karns Kemeny and Williams, 1984) Neverthe- 
less, the use of a certain number of assumptions allows inference on 
the level of subsidy received by recent buyers in the Birmingham Inner 
City. 
In general, owner-occupier j's entitlement to mortgage interest tax 
relief can be expressed as: 
MITR; = (1 - t3) I (i i, 
T j, Lj, ds, n) 
where t, is the marginal tax rate, for owner-occupier j and i is his 
annual interest payment. This annual interest payment is a function 
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of Ls, the amount of his loan; i,, the rate of interest he pays; 
TS, the term of his loan; d3, the date of his house purchase and n, 
the date or tax year for which the calculations are made. Only a pro- 
portion of this information is available from the survey data, the 
rest being supplied by assumption. The marginal rate of tax, t, is 
not available and it is assumed for the purpose of these calculations 
that all members of the sample were paying tax at the standard rate 
for the tax year 1979/80 of thirty per cent. (1) 
The type of lender supplying the loan for home purchase is avail- 
able from the survey and tax relief calculations have therefore been 
performed for borrowers grouped by type of lender and with interest 
rates appropriate to the type of lender assumed. Similarly, the term 
of the mortgage typically offered by the type of lender has been 
assumed in the calculations. Hence a twenty-five year term has been 
assumed for building societies and local authorities and alternative 
assumptions of five and seven years have been made for banks. 
Rates of interest were taken to be fifteen per cent for building 
society loans - the standard rate for April 1980 - and thirteen per 
cent for local authority loans which was the rate charged by 
Birmingham City Council at the time. Separate calculations were 
performed for banks with terms of five-years and seven years. Five 
years is the maximum term for personal loans, and the rate of interest 
for these was 20.51 per cent. A second set of calculations was 
performed an the assumption that loans were secured an the property 
rather than the person at three per cent over the base rate of. seven- 
(1) The thirty per cent band for 1979/80 runs from £750 to £10,000. 
The average take-home pay for the sample was £3328. This assump- 
tion therefore appears to be quite realistic. 
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teen per cent obtaining for 1979/80 and with a term of seven years. 
The date of purchase of the houses is available from the data, and 
tax relief was calculated for the financial year April 1979 - April 
1980. Finally the amount of the mortgage loan is available from the 
data. 
The following expression, derived in Appendix II as expression (10) 
was used to calculate the recent buyers' interest payments: 
In = Li [(1 + j) T- (I t j)n-1J 
(1 + 3)7 -1 
Where I,,, is the interest payment in year n, i is the rate of inter- 
est, T is the term of the loan, and L is the amount of the loan. 
In fact this formula is a simplification, in that the mortgage year 
may not coincide with the tax year April 79 - April 80 and the mort- 
gage may be in, say, year k for the first few months of the tax year 
and year k+1 for the remaining months of the tax year. The adjust- 
ment used to take account of this is also described in Appendix II 
under the heading "Calculation of Annual Interest Payments". 
The results of these computations for the average tax relief found 
in the four inner-city areas of Birmingham sampled are given in Tables 
14,15,16 and 17. By way of comparison, the national average for 
mortgage interest tax relief is given in Social Trends (HMSO 1982, 
p. 158) for 1979-8a as £152 for all owner-occupiers and £265 for mort- 
gagors. 
These national figures are quite low compared with the results for 
Birmingham, especially as average house prices in the sample were well 
below the national average as shown in Table 18. However the low 
national average for tax relief can be explained by the fact that the 
national figures relate to all mortgagors including those who bought a 
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long time ago. Other things being equal, the longer a mortgagor has 
held a mortgage the lower the tax relief will be, because the price 
paid for the house is expected to be lower, the longer ago it was 
bought, and the interest payments on a mortgage decline over time and 
in consequence so does tax relief. This decline of interest payments 
over time is illustrated by the example given in Table 19. 
As an alternative way of setting the Birmingham results in context 
it is possible to infer likely tax relief granted to house buyers 
paying the national or regional average prices shown in Table 18. In 
order to make such a comparison, assumptions need to be made on how 
long the mortgage has been held, and what percentage of the house pur- 
chase price has been raised by mortgage. For the purposes of compari- 
son the mortgage percentage, and the number of months the mortgage had 
been held were assumed to be the average of the Birmingham sample. 
The average percentage mortgage for the Birmingham sample is given in 
Table 20 and the average number of months mortgage is given in 
Table 21. 
These results were used to calculate the mortgage interest tax 
relief that would result from holding building society loans of the 
average maturity for the Birmingham sample (26 weeks) for the average 
proportion of the selling price (79.3). The term of the loan has been 
assumed to be 25 years and the rate of interest that obtaining at the 
time for building societies: 15%. The results of these calculations 
are given in Table 22. 
The values for tax relief are very high compared with the national 
Social Trends figure of £265 for all mortgagors, and the same reasons 
can be advanced for this divergence as were advanced to explain the 
divergence between this figure and the Birmingham survey results, 
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TABLE 14: VALUE OF TAX RELIEF 1979-1980 
BUILDING SOCIETY LOANS AT 15% WITH 25 YEAR TERM 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 74 245 6.25 
SOHO 18 191 10.80 
SALTLEY 13 225 22.43 
HANDSWORTH 49 299 13.80 
BIRMINGHAM COMBINED 154 259 6.56 
TABLE 15: VALUE OF TAX RELIEF 1979-1980 
LOCAL-AUTHORITY LOANS AT 13Y WITH 25 YEAR TERM 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 25 192 13.29 
SOHO 22 156 8.34 
SALTLEY 17 197 18.11 
HANDSWORTH 34 251 15.76 
BIRMINGHAM COMBINED 98 211 8.11 
TABLE 16: VALUE OF TAX RELIEF 1979-60 
BANK LOANS AT TWENTY PER CENT WITH 7 YEAR TERM 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 34 122 10.48 
SOHO 59 130 9.38 
SALTLEY 72 116 7.27 
HANDSWORTH 18 239 34.44 
BIRMINGHAM COMBINED 183 135 6.07 
TABLE 17: VALUE OF TAX RELIEF 1979-1980 
BANK LOANS AT 20.51% WITH 5 YEAR TERM 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 34 105 11.40 
SOHO 59 111 9.65 
SALTLEY 72 106 7.66 
HANDSWORTH 18 213 37.01 
BIRMINGHAM COMBINED 183 120 6.44 
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TABLE 18: AVERAGE HOUSE PRICES 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 155 5,638 135.8 
SOHO 169 4,678 124.3 
SALTLEY 166 4,260 151.1 
HANDSWORTH 129 7,363 259.7 
BIRMINGHAM COMBINED 619 5,414 90.6 
Average House price (excluding new houses) Britain, DoE survey 1979 £19,886 
Average House price, West Midlands Quarter 1,1979 £16,520 
Average House price, West Midlands pre 1919 Terrace £9,377 
Average House price, West Midlands post 1919 Terrace £12,361 
TABLE 19: TAX RELIEF a 30Y. ON 10,000 REPAID OVER 25 YEARS 
YEAR INTEREST TAX RELIEF @ 30% 
1 1,200 360 
2 1,190 357 
3 1,180 354 
4 1,169 350 
5 1,156 346 
6 1,142 342 
7 1,126 337 
8 1,108 332 
9 1,088 326 
10 1,065 319 
11 1,040 312 
12 1,012 303 
13 981 294 
14 945 283 
15 906 271 
16 861 258 
17 812 243 
18 756 226 
19 694 208 
20 624 187 
21 546 163 
22 458 137 
23 360 108 
24 251 75 
25 128 38 
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TABLE 20: PERCENTAGE OF HOUSE PRICE LENT BY BUILDING SOCIETIES 
SPARKHILL 
SOHO 
SALTLEY 
HANDSWORTH 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS MEAN STD ERROR 
74 82.6 1.24 
18 71.5 3.56 
13 79.6 4.61 
49 77.9 1.94 
154 79.3 
TABLE 21: AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS MORTGAGES HAVE BEEN HELD BY BUILDING 
SOCIETY BORROWERS IN SAMPLE AS OF APRIL 1979 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS MEAN STD ERROR 
(mnths) 
SPARKHILL 74 26.3 1.86 
SOHO 18 25.7 4.22 
SALTLEY 13 23.5 4.52 
HANDSWORTH 49 27.1 2.16 
BIRMINGHAM OVERALL 152 26.2 1.30 
namely that the average from Social Trends is for all mortgagors and 
will include many who are paying low interest because they bought a 
long time ago at a low price and their mortgage interest payments have 
diminished over time. 
On the other hand, the figures for tax relief in Table 22 are high 
compared with the Birmingham survey results. The reason for this is 
that average house prices in the surveyed areas as shown in Table 18 
are well below national and regional averages. The calculations for 
Table 22 were made under the assumption that the percentage mortgage 
advance was the same as the average given for building society 
borrowers in the Birmingham inner-city areas surveyed: 79.3%. Howev- 
er a national average percentage advance can be calculated from fig- 
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TABLE 22: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL MORTGAGE INTEREST TAX RELIEF 
COMPARISONS 
£ AVERAGE PRICE SOURCE, AND DESCRIPTION 
OF PROPERTY 
19,886 Average for Britain, 1979 
Building Society financed 
purchases. Price at 
mortgage completion stage 
DoE Survey. 
16,520 Average for West Midlands 
Quarter 1,1979 DoE 5% 
sample survey. 
9,377 West Midlands, Average, 
1st Quarter 1979, Pre 1919 
terrace. Abbey National 
Survey. 
12,361 As above but post 1919 
terrace. 
£ IMPLIES ANNUAL £ TAX RELIEF 
INTEREST AT 34'% 
2,339 795 
1,943 660 
1,103 375 
1,453 494 
ures given in Tables 9 and 10 of (BSA 1981), at 60.9%. When this low- 
er percentage is applied the tax relief is correspondingly reduced. 
These re-calculated comparisons are given in Table 23, from which it 
can be noted that the tax relief is still higher than that computed 
for Birmingham. 
Another way of placing the results of Tables 14 to 17 for tax 
relief in the Birmingham surveys in context is to compare the level of 
relief with average weekly income for the owners. Average weekly 
income after deductions is tabulated in Tables 24 to 26 for borrowers 
from building societies, banks and local authorities. 
From this analysis it can be seen that though the subsidy implicit 
in mortgage interest tax relief for recent Birmingham inner-city buy- 
ers may be low in comparison with national averages, the sums involved 
are significant, seen in relation to the incomes of the sample 
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TABLE 23: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL MORTGAGE INTEREST TAX RELIEF 
COMPARISONS. 
TABLE A9 RE-WORKED WITH PERCENTAGE LOAN SET AT 60.9% 
HOUSE PRICE ANNUAL INTEREST TAX RELIEF 
19,886 1,796 610.7 
16,520 1,492 507.3 
9,377 847 287.9 
12,361 1,117 376.6 
TABLE 24: AVERAGE WEEKLY INCOME AFTER DEDUCTIONS: BUILDING SOCIETY 
BORROWERS 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 71 67.7 2.6 
SOHO 19 64.4 4.2 
SALTLEY 13 70.6 4.2 
HANDSWORTH 47 76.4 2.9 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 150 71.1 1.7 
TABLE 25: AVERAGE WEEKLY INCOME AFTER DEDUCTIONS: BORROWERS FROM 
BANKS 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 32 62.9 4.9 
SOHO 54 70.7 2.6 
SALTLEY 71 63.6 2.2 
HANDSWORTH 14 61.0 6.0 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 171 65.0 1.6 
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TABLE 26: AVERAGE WEEKLY INCOME AFTER DEDUCTIONS, BORROWERS FROM L. A. 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 25 63.6 3.1 
SOHO 19 62.3 4.7 
SALTLEY 17 69.5 5.3 
HANDSWORTH 34 73.4 4.0 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 95 68.8 2.2 
members, often exceeding four weeks' post-tax income. 
It will be recalled that the view of mortgage interest tax relief 
as being the subsidy to home owners stems from viewing the house as a 
consumption good but that a house is more logically viewed as an 
investment good. The implication is that the subsidy to home owners 
resides in the failure to tax imputed rent and capital gains. The 
magnitude of subsidy under this view is examined in the next two sec- 
tions. 
IMPUTED RENT 
If a house is an investment good then for consistency with the 
treatment of other investment goods an owner-occupier should pay tax 
on the imputed rental income derived from occupation of his own home 
and an income derived from any gain in its capital value. At the same 
time he should be granted tax relief on interest payments paid on a 
mortgage taken out to purchase the house. 
Currently owner-occupiers are granted tax relief on mortgage inter- 
est but, inconsistently, are no longer taxed on imputed rental income 
and are not taxed on capital gains made on their home. In this sec- 
tion calculations are made of the average level of extra tax that mem- 
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bers of the Birmingham inner-city sample would have paid if a tax on 
imputed rental income had been in force in April 1979 and in the next 
section the implications of taxing capital gains from the 
owner-occupiers house are considered. 
CALCULATION OF IMPUTED RENT 
It is difficult to estimate the market rent of a property in 
Britain because the private market for rental housing is small and 
shrinking and legislation has affected rent levels. In contrast, much 
information exists on the capital values of owner-occupied property, 
as there are frequent sales in a free market. However there is a 
drawback with capital values in that the concession of failing to tax 
imputed rent may itself be capitalised into the price of the house. 
It is recalled from earlier discussion that the extent of 
capitalisation depends inter alia on the elasticity of supply of hous- 
ing. As noted, very little empirical work has been done on the elas- 
ticity of supply of housing. However a priori reasoning supplies some 
information. In the long run, supply will only be inelastic if there 
is restricted availability of any of the factors of production of 
housing. It is likely that such restrictions will only be manifest in 
the supply of land. Arguing thus, Grey et al. (1981 p26) suggest that 
the increase in price produced by subsidy "might be of the order of 
5-10%, with a spread around the average depending on the importance of 
land. " 
As noted the data set used in this research has an advantage in 
that the market price and date of sale of houses has been recorded. 
Previous studies have had to use rateable values and projections from 
regression equations to estimate the market price of housing (Robinson 
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(1981), Hughes (1981)). Robinson used the relation (mentioned on page 
296) P= 8164 + . 09898RVE with an REý of 0.99. Although this is a 
good fit, the actual price data is preferable. Other studies have 
suggested drawbacks to using rateable value to predict price. Foster, 
Jackman and Perlman (1981, p 311) found that "the correlation between 
house prices and rateable values was rather weak". One of their find- 
ings was that the ratio of rateable value to price fell as house 
prices rose and this would support Robinson's use of a quadratic rela- 
tionship for prediction. 
Given that the actual market price of the houses in the sample was 
collected an imputed rent could be derived from this price data. This 
is discussed by Odling-Smee (1975). If a house is expected to last 
forever, the rental value can be obtained by applying the opportunity 
cost of capital to the price of the house and adding annual adminis- 
trative and maintenance costs. Thus: 
R= rP +C (9) 
where R is rent, r is the opportunity cost of capital, P is the price 
of the house and C is the sum of administrative and maintenance costs. 
If on the other hand, the house has a limited lifetime, the overall 
rate of return on the house must be higher so that the purchase price 
can be recovered by the end of the life of the house. Equation (9) 
then becomes: 
R=arP+C (10) 
(Odling-Smee, 1975, p18) with the amortisation of the purchase of the 
house effected by the adjustment a and with: 
a= 1/CI-(1/I+r)'7 (11) 
where n is the number of years of remaining life of the house. For 
likely values of n- say over 25 years, this adjustment becomes quite 
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small as a is close to unity. 
In performing imputed rent calculations an important question to be 
settled concerns the treatment of inflation. Ideally it is the real 
rather than money imputed rent that should be taxed as the latter is 
inflated by purely paper gains. However, the concession of mortgage 
interest tax relief is based on money rather than real interest pay- 
ments which for many years have been zero or negative (Hills 1980, 
Atkinson and King 1980). Hence, a position stopping short of whole- 
sale reform of the whole treatment of inflation by the tax system sug- 
gests that the relevant magnitude to calculate is money imputed 
rent. Atkinson and King (1980) and Robinson (1981) have followed this 
course in their work and have derived imputed rents on the basis of a 
12% and a 14% return respectively. 
Applying these rates to house prices in the sample yields the 
results given in Table 27. The home prices have been written up to 
April 1979 values using monthly inflation rates. The derivation of 
these inflation rates is explained later in this chapter. These 
results can be set in a regional and national context by using the 
national and regional average prices quoted in Table 22. Thus, using 
Atkinson and King's 12'/. rate of return, the imputed rent based on the 
average house price for Britain in 1979 (£19,886) is £2,386. The 
implied subsidy from failure to tax this at 30'h is £716. The 
corresponding subsidy for the average West Midlands house sold in the 
first quarter 1979 is £594, for a pre-1919 West Midlands terraced 
house, £338 and for a post 1919 West Midlands terrace £445. Imputed 
rents for inner-city Birmingham can be seen to be somewhat below these 
regional and national averages. 
A second implication of viewing the house as an investment good - 
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TABLE 27: AVERAGE TAX BENEFIT RESULTING FROM FAILURE TO TAX IMPUTED 
RENT 
Rate of Interest 14% 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 155 282 6.83 
SOHO 169 189 5.10 
SALTLEY 166 211 7.02 
HANDSNORTH 129 356 11.77 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 619 257 4.14 
Rate of Interest 12% 
NO. OF OBSERVATIONS £ MEAN STD ERROR 
SPARKHILL 155 242 5.86 
SOHO 169 162 4.38 
SALTLEY 166 181 6.02 
HANDSWORTH 129 305 10.09 
OVERALL BIRMINGHAM 619 220 3.56 
the subsidy implicit in failure to tax capital gains - is now 
examined. 
CAPITAL GAINS 
It has been argued that if housing is regarded as an investment 
good, owner-occupiers are subsidised in that capital gains on housing 
are not taxed whilst capital gains on other investments are. To gain 
some idea of the magnitude of these gains, estimates are now made for 
the Birmingham inner-city areas. An important step in this is the 
estimation of the rate of change of house prices. 
(i) The Rate of Change of House Prices 
Fleming and Nellis (1981) have recently reviewed the range of house 
price statistics available in the United Kingdom. They identify two 
weaknesses of these data. 
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Firstly, with the exception of surveys by the Inland Revenue (Eco- 
nomic Trends 1974,1976,1979,1980) the prices sampled are for sales 
financed by a particular type of institution - usually building 
societies. Building societies have different lending markets to 
banks, insurance companies and local authorities and also differ 
between themselves in this respect (Doling & Williams, 1983). 
Secondly, with the exception of the index produced by the Nation- 
wide Building Society, price indexes are based on a simple averaging 
of purchase price and no attempt is made to take account of changes in 
the characteristics of houses sold from sample period to sample 
period. Unless allowance is made for such changes, indexes can be 
misleading. For example if mainly small houses had been sold in the 
first period, and mainly large houses sold to the second period, a 
simple index of price change from these figures could over-estimate 
any price rise because of the change in the nature of the houses sold 
to larger and hence more expensive properties. In the estimates 
presented here, explicit allowance for changes in the characteristics 
of houses over time is made by using hedonic price indexes (Griffiches) 
1971). 
In the hedonic approach, the price of a house is assumed to be 
explained by its characteristics. If data is available on a number of 
relevant characteristics of houses, a high proportion of the variation 
in their price can be explained statistically in terms of variation of 
characteristics. If the date of sale is included as one of the char- 
acteristics then hedonic techniques allow the measurement of the pure 
effect of the passage of time on price after making allowance for 
shifts in the other characteristics of the houses sold over time. 
Estimation of the hedonic price index is described in detail in 
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Appendix III. For the purposes of estimation it was assumed that a 
constant monthly growth rate of house prices r applied over the time 
period and the estimates of r for the four areas of Birmingham 
examined are given in Table 28. 
The major point to arise from these estimations is that house price 
TABLE 28: ESTIMATES OF THE RATE OF INCREASE OF HOUSE PRICES 
MONTHLY GROWTH ANNUAL GROWTH PERCENTAGE INCREASE 
(1 + r) i1 + r) 
SPARKHILL 1.0074 1.0924 9.24'/ 
SOHO . 9983 . 9808 -1.92%. 
SALTLEY 1.00781 1.0980 9.80'/. 
HANDSWORTH 1.00561 1.0694 6.94%. 
inflation in inner-city Birmingham has been very low, and in the case 
of Soho, prices have actually fallen. 
During the period for which these rates of inflation were 
estimated, the General Index of Retail Prices rose from 100 to 165.8 
which represents an average constant annual growth rate of prices of 
13.47%. (1) Hence it can be seen that these rates of increase of house 
prices are considerably below the general level of increase of prices, 
even for the case of Saltley where the rise in house prices was most 
rapid. 
If comparisons are made with the national average rate of inflation 
of house prices, the rise in prices in inner-city Birmingham is seen 
to be even lower by contrast. Fleming and Nellis (1981) quote an 
average percentage change in annual price of houses for 1975-1979 of 
18.4 for new houses, and 16.6 for second hand houses, using the 
(1) (1975 16.5h, 1976 15.9%, 1977 8.3%, 1978 13.4%, 1979 18.0'%). 
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DoE/BSA survey published in Housing Construction Statistics (HMSO, 
quarterly). 
(ii) The Level of Capital Gains 
The estimates of the monthly inflation factors given in Table 28 
can be used to calculate an imputed capital gain for each of the 
houses in the data set. Recorded for each house is the purchase 
price, and date of purchase. Hence a growth factor can be applied to 
each house price based on the number of months between the start of 
the 1979/80 tax year: April 1979 and the time the house was 
purchased. More precisely, the price of the house in April 1979, 
denoted P79 can be imputed using the relation P79 =Px MIR' , where 
P is the purchase price, MIR is the monthly inflation rate from 
Table 28 and MSP is the number of months between the purchase date and 
April 1979. With all house prices written up to the level implied by 
the monthly growth rate for April 1979, the capital gain for each 
house can be imputed for the 1979-80 tax year by the relation 
CG = (P79 x MIRI2) - P79 
The results of performing these calculations are given in Table 29. 
TABLE 29: IMPUTED CAPITAL GAINS 
AVERAGE CAPITAL GAIN MAX MIN NO. OF OBSERVATIONS 
SPARKHILL £620 £1015 £154 155 
SOHO -£ 87 -£ 28 -£247 169 
SALTLEY £493 £1759 £ 53 166 
HANDSWORTH £589 £1192 £162 129 
Because house price inflation was negative for Soho for this year, 
capital losses are estimated for this area. 
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(iii) The Subsidy Implicit in Failure to Tax Capital Gains 
Given these implicit capital gains, and for the case of Soho, 
losses arising from ownership, the question arises of how much subsidy 
is implicit in the failure to tax such gains. More specifically, if 
these capital gains were taxed consistently with other capital gains 
what would the tax bill be? Unfortunately the answer to this question 
would vary from year to year because the precise details of capital 
gains taxation have tended to change from year to year. Capital gains 
for the tax year that this study has chosen to focus on - 1979/80 are 
calculated here. For the years 1977-78,1978-79 and 1979-80 no tax 
was levied on capital gains of up to £1,000. The excess over £1,000 
was taxed at 15% provided total net gains were below £5,000. Details 
of capital receipts are not known for the sample, but it seems likely 
that few of the sample would make any significant capital gains and 
hence it has been assumed that capital receipts from other sources are 
zero. On this basis, liability to capital gains taxation can be 
computed by treating housing consistently with other assets. Table 29 
showed that average capital gains were well below the threshold of 
£1,000 beyond which the tax would be levied. In fact, very few capi- 
tal gains were made in excess of £1000 for any of the households in 
the sample: in Sparkhill, one household made a gain of over £1000, in 
Soho all capital gains were negative, in Saltley three households made 
gains over £1000 and in Handsworth, six households. Their average 
imputed liability to capital gains tax is shown in Table 30. 
From these calculations it can be inferred that the households in 
the survey would benefit from the extension of capital gains taxation 
to gains on owner-occupied housing. Very few would pay any extra tax 
as a result of this move, but all could be expected to benefit from 
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TABLE 30 
No. of households with imputed 
capital gain <£1000 
SPARKHILL 1 
SOHO 0 
SALTLEY 3 
HANDSWORTH 6 
Average imputed liability to 
capital gains tax of these 
households 
£2.26 
£0 
£4.37 
£15.61 
the reduction in tax rates that this extra source of revenue would 
permit. As it is only those with expensive houses that benefit from 
this exemption, because of the £3000 allowance, it can be seen that 
the nature of this exemption is regressive. 
The exemption of owner-occupied housing from capital gains tax can 
also work against low-income owner-occupiers in a rather unusual way 
as shown by Soho. Here, where house prices have fallen, rather than 
risen, the owners will sustain capital losses. As their property is 
exempt from taxation on capital aQ ins, by the same taken these capi- 
tal losses cannot be included amongst those set against other capital 
gains that the homeowner may enjoy. Although in theory this effect is 
passible, in practice it seems unlikely that many from our sample will 
have other sources of income in the form of capital gains. 
Since April 1980 the details of capital gains taxation have been 
changed again in that the first £5,300 of gains are now exempt, and 
since April 1982 the original cost on which the gain was made may be 
written up by inflation as measured by the retail price index, thus 
changing the nature of the tax from a tax on nominal capital gains to 
a tax on real capital gains. The effect of both of these measures is 
to reduce still further those that would be liable to pay capital 
gains tax should the owner-occupiers' exemption be removed. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that the definition of subsidy to 
owner-occupiers depends upon whether a house is viewed as a consump- 
tion or an investment good. Taking the more logical view that a house 
is an investment good leads to the definition of housing subsidy as 
failure to tax imputed rent capital gains. If, on the other hand, 
housing is seen as a consumption good, the subsidy to owner-occupiers 
is measured by mortgage interest tax relief. 
The survey of estimates of subsidies to owner-occupiers and the 
effects of tax reform leads to the conclusion that subsidies to 
owner-occupiers are large, regressive and that overall gains in effi- 
ciency and equity are likely to result from their removal. Despite 
this, the subsidies remain, and this is explained by the public choice 
argument that strong efforts to block the removal of subsidy will be 
made by the interest group that would be adversely affected - 
owner-occupiers. 
Note was made of the absence of studies of subsidy to particular 
sub-groups within owner-occupation as a whole in the UK. Recent buy- 
ers in inner-cities were argued to be of particular interest as 
representing a high proportion of new-entrants to owner-occupation. A 
study of subsidy to this group was therefore made on a set of data 
already collected for inner-city Birmingham. 
Subsidy under the two alternative views of housing as a consumption 
good and housing as an investment good were considered. The results 
for the consumption good measure - mortgage interest tax relief - show 
that tax relief is high when compared with national figures, bearing 
in mind that property prices in the areas surveyed are well below the 
national average. Tax relief is also high in relation to the average 
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weekly income of those in the sample, often exceeding four weeks' net 
income. 
Under the investment view of housing, the tax relief from failure 
to tax imputed rent was found to be of a similar magnitude. To inves- 
tigate capital gains, data on house prices, dates of purchase and 
house characteristics was used in the hedonic estimation shown in 
Appendix III to obtain a set of house price inflation rates for the 
areas surveyed. House price inflation was found to be very low, with 
prices in Soho actually falling. Because of these low house-price 
inflation rates, in conjunction with the £1,000 threshold on capital 
gains taxation and the low level of house prices, the subsidy implicit 
in failure to tax capital gains was seen to be negligible. In fact 
the owners would benefit from removal of this tax relief as others 
richer than they would then be liable and a revenue neutral reform 
would leave owners in the sample better off. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT, APPENDIX I: SOURCES OF DATA 
The data used in the estimates of subsidy was from a 1979 survey of 
recent buyers in the inner areas of Birmingham. (Kern, Kemeny and 
Williams, 1984). This was carried out for a Department of Environment 
sponsored project on Low Income Home-ownership in the Inner City. The 
study was of "inner-city" home-ownership. "There is no general agree- 
ment on a definition [of inner-city] and in terms of housing the 
nearest approximation for this study was to equate the inner-city 
areas with areas where pre-1919 housing predominates or where such 
stock has been cleared or replaced, usually with post-war local 
authority housing. This was the definition used. As far as 
owner-occupation goes, the overwhelming bulk of inner-city housing is 
found in pre-1919 areas (as against rebuilt areas) in the inner ring 
of the city. The study therefore confined itself to owner-occupation 
in this older stock. Strictly speaking, in order to be able to 
generalise about inner city home-ownership of old stock in Birmingham, 
using the above definition, it would be necessary to conduct a random 
sample of owners of pre-1919 housing. A sample drawn from this popu- 
lation would be scattered randomly around the whole inner ring of the 
city. However, the 1974 survey, which was funded by the Social Sci- 
ence Research Council was designed as three discrete area surveys 
within inner Birmingham because it was aimed to get a balance of eth- 
nic groups. While this means that the degree to which it has been 
possible to generalise about "Inner Birmingham" is somewhat reduced, 
the problem is lessened by the fact that the areas are relatively 
large. The four areas ultimately surveyed in Birmingham in 1979 com- 
prise some 13,000 dwellings: about one fifth of the pre-1919 inner 
ring housing stock". (l) 
CHAPTER EIGHT, APPENDIX II: FORMULA FOR MORTGAGE INTEREST 
A series can be constructed for mortgage debt at the end of each 
year. Thus if i is the interest rate P is the sum borrowed, m is the 
annual payment and T is the term of the loan, the following table can 
be generated: 
Year Debt at End of Year 
0 P 
1 P(1 + i) - m 
2 P(1 + i)e - m(1 + i) -m 
3 P(1 + i)3 - m(1 + i), ý - m(1 + i) -m 
n P(1 + i)n - m(1 + i)--l - m(1 + i) -m 
T P(1 + i)T - m(1 + i)T-1 - m(1 + i) -m 
The last n terms of the expression for debt at end of year n form a 
(1) Karn, Kemeny and Williams, 1984) p131. 
140) 
See also ibid. pp 131 - 
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geometric progression and can be written: 
m(1 - (1 +i)n) (1) 
1- (1 + i) 
or 
mil + 1)n - 11 (2) 
i 
Hence debt in year n can be written: 
ÜT, =P (I + i)- - MEii 1 
Now debt in year T, where T is the term of the loan, must be zero, 
hence setting DT equal to zero using equation 3, 
DT =0= P(1 + i)7 - M[(1 + i)T - 1J (4) 
i 
re-arranging gives: 
m= Pi (1 + i)T 
[(1 + i)T - 1] 
(S) 
To derive an expression for interest payments in year n it is noted 
that the interest in year n will be paid on debt in year n-1 which is 
available from expression 3. Hence interest in year n: (I) is 
given by: 
I,., i(DY, -ý) = i! P(1 +ii<-1> _ mE(1 + i)<ý, -ý> (6) 
i. e. In = Pi(1 + m(1 +i), --z? +m (7) 
Substituting for m using (5) this can be written: 
I = Pi (1+i)(^-i' - Pi(1+i)T(1+i)(-. 1) + P1(1+1)T (8) 
(1+i )T -1 (1+1 )' -1 
1 . e. 
I= Pi(l+i)(-IL> (l+i)T_P(l+i)<-'>_Pi(l+i)T(l+i)n-1 +P (l+i)T (9) 
(1 + 1)T -1 
i. e. 
Ir) = Pi[(1 + 1)T 
(1 +i )T -ý 
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CALCULATION OF ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS APRIL 1979 - APRIL 1980 
Available from the data matrix is MP - the months since purchase 
measured at the interview date. MI gives the month of interview 
measured as Jan 79 =1 Feb 79 =2 etc. Hence months since purchase 
(MSP) seen as from L/79 i. e. April 79 is given by: 
MSP = MP +4-MI 
At the beginning of April 1979 the mortgage will be in its 
MSP/12 +1= IN year where the division MSP/12 is carried out as inte- 
ger division with truncation. 
However, consider the truncated remainder to the division given by 
IREM = MSP - (IN - 1) x 12. If at the start of the financial year the 
mortgage is IREM months into its INt}- year then for the last IREM 
months of the financial year the mortgage will be in its (IN + 1)tß 
year. If monthly interest payments in year n are denoted Ir, then the 
annual interest payments for April 79 - April 80 will be given by: 
IREM. I(_.,., + (I2 - IREM). I,., 
CHAPTER EIGHT, APPENDIX III: ESTIMATION OF THE HEDONIC PRICE INDEX 
The Model 
The data used for this study have been described in Appendix I. 
Amongst the information collected was the year and month of purchase 
of each house, the purchase price, and a number of characteristics of 
the house that might be expected to affect the purchase price. The 
rate of increase of house prices was analysed within a simple hedonic 
framework. For each area the following model was hypothesised: 
X- YC 
PL t: 2.12 
where n is the number of observations sampled in the area, X,,, is 
equal to one for i=l.. n, Z, therefore being the house price con- 
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stant. Observations for Xi. to Xipk. _,, record for each recent buyer 
ia set of house characteristics thought to affect the purchase price 
P, 
rt. t records the month of purchase of the house, lying between 
its extreme values of 0 in December 1979 and -60 for January 1975, and 
price is assumed to grow at a constant monthly rate r. 
Writing (1 + r) as Z,, and t as Xx; s, taking logarithms and writ- 
ing lnex as ui enables (1) to be re-written as: 
1nPi, t = Xi.. 11nZ, + X1,; ýR1nZa +,., + X;, 4<1nZw: + Ui i=1, n 
or equivalently: = ýC -t ýL 
whQ. re Lrl Pntt) 
PJ 
Each element u;., i=l, n is assumed to be independently normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 2. 
(2) 
Given an estimate of <<, the rate of growth of house prices r may 
be derived reversing the substitution process made above. Hence 
ßk: = ln(1+r) and thus (1+r) = erl or 
r= eß'L -1 (4) 
As r is the monthly growth rate it is of interest to compute an 
annual growth rate of prices r. as: 
r. = (1 + r)12 -1 (5) 
The idea of using the coefficient on time within the structure of 
an hedonic model to capture the pure effect of the passage of time, 
after account has been taken of changes in other characteristics by 
the other variables in the equation, was first used by Court (1939) 
and later by Griliches (1961). However, a difference is that in these 
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studies, the coefficient on time expresses the shift in price between 
cross sections for two time periods. 
Estimation and Data 
Ordinary least squares was used to estimate the model in (3). The 
dependent variable was the natural logarithm of the selling price of 
the house and this was regressed on the set of explanatory variables 
listed and defined in Table 1. 
In order to render the data reasonably homogeneous the minority of 
TABLE 1: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
PTYPE Dummy =0 for terraced house and 1 for an end of terrace house 
PREIW Dummy =1 for pre-1919 houses and 0 for post-1919 houses 
FNGDN Dummy =1 if house has a front garden or paved parking area, 0 
otherwise 
STRYS Number of storeys of the house 
CELLR Dummy =1 if house has cellar, 0 otherwise 
BKGDN Dummy =1 if house has back garden, 0 otherwise 
HALL Dummy =1 if house has entrance hall, 0 otherwise 
NEEDS Number of bedrooms in house 
BATHR Dummy =1 if house has a separate bathroom, 0 otherwise 
CNCL Dummy =1 if source of loan was local council, 0 otherwise 
BSINS Dummy =1 if source of loan was a building society or insurance 
company, 0 otherwise 
BNK Dummy =1 if source of loan was a bank, 0 otherwise 
TIME Variable denoting month of purchase lying between - 60 for Janu- 
ary 1975 and 0 for December 1979. 
properties that were neither terraced nor end-of-terrace were omitted 
from the data set. 
The results of the regressions are given in Table 2. The coeffi- 
cients on the variable time from the basis for the growth rates of 
prices presented in Table 28 in Chapter 8. Thus for example the coef- 
ficient on TIME for Sparkhill is 0.00737 which gives the monthly 
growth rate of prices (1 + r) quoted in Table 28 as 
eo. 0n737 = 
1.0074. 
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TABLE 2, HEDONIC PRICE EQUATIONS 
SPARKHILL SOHO SALTLEY HANDSWORTH 
VARIABLE COEFF t COEFF t COEFF t COEFF t 
CONST . 743E-1 20.14 . 719E-1 26.47 . 851E-1 10.73 . 712E-1 14.13 PTYPE . 346 2.18 . 571E-1 0.48 . 610E-1 0.38 . 449 2.13 PREIW -. 223E-1 -0.15 . 630E-1 0.74 -. 498 -1.24 -. 213 -2.14 FNGDN -. 216E-1 -0.36 . 516E-1 0.62 . 796E-1 1.01 -. 621E-1 -0.38 STRYS . 220 1.51 . 114 1.05 -. 155 -. 55 . 356 2.09 CELLR -. 208 -2.42 -. 182 -3.11 -. 203 -1.94 -. 157 -1.40 BKGDN . 180 1.30 . 435 2.58 -. 126 -0.33 . 428 1.07 HALL . 105 2.35 . 203 3.62 . 145 2.01 . 682E-1 0.77 NBEDS . 120 2.83 . 291E-1 0.77 . 153 2.59 . 575E-1 0.79 BATHR . 189 2.25 . 106 1.17 . 429 4.79 . 494 2.31 CNCL . 167 - 2.10 . 111 1.57 -. 230 -2.10 . 204E-1 0.19 BSINS . 431 6.17 . 319 4.34 -. 776E-2 -. 07 . 143 1.36 BNK . 680E-2 0.09 . 782E-1 1.48 -. 820E-1 -1.19 . 280E-1 . 21 TIME . 737E-2 5.20 -. 161E-2 -1.10 . 779E-2 3.97 . 560E-2 2.42 
n 154 159 159 83 
SSE/n 0.6179E-1 . 6949E-1 . 1318 . 8621E-1 Rt 0.532 0.344 . 319 . 405 Rý-' 0.488 0. 285 . 258 . 293 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The concern of this thesis has been government expenditure and 
intervention in the economy. The first five chapters have looked at 
different aspects of government expenditure. The last three are con- 
cerned with other aspects of government intervention. The focus of 
the expenditure chapters moves from general government expenditure in 
Chapter 1 to local government current expenditure Chapter 2 and local 
government capital expenditure in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 examine 
branches of the local authority current expenditure and capital expen- 
diture budget. Chapter 4 examines the education branch of the current 
expenditure budget and Chapter 5 examines the housing branch of the 
capital expenditure budget. In the second part of the thesis, Chap- 
ters 6 to 8 consider other forms of government action: its interven- 
tion in the aerospace industry and its effect on industry profits, its 
payment of direct grants to schools in the private sector and lastly 
its tax expenditures on owner-occupiers 
What conclusions emerge from this work? The broad picture that 
emerges from Chapter 1 is that government expenditure in developed 
nations has been growing continuously this century. The public expen- 
diture patterns of seven developed nations: France, Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the USA are examined in detail 
since World War II and confirm this pattern. Total public expenditure 
as a percentage of national income has been growing continuously since 
the Second World War, and at an increasing rate. Within this pattern 
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of growth, expenditure on goods and services has been growing continu- 
ously, and expenditure on transfers has also been growing continuous- 
ly, but at a faster rate. Hence the share of transfers in public 
expenditure in these nations has been rising. 
What explains this growth of expenditure? Estimation of the rela- 
tionship between political orientation of the government and expendi- 
ture growth suggests that the proportion of Conservative members of 
parliament has a role in the explanation, with a ten per cent increase 
in Conservative membership of Parliament expected to reduce the per- 
centage of government expenditure to national income by three per 
cent, though this leaves political orientation itself to be explained. 
A large number of theoretical explanations put forward to explain 
government expenditure growth were surveyed in Chapter 1, including 
the displacement effect, Wagner's law, Baumol's Disease, bureaucratic 
expansionism, bureaucratic voting, and fiscal illusion. An area of 
much current interest, where the growth of government is seen as 
resulting from interest groups' endeavours to secure transfers in kind 
for their members, was also surveyed. Redistribution is seen in these 
theories as the engine of government growth, fuelled by the political 
actions of those who stand to gain. It is concluded from this survey 
of the growth of government that no single theory is likely to explain 
government growth entirely, but that the explanation lies in a combi- 
nation of effects operating at once. Empirical research to distin- 
guish between different theories is currently hampered by poor data 
and further research designed to improve data sources is likely to be 
fruitful. 
There are two appendices to Chapter 1. Appendix I is concerned 
with the econometrics of testing for the displacement effect 
in 
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Diamond's (1976/77) study. Diamond is shown to have used the wrong 
test for change of structure in his work, given his emphasis on 
excluding equality of error variance before and after the displacement 
from his null hypothesis. Appendix I shows that re-testing with a 
test that meets his stipulations does not change his results. 
Appendix II is a study of a range of alternative tests for change 
of structure, stimulated by the problems raised in Appendix I, and 
also Appendix III of Chapter 5. These are surveyed and small sample 
properties are investigated by Monte Carlo simulation. It is 
concluded that a Chow test for change of structure is appropriate when 
either disturbance variances can be assumed to be equal or a joint 
test of equality of regression coefficients and disturbance terms is 
required. If, on the other hand, it is not wished to assume that dis- 
turbance variances are equal, or the experimenter wishes to know 
whether the regression coefficients are equal without including error 
variance equality in the null hypothesis the recommendation becomes 
much less clear cut. The Wald test suggested in Appendix II is easier 
to compute than a Jayatissa test and yields more power, but at the 
expense of some slippage in the size of the test. 
In Chapter 2, current expenditure of local government is examined. 
Over the last five years housing expenditure is found to have been cut 
whilst there have been increases in expenditure on social security and 
law and order. A tendency is noted for central Government to plan 
cuts in local government current expenditure which do not materialise 
in outcomes. In the main part of Chapter 2 the local authority budget 
constraint is analysed in detail and approximate measures of the con- 
straint, termed fiscal pressure are developed. A model of local 
authority expenditure change is then specified and estimated making 
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use of the measures of fiscal pressure. 
The model of local government expenditure change developed in 
Chapter 2 seeks to answer the question: what determines the change in 
a local authority's annual budget year-on-year? This question is a 
subject of much speculation. The current Conservative government has 
been seeking to control local government expenditure since it came to 
power in 1979. The conclusions from the empirical work on English 
local authorities of Chapter 2 are that fiscal pressure has a negative 
effect on year-on-year increases in local authority budgets. In addi- 
tion, the political control of the local authority is of importance, 
with Conservative control tending to reduce expenditure increases. 
Chapter 3 analyses the arguments surrounding the control of local 
authority capital expenditure. The macroeconomic argument for its 
control are found to be weakly established. This argument is that 
local government borrowing forms a large part of the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) and a large PSBR makes money supply con- 
trol difficult. However, Government controls are not on local author- 
ity borrowing but on local authority capital expenditure. There is 
enormous variation in the relation between capital expenditure and 
borrowing from year to year and, overall, local authorities do not 
even spend up to their capital expenditure empowered spending levels. 
Hence it is not clear that control is being exercised. Furthermore, 
it is shown that stabilisation of capital expenditure attempted by the 
government may well have been counter-productive. The essential force 
behind the Government's desire to control local authority capital 
expenditure is argued to be accountability. Since central government 
makes a major contribution in grant toward paying for what the local 
voter votes for, central government desires to have a major voice 
in 
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determining how much is spent and aims to see a reduction. "He who 
pays the piper calls the tune". 
In Chapter 4a model of local government education expenditure 
change is developed, based on the model of Chapter 2. As in the model 
developed for current expenditure in Chapter 2, fiscal pressure and 
Conservative control are found to have negative effects on education 
expenditure increases. Thus, for instance, Conservative control is 
found to reduce the year-on-year increase in education budgets by two 
per cent in non-Metropolitan Counties between 1982/3 and 1983/4 and by 
four per cent in outer-London Boroughs. In the next year, in 
outer-London, the Conservative negative effect rises to six per cent. 
In addition, there is some evidence from the variable ALIGN of 
local government moving its education budget share into line with its 
GRE share. However, there is considerable instability in the coeffi- 
cients in these models. Further research would be valuable, devoted 
to expanding the representation of demographic factors in the model in 
the form of numbers of different categories of pupil. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis explored housing expenditure, the most 
important branch of the capital expenditure budget of local 
authorities. Expenditure on housing was found to be positively relat- 
ed to factors indicating need, such as the percentage of unfit housing 
stock and the percentage of households without hot water. The vari- 
able IMPETUS, a measure of bureaucratic momentum in the housing pro- 
gram was found to have high explanatory power. Investment functions 
were estimated for the four types of housing authority in existence 
before reorganisation: County Boroughs, non-County Boroughs, Urban 
Districts and Rural Districts. Formal testing in Appendix III to 
Chapter 5 indicated that the investment function was not homogeneous 
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across the four different classes of authority. County Boroughs 
proved to be the most easily modelled, supplying, thereby, tentative 
grounds for a belief that they were the most systematic in their hous- 
ing investment behaviour. In contrast with the models of Chapters 4 
and 5 political control did not emerge from the empirical work as an 
important explanatory variable, though this may be because Labour con- 
trol correlates with indicators of need such as hot water lack. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis examined the UK aerospace industry. This 
industry has been, and continues to be, the subject of much government 
intervention. A model of the determinants of profitability in the 
aerospace industry was specified and estimated. The most striking 
finding was that Government-induced mergers may have reduced the 
industry's profit rates by around six per cent. A negative finding 
was that the Review Board for Government Contracts, set up after the 
"excessive" profits cases of the 1960s, was not found to have a sig- 
nificant negative effect on profit rates. Lastly, as might be 
expected, there was a significant positive relation between aerospace 
profitability and manufacturing industry profitability. 
Recent legislation reintroduces direct payment from central govern- 
ment to schools that "opt out" of local government control. Chapter 7 
of this thesis studied the cost functions of the direct grant schools, 
schools which received a capitation fee under the Direct Grant system 
abolished in 1976. The conclusion of the study is that there were no 
grounds for inferring significant economies of scale from the data 
studied. This result is of interest as a negative result because, 
should significant economies have been found this would have 
unfavourable implications for schemes for re-organisation of education 
based upon competition between schools. Other findings from the work 
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were that models applied to girls' schools in general had significant- 
ly greater explanatory power than the same models applied to boys' 
schools, and that a high proportion of pupils with fees paid by the 
local authority is generally associated with lower costs. 
The last chapter of the thesis examined tax expenditures on 
owner-occupied housing. Definitions of the subsidy to owner-occupiers 
vary according to whether a house is seen as a consumption good or an 
investment good., Seen as a consumption good a house attracts subsidy 
in the form of mortgage interest tax relief. On the other hand, when 
the house is, as is more logical, seen as an investment good, the sub- 
sidy becomes the failure to tax imputed rent and capital gains. A 
survey of estimates of subsidy to owner-occupiers indicates that 
subsidies favour the rich and generate deadweight losses. The fact 
that they are not removed by the government is attributed to the 
political power of owner-occupiers as an interest group. Further 
research is needed in the public choice field on mechanisms for 
compensating interest groups with some part of such efficiency gains 
so that removal of deadweight losses is not blocked by "political 
impassibility". 
Having surveyed existing estimates of subsidy, Chapter 8 goes on to 
estimate subsidies to the sub-group of owner-occupiers represented by 
recent buyers in inner-city Birmingham. Subsidy is found to be high 
for this group - its annual value often exceeding four weeks' post-tax 
income. 
Lastly, Appendix III specifies and estimates a hedonic model of 
house price inflation. An interesting finding is that house price 
inflation at the time of the survey (1979) in inner-city Birmingham 
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has been low, and in the case of Soho, negative. Exemption from capi- 
tal gains tax on housing has not been of benefit to these owners. 
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